Who Really Destroyed the Luftwaffe?

[evangilder]

This thread will go back to being in topic and civil, or it will be closed and I will be sending people packing. This is the one and only warning I will give.

 

[bobbysocks]

Gentlemen,

I've begun reading a book that claims the USAAF defeated the Luftwaffe, a task that no other Allied AF was capable of. The author argues that the RAF was only able to achieve temporary, local air superiority beyond England, and that the Red Air Force was even less effective at superiority. Only the USAAF had the ability to destroy the GAF. Any thoughts?

i can see what he is driving at and i would have to say in my uneducated estimation that yes there is a ring of truth to the first part but he is embellishing the second part. let me explain...prior to D-Day...the LW planes could only penetrate so far into the UK and the USSR...and visa versa ( for the most part..not talking lancs and mossies etc.). so there was basically a corridor so many miles wide on each front where ac were constantly engaging each other in attempts to interdict incoming ac from raids. beyond that corridor was "safe ground"...bases where ac could be staged with out much fear of attack or damage. AGAIN, i do know both sides had bombers that could reach further...but if you go to those areas due to fuel constraints the e/a would have to break off and head home. both of those corridors required a vast amount of ac committed to their defense. in essence squadrons were pinned there no matter what. the long range bombing with fighter escort added another dimension to the war by eliminating germany's "safe ground". in ortherwords...no where to run..no where to hide. the LW had to field ac to meet the bombers but were engaged by the fighter escort...who then found fields and destroyed ac on the ground. all the while...the LW couldnt pull back or abandon those corridors. after D-day and with he russian offensive on the east those corridors closed in on themselves towards berlin...giving raf and soviet deeper penetrations into german. so while the author claims local superiority..yes...within those corridors. but they they also pinned 50%? of LW resources? the LW was essentially fighting on 3 fronts...the west, east, and right over their heads. divide and conquer...no one allied nation can claim they were the straw that broke the camels back...it was the whole bail of hay that did.

 

[FLYBOYJ]

i think yuo meant you...sorry i married an english teacher.

I corrected it - and I think you meant "I" in lieu of "i". Your wife would be ashamed!

 

[parsifal]

I just hope that the thread stays open. There are some very good bits of information coming in, despite the occasional derailing and off track comments


I agree with Graugeists post, incidentally.....a very accurate summation, and not just a politically correct one

 

[syscom3]

yep who was doing the escorting for the AAF B26's over Holland

And who was escorting the bombers over Berlin or Vienna? The LW could refuse to fight over Holland, but couldn't ignore the fight right over their own heads.

 

[renrich]

To me, a question like "who destroyed the LW" needs to be looked at from a point of view that all contributed, as Graugeist has already observed. A question like "who destroyed the Wehrmacht" might, at first glance be answered by "the Red Army" since the battles on the Eastern Front had the most casualties. However, as an example, the ultimate defeat of the Afrika Korps in NA, although the numbers involved were much smaller, played a big role in destroying the Wehrmacht, beginning with the desperate Battle of El Alamein and culminating with the surrender of around 275000 German troops at Tunis. If those 275000 troops and their arms had been available on the Eastern Front would the outcome have changed. But should not some of the credit for defeating Rommel go to the RN and RAF for interdicting his supply lines? Could the Red Army have enjoyed the success they had on the Eastern Front without the Lend Lease efforts of Great Britain and the US? The point is, IMO, it is almost impossible to answer a broad question like this one by pin pointing a single entity because of all the factors involved.

 

[syscom3]

renrich, the LW was a viable military organization (for defense) untill the AAF began operations anywhere within the Reichs borders. At that point the AAF effectively destroyed the LW.

Whether it was through lack of POL's, or getting shotdown by escorting P38's, P47's or P51's; it doesnt matter. It was the AAF that delivered the body blows that sent the LW reeling.

 

[parsifal]

renrich, the LW was a viable military organization (for defense) untill the AAF began operations anywhere within the Reichs borders. At that point the AAF effectively destroyed the LW.

