Why did the Brits persist with the Seafire until the end of WWII and beyond? (1 Viewer)

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ENOUGH!!!

This is NOT the topic of the thread. You want to argue whose a better researcher or source material for Japanese a/c, please start another thread.

I've given you both infractions for this because it goes on across threads all over the forum and its childish.

Hong Cong's War crimes had WHAT to do with the Seafire????????
 

Tactics come into this too.
At Salerno in 1943 the Seafires (they were LIIcs) were severely criticised for their inability to protect the beach head from incoming Fw 190s. The Seafires were perfectly capable of catching these low flying Fw 190s but simply didn't have enough warning. The ships' radars did not give sufficient warning because they were well inshore and the radars suffered from severe ground clutter. A Seafire on CAP cruising at around 240 knots needed more than a couple of minutes to get into position and accelerate to the 350 knot diving approach speed of the Fw 190s or 300 knot escape speed. Had the ships stood further off and detected the incoming Fw 190s at longer range then more than the three successful interceptions may have been made.
History repeated itself in San Carlos bay in 1982.
Cheers
Steve
 
At Salerno in 1943 the Seafires (they were LIIcs) were severely criticised for their inability to protect the beach head from incoming Fw 190s.
Salerno was an American operation. Why was the RN responsible for air defense?
 
Salerno was an American operation. Why was the RN responsible for air defense?

Salerno was a combined US/UK amphibious assault. In any event, the RN would have provided air cover just as they did during the US only invasion of the south of France.
 
Salerno was an American operation. Why was the RN responsible for air defense?

Salerno was a joint Allied operation the Vth army consisted of a US and a British Corp with Canadian division involved as well. The overall commander was General Alexander who was British and his army commander was General Clark who was US.
 
My point exactly. Salerno contained some British combat elements but it was an American operation.

Salerno is only about 250 miles from airfields on Sicily. So why wasn't air cover provided by American A-36s and P-38s rather then exposing RN CVs to Luftwaffe air attack?
 
The Royal Navy task force at Salerno comprised five aircraft carriers, the small fleet carrier Unicorn and the still smaller escort carriers Battler, Attacker, Hunter and Stalker. Admiral Sir Phillip Vian was appointed to command these ships, together with the anti-aircraft light Dido class cruisers Charybdis, Euryalus, Sylla and ten destroyers. He hoisted his flag in Euryalus on the 27th August.
The operation of five carriers together was new. Up till then there had been too few to form such a squadron. The co-ordination of small escort carriers from a cruiser flagship was to prove a successful experiment. In Euryalus, far from the noise of flying operations, full attention could be given to controlling both the squadron at sea and planes in the air. These included fighters sent from Illustrious and Formidable, part of Admiral Willis's battle force, which was to provide cover from attack from seaward. As Admiral Vian had no experience of carrier operation, he obtained the services of Captain G. Grantham, Chief-of-Staff to Rear-Admiral C. Moody, H.M.S. Illustrious.
Interestingly it was Vian,with his poor grasp of air operations,who levelled such harsh criticism at the performance of the Seafires.

Force Five's duty was to provide fighter patrols over the beaches throughout daylight hours until the airfield at Montecorvino was captured and R.A.F. fighters established there. This was expected to be on the second day of the assault.

By the evening of the 11th, the third day of the assault, Admiral Vian reported that Force Five had 'about shot its bolt' but,with no landing ground yet in Allied hands, his orders were to stick it out. U.S. engineers had gone to work constructing a landing strip near Paestum, a little town close behind the beaches and, by the 12th, it was ready. On Admiral Hewitt's (U.S.N.) orders, all twenty-six available Seafires were sent to this new base, from where they were to continue operations until the 15th.

As others have said this was not a US operation but an Allied operation.

Cheers

Steve
 
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I've just read that Salerno was the scene of a rare mutiny involving British troops in WW2.

"Several hundred of the troops who had been rushed from Philippeville to re-enforce the beach-head at Salerno, had staged a sit down, refusing to join the front-line units. Sitting on the sand and surrounded by military police, they had been warned of the consequences of a mutiny in the face of the enemy. After their refusal, three times, to pick up their weapons and kit, the Corps Commander, General McCreery, made one last attempt.
He understood their main complaint was that, having been promised that they would be rejoining their old regiments, they had been switched to the Fifth Army at the last moment. He promised that as soon as the situation had improved, he would hasten the return to their units.
After he had finished, General McCreery left the beach and, shortly after, was informed that, with the exception of 192 men, the troops had responded to his plea. The recalcitrants were then placed under arrest and sent back to Constantine (Algeria) where, after trial, 191 received sentences of between five to twenty years penal servitude. A handful of ring-leaders received death sentences.
All sentences were immediately suspended, and the troops posted to the Eighth Army. Many years later, allegations were to be voiced that those men received deliberate continuous exposure in the front line."

Good job they hadn't tried that thirty years earlier.

Steve
 
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I seem to recall the main gripe was that they were supposed to be going home, some of them had been in North Africa for 3 years without a break, away from thier families!
 
