Why was Nagumo in command at Santa Cruz?

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Most of KdB's strike aircraft had been recovered when the 10:20 assault by the SBD's began, so they were in their respective hangars and destroyed with their ships.

SaparotRob said:
Nagumo as I recall, relied on his Air Staff (whose names I can't remember since no ships were named after them). Calling GrauGeist.
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Minoru Genda, he was Nagumo's chief of air operations and any questions during planning and war games that related to carrier ops would have been directed to him. Nagumo was not at all well versed in the day to day ops, like the flight deck cycle of the weapons he was commanding. This is no knock on him, I think he did a commendable job every time he sortied considering he was an old torpedo expert. He was also totally cowed by Yammamoto, everyone knew that Nagumo was no one's first choice at commanding KdB, but, he had the seniority and rank.
 
Other Zeros did land on Hiryu. One pilot was saying his Zero was pushed overboard.

You can't have a CAP carrier because if that carrier gets sunk then bang goes your CAP.

Also Carriers were supposed to be self contained groups.
 
The Basket said:
You can't have a CAP carrier because if that carrier gets sunk then bang goes your CAP.
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It would need to be flexible. By which I mean all four carriers had their CAP up to defend against the first USN strikes. As each Zero depleted its ammunition and/or fuel it had to return to its home carrier, thus preventing that carrier from spotting its Vals and Kates for a strike. But it doesn't need to be that way.

Here's where an air ops maximizing doctrine could come into play, but this requires flexible thinking, working radios on the Zeros and the idea that the aircraft and pilots are assigned to the entire KB, not one carrier.

1) Nagumo assigns one carrier to service all four carriers' Zeros, leaving the other three carriers to spot and launch their Vals and Kates.
2) If the CAP carrier is hit, then another surviving carrier is then assigned the CAP support role, leaving the balance of the carriers to spot and launch Vals and Kates.
3) Once the Vals and Kates are launched, all the carriers can begin recovering and rearming their Zeros.

It must have been maddening to be onboard the IJN carriers and watching each of four carriers holding their Vals and Kates below deck whilst each CV individually serviced its own Zeros. I bet someone onboard shouted, if only to themselves "send all the Zeros to one carrier so that the rest of us can launch our bombers!!!"
 
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Admiral Beez said:
1) Nagumo assigns one carrier to service all four carriers' Zeros, leaving the other three carriers to spot and launch their Vals and Kates.
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You can neither spot nor launch a strike when your carriers are under attack. And Nagumo's carriers were under attack much of the morning (from about 07:55-08:25 from Midway's aircraft and then again from 09:25-10:25 from the USN's torpedo squadrons.).
 
33k in the air said:
You can neither spot nor launch a strike when your carriers are under attack.
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Launching sure, but why not spotting? Assuming your fighters are being replenished by another carrier, your aircraft handlers can continue fueling, arming and bringing up aircraft to the flight deck. It's not like the aircraft or their handlers are safer remaining below in the hangar.
 
They had to keep the flight decks clear to recover and launch CAP. The attacks were scattered and uncoordinated. The fighters would be scattered somewhat so not a coordinated recovery/launch sequence for servicing. Those decks also had to be headed into the wind. Those carriers had scattered as well. All the attacks left those flight decks unavailable. And the Midway strike was returning.
 
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Admiral Beez said:
Doctrine explains why it wasn't done, not why it couldn't be done.
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The IJN developed their doctrine over the years against lesser opponents and independant of Western carrier warfare.
So their tactics (to them) were sound.

And the IJN Carrier practice was to recover their attack aircraft and place them belowdecks to refuel and rearm, leaving the deck clear for their CAP operations.

This is one reason why the USN hits against their carriers were so devestating: there was ordnance and fuel vapors (and active fuel lines) below in the confined hangar area which amplified the bombs' damage.

Also, there are several photos taken by attacking SBDs that show A6Ms trying to get aloft when the Dauntlesses attacked, from otherwise clear decks.
 
