Why was Nagumo in command at Santa Cruz?

GrauGeist · Mar 2, 2021

The hangars aboard the 4 carriers were in disarray: the strike intended for Midway was cancelled and the aircraft were in the process of being loaded for attacks on the recently spotted US carriers. In their haste, the orderly removal of ordnance was bypassed and allowed to be strewn about along with active fuel lines laying about.
Even if the armorers and crew teams had 10 minute's warning (which was much less than typical), they could have started to secure the hangars for battle.

As has been mentioned before, the Dauntlesses literally appeared out of thin air - the only warning the Japanese had was the sound of their dives, giving them just enough time to look up and realize sh!t was about to get ugly...

Thumpalumpacus · Mar 2, 2021

GrauGeist said:
The hangars aboard the 4 carriers were in disarray: the strike intended for Midway was cancelled and the aircraft were in the process of being loaded for attacks on the recently spotted US carriers. In their haste, the orderly removal of ordnance was bypassed and allowed to be strewn about along with active fuel lines laying about.
Even if the armorers and crew teams had 10 minute's warning (which was much less than typical), they could have started to secure the hangars for battle.

As has been mentioned before, the Dauntlesses literally appeared out of thin air - the only warning the Japanese had was the sound of their dives, giving them just enough time to look up and realize sh!t was about to get ugly...

That's essentially my read of it. Not to mention that Japanese attention had been drawn to lower altitude by earlier, otherwise fruitless attacks from Americans.

GrauGeist · Mar 3, 2021

Thumpalumpacus said:
That's essentially my read of it. Not to mention that Japanese attention had been drawn to lower altitude by earlier, otherwise fruitless attacks from Americans.

Yes, the fleet's CAP had been not only been pulled down by USN torpedo bombers, but had been run ragged by the Midway based attacks.
They were low on fuel and far too low to spot/intercept the inbound SBDs.

The Basket · Mar 3, 2021

Follow orders
What happens if the order is wrong?
Did I stutter?

Giving backchat to an officer in the Imperial Japanese military is not good for your health.

Doctrine is everything. Nagumo cannot be blamed if all he did was follow standard operating procedure.

What did Nagumo do that showed incompetence? If the plan was flawed then not on Nagumo. Falling in the CAP again not on Nagumo. Carriers are giant pipe bombs...not on Nagumo.

Admiral Beez · Mar 3, 2021

GrauGeist said:
As has been mentioned before, the Dauntlesses literally appeared out of thin air

Only because the high altitude CAP broke discipline and dove to join their low altitude breathen in what they perceived to be a turkey shoot.

As the Devastators arrived Nagumo and his air staff must have been wondering where the USN dive bombers were, and should have expected their arrival. Nagumo knows that any strike would include both torpedo and dive bombers, because that's the same for the KB. The Zeros should have been told to remain at HA no matter what.

Is this why Nagumo wasn't removed from command after Midway, that he was considered a victim of circumstance and ill fortune beyond his control?

The Basket said:
What did Nagumo do that showed incompetence? If the plan was flawed then not on Nagumo.

A good and perhaps effective defence. Perhaps this answers my question.

Peter Gunn · Mar 3, 2021

Admiral Beez said:
Only because the high altitude CAP broke discipline and dove to join their low altitude breathen in what they perceived to be a turkey shoot.

Nagumo and his air staff must have been wondering where the USN dive bombers were, and should have expected their arrival. Nagumo knows that any strike would include both torpedo and dive bombers, because that's the same for the KB. The Zeros should have been told to remain at HA no matter what.

Well yes, on the face of it, but IJN CAP was very much a reactive, almost organic thing. A surface ship in the screen would spot EA, would then lay down smoke and fire (usually their main battery) in the direction of the incoming raid. At that moment, any Zeke/Zero flight that saw this began charging over to intercept. Consequently you had CAP from all four carriers going after the same inbound strike, there was no vectoring of units to stay/intercept, they just all went after the raiders.

Also remember that as wonky as USN radio communications were in 1942, in the IJN it was almost non-existent, Japanese aircraft radios of the day were dreadful to the point of them being removed in some cases I