Reluctant Poster
Tech Sergeant
- 1,700
- Dec 6, 2006
And yet the Japanese put together scratch surface forces all the time and were very successful with them.
Why was Nagumo in command at Santa Cruz?
- Thread starter Admiral Beez
- Start date
Ad: This forum contains affiliate links to products on Amazon and eBay. More information in Terms and rules
Thumpalumpacus
Major
I know they did. It makes the reluctance to do so with Zuikaku more baffling, to me. Perhaps Nagumo was more doctrinaire than others? Or perhaps he didn't feel Shokaku's group could be honed for ops on Zuikaku? I mean, at Savo, what was essentially a IJN scratch force mauled the Allies.
I've always wondered about the decision to leave Zuikaku out -- who took it, and why.
I've always thought that the IJN should have sent Yamato and the other battleships forward on the night of 3 June to arrive off Midway at dawn on 4 June to bombard the island's airfields. This would have forced the USN carriers to into a terrible decision: Attack the IJN battleships, and thereby revealing their presence to the IJN, or risk losing the island's airfields.
Last edited:
SaparotRob
Unter Gemeine Geschwader Murmeltier XIII
To answer the thread's question: Admiral Nagumo was in charge because, in a strictly hierarchical military, he was slated to fill that position. Admiral Yamamoto was not pleased with Admiral Nagumo's performance at Pearl Harbor. No third strike. Even as lofty a being as Admiral Yamamoto couldn't replace him.
As to Nagumo's closing on TF 16, I imagine that's what a torpedo guy would do. Compare that with his Midway opponent, Admiral Spruance.
Admiral Spruance was a member of the gun club. However, Admiral Spruance was there by Admiral Nimitz's choice. Spruance filled in for Admiral Bill Halsey. Admiral Spruance was selected for perceived ability which he did demonstrate. After the sinking of the four enemy carriers, Admiral Spruance (a black shoe admiral) chose to open up the range between the two forces.
The U.S. military was no stranger to "shake ups". The IJN seems less flexible.
As to Nagumo's closing on TF 16, I imagine that's what a torpedo guy would do. Compare that with his Midway opponent, Admiral Spruance.
Admiral Spruance was a member of the gun club. However, Admiral Spruance was there by Admiral Nimitz's choice. Spruance filled in for Admiral Bill Halsey. Admiral Spruance was selected for perceived ability which he did demonstrate. After the sinking of the four enemy carriers, Admiral Spruance (a black shoe admiral) chose to open up the range between the two forces.
The U.S. military was no stranger to "shake ups". The IJN seems less flexible.
Thumpalumpacus
Major
I've never considered that, but I do like that idea. It's akin to the Henderson Field bombardment of 13-14 Oct 42 with an actual follow-up landing and/or air attack to take advantage of the damage inflicted, and perhaps provides the BBs daylight air-cover as well on their withdrawal depending on circumstances if the IJN carriers aren't too far behind.
Yamamoto's dispersal of forces was a crucial Japanese mistake. A combined-arms attack-- air and sea bombardment -- would have made the plan more coherent, imo.
SaparotRob
Unter Gemeine Geschwader Murmeltier XIII
I think that Admiral Yamamoto should have just taken the combined forces initially and closed with everything he had. Forget the Aleutians. Instead of all those clever moves just do "Hulk Smash".
Thumpalumpacus
Major
When you have mass, apply it at the point of contact. There's no shame in a dull victory, nor any honor in a complex defeat.
SaparotRob
Unter Gemeine Geschwader Murmeltier XIII
This was after all, THE DECISIVE BATTLE.
GrauGeist
Generalfeldmarschall zur Luftschiff Abteilung
The point of the Aleutian portion of the attack, was to take it by surprise.
However, had the IJN focused their full force on Midway and taken it, they could have then moved on to the Aleutians and taken it without worrying about losing any element of surprise.
The US, having lost Midway Atoll, would have most likely assumed Hawaii (or another Hawaiian island/atoll) would be next and pulled in assets to protect the area, leaving the way clear to the Behring Strait.
However, had the IJN focused their full force on Midway and taken it, they could have then moved on to the Aleutians and taken it without worrying about losing any element of surprise.
The US, having lost Midway Atoll, would have most likely assumed Hawaii (or another Hawaiian island/atoll) would be next and pulled in assets to protect the area, leaving the way clear to the Behring Strait.
Not so easy as that. German radios wouldn't have solved the problem without huge improvements in the ignition shielding and static electrical bonding on IJN aircraft. They were electronic noisemakers to an astounding degree. One of my uncles was a radioman on a destroyer off Okinawa that survived three kamikaze near misses, and he said each plane made loud crackling static noises on his equipment as it missed the ship's mast by mere feet and splashed into the drink.
It wasn't Nagumo's choice to make. I'm sure that, given his druthers, he would have preferred to have Zuikaku along, even with a reduced air group. Shokaku was in custody of ships repair and Zuikaku in outfitting and training, both separate fiefdoms with their own agendas and protocols, so neither was available. A Yorktown-at-Pearl style 72 hour miracle was just not going to happen unless Yamamoto started violating boundaries and rattling cages, and he was too confident in the outcome of Operation M to do anything so undecorous as that.
33k in the air
Staff Sergeant
- 1,356
- Jan 31, 2021
It should be remembered that the seizure of the Aleutians and Midway were really sideshows to the main goal of the operation: the destruction of the USN carriers. The point of the Aleutians was to draw off and delay the American carriers while Midway was attacked, at which point that would bring the USN flattops to Midway where the IJN's carriers would engage and sink them.
Neither the Aleutians nor Midway offered much to Japan's defensive perimeter. Japan would arguably have been better off if it simply used its superior forces to sail right up to the key island(s) it thought it still needed and dared the USN to try and stop them in a straight-up battle.
Thumpalumpacus
Major
If ever there was a bang-on-the-desk moment, that discussion would be it. One more deck, 50 more planes, and you pass that up? If you're looking to land a knockout, you put your all into it.
20 more fighters to help fly CAP or escort, 30 more bombers to help with striking. Yamamoto wasn't averse to rattling cages -- he'd threatened resignation if the PH attack was denied -- and I think he made a mistake not ordering this apparent contravention of doctrine.
In hindsight, perfectly true. However, Yamamoto, and IJN aviation in general, was suffering from "victory disease", you know, that heady feeling of invincibility you get when the chips keep falling your way in defiance of the laws of probability. They envisioned the USN CVs cowering in Pearl Harbor after the drubbing they had supposedly experienced in the Coral Sea, and that it would take extreme provocation to lure them reluctantly out to their destruction. Read Shattered Sword.
GrauGeist
Generalfeldmarschall zur Luftschiff Abteilung
Keep in mind that there were two Escort carriers with Yamamoto's main fleet that saw NO action at Midway, which had between them additional A6Ms, torpedo bombers and dive bombers...
Peter Gunn
Master Sergeant
Maybe, Nimitz was after the IJN carriers just like Yammamoto wanted the American CV's. By 0530 on June 4, the PBY's had found KdB and by 0600 Fletcher had already decided to launch TF16's strike, holding TF17 (Yorktown) in reserve, but followed TF17's 0700 launch about 50 minutes later.
Had the BB's showed up to bombard Midway it certainly would have thrown a curve to Fletcher, but the US was expecting just that, a pre-invasion shore bombardment, Midway, while an important cog in the wheel, was expendable in a sense and its airfields were secondary to the battle. They were a convenient unsinkable carrier but not the final arbiter of victory. Nimitz knew if it did fall, he could retake it at his choosing, this was not a "to the last carrier" defense, indeed Fletcher had orders to back off if things went awry and let Midway take care of itself as best it could. Midway the battle, from the USN perspective, was about destroying IJN CV's whilst preserving Yorktown, Hornet and Enterprise. Fletcher knew that once IJN carriers were out of the way, he could deal with IJN BB's at his leisure.
A bigger "what if" is how about Hornet's strike destroys Hiryu at the same time as the Akagi, Kaga and Soryu instead of what they historically did? Yorktown lives to fight another day i.e. Solomons and any IJN surface forces are totally screwed if they even come near Midway or TF16 & 17.
Peter Gunn
Master Sergeant
True in the first part, the IJN's goal was the destruction of the USN carriers, but as Shattered Sword revealed, the Aleutians operation was actually a separate entity all unto itself with its own logistics and fleet train. The Japanese planned the Aleutians thrust to forestall any US incursion of the home islands from the North Pacific, not realizing how ridiculous that was in the scheme of things. It was not a feint to draw American carriers north.
Agreed.
Thumpalumpacus
Major
Well, yeah, they had VD, many books I've read mention that aspect.
The Basket
Senior Master Sergeant
- 3,712
- Jun 27, 2007
To sail to Midway was an enormous risk as there are no nearby bases.
Any mission killed crippled vessels are in a world of hurt trying to get back.
Even Yamato would be up poop creek if she got hit.
So let's talk about the 4 cruisers Mogami, Mikuma, Suzuya and Kumano whose role was the bombardment of Midway. Imagine if the 4 cruisers were with the Kido Butai instead. More targets, more flak and the float planes from the cruisers could have added to the recon. Maybe big deal maybe not.
Mikuma was lost so using Yamato or the Kongos under the air umbrella of American air power would be a dodgy prospect unless you can do it under nightfall.
Any mission killed crippled vessels are in a world of hurt trying to get back.
Even Yamato would be up poop creek if she got hit.
So let's talk about the 4 cruisers Mogami, Mikuma, Suzuya and Kumano whose role was the bombardment of Midway. Imagine if the 4 cruisers were with the Kido Butai instead. More targets, more flak and the float planes from the cruisers could have added to the recon. Maybe big deal maybe not.
Mikuma was lost so using Yamato or the Kongos under the air umbrella of American air power would be a dodgy prospect unless you can do it under nightfall.
If Yamamoto had the foresight (as RCAFson suggested) to see beyond his VD and pull a "Nimitz move" and send all his heavy iron on an overnight sprint to bombard Midway's airfields at first light on the 4th, things would have gone a lot differently. The continued harrassment that left KB vulnerable to the SBDs at 10:20 wouldn't have occurred so effectively, KB would probably have gotten the jump on TFs 16&17, and the long sought "decisive battle" likely turned out "not necessarily in our (America's) favor". Ultimate gamble for ultimate victory, but Yamamoto wouldn't see it through his rose tinted spectacles.
Last edited:
