Why did the Brits persist with the Seafire until the end of WWII and beyond?

[JoeB]

1. Just to give the alternative position, i rely on rod kirkby's and Gerry Murphy's research as a more balanced and accurate account. Before you jump to the conclusion that they simply regurgitate the 8 claim made by Brown and others, they dont.

2. To summarise their research....they were up against 302 Kokutai, which was not a green unit, infact it was one of the most experienced outfits left in the IJN. if i am not mistaken Yamada had fought over Malaya....Kirby claims there were 12 IJN interceptors, including 4 Raidens, Murphy says he saw 4 raidens, but only 10 a/c engaged...notice he does not say there were just 10 in the battle, only that his section (4 a/c) engaged 10). The Japanese were successful in shooting down one BPF Avenger

3. There were no hellcats or Corsairs in the air on that day. It was a British controlled sector...any US forces that stumbled into the operational area risked being shot at, and there were no BPF Hellcats or corsairs in the strike....the fighter component consisted of just 7 seafires, of which 3 were topcover and were late to engage. By most accounts (not all), for most of the battle, there were 7 Seafires engaged by 12 enemy a/c, with at least 8 zeroes included.

4. The battle took place over Tokyo Bay, with the the leader of the top cover trio, Sub Lt Victor Lowden, hit five, destroying two, and was credited with a third, shared with Sub Lt W J Williams.

The third Seafire F III pilot, Sub Lt Gerry Murphy, shot down two Zeroes in turning combat, which, to quote David Brown's fine book, 'The Seafire', "should have favoured the enemy", but "ended with them both being shot down by some fine deflection shooting."

5. These losses were incidentally confirmed in a post war interview i believe on the japanese side. i have it somewhere. i will post it when i find it

1. But what actual evidence did they find of more Japanese losses than mentioned in the sources I named, Hata's 'August 15 book' and Maru series accounts of the various JNAF fighter units? You don't give any.

2. I didn't give any characteriziation of the 302nd. And the only Japanese pilot actually known to have been shot down in this action by a Seafire was Homna from the 252nd AG which therefore we must assume was also engaged. Otherwise the info you give here is same as what I said, eg. 8 Zeroes, 4 Raiden from 302nd.

3. This is simply not so. The Japanese language sources I gave in my previous post for each Japanese unit speak of overlapping combats with F6F's and Seafires. In the English language "Japanese Naval Aces and Fighter Pilots of WWII" by Hata and Izawa pg. 215, the 4 Raiden and 8 Zeroes of 302nd are actually *only* mentioned engaging 'Grummans' this day and losing 4 a/c to them (p. 215), though again the Maru series account by 302nd mentions that Yamada was wounded by a Seafire, though a/c apparently returned safely. And the USN official victory list (published privately by Frank Olynyk, p. 183) lists a number of victory credits over Zeroes by VF-31 and VF-49 in 0540-0620 time period in the same area, which matches the times given in Japanese accounts. So I can't see on what basis the researchers you mention, or you, could have concluded that no F6F's were present. That directly contradicts both Japanese and US accounts.

4. This is just a reiteration of claims in more detail. *We* really *have* been through wrt to *all* combatants that aerial claims almost always have a good faith basis, and therefore detailed accounts written down at the time to back them up. But it doesn't mean they actually represented unduplicated incidents of destruction of enemy a/c. That's what we look in the other sides' accounts to find out.

5. This would not be at all incidental. It would be the *only* info you'd have provided which (correctly) contradicted anything I said. So please do find and post specifics and source, then we'd have real new info, not childish accusations of 'agenda' without actually correctly contradicting, with sourced specifics, *anything* I said.

For completeness, another recent published source is Osprey series 'Duel Seafire v A6M Zero' by Donald Nijboer. It presents some of the same info, mentioning the 4 losses by 302nd but failing to reconcile the 302nd accounts appearing to say they were lost to F6F's, though OTOH also failing to mention the loss of 252nd AG (Honma's plane) definitely to Seafires according to Japanese accounts. Also it mentions VBF-88 (F4U) claims but those were a bit later, and it doesn't mention the earlier VF-31 and 49 (or VF-6) claims. So, I don't know that the book has any 'agenda', but just doesn't include all relevant known info.