Whether it was through lack of POL's, or getting shotdown by escorting P38's, P47's or P51's; it doesnt matter. It was the AAF that delivered the body blows that sent the LW reeling.

The AAF delivered the death blow....well the daytime component at least, all the preparatory work had been done by others Without that preparation, the LW would have been too powerful to take on, even by the Americans

 

[Glider]

To me, a question like "who destroyed the LW" needs to be looked at from a point of view that all contributed, as Graugeist has already observed. A question like "who destroyed the Wehrmacht" might, at first glance be answered by "the Red Army" since the battles on the Eastern Front had the most casualties. However, as an example, the ultimate defeat of the Afrika Korps in NA, although the numbers involved were much smaller, played a big role in destroying the Wehrmacht, beginning with the desperate Battle of El Alamein and culminating with the surrender of around 275000 German troops at Tunis. If those 275000 troops and their arms had been available on the Eastern Front would the outcome have changed. But should not some of the credit for defeating Rommel go to the RN and RAF for interdicting his supply lines? Could the Red Army have enjoyed the success they had on the Eastern Front without the Lend Lease efforts of Great Britain and the US? The point is, IMO, it is almost impossible to answer a broad question like this one by pin pointing a single entity because of all the factors involved.

I think that this is the best posting on the topic. Germany was overstretched by actions of its own choosing and was worn down by heavy losses which it couldn't replace. No one air force or country can or should take the credit for destroying any part of the German war machine.

Parsifal has it right when he states that the USAAF finished off the day component, Russia also must take the credit for the losses on the Eastern Front where considerable forces were maintained, it was part of the preparation. I think its fair to say that the USAAF does take the credit for ensuring that the Luftwaffe had no where to hide, ensuring that there were no safe bases to operate or recuperate from.

Syscom also has it partly right when he said 'the LW was a viable military organization (for defense) untill the AAF began operations anywhere within the Reichs borders. At that point the AAF effectively destroyed the LW.

Whether it was through lack of POL's, or getting shotdown by escorting P38's, P47's or P51's; it doesnt matter. It was the AAF that delivered the body blows that sent the LW reeling'.

I say partly in that the Luftwaffe didn't have a viable organisation for defence when the USAAF started daylight raids. What Germany did was quickly develop such a defence, but only by taking the forces from other fronts. Think how many Luftwaffe aircraft were in France on D Day.

Germany survived and produced the arms it did by robbing Peter to pay Paul but by 1944 Peter was almost broke. I read an interesting fact the other day. In April 1944 the German army had approx 250,000 fewer trucks than in April 1942. All the effort went into producing weapons. Result, in Russia large areas of the front had their trucks taken away and replaced by horses, while the trucks went to more active parts of the front. You can imagine what that did to the supply situation.

 

[skipperbob]

I find it a little ironic about the change in strategy by 8th AF. Dedicated to the destruction of German industry by bombing with 8th Fighter Command's main purpose being to protect the bombers, in early 1944 the mission was changed to destroy the LW in the air and on the ground, effectively using the bombers as bait to draw up German fighters to defend key targets. It was an extremely effective strategy and in just three months the Americans gained air supremacy over Europe, crippling the LW.

 

[davebender]

in early 1944 the mission was changed to destroy the LW in the air and on the ground, effectively using the bombers as bait to draw up German fighters to defend key targets. It was an extremely effective strategy and in just three months the Americans gained air supremacy over Europe, crippling the LW.

I think you are wrong. Germany maintained aerial superiority over Central Europe until the fall of 1944. During the Spring of 1944 8th Air Force gained aerial superiority (not supremacy) only over N.W. France.

 

[drgondog]

I think you are wrong. Germany maintained aerial superiority over Central Europe until the fall of 1944. During the Spring of 1944 8th Air Force gained aerial superiority (not supremacy) only over N.W. France.

The 8th had two days from January 1,1944 through the end of the war when it lost ~10% of the attacking force - March 6 and April 29 raids on Berlin. The latter because the LW controllers found an entire BD off course and without escort, and another with only one Group covering them - and shot down 69. Contrast to 60 out of 228 on October 14, 1943.