I suspect British forces in the Aegean getting bombed to dust by Ju-87s and Ju-88s would have given a lot for the five Seafire squadrons operating from those CVEs.
 
I've just read that Salerno was the scene of a rare mutiny involving British troops in WW2.

They probably heard that "...it was an American operation..." despite the fact that about 1/2 the forces committed to it were from the UK, and decided they'd rather not participate...
 
It would be much more graceful for you to admit you missed the reference to Triumph in my original post, which you pretty obviously did, rather than come up with some convoluted comeback like that to still try to say I was omitting something. Also I would repeat that it's common knowledge anyway AFAIC that the RN/RAN only used Colossus class carriers in Korea, and my post was in response to one about Seafire wrinkling *in Korea*. I think you've failed utterly to show that the post was either misleading or not completely relevant to the post I quoted in responding.

And the view of the FAA units at the time was certainly not that rapid disablement of these fighters in normal operations 'didn't count' because it wasn't on a larger carrier. As Landsdowne says for example about the 4 a/c written off Sept 9 p.30 "Some of these a/c had been received from Unicorn only the previous week and not been subjected to anything out of the ordinary in the way of landings". So this case goes beyond the usual rejection of opposing accounts that say things people don't want to hear, to saying the FAA's *own* record and opinion of its own a/c's fault must have somehow been wrong, or irrelevant because of the type of ship. It's ridiculous. These a/c, in the actual situation in which they were called upon to perform combat operations, had a serious problem with lack of durability in prolonged carrier ops. That's a historical fact.

The only other thing I'd note is that this was 1950 and so the a/c were a few years old. Landsdowne even mentions that some of those which gave out very easily were assumed to be older ones. Whereas, front line a/c in WWII were usually no more than months old (OTOH some WWII a/c served on for 20 or more years after WWII).

Also the record of Sea Furies was mentioned. In fact the results with Sea Furies from the same ships were pretty different. For example HMS Glory following year in similar season (rougher weather and ice made winter more difficult) 23 April-30 Sept 1951
Started w/ 22 Sea Furies, pilots unharmed except as noted
April 27: probably crashed in poor visibility, MIA
May 2: force landed after fired on by flak, 'engine trouble'
May 15: ditched, flak
Ca. May 20: ditched, engine trouble during carrier landing practice off Japan
June 4: ditched, engine quit after strafing various targets
June 5: damaged by flak, engine quit on approach, ditched, KIA
June 30: catapult fails a/c lost
July 18: two a/c lost to flak, one KIA
July 20: wheels up deck landing after losing a wheel hitting the round-down on the first try, not clear if a/c was a total loss
Aug 16: wheels up landing on beach of UN held island, flak, not clear if total loss
Sep 2: 2 a/c wheels up landings on beach UN held island, flak, one later recovered
Sept 24: engine trouble after strafing junks, ditched

In 13 Sea Fury total losses or possible ones are mentioned, but only 3 directly in carrier landing and takeoff phases, in 1818 landings, and none at all to fuselage wrinkling or overstrain, compared to 15 Seafires in Triumph's tour, w/ 'regular' landing/launch losses on top. There's an obvious difference there, Sea Fury a satisfactorily rugged a/c for carrier ops, Seafire still deficient even in F.47 version, for operating on the actual ships RN had available for Korean ops. The Sea Furies suffered a lot more flak and 'engine trouble' losses (latter often after strafing targets which were probably shooting back) than Seafires on Triumph's (shorter) tour, but in general flak got more difficult in Korea as time went on, and again Triumph's fighter sdn was pretty rapidly thinned out by those fuselage strength issues so sortie rate was pretty low.

Joe
 
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This bickering has gotten old. We are no longer playing around.

I recommend a few people in this thread go and read post #77 in the thread "A Word To Forum Members: Patience".
 
I suspect British forces in the Aegean getting bombed to dust by Ju-87s and Ju-88s would have given a lot for the five Seafire squadrons operating from those CVEs.

Would they have been "bombed to dust"? What was the effectiveness of Ju 87s and Ju 88s against ships, and what was their effectiveness wehn up against fighters?

Ju 87s didn't fare so well in the BoB. Why would they fare any better against Seafires?
 
Interesting pic that I found - was gonna use it for another thread but it fits here....
 

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I think you've failed utterly to show that the post was either misleading or not completely relevant to the post I quoted in responding.


Joe


Some things not mentioned:


So a two shaft ship was having trouble with one shaft...


So the status of the Seafire airworthiness was decided upon peacetime, not wartime rules, and by my count 6 were still operational using wartime rules after nearly 3 months of hard service. The replacement Seafires were also the aircraft deemed least airworthy, so 800 squadron was being replaced with culls, not top line aircraft:

 
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Nice piccy from"Njaco".

According to Crosley at this time,long before the development of the gyro stabilised mirror landing "sights", the signals from a U.S.N. L.S.O were advisory whereas those given by his R.N. equivalent were mandatory. If the batsman got it wrong then so would you!

Cheers

Steve
 
It was historically.

Seafires operating from CVEs might turn British defeat into a British victory. The Aegean had such huge strategic importance that it was worth losing a few CVEs to win this battle.
 

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