Good point that man. You need good sailing into the wind to launch heavily laden attack aircraft. Zig zagging and turning crazy ain't that.

Doctrine is doctrine. To use a phrase just because you can doesn't mean you should.

A few points. Dive bombers were armed on deck and engines were started on deck. So that's from cold.

Carriers in ww2 were one trick ponies. You can launch, spot or recover aircraft but not at the same time.

Also Midway was the 2nd carrier battle in history and the Japanese didn't even know that until it was too late.

So no finding the great carrier history book or finding out what Napoleon would do.

Here is a list of chores to launch a strike on a IJN carrier. To launch 20 aircraft would take roughly 45 minutes.

• Bringing the aircraft up to the flight deck
• Spotting the aircraft, unfolding its wings, and chocking wheels
• Warming up engines
• In the case of dive-bombers, arming the aircraft
• Delivering final briefings to the pilots
• Moving crew to planes and performing final preflight checks
• Launching the strike
 

As I remember from reading discussions about this over at Tully's Port, doctrine was indeed the reason; IJN doctrine didn't really allow for swapping air groups between carriers. I'd have to dig into it and see if my recollection is correct or not, so I'm amenable to any corrections those here in the know might offer.
 
Admiral Beez said:
Agreed. But the handlers can still spot the aircraft during these manoeuvres.
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I couldn't be sure about that, what with ships heeling under turns and such. I'm a landlubber so have no experience, but heavy wheeled stuff like ammo carts could, I think, be operational hazards should they escape the control of deck crews, or fuel lines escaping the grasp of the fuelies, that sort of thing.

The only flight lines I've worked were firmly on ground, and even those could be dangerous work-spaces at times.
 
Good points. And i wouldn't want to be trying to load bombs, torpedoes and fuel plus move aircraft under these conditions. Aircraft and men would be sliding all over the flight deck and might fall over the side.



But is the alternative is to be immobilized and potentially die in your hangar until the enemy has been defeated or decided to depart?
 
Admiral Beez said:
Good points. And i wouldn't want to be trying to load bombs, torpedoes and fuel plus move aircraft under these conditions. Aircraft and men might fall over the side.


But the alternative is to die in your hangar.
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The alternative, seems to me, is sail away from Midway while the attack is in the air, and steer headwind for recovery. Tot up a proper four deckloads at a longer, safer range. Launch that, and then start cycling your CAP to cover the fleet as you close for a second recovery.

Easy enough to type on my laptop, though.
 
Admiral Beez said:
Launching sure, but why not spotting? Assuming your fighters are being replenished by another carrier, your aircraft handlers can continue fueling, arming and bringing up aircraft to the flight deck.
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Fueled and armed aircraft on deck are an explosion and conflagration waiting to happen should an enemy aircraft happen by. As it was, the Japanese had fueled and armed aircraft on the hangar deck — consider the results after USN Dauntlesses put a few bombs into them.

Or you can look at the USS Franklin, which in March 1945 was hit by a pair of bombs while fueled and armed aircraft were on its flight deck. The ship was nearly lost as a result.
 
For the IJN carriers, the rules were, if enemy aircraft were spotted, fuel lines were to be drained and the hangar(s) were to be force-vented to clear vapors and ordnance was to be either stowed or secured.
This proceedure saved several Japanese carriers in several battles, but there was no warning of the SBDs' approach at Midway.
 
GrauGeist said:
For the IJN carriers, the rules were, if enemy aircraft were spotted, fuel lines were to be drained and the hangar(s) were to be force-vented to clear vapors and ordnance was to be either stowed or secured.
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[emphasis added]

The reading I've done indicates that the emboldened practice was not followed at Midway, due to the order-counterorder-disorder flow of events. What I've read (fair notice, I haven't yet read Shattered Sword, but have read Prange), bombs and torpedoes through the processes weren't expedited to magazines in that battle, which added to the conflagrations.

I can't offer much about the fuel lines or hangar-ventilation in this particular battle, but I suspect the dive-bombing happened quickly enough that those ops probably didn't have time to be accomplished.
 
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