Why was Nagumo in command at Santa Cruz?

[Reluctant Poster]

One more case, perhaps, of a bad read of the enemy by Yamamoto. One of the big reasons behind split up forces, and the main body being so far back was Yamamoto thought if they knew the entire combined fleet was at Midway, the USN might just stay home and leave Midway to its fate, and of course the Japanese wanted the decisive battle and chance to sink the USN carriers once and for all.

It's easy for us to look back in hindsight and point out all the blunders, knowing what we know. At the time, Yamamoto continued to misread the enemy and think they wouldnt come out and fight if they face too great odds. And one has to wonder, if the entire force of 6 carriers of the Kido Butai is there (what if they also had Junyo and Ryujo and Zuiho, for NINE carriers?), and the US has basically 2.5 carriers and largely ALL their carriers in the pacific at the time, DO they come out to contest Midway?

You don't need battleships to sink carrier. Japan's very capable heavy cruisers were more than adequate. Yamamoto doesn't know that the US is reading his messages so he should not be basing his decisions on not scaring the Americans.
If the Americans were willing to abandon Midway, Midway was the wrong target

 

[Shinpachi]

I find it amazing that after Midway, the IJN kept Nagumo in charge of their carrier force for the October 1942 Battle of Santa Cruz.

Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands - Wikipedia

Was Nagumo politically connected? Was he really the best Admiral available?

Yamamoto gave Nagumo a chance to redeem himself. Yamamoto liked Nagumo because Nagumo was loyal unlike other Admirals as Yamamoto's rivals. Yamamoto thought himself being responsible for Pearl Harbor and Midway regardless the results as Nagumo only did his best for Yamamoto. This brotherhood would have been IJN's tradition since the Battle of Tsushima.

 

[Admiral Beez]

You don't need battleships to sink carrier. Japan's very capable heavy cruisers were more than adequate. Yamato doesn't know that the US is reading his messages so he should not be basing his decisions on not scaring the Americans.
If the Americans were willing to abandon Midway, Midway was the wrong target

Best way for Japan to kill the USN's carriers was their big, long range, lance-armed submarines. Instead of Pearl Harbour. And Japan should know where they are, WA, CA, etc.

 

[Shortround6]

Best way for Japan to kill the USN's carriers was their big, long range, lance-armed submarines. Instead of Pearl Harbour. And Japan should know where they are, WA, CA, etc.

The Japanese were certainly trying that. It was part of the Japanese submarine doctrine. Submarines were to accompany or proceed the fleet and either cause attrition before the battle or take part in the battle. Japanese submarine doctrine was not biased towards supply ships/merchant men.

However Japanese submarines did NOT have the big 24in torpedoes that the cruisers and destroyers had.

They used a 21 in torpedo about 1000kg lighter, Still very dangerous but Submarines also have limited visibility when submerged. They can't shoot at what they can't see and a periscope a few feet above the water cannot see anywhere near as far as crewmen in the upper works or masts of surface ships. If submerged it was also almost pure luck if the enemy ship would pass close enough for a torpedo shot.

Japanese could have done a better job of mining US harbor inlets/outlets.

 

[Reluctant Poster]

The Japanese were certainly trying that. It was part of the Japanese submarine doctrine. Submarines were to accompany or proceed the fleet and either cause attrition before the battle or take part in the battle. Japanese submarine doctrine was not biased towards supply ships/merchant men.

However Japanese submarines did NOT have the big 24in torpedoes that the cruisers and destroyers had.

They used a 21 in torpedo about 1000kg lighter, Still very dangerous but Submarines also have limited visibility when submerged. They can't shoot at what they can't see and a periscope a few feet above the water cannot see anywhere near as far as crewmen in the upper works or masts of surface ships. If submerged it was also almost pure luck if the enemy ship would pass close enough for a torpedo shot.

Japanese could have done a better job of mining US harbor inlets/outlets.

Japanese submarines did take out Wasp and applied the coup de grace to the Yorktown.

 

[XBe02Drvr]

Probably because Midway was still in American hands when the Doolittle raid launched? Just sayin'...

All the more reason to grab it and prevent another Doolittle. These Doolittles, they worry His Majesty.

 

[XBe02Drvr]

If the Americans were willing to abandon Midway, Midway was the wrong target

How was Yamamoto supposed to know that?

 

[Admiral Beez]

Japanese submarines did take out Wasp and applied the coup de grace to the Yorktown.

Submarines sank at least eighteen carriers, including USS Wasp, Yorktown, Block Island, Liscome Bay; HMS Ark Royal, Courageous, Eagle, Audacity, Avenger; and IJNS Chuyo, Shinano, Shinyo, Shōkaku, Taihō, Taiyō, Unryū, Unyō and the IJAS Akitsu Maru. The best way to sink a carrier does seem to be with a submarine.

 

[Reluctant Poster]

How was Yamamoto supposed to know that?

I'm saying he shouldnt shorten his bench so as not to scare the Americans. You always go into battle with as much as you have.