Joe

 

[parsifal]

what about the testimony given at the war crimes trial of Sub lt hockley, the seafire pilot downed on that day and subsequently executed by members of the 426th infantry regt

According to Nakamura Kiyozo, an air raid warden in the village of Higashimura, he observed a force of 12 zeroes engaged by 8 Seafires. according to this mans testimony, given under oath and accepted by the tribunal, at least seven zeroes were seen to crash as a result of the seafire attacks, and the remainder ran away . Kiyozo was the man that took the surrender of hockley, and handed him over to the soldiers of the 426th regt. Kiyozo testified that the pilot was unhurt at that time and was not armed. The two shook hands and smoked two cigarettes as they watched the battle unfold that the British airman produced. Nakamura then took Hockley to the local civil defence HQ, where the commander decided to hand him over to the local military unit, the 426th Infantry Regiment

This is a japanese source, as good as any of the half baked sources that you consistently pedal on this issue, and has the added weight of being official testimony. I do not know why there were more losses than your sources admit. But given the warped state of japan at that time, its not hard to extrapolate reasons. Wanting to present the best possible profile for posterity for a nation obsessed with national honour has to be considered as at least possible. Whatever the reason, some japanese records are decidely questionable on this issue and indirect contradiction to the official after action reports and the testimony of fairly impartial eyewitnesses.

 

[stona]

.
Regarding the Seafire/Spitfires undercarriage , Gix, I wasn't for a moment suggesting it was as tricky as the 109 (landing a 109 on a carrier, I bet Luftwaffe pilots would have woken up in a cold sweat over that idea).

The Germans carried out just shy of 500 test landings on a mock up of the Graf Spee's deck,complete with arrestor cables,at Travemunde without a single accident.

This isn't landing on a moving ship and the Graf Spee's deck was to have been longer (860 feet) than the British carriers,nonetheless the Bf 109,the T in this case,tends to have this dodgy narrow track undercarriage argument unjustly thrown at it. A comparison of the undercarriage track of the Spitfire/Seafire and Bf 109 can be enlightening.
Other factors come into play of course,different geommetry and the relative tail heaviness on the ground of the 109 probably being the most significant.

Cheers

Steve

 

[CobberKane]

The Germans carried out just shy of 500 test landings on a mock up of the Graf Spee's deck,complete with arrestor cables,at Travemunde without a single accident.

This isn't landing on a moving ship and the Graf Spee's deck was to have been longer than the British carriers,nonetheless the Bf 109,the T in this case,tends to have this dodgy narrow track undercarriage argument unjustly thrown at it. A comparison of the undercarriage track of the Spitfire/Seafire and Bf 109 can be enlightening.
Other factors come into play of course,different geommetry and the relative tail heaviness on the ground of the 109 probably being the most significant.

Cheers

Steve

Yep, the Spitfire certainly was not viceless in this respect. I don't know how much of the 109 or spits reputation as being tricky to land was due to their narrow undercarriages or other factosr such as those you mentioned. Still, I think the 109's reputation was worse in this respect. Maybe the spitfire's landing gear was just as bad, but it was better overall due to it's benign low speed handling - I read one account from a Luftwaffe pilot who said that compared to a 109 a spit was 'childishly easy to land'. Either way, narrow track undercarriage seems to have been a feature of aicraft designed before the war, one that fell out of favour as hostilities progressed.

 

[Kryten]

My Great uncle Jim was Fleet Air Arm, he was a rigger on Illustrious I believe, his take on the seafire landing problems centered around two issues, one being the undercarriage stroke was really too short for carrier ops, which was the primary cause of monocoque stressing (wrinkling) when landing, especially when the deck was rolling which often resulted in a "harder" landing and secondly the Seafire would have had to have major reinforcement of the monecoque to extend its service life, but this would have resulted in considerable weight incresases, not good for a point defence!

he also mentions the Seafires write off record was worse than the purpose built carrier aircraft however "we wrote off a fair few of them too" was his comment, sounds like carrier ops were rough on all the planes, anyone know the expected life of a Corsair from a carrier relative to a ground based one for instance, that would be of interes here?

 

[Elmas]

See §23, pag. 270 - Seafires and the Fleet Air Arm

and

 

[stona]

I read one account from a Luftwaffe pilot who said that compared to a 109 a spit was 'childishly easy to land'. Either way, narrow track undercarriage seems to have been a feature of aicraft designed before the war, one that fell out of favour as hostilities progressed.

The comment was made by Werner Molders.

"It was very interesting to carry out the flight trials at Rechlin with the Spitfire and the Hurricane. Both types are very simple to fly compared to our aircraft, and childishly easy to take-off and land."

Cheers

Steve

 

[yulzari]

Leaving aside the issues of specific combats, the essential answers to the original question have been given.