After April 29, the LW managed to punish one or two BG's severly when the controllers found a gap in coverage and exploited it. May 12, July 27, Sept 27 and Nov 26 come to mind. In each case a large force of LW day fighters were skillfully directed to a single bomb wing over a 200 mile stretch.

On D-Day, the LW was defenseless over the beach head and remained ineffectual throughout the rest of the war over Allied battlefield in the west. Contrast that to Ost front with far fewer fighters than LuftFlotte Reich and LuftFlotte 3 in the west.

The LW lost 3178 s/e day fighters over Germany in the Jan-May 1944 timeframe when only the 8th FC (and mostly only Mustangs) were shooting them down over central and east/southeast Germany.

What is your definition of 'superiority' or supremacy?

 

[drgondog]

I find it a little ironic about the change in strategy by 8th AF. Dedicated to the destruction of German industry by bombing with 8th Fighter Command's main purpose being to protect the bombers, in early 1944 the mission was changed to destroy the LW in the air and on the ground, effectively using the bombers as bait to draw up German fighters to defend key targets. It was an extremely effective strategy and in just three months the Americans gained air supremacy over Europe, crippling the LW.

I agree. Having said that I found some of the documentaries, which conveyed a sense of irresponsibility on the part of the escort fighters to go after the LW and leave the bombers un-escorted, simply false or grossly mis represented.

The 8th FC still had the imperative 'protect the bombers' and developed tactics to send 'parcels' in the form of flights, then sections, then squadrons to engage depending on the size of the attacking LW forces. SOME instances did occur when a sizeable chunk of one group were lured away, only to have a second gaggle attack that local spot - with grave consequences.

Those were isolated. When the LW scored big on a bomb group it wasn't usually because a Fighter Group CO made a mistake - it was because of a combined BG off course or time, or a FG being late for RV or simply because the LW controller found a gap in the planned coverage.

The latter occurred (gap in coverage) frequently when only a few groups of long range escorts were available for target escort (Dec 1943 through April 1944). In that interval the 8th AF grew from three fighter Groups capable of target escort in Central Germany (354th, 20th and 55th FG) to (Mustangs - 354th, 355th, 357th, 4th and 352nd, Lightnings (20th, 55th and 364th).

At the end of April 1944, the 8th FC had ~ 2 Groups per 50 miles of bomber stream to protect the bombers. The 8th (and 9th) AF Jugs were relegated to Penetration and Withdrawal support to and from say, Frankfurt.

That is pretty thin when a LW controller could direct 100-300 day fighters into a concentrated area.

 

[davebender]

On D-Day, the LW was defenseless over the beach head and remained ineffectual throughout the rest of the war over Allied battlefield in the west.

I agree. But that has nothing to do with aerial superiority over Germany. You are talking about aerial superiority over Italy and France.

 

[drgondog]

I agree. But that has nothing to do with aerial superiority over Germany. You are talking about aerial superiority over Italy and France.

Begging the question - how do You define 'aerial superiority'??

 

[bobbysocks]

i would say the germans had air control over their skies during the daylight up until around feb/mar 44. the raf had stopped daylight raids and flew sorties at night...the usaaf suspended daylight bombing as was suggested in oct 43 after some devistating losses. so the lw had put up enough of a deterant to prevent allied daylight bombing and make them alter their strategy. but after the introduction of long rang escorts...control dwindled for the german side. the lw with no safe haven and increasing fuel problems were bled horribly. the allies didnt have either of those issues. as more and more LR FGs were added, bases introduced into france and belgium that bleeding went up exponentially. if your enemy can put up 600 to 1000 plane raids over your territory consistantly and at will and all your efforts do nothing to make them cease...you have lost overall air superiority.

 

[drgondog]

i would say the germans had air control over their skies during the daylight up until around feb/mar 44. the raf had stopped daylight raids and flew sorties at night...the usaaf suspended daylight bombing as was suggested in oct 43 after some devistating losses. so the lw had put up enough of a deterant to prevent allied daylight bombing and make them alter their strategy. but after the introduction of long rang escorts...control dwindled for the german side. the lw with no safe haven and increasing fuel problems were bled horribly. the allies didnt have either of those issues. as more and more LR FGs were added, bases introduced into france and belgium that bleeding went up exponentially. if your enemy can put up 600 to 1000 plane raids over your territory consistantly and at will and all your efforts do nothing to make them cease...you have lost overall air superiority.

BobbyS - I would say you are correct.

A further insight might be that ONLY the USAAF was conducting daily, large scale daylight raids from Britain and Italy over every corner of Germany and Poland and Czechoslovakia and Austria. There was no ability of the LW or USSR or GB to achieve such massive strikes on strategic targets over their enemy airspace, nor could they continue to deal unacceptable losses. When the latter occurred the LW was never able to slow the USAAF down.

That period was January through May, 1944

Even when the LW was dealing blows so punishing that daylight strategic bombing was being questioned, the 8th AF was never turned back by the LW... but from January through April what used to be sanctuary to take off, form and strike en masse became impossible.

Contrary to DaveB assertion, the LW lost complete control of any point over Germany/Czechoslovakia/Poland/Austria where they could deny the 8th and 15th AF their objectives... objectives which were prohibitive in Fall 1943, were easily attacked with reasonable to low losses from mid May to the end of the war. They lost control over Holland and France in the Fall of 1943 when 8th and 9th and RAF dominated.

Speer was brilliant in distributing his manufacturing base but he couldn't relocate his Chemical/Petroleum refining points and couldn't defend them from persistent and destructive attacks - and the RAF DID contribute in this initiative, despite Harris' objections.

 

[davebender]

Friendly aircraft can operate without a strong fighter escort. Enemy aircraft must have a strong fighter escort or else they get slaughtered.

 

[bobbysocks]

bombers and fighter escorts would we all know make contrails. a 1000 plane raid would have stretched out across the horizon and would have appeared like a white blanket was being pulled across the sky. can you imagine what the german civilian must have felt when they saw that...knowing it was heading towards them?

 

[parsifal]

What is being described here is air supremacy, which was not achieved until the the lw was grounded. This only occurred in the final months of the war.

There are normally thought to be three levels of control of the air. Air supremacy is the highest, meaning there is complete control of the skies. Air superiority is the next highest, which is being in a more favorable position than the opponent. It is defined in the NATO Glossary as "That degree of dominance in the air battle of one force over another that permits the conduct of operations by the former and its related land, sea, and air forces at a given time and place without prohibitive interference by opposing air forces." Air parity is the lowest level of control, meaning control of the skies only above friendly troop positions.

Air parity, tending towards air superiority had been achieved over the germans by early 1942. This can be stated because whereas the allies were able to penetrate german controlled airspace with increasing regularity and ease, the same could not be said for german intrusions into allied airspace. german raids over allied controled airspace became virtually impossible from the end of 1942 onward, though they did occur. Only in restricted areas, or areas limited in size were the germans able to claim air parity.

On the Eastern front, the germans had lost general air superiority by the end of 1941, though they were able to achieve local air aupeiority over key sectors by concentrating their air resources over that sector, for limited periods. By the end of 1942, their ability to gain local air supriority had disappeared, in a general sense they had lost air superiority, even in localised situations they could no longer claim air superiority....they could only claim air parity over parts of the front. After Kursk, even that disappeared, and from August 1943, the russians could claim air superiority over the Germans, even though the germans were still quite able to inflict heavy losses on them. The Germans could not deny the Russians from achieving all that they needed to do in the air, whilst they themselves lacked the bomber strengths to have any measurable effect on operations themselves.

In the early months of 1944, the germans on the western front even lost the ability to gain local air superiority around the bomber formations, with the introduction of LR fighter escorts as part of the US bombing campaign. It took some months longer for the night campaign to catch up, and total air superiority at night was never attained. However, even at night, the LW was never better than air parity status, from June 1944 onward, with the beginning of Mosquito sweeps, equipped with AI MkX