 

[XBe02Drvr]

And Japan should know where they are, WA, CA, etc.

Maybe, but sometimes their Intel fell a little short of the mark.

 

[J_Riley]

You don't need battleships to sink carrier. Japan's very capable heavy cruisers were more than adequate. Yamamoto doesn't know that the US is reading his messages so he should not be basing his decisions on not scaring the Americans.
If the Americans were willing to abandon Midway, Midway was the wrong target

Yes, I am sure he would have done something completely different if he had known they were reading his messages. After Midway, he had to start to suspect...hmmm, American carriers showed up at Coral Sea, and a month later they are there, waiting for us, gotten past our sub picket lines, over 1000 miles north of the Coral Sea.

So yes, he doesn't know they are reading his signals, 100%. In fact, he assumes they are not and are only going on recon intel and possibly radio traffic, which is why the IJN observed radio silence. THEREFORE, Yamamoto keeps his main body back, so they cannot be spotted by PBYs from Midway and reported. Remember, the plan was the Japanese HITTING Midway draws the USN out to fight, after the initial strikes, the plan was never predicated on the USN already being there. Again, think about what was going on, what the plan was, not what we know 70+ years later. Obviously, the Japanese are not completely foolhardy and searched for enemy ships, just in case.

I think if the US intel says the Japanese are fielding NINE carriers, 7 of them being Fleet carriers, 10 battleships, 15 cruisers and 50 destroyers, yes, 100% the USN stays home with their 3 carriers, 8 cruisers and 15 DDs. As it was, 4 vs 3 and they KNEW the odds, they were still governed by not risking their carriers without a good chance of heavily punishing the Japanese carriers in exchange....what did Nimitz call it, calculated risk? 3:1 odds in carriers, your ONLY carriers in the Pacific at that exact moment, and hell yeah they leave Midway to its fate. If they lose those 3 carriers, they have Saratoga and if they are desperate, Ranger, until they can get the Wasp to the Pacific. Then they have to wait until Essex carriers start rolling out in early 1943. Even then, they are still outnumbered and will be reduced to raids again for the rest of 1942.

Would the US have showed up if they knew the Japanese were going to have all 6 (i.e. Zui & Shokaku) big carriers? Maybe, but those are still long odds, even with the element of surprise. Force multiplication says 2 carriers are 4x more powerful than 1 carrier, or 4 carriers are 4x more powerful than 2 carriers...the principle is something to that effect, to basically say 2:1 odds is not 2x more powerful than your force, but actually at least 4x more powerful. In other words, the ratio of numbers was not a linear relationship to the power they could exert.

Name me ANY island base the Japanese could attack that the Americans would not abandon in the face of overwhelming odds? The Americans didn't believe in suicide missions (though you could almost say the Doolittle Raid was one), and going against 9 carriers with 3 is suicide. There comes a point where you say nothing is worth throwing away those 3 carriers, certainly not a rinky-dink atoll that is largely a glorified sub base and forward base for advance warning. We'll wait until a few more of the Essex carriers being built are off the slipways, and we get the Wasp and Saratoga back, then we'll start our offensive a little farther back and the war will last another year.

Midway was, what 1100 miles, from Hawaii? From the US perspective, who cares? The B-17 can't bomb Hawaii from Midway and get back. The G4M cannot either. Maybe the US doesn't know the G4M can't reach Hawaii, but I think it's a safe guess if a B-17 can't, probably their G4M can't make it. The Japanese cannot possibly support that garrison on Midway, long term. The US could retake that island any time they wanted to, really, unless the Japanese commit serious naval assets to hang around Midway pretty much constantly. Its twice as far Japan to Midway, as it is Pearl Harbor to Midway, almost exactly. The US subs blockade Midway and choke it out pretty quickly.

 

[unkated]

Each carrier's air group operated independently, which is one reason why Zuikaku was not with Kido Butai at Midway: her air group had been depleted at the battle of Coral Sea. Had the IJN adopted a philosophy of co-operation/co-training between air groups, she could have taken aboard Shokaku's remaining air group and/or transferred other air groups aboard to bring her numbers up to operational strength.

Have to differ with you. The Japanese carrier air groups operate as divisions of two. They were way better than the Americans at forming, travelling, and striking in a coordinated fashion than the USN in mid-1942. They did make coordinated strikes, TBs or DBs striking from two directions at the same time.

Contrast that with the USN strike at Midway, where each carrier`s air group scattered, each element moving toward and attacking the enemy more or less alone.

• Each TB squadron attacked alone, each subsequent squadron arriving after the other one had been destroyed. only 1 squadron had any escort, and that was only 1 flight of the four that had been detailed to the attack.
• Hornets DB`s and fighters were together - but flew off in the wrong direction, the CAG leading them far enough away that mot of the fighters were lost by ditching.
• Enterprise`s fighters reached the target at altitude but saw no CAp to fight - they had all dived to beat up the TBs and other random aircraft attack from Midway. After waiting for a signal from their TB squadron that they never received, they flew back without having one anything.
• The Enterprise DBs, having lost their escort and flown past the Kido Butai spotted a Japanese DD in a hurry to go somewhere and got lucky on two counts - having spotted the destroyer, and after the CAp was down low, having beaten up the USN TBs. Yorktown`s DBs showed up a few minutes later - also without fighter escort, by luck rather than plan or instruction.