Britain was bankrupt by February 1941, having spent the last of the proceeds of selling off all it's USA industrial assets. The FAA only continued to have USA combat aeroplanes through lend-lease. Once the war ended they had to be returned (or thrown off the ships as USA had no use for them.) If the FAA wanted fighters they had to be British as there was nothing else affordable. Remember, the British civilian food rations were reduced after the war as imports had to be paid for in hard cash. They only came back up to wartime levels shortly before 1950. This was a time when British Coopers were making racing cars out of surplus air raid shelters and old ships engine cylinders while Italian Ferrari made theirs on new American machinery.

The role the FAA had for fighters was in close fleet defence. What was wanted was a seagoing interceptor; the role for which the Spitfire was designed. The USA wanted to achieve air superiority within the range of it's strike aeroplanes. So they needed far longer ranged (and heavier) fighters. The Bearcat was allegedly in response to the recognition of their lack of a close range interceptor.

Yes the Seafire did have a noticeable write off level (reduced markedly when the propellor tips were cropped and undercarriage stroke was increased.) However, as long as you got the expensive trained pilot back, you simply replaced the losses from production. Wartime fighters were expected to have a short life. Bend it and draw another one when you are next in port. The FAA was optimised for service in the North Atlantic and (post the fall of France) Mediterranean. Carriers could expect to be in reach of replacement aircraft fairly often. The USA navy was optimised for Pacific service far away from land resupply. Different needs, different solutions.

 

[Gixxerman]

landing a 109 on a carrier, I bet Luftwaffe pilots would have woken up in a cold sweat over that idea.

Had the Graf Zeppelin carrier ever been made operational the plan was for Me 109T varients to fly from it.....I wonder how many of the ear-marked pilots felt that cold sweat and the relief come the 1943 orders to scrap new surface fleet development!

 

[stona]

Had the Graf Zeppelin carrier ever been made operational the plan was for Me 109T varients to fly from it.....I wonder how many of the ear-marked pilots felt that cold sweat and the relief come the 1943 orders to scrap new surface fleet development!

Following the Travemunde trials they would have had no reason to be nervous.

In the Bf 109 T they would have been landing on a faster carrier with a longer deck and with better forward visibility than their British counterparts in their Seafires.

Steve

 

[Njaco]

Word of Warning:

1. Any more sarcastic or personal attacks, the thread will be closed and infractions given.
2. If this goes political (i.e. political reasons for the UK keeping the Seafire, etc), the thread will be closed and infractions given.

I've been asked to close the thread but, against my better judgement I want it to continue. But any more 'he said, she said', and it will be closed.

 

[stona]

Thanks for that "Elmas".
I've got Crosley's book but haven't read it for ages. I've just dug it out and intend to give it another read.
Cheers
Steve

 

[RCAFson]

OTOH "With the Carriers in Korea" by Landsdown is a day to day account of the RN carrier ops in Korea. The history of Seafire attrition in combat ops is as follows:

You've omitted the fact that the Seafires were operating from the CVL Triumph. Triumph was hard pressed to make 24 knots, and that in combination with her short flight deck was the probable cause of the wrinkling. I suspect that few problems would have occurred if the Seafires had operated from a 30 knot CV.

 

[FLYBOYJ]

You've omitted the fact that the Seafires were operating from the CVL Triumph. Triumph was hard pressed to make 24 knots, and that in combination with her short flight deck was the probable cause of the wrinkling. I suspect that few problems would have occurred if the Seafires had operated from a 30 knot CV.

How would 6 knots made a difference?

 

[stona]

How would 6 knots made a difference?

Good job I've just started perusing Crosley's book.
From his chapter on Salerno.

"The accident rate of about ten percent of landings was inevitable,for,with the maximum vertical touch down velocity of 7ft/sec,a mandatory 3.5 degree descent path and with only 15 knots of wind over the deck ,an undercarriage failiure was a mathematical certainty,even on a perfect landing.
Many pilots knew this and tried to flare out at touchdown. However,this resulted many times in aircraft floating over the wires and making a full toss into the barriers."

My italics.

He attributes the high accident rate directly to the failiure of the Admiralty to arrange,

"...for the fighters to operate from faster carriers capable of a better speed than 15 knots,so giving them more windspeed for landing in the calm conditions prevailing in the Mediterranean at that time of year."

I'm sure he would have been very happy to have an extra 6 knots of wind over the deck.

A "full toss" is a cricketing term for a delivery which reaches the batsman without pitching (bouncing) on the pitch on the way to him.

A Seafire landed at only 3 knots above the engine on stall speed (1.05 Vse) and below the engine off stall speed. US naval aircraft were designed to withstand a 12 ft/sec rate of descent and to land at 1.2 Vse.

