Why was Nagumo in command at Santa Cruz?

[GrauGeist]

At the very least, with the combined Japanese fleet off the coast of Midway Atoll, the USN would have had 6 carriers, plus the full fleet to weed through for target selection.
This would also mean that the Army, Marine and Navy elements at Midway would have been hard-preased to get any aircraft up due to the shelling which in turn would have freed up Nagumo's CAP for any inbound elements from the USN's carrier force.
Additionally, the concentration of the IJN's capitol ships amongst their carriers would have meant a better AA screen, more scouting aircraft and better ASW against USN subs.

 

[XBe02Drvr]

KB would probably have gotten the jump on TFs 16&17

Addendum to the above: If Cdr Genda had been on top of his game, instead of in sickbay under the weather, a more effective dawn search might have been launched from KB. The American task forces would likely have been located earlier, while KB had a significant range advantage. What was launched was a standard low probability doctrine search pattern. Given the stakes, Genda likely would have opted (my opinion here) for a more aggressive search if he was in the loop and on top of his game. He escaped from sickbay and dragged himself to Akai's bridge in pajamas to watch the first Midway strike launch.

 

[XBe02Drvr]

Additionally, the concentration of the IJN's capitol ships amongst their carriers would have meant a better AA screen, more scouting aircraft and

This would have been too large a doctrine deviation to swallow. IJN viewed individual maneuverability as far superior to massed firepower in defense against air attack, and had developed it to a fine art. They wouldn't want to be hemmed in by a large gaggle of ships in close proximity. Their approach would likely be to send the BBs and CAs inshore with a few DDs and leave the CLs and remaining DDs with the CVs at sufficient distance to make any land based aircraft have to reach out near their fuel limits. Remember, IJN had no awareness of medium or heavy bombers at Midway, so would have been thinking of approximately 200 mile combat radius for defending aircraft.
Remember, IJN CA and CL ships had ASW capabilities and torpedoes that were only seen on DDs and DEs in western navies.

 

[GrauGeist]

When I say "concentration", I'm meaning a combined fleet in proximity.

Kido Butai was thinly protected by Capitol ships and seperated from the main battle group, which was a considerable distance away.
With the full fleet drawn together and working as a cohesive unit, it would have presented a challenge.
With a layered shelling arrangement of select cruisers closer to the Atoll and battlewagons laying further out with the carriers forming a fluid perimeter with appropriate screens, it would have been a gauntlet for USN attack aircraft.

 

[The Basket]

Too much going on.

Typical Japanese plan. Too complex and no flexibility.

The invasion of Midway just added to the mess and then attacking the base was more spanners in the works.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Mikuma was lost so using Yamato or the Kongos under the air umbrella of American air power would be a dodgy prospect unless you can do it under nightfall.

That's how I was envisioning my ATL, under nightfall, and why I mentioned air-cover for a daylight withdrawal of the BBs: a nighttime shelling a la 13-14 October upon Henderson Field, turn around about 4am, and if needed have a CAP over the battlewagons for the early morning.

I like RCAF's idea, and under the circumstances I mention above, think it could have been doable -- and perhaps better than what unfolded. Making synergy work for you in operations was still a fledgling art at that time, though. I'm definitely guilty of hindsight on that score.

A daylight bombardment would certainly not be wise, as you say. But concentrating their forces and sequencing them well (nighttime BB bombardment, sunrise airstrike?) would, I think, be both possible and have better potentials. They had the numbers and the skill to do it had they decided on it.

 

[Reluctant Poster]

That's how I was envisioning my ATL, under nightfall, and why I mentioned air-cover for a daylight withdrawal of the BBs: a nighttime shelling a la 13-14 October upon Henderson Field, turn around about 4am, and if needed have a CAP over the battlewagons for the early morning.

I like RCAF's idea, and under the circumstances I mention above, think it could have been doable -- and perhaps better than what unfolded. Making synergy work for you in operations was still a fledgling art at that time, though. I'm definitely guilty of hindsight on that score.

A daylight bombardment would certainly not be wise, as you say. But concentrating their forces and sequencing them well (nighttime BB bombardment, sunrise airstrike?) would, I think, be both possible and have better potentials. They had the numbers and the skill to do it had they decided on it.

Sinking Yamato would be far, far more difficult than sinking Mikuma. Mikuma was an own goal in that its torpedoes did it in. The amount of punishment Yamato and Musashi took before succumbing was enormous. Taking into account how poor US torpedoes were in 1942 and the size of the forces the USN had available in 1944 compared to what it had at Midway I don't believe the USN had the capability to sink the Yamato at that time.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Sinking Yamato would be far, far more difficult than sinking Mikuma. Mikuma was an own goal in that its torpedoes did it in. The amount of punishment Yamato and Musashi took before succumbing was enormous. Taking into account how poor US torpedoes were in 1942 and the size of the forces the USN had available in 1944 compared to what it had at Midway I don't believe the USN had the capability to sink the Yamato at that time.

All very true, but neither the Japanese nor the Americans knew that at the time, meaning the Americans would possibly throw the kitchen-sink at it, and the Yamato would probably shrug it off. The Japanese would still have fighters overhead to cover the withdrawal of BBs, and I'd do the same were I in charge. The Japanese themselves were the only military at the time that had sunk a BB and a BC while at sea with airpower. I don't doubt they'd be wary and post a CAP, your correct point notwithstanding, because it was the lack of a CAP that cost the UK PoW and Repulse.

 

[The Basket]

You will not sink Yamato but you can easy enough mission kill her.

Or reduce her speed so she becomes a piñata for every sub in town.

Yamato become too precious to use when a faster Kongo or cruiser will do.

 

[Admiral Beez]

And yet the Japanese put together scratch surface forces all the time and were very successful with them.

Combine British AFD 1942 carrier specs (radar, FDO, armoured deck, fire control) with Japanese aircraft and slightly modified doctrine and they'd crush all comers.

 

[J_Riley]

I'm a little late to the game (also new here, hi!) so I will just try to hit a couple points. In the various reading I have done, a big part of having everyone spread out for Yamamoto was his thinking that if he brought the entire fleet en masse, the USN would stay home. That goes back to another point a poster made (several pages ago) about USN being scared.

As far as doctrine, most of the salient points have been covered. One thing that has always surprised me is why the Japanese never employed carriers like Shoho and Zuiho as solely CAP carriers. They could carry 30 A6M's with little issue and allow the big carriers to focus on what they focused on anyway - offense. I never really understood what good it did for Zuiho to run around with a dozen B5N's or D3A's. They learned something from Midway, because by October 1942 Zuiho was only carrying 6 B5Ns and 18 A6M's...why not take the plunge and just go all fighters and handle the CAP? [as an aside, I have read that not every A6M was even equipped with a radio, but they definitely needed more and better CAP organization and communication]

Why did Nagumo turn toward the USN carriers? Not even just Hiryu, but the ENTIRE group of carriers, once the USN carriers were spotted? When they were recovering the Midway strike and obviously vulnerable? I understand the attack mantra, but that doesn't mean you have to be foolhardy....Japanese carrier planes, even in 1944 (philippine sea) had a significant range advantage over the Americans. Why not turn AWAY, recover the Midway strike, put some distance between you and essentially, you control the engagement due to your range advantage. Yes, I know, you have to turn into the wind to recover or launch, but I am pretty sure the prevalent wind direction was not such that they had to head toward the USN to land the Midway strike. The goal of the plan should have been clear - we're here to sink the USN carriers above ALL else. Midway is the bait. Of course, they didn't think the USN carriers would be there when they first hit Midway.

Someone else mentioned the Aleutians operation. Let's remember that a mere 6 weeks before Midway, the Doolittle raid had hit Japan. They got as close to Japan as they did roughly by using the same tactic the Pearl Harbor strike force did - stay north out of the sea lanes and more out of sight. Kiska, Attu etc were seen as another extreme route to do the same thing, and bases to possibly help spot such a force. As far as a distraction, that's counter to the decisive battle plan, isn't it? The Japanese WANTED the USN carriers to come to Midway, they wanted to destroy them. I have read an account or two that stated that hitting Dutch Harbor etc was intended so that the USN carriers engaged at Midway could not interfere...but I have a problem with that cause they hit Dutch Harbor FIRST, on the 3rd of June. In any event, it was not an operation designed as a diversion.

Finally, the point of the post, why did Nagumo keep his job? A good question, cause Inoue lost his after Coral Sea, which was certainly more successfully than Midway was. Similarly, even though he smoked the allies at Savo Island, Mikawa was eventually rebuked for not hitting the transports and eventually was blamed for the slipshod Guadalcanal campaign and relegated to obscurity largely. So who's left to command Japan's carriers after Midway? Other than Ozawa, I think Nagumo was the only vice admiral with carrier experience. I think the Japanese system could not put a rear admiral in charge of the carrier forces with an experienced vice admiral around. Many have made the point that given the conflicting orders given for the Midway operation, there was little any commander could do to achieve victory, but Nagumo had proven to be conservative and somewhat timid since Pearl Harbor, but he was given a LOT more chances, it seems, than any other admiral in charge of carriers. But if it was me, if I was Yamamoto, after Midway, Ozawa gets the job in July, not November

 

[33k in the air]

Or reduce her speed so she becomes a piñata for every sub in town.

Except for the fact that U.S. submarines at that time were cursed with the early Mk 14 torpedo. The USS Nautilus valiantly conducted several attacks during Midway, but was let down by its torpedoes.

 

[GrauGeist]

The USS Tambor (SS-198) was responsible for the collision between the Mogami and Mikuma, too.

 

[Shortround6]

Japanese did not know how bad the US torpedoes were. While they would know or expect the US torpedoes were not as good as their own the true extent of the problems were unknown.

Nagumo maybe getting a bit of bum rap. He was a little bit like Jellicoe in WW I. If he really screwed up he could lose the war in a day and he knew it before the operation/s started.

AS far as using the Battleships and Cruisers for bombardment.
1. On June 3rd the Americans spotted Japanese ships over 500 miles from Midway with a PBY and B-17s. The Americans failed to spot anything but the transports but the possibility was there.
2. how many hours of darkness were there? Japanese were flying planes off the carriers at 4-4:30 in the morning, 9 hours perhaps from nautical dusk to nautical dawn? How far can the ships travel in that time? Running a within a couple of knots of top speed is risking mechanical breakdowns.
3. Japanese AA was not any better than anyone else's, in fact most of their battleships and cruisers had eight 5 in DP guns (Yamato had 12) and their light AA was pretty poor. The 5in/40 had a rate of fire about 2/3rds that of the US 5in Aa guns. The 25mm was not a good gun (rate of fire and magazine capacity) , the mounts vibrated too much and there weren't enough of them.

How much the Japanese knew about US AA I don't know. I will note that later large US ships with 5in/38s had 400 rounds or more per gun, about double the earlier US ships and double the ammunition the Japanese ships had for their 5in AA guns. Expecting Japanese battleships and cruisers to act in the AA role in 1942 like US ships did in late 1942 and in 1943/44 may be asking to much.

 

[Admiral Beez]

Japanese did not know how bad the US torpedoes were.

Poor intel, willful competitive blindfulness and misplaced exceptionalism was what got Japan into the entire mess of the Second World War.

 

[The Basket]

The naval bombardment idea....

Take 4 obsolete cruisers with obsolete destroyer escort and have them shoot up Midway in a night action.

Daylight, any surviving strike aircraft are going to launch against this force. Not against the carriers and you don't need a strike force from the carriers so clear decks.

Problem is that American has broken the codes so are going to be aware of the game plan.

Problem is that all were yes men as the no men were 6 feet under.

Military and national extremism got Japan in this mess and, by jove, it was in for the ride.

Common sense and logic left the chat a long time ago and the ones left were drinking the kool-aid.

So cowabunga it is.

 

[Shortround6]

Misinformation, willful blindfulness and misplaced exceptionalism was what got Japan into the entire mess of the Second World War.

That may be true but when suggesting alternative strategies /tactics for the Japanese in various battles we have the luxury of knowing how bad the US torpedoes were. The Japanese should have been planning on the American torpedoes working as well as a normal compressed air wet heater torpedo.

 

[SaparotRob]

The American torpedoes had actually worked a month or so earlier at the Battle of the Coral Sea. The IJN had every reason to be wary of torpedo attack.

 

[GrauGeist]

The American torpedoes had actually worked a month or so earlier at the Battle of the Coral Sea. The IJN had every reason to be wary of torpedo attack.

It was a crap-shoot if the torpedoes worked or not.
And in the case of the USN's subs, they occasionally worked OR they ran true and struck the enemy's hull with a "thud".
There were a few instances where it would start descending, missing the ship/boat altogether and once in a while, it would circle back toward the sub - and sadly, in those instances (if the sub wasn't able to dive fast enough), the torpedo's warhead worked...

 

[33k in the air]

Japanese did not know how bad the US torpedoes were.

The USN didn't know either. Or at least, it was in serious denial about problems with its submarine torpedoes.