That does not sound very coordinated to me.

The USN did have a more coordinated defense, in that radar provided them a single picture of the whole area, and they had appointed one fighter director to coordinate for the area, a all three task forces operated at some distance from each other.

The USN got better at coordinated strikes by Santa Cruz.

USN organizational doctrine did make it easier to change air groups and squadrons than the IJN, making it easier to bring a carrier back up to strength by swapping whole units. The Japanese would rebuild by bringing new air crew into the existing units, which remained operational. Training up whole spare carrier air units was not a luxury the Japanese could afford.

Uncle Ted

 

[33k in the air]

In fact they were in denial. The history of US torpedoes is sad stoy.

What's fascinating is that the German Kriegsmarine had similar issues with its submarine torpedoes. One can only speculate the difference that might have been made for both submarine services had their torpedoes functioned reliably earlier in the war.

 

[33k in the air]

I wonder about that. If Mavis had been patrolling out of Midway, do you think the Doolittle strike force would have got by undetected? I bet Yamamoto and maybe some others were wondering the same thing. Mavis had pretty long legs.

It would have been difficult to keep supplied and defended. Midway is over 1,000 miles further from Japan than it is from Hawaii (about 2,543 miles versus 1,486 miles). That's a long, vulnerable supply chain.

 

[Admiral Beez]

Maybe, but sometimes their Intel fell a little short of the mark.

The fifth column turned out to be a myth.

 

[SaparotRob]

Probably because Midway was still in American hands when the Doolittle raid launched? Just sayin'...

The funny is for your prior post as well. Can't give more than one award to a post.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Japanese submarines did take out Wasp and applied the coup de grace to the Yorktown.

... not to mention torpedoed Sara a couple of times in 1942 (once off the West Coast, as Beez was suggesting should be done); and sank the CVE Liscome Bay in 1943.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

I'm saying he shouldnt shorten his bench so as not to scare the Americans. You always go into battle with as much as you have.

And if the enemy doesn't show up to fight, you inflict your will upon him. That is the point of war, to read Clausewitz.

 

[GrauGeist]

Have to differ with you. The Japanese carrier air groups operate as divisions of two. They were way better than the Americans at forming, travelling, and striking in a coordinated fashion than the USN in mid-1942. They did make coordinated strikes, TBs or DBs striking from two directions at the same time.

Contrast that with the USN strike at Midway, where each carrier`s air group scattered, each element moving toward and attacking the enemy more or less alone.

• Each TB squadron attacked alone, each subsequent squadron arriving after the other one had been destroyed. only 1 squadron had any escort, and that was only 1 flight of the four that had been detailed to the attack.
• Hornets DB`s and fighters were together - but flew off in the wrong direction, the CAG leading them far enough away that mot of the fighters were lost by ditching.
• Enterprise`s fighters reached the target at altitude but saw no CAp to fight - they had all dived to beat up the TBs and other random aircraft attack from Midway. After waiting for a signal from their TB squadron that they never received, they flew back without having one anything.
• The Enterprise DBs, having lost their escort and flown past the Kido Butai spotted a Japanese DD in a hurry to go somewhere and got lucky on two counts - having spotted the destroyer, and after the CAp was down low, having beaten up the USN TBs. Yorktown`s DBs showed up a few minutes later - also without fighter escort, by luck rather than plan or instruction.

That does not sound very coordinated to me.

The USN did have a more coordinated defense, in that radar provided them a single picture of the whole area, and they had appointed one fighter director to coordinate for the area, a all three task forces operated at some distance from each other.

The USN got better at coordinated strikes by Santa Cruz.

USN organizational doctrine did make it easier to change air groups and squadrons than the IJN, making it easier to bring a carrier back up to strength by swapping whole units. The Japanese would rebuild by bringing new air crew into the existing units, which remained operational. Training up whole spare carrier air units was not a luxury the Japanese could afford.

Uncle Ted

Zuikaku had the remnants of Shokaku's air group when she returned to Japan - did she integrate Shokaku's air group into her own?
No.
Why? Because this was not IJN policy.

USN, USMC and RN could and did integrate air groups aboard their carriers and there were even occasions where USN groups operated from RN carriers.

In the case of Midway, the USN hastily launching their respective groups in an uncoordinated attack has nothing to do with each carrier's air group (IJN or otherwise).

 

[SaparotRob]

... not to mention torpedoed Sara a couple of times in 1942 (once off the West Coast, as Beez was suggesting should be done); and sank the CVE Liscome Bay in 1943.

I was waiting for someone to post that about U.S.S. Saratoga. Talk about mission kill.