Cheers

Steve

 

[parsifal]

We had very similar problems with A4s landing on a half sister to the Triumph that at times could not make better than 14knots. at those times we tried not to operate the A4s at all. when forced to do so, because operational circumstances, such as when we were being hassled by Russian LR patrol a/c, we ran a high risk of accidents, which explains why we lost two A4s out of 8 in a singloe patrol.

Triumph was a near sister to the Melbourne. There would have been many occasions when the windspeed cross the deck would have been at or below 15 knots, particualarly if the ship was trying to conserve fuel. It would have been a nightmare operating the Seafires under those circumstances.

A Majestic Class had about 16 days of fuel when operating at 15 knots, and about 3 days when operating above 20+ knots

 

[DerAdlerIstGelandet]

Word of Warning:

1. Any more sarcastic or personal attacks, the thread will be closed and infractions given.
2. If this goes political (i.e. political reasons for the UK keeping the Seafire, etc), the thread will be closed and infractions given.

I've been asked to close the thread but, against my better judgement I want it to continue. But any more 'he said, she said', and it will be closed.

This probably should be said in the Admin/Mod section, but maybe a few others should read it as well...

It is probably no use. There are too many spoiled rotten brats that were never taught by their parents how to act civil and like an adult. They don't agree with someone, and therefore have start throwing insults and immature comments.

The sad thing is that it ruins for all the adults and mature people here who enjoy reading and learning from the threads.

I am pretty sick of it. Tired of saying something about it, and it doing no good. I have thought about leaving, but then I have decided against it. Why should they ruin it for me, and others. We will just have to start removing the problems.

 

[fastmongrel]

I dont know how long Triumph was out of dry dock but with a foul bottom a war load and warm water I bet her Chief Engineer would only have seen 24 knots on the pit log in his wildest dreams. Plus I have read somewhere that the Colossus/Majestic class didnt have the smoothest shell plating so individual ships of the class could have had big differences in top speed even when fresh out of dock.

 

[renrich]

The reason the Seafire stayed in service after the war had to be primarily money. THe RN had Seafires and I suspect that most of the American AC the RN used during the war had to be destroyed or given back to the US because they were lend lease. I recall reading that quite a number of brand new Corsairs were shoved overboard by the NZ navy. Obviously it would have been nice to replace all the Seafires with Sea Furies but Britain was not in good shape financially. In this case, "Old ugly is better than old nothing."

 

[CobberKane]

Leaving aside the issues of specific combats, the essential answers to the original question have been given.

Britain was bankrupt by February 1941, having spent the last of the proceeds of selling off all it's USA industrial assets. The FAA only continued to have USA combat aeroplanes through lend-lease. Once the war ended they had to be returned (or thrown off the ships as USA had no use for them.) If the FAA wanted fighters they had to be British as there was nothing else affordable. Remember, the British civilian food rations were reduced after the war as imports had to be paid for in hard cash. They only came back up to wartime levels shortly before 1950. This was a time when British Coopers were making racing cars out of surplus air raid shelters and old ships engine cylinders while Italian Ferrari made theirs on new American machinery.

The role the FAA had for fighters was in close fleet defence. What was wanted was a seagoing interceptor; the role for which the Spitfire was designed. The USA wanted to achieve air superiority within the range of it's strike aeroplanes. So they needed far longer ranged (and heavier) fighters. The Bearcat was allegedly in response to the recognition of their lack of a close range interceptor.

Yes the Seafire did have a noticeable write off level (reduced markedly when the propellor tips were cropped and undercarriage stroke was increased.) However, as long as you got the expensive trained pilot back, you simply replaced the losses from production. Wartime fighters were expected to have a short life. Bend it and draw another one when you are next in port. The FAA was optimised for service in the North Atlantic and (post the fall of France) Mediterranean. Carriers could expect to be in reach of replacement aircraft fairly often. The USA navy was optimised for Pacific service far away from land resupply. Different needs, different solutions.

This makes sense. If the RN was looking for an aircraft that duplicated the Spitfire's point defence capabilities in a shipboard fighter the Seafire would have been the obvious result. The Wildcat and Sea Hurricane might have been fine for countering Condors in the Atlantic, but sending them up against Fw190s and Bf109Gs in the MTO would have been dicey to say the least. Even when the Corsair and Hellcat arrived on the scene the Sea fires seem to have had the advantage in climb and manoeuvrability, and if the production line was able to keep up with the higher rates of attrition through wear and tear, which wasn't costing pilots, maybe they were the best option in this role. And when the RN went to the PTO they could just supplement the seafires with the American fighters, with their greater serviceability and ordinance capacity