Why was Nagumo in command at Santa Cruz?

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Either Tulley or Parshall or perhaps Drachinifel mentioned the kantai kessen or decisive battle. The plan called for whittling down the USN as it closed in on Japan. There were three decisive battles and one decisive campaign by my count. Each time, instead of drawing out the USN to home waters, they came out instead and they themselves were whittled down.
Maybe it was Bismarck and Justin on Military Aviation History who mentioned it.
 
I did not know that.
She had Army and Navy aircraft aboard and was hoped to get their sooner.
Would have been interesting if she were able to join battle, as the first aircraft off would have been P-40s (which were reinforcements for Midway).
 
Over fifty years ago I read a book entitled The Battle of Midway. The author mentioned Admiral Nagumo's surprise of three American aircraft carriers present as the USN had only two. Later on (due to a mistaken scouting report) a fourth American carrier was reported much to his dismay. It also had the "Fuchida Full Flight Decks" ending.
With U.S.S. Saratoga arriving at Midway, it changes the picture for me. A further impetus for Admiral Spruance to retire AND to reinforce his fleet as well. I had thought "just send the battle line and clobber the place" like many others. With that fourth American carrier after all, that would have been a big surprise.
 
An interesting side note, my Uncle was aboard the USS Grayling (SS-209) at Midway and they were mistaken for a Japanese ship and attacked by a B-17 - that's about as much action they saw during the battle.
And out of the 19 US subs on station, only two (Tambor and Nautilus) made contact with the enemy.
I do believe I read about a US sub being attacked by friendly aircraft.
Although only two subs made contact, the mayhem they caused was quite impactful, especially U.S.S. Nautilus.
 
I do believe I read about a US sub being attacked by friendly aircraft.
Although only two subs made contact, the mayhem they caused was quite impactful, especially U.S.S. Nautilus.
The Nautilus (world's largest sub at the time) had a shot at the IJN Kaga, the Tambor caused two IJN cruisers to collide.
As effective as the US Navy's subs were during the Pacific war, they had little contribution to Midway even though it was one of the largest concentration of US submarines in any single battle.
 
The Nautilus (world's largest sub at the time) had a shot at the IJN Kaga, the Tambor caused two IJN cruisers to collide.
As effective as the US Navy's subs were during the Pacific war, they had little contribution to Midway even though it was one of the largest concentration of US submarines in any single battle.

It may not have made a contribution in terms of directly damaging the Japanese ships, but the Nautilus' earlier effort resulted in the destroyer Arashi staying back to deal with the sub, with that same destroyer later being spotted by McClusky which led his dive bombing force to the Japanese carriers.
 
Soryu was not a carrier.

It was a giant fuel/air bomb which could carry aircraft.

Look at the damage HMS Formidable took in comparison.

Soryu was designed and built at a time when IJN early to mid 1930s designs were a bit wonky.

IJN were constrained by treaty and yet would deliberately break them but somehow gave the impression they were keeping within them.

The Mogami class was a good example of this double think. Make a too large cruiser but then make it structurally light so it pretended to be a treaty cruiser. Then watch it snap.

So Soryu was a big carrier without any armour protection and therefore could meet the weight requirements of a treaty which the Japanese were breaking anyway. Er....

Hiryu was not a full sister ship but had a bit more beef but was still pretty light.

Shokaku was a non treaty carrier so the IJN didn't even pretend so it did carry more structure and armour protection which made it survive the hits it took.
 
It may not have made a contribution in terms of directly damaging the Japanese ships, but the Nautilus' earlier effort resulted in the destroyer Arashi staying back to deal with the sub, with that same destroyer later being spotted by McClusky which led his dive bombing force to the Japanese carriers.
Yes, by a stroke of luck, McClusky (using his scouting training) was able to latch onto Arashi.

However, out of 19 submarines, that's as good as it got?
 
Yes, by a stroke of luck, McClusky (using his scouting training) was able to latch onto Arashi.

Undoubtedly. It's a fascinating example of how chance can turn great events. If the Arashi isn't there to follow, does McClusky still locate the carriers? What if Best and his two wingmen hadn't aborted their dive on Kaga to attack the Akagi instead? So many small moments that add up to the larger story. Change one of them; how much does the larger story change?

There's no way to answer that, but the thread that leads from one moment to the next to the next I find intriguing to contemplate.
 
Imagine, if you will, what would have happened if even half of the US subs had engaged Kido Butai before the battle ensued.
TF 7.1 was deployed in a broad screen, but if it had been tighter, or perhaps in a tighter radius even, they would have had more opportunity for contact.
 

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