Why did the Brits persist with the Seafire until the end of WWII and beyond?

[Njaco]

ENOUGH!!!

This is NOT the topic of the thread. You want to argue whose a better researcher or source material for Japanese a/c, please start another thread.

I've given you both infractions for this because it goes on across threads all over the forum and its childish.

Hong Cong's War crimes had WHAT to do with the Seafire????????

 

[stona]

The Seafire II/III were low altitude rated fighters with single stage, single speed SCs with 16-18lb boost at low altitude. The LIIC and LFIII had the Merlin 32/55m respectively so they had spectacular initial climb rates and good speed at low altitudes. IIRC, the plan when intercepting FW190s was to climb rapidly then attempt an intercept using speed accumulated in the dive. The Seafire XV/XVII had single stage, two speed griffons, with much better high altitude performance and the Seafire 47 two stage, two speed griffons with excellent high altitude performance and a service ceiling of about 40,000 ft.

Tactics come into this too.
At Salerno in 1943 the Seafires (they were LIIcs) were severely criticised for their inability to protect the beach head from incoming Fw 190s. The Seafires were perfectly capable of catching these low flying Fw 190s but simply didn't have enough warning. The ships' radars did not give sufficient warning because they were well inshore and the radars suffered from severe ground clutter. A Seafire on CAP cruising at around 240 knots needed more than a couple of minutes to get into position and accelerate to the 350 knot diving approach speed of the Fw 190s or 300 knot escape speed. Had the ships stood further off and detected the incoming Fw 190s at longer range then more than the three successful interceptions may have been made.
History repeated itself in San Carlos bay in 1982.
Cheers
Steve

 

[davebender]

At Salerno in 1943 the Seafires (they were LIIcs) were severely criticised for their inability to protect the beach head from incoming Fw 190s.

Salerno was an American operation. Why was the RN responsible for air defense?

 

[RCAFson]

Salerno was an American operation. Why was the RN responsible for air defense?

Salerno was a combined US/UK amphibious assault. In any event, the RN would have provided air cover just as they did during the US only invasion of the south of France.

 

[fastmongrel]

Salerno was an American operation. Why was the RN responsible for air defense?

Salerno was a joint Allied operation the Vth army consisted of a US and a British Corp with Canadian division involved as well. The overall commander was General Alexander who was British and his army commander was General Clark who was US.

 

[davebender]

My point exactly. Salerno contained some British combat elements but it was an American operation.

Salerno is only about 250 miles from airfields on Sicily. So why wasn't air cover provided by American A-36s and P-38s rather then exposing RN CVs to Luftwaffe air attack?

 

[stona]

The Royal Navy task force at Salerno comprised five aircraft carriers, the small fleet carrier Unicorn and the still smaller escort carriers Battler, Attacker, Hunter and Stalker. Admiral Sir Phillip Vian was appointed to command these ships, together with the anti-aircraft light Dido class cruisers Charybdis, Euryalus, Sylla and ten destroyers. He hoisted his flag in Euryalus on the 27th August.
The operation of five carriers together was new. Up till then there had been too few to form such a squadron. The co-ordination of small escort carriers from a cruiser flagship was to prove a successful experiment. In Euryalus, far from the noise of flying operations, full attention could be given to controlling both the squadron at sea and planes in the air. These included fighters sent from Illustrious and Formidable, part of Admiral Willis's battle force, which was to provide cover from attack from seaward. As Admiral Vian had no experience of carrier operation, he obtained the services of Captain G. Grantham, Chief-of-Staff to Rear-Admiral C. Moody, H.M.S. Illustrious.
Interestingly it was Vian,with his poor grasp of air operations,who levelled such harsh criticism at the performance of the Seafires.

Force Five's duty was to provide fighter patrols over the beaches throughout daylight hours until the airfield at Montecorvino was captured and R.A.F. fighters established there. This was expected to be on the second day of the assault.

By the evening of the 11th, the third day of the assault, Admiral Vian reported that Force Five had 'about shot its bolt' but,with no landing ground yet in Allied hands, his orders were to stick it out. U.S. engineers had gone to work constructing a landing strip near Paestum, a little town close behind the beaches and, by the 12th, it was ready. On Admiral Hewitt's (U.S.N.) orders, all twenty-six available Seafires were sent to this new base, from where they were to continue operations until the 15th.

As others have said this was not a US operation but an Allied operation.

Cheers

Steve

 

[stona]

I've just read that Salerno was the scene of a rare mutiny involving British troops in WW2.

"Several hundred of the troops who had been rushed from Philippeville to re-enforce the beach-head at Salerno, had staged a sit down, refusing to join the front-line units. Sitting on the sand and surrounded by military police, they had been warned of the consequences of a mutiny in the face of the enemy. After their refusal, three times, to pick up their weapons and kit, the Corps Commander, General McCreery, made one last attempt.
He understood their main complaint was that, having been promised that they would be rejoining their old regiments, they had been switched to the Fifth Army at the last moment. He promised that as soon as the situation had improved, he would hasten the return to their units.
After he had finished, General McCreery left the beach and, shortly after, was informed that, with the exception of 192 men, the troops had responded to his plea. The recalcitrants were then placed under arrest and sent back to Constantine (Algeria) where, after trial, 191 received sentences of between five to twenty years penal servitude. A handful of ring-leaders received death sentences.
All sentences were immediately suspended, and the troops posted to the Eighth Army. Many years later, allegations were to be voiced that those men received deliberate continuous exposure in the front line."

Good job they hadn't tried that thirty years earlier.

Steve

 

[Kryten]

I seem to recall the main gripe was that they were supposed to be going home, some of them had been in North Africa for 3 years without a break, away from thier families!

 

[davebender]

I suspect British forces in the Aegean getting bombed to dust by Ju-87s and Ju-88s would have given a lot for the five Seafire squadrons operating from those CVEs.

 

[RCAFson]

I've just read that Salerno was the scene of a rare mutiny involving British troops in WW2.

They probably heard that "...it was an American operation..." despite the fact that about 1/2 the forces committed to it were from the UK, and decided they'd rather not participate...

 

[JoeB]

Your post did not state that Triumph was a rather slow CVL, and is written so that it is not clear that Triumph was operating the Seafires in question rather than acting as a ferry to bring the surviving aircraft from Korea.

The fact is that all WW2 CV capable aircraft are more prone to landing damage if the CV or apparent wind is too slow, since it causes much greater strain on the aircraft hooks and LG.

It would be much more graceful for you to admit you missed the reference to Triumph in my original post, which you pretty obviously did, rather than come up with some convoluted comeback like that to still try to say I was omitting something. Also I would repeat that it's common knowledge anyway AFAIC that the RN/RAN only used Colossus class carriers in Korea, and my post was in response to one about Seafire wrinkling *in Korea*. I think you've failed utterly to show that the post was either misleading or not completely relevant to the post I quoted in responding.

And the view of the FAA units at the time was certainly not that rapid disablement of these fighters in normal operations 'didn't count' because it wasn't on a larger carrier. As Landsdowne says for example about the 4 a/c written off Sept 9 p.30 "Some of these a/c had been received from Unicorn only the previous week and not been subjected to anything out of the ordinary in the way of landings". So this case goes beyond the usual rejection of opposing accounts that say things people don't want to hear, to saying the FAA's *own* record and opinion of its own a/c's fault must have somehow been wrong, or irrelevant because of the type of ship. It's ridiculous. These a/c, in the actual situation in which they were called upon to perform combat operations, had a serious problem with lack of durability in prolonged carrier ops. That's a historical fact.

The only other thing I'd note is that this was 1950 and so the a/c were a few years old. Landsdowne even mentions that some of those which gave out very easily were assumed to be older ones. Whereas, front line a/c in WWII were usually no more than months old (OTOH some WWII a/c served on for 20 or more years after WWII).

Also the record of Sea Furies was mentioned. In fact the results with Sea Furies from the same ships were pretty different. For example HMS Glory following year in similar season (rougher weather and ice made winter more difficult) 23 April-30 Sept 1951
Started w/ 22 Sea Furies, pilots unharmed except as noted
April 27: probably crashed in poor visibility, MIA
May 2: force landed after fired on by flak, 'engine trouble'
May 15: ditched, flak
Ca. May 20: ditched, engine trouble during carrier landing practice off Japan
June 4: ditched, engine quit after strafing various targets
June 5: damaged by flak, engine quit on approach, ditched, KIA
June 30: catapult fails a/c lost
July 18: two a/c lost to flak, one KIA
July 20: wheels up deck landing after losing a wheel hitting the round-down on the first try, not clear if a/c was a total loss
Aug 16: wheels up landing on beach of UN held island, flak, not clear if total loss
Sep 2: 2 a/c wheels up landings on beach UN held island, flak, one later recovered
Sept 24: engine trouble after strafing junks, ditched

In 13 Sea Fury total losses or possible ones are mentioned, but only 3 directly in carrier landing and takeoff phases, in 1818 landings, and none at all to fuselage wrinkling or overstrain, compared to 15 Seafires in Triumph's tour, w/ 'regular' landing/launch losses on top. There's an obvious difference there, Sea Fury a satisfactorily rugged a/c for carrier ops, Seafire still deficient even in F.47 version, for operating on the actual ships RN had available for Korean ops. The Sea Furies suffered a lot more flak and 'engine trouble' losses (latter often after strafing targets which were probably shooting back) than Seafires on Triumph's (shorter) tour, but in general flak got more difficult in Korea as time went on, and again Triumph's fighter sdn was pretty rapidly thinned out by those fuselage strength issues so sortie rate was pretty low.

Joe

 

[DerAdlerIstGelandet]

This bickering has gotten old. We are no longer playing around.

I recommend a few people in this thread go and read post #77 in the thread "A Word To Forum Members: Patience".

 

[wuzak]

I suspect British forces in the Aegean getting bombed to dust by Ju-87s and Ju-88s would have given a lot for the five Seafire squadrons operating from those CVEs.

Would they have been "bombed to dust"? What was the effectiveness of Ju 87s and Ju 88s against ships, and what was their effectiveness wehn up against fighters?

Ju 87s didn't fare so well in the BoB. Why would they fare any better against Seafires?

 

[Njaco]

Interesting pic that I found - was gonna use it for another thread but it fits here....

 

[RCAFson]

I think you've failed utterly to show that the post was either misleading or not completely relevant to the post I quoted in responding.


Joe

OTOH "With the Carriers in Korea" by Landsdown is a day to day account of the RN carrier ops in Korea. The history of Seafire attrition in combat ops is as follows:
June 29: disembarks 4 over-wrinkled Seafires before entering combat, 12 remain available
July 18: 1 Seafire severely damaged in landing (one other became unserviceable of several incidents ments mentioned)
July 22: disembarks 2 unserviceable Seafires, takes on 7 from Unicorn, 17 available
July 24: 1 Seafire written off to wrinkling, one to fuselage damage from mishandling by deck crew
July 28: Seafire shot down by B-29's, 14 available
Aug 9: Seafire written off to off-center landing, 13 available
Aug 23: 2 more Seafires exceed wrinkling limit and another overstressed by off center landing, says 9 available but this seems a typo for 10
Aug 26: Seafire written off in landing practice, 9 available
Aug 30: embarks Unicorn's last 6 Seafires
Sep 4: Seafire badly damaged in takeoff accident, lands but unserviceable
Sep 8: Seafires written off in landing accident, pilot bailed out of another when arrestor hook wouldn't extend, 10 serviceable (seems 2 others not mentioned)
Sep 9: 4 Seafires exceed wrinkling limit
Sep 14: Seafire written off in heavy landing
Sep 20: 3 Seafires operational (thus 2 others are not mentioned)
Triumph set sail for home with 3 Seafires and 8 Fireflies remaining operational.

Some things not mentioned:

On 21st July, Triumph sailed for Sasebo, due to deterioration of the packing in the Starboard stern gland, and arrived the next morning. Here, Triumph replaced damaged aircraft, bringing her Seafire complement to 17, four below complement, and reprovisioned. Triumph and Comus, who had accompanied her back to port, sailed on 25th July, to provide close support for the endangered US 8th Army, and the South Korean Army, who were in danger of being encircled and overrun. Triumph flew 28 CAP sorties, during the day, and moved to the East coast on 26th July, flying Anti-Submarine and CAP sorties again.

Triumph entered Sasebo on 21st September, where she entered drydock, for two days of temporary repairs to her starboard stern gland. Triumph sailed for Hong Kong on 25th September 1950.

HMS Triumph

So a two shaft ship was having trouble with one shaft...

Korean War Service
Post war, the Fleet Air Arm replaced its Merlin-powered Seafires with Griffon-powered aircraft, initially with the Seafire Mk. XV and Mk. XVII, and from 1948, by the definitive Seafire Mk. 47. In 1950, HMS Triumph began a tour of the Far East, embarking 800 Naval Air Squadron with Seafire Mk. 47s along with 827 Naval Air Squadron, equipped with Fairey Fireflies. Following the outbreak of the Korean War, HMS Triumph was diverted to interdiction operations to try and stem the North Korean offensive, and her Seafires flew both ground attack and combat air patrol missions from July until September 1950, when Triumph was replaced on station by HMS Theseus, equipped with Sea Furies. During operations off Korea, Seafires flew 360 operational sorties, losing one aircraft shot down by friendly fire from a B-29 Superfortress and a second aircraft lost when its arrestor hook failed to extend. The Seafire, however, proved more vulnerable to the stresses of carrier operation with many aircraft suffering wrinkling of the rear fuselage brought about by heavy landings. Following the end of operations, when peacetime airworthiness rules were re-imposed, all but three of 800 Squadron's Seafires were declared unserviciable owing to wrinkling.
https://hangar47.com/Supermarine_Seafire_XV.html

So the status of the Seafire airworthiness was decided upon peacetime, not wartime rules, and by my count 6 were still operational using wartime rules after nearly 3 months of hard service. The replacement Seafires were also the aircraft deemed least airworthy, so 800 squadron was being replaced with culls, not top line aircraft:

Due to succession of heavy landings caused by bad weather and tiredness some of the fuselage wrinkles on the Seafires were becoming a bit too large for comfort so the worst of the affected aircraft were withdrawn and used for spares...

On the 30th of August HMS Triumph returned to Sasebo in Japan to replenish stores and recieve the last 6 seafires and 8 fireflys from HMS Unicorn, which were the least serviceable of of all the replacements and as such had been held back until now for that reason...
http://www.royalnavyresearcharchive.org.uk/Article_Forgotten_Cruise.htm

 

[stona]

Nice piccy from"Njaco".

According to Crosley at this time,long before the development of the gyro stabilised mirror landing "sights", the signals from a U.S.N. L.S.O were advisory whereas those given by his R.N. equivalent were mandatory. If the batsman got it wrong then so would you!

Cheers

Steve

 

[davebender]

It was historically.

Seafires operating from CVEs might turn British defeat into a British victory. The Aegean had such huge strategic importance that it was worth losing a few CVEs to win this battle.

 

[stona]

It was historically.

"Accolade" never happened.

Steve

 

[davebender]

Dodecanese Campaign - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

August 1943 the British started preparations to take quickly advantage of a possible Italian-German split, in the form of a scaled-down "Accolade".

Would "Accolade Lite" be the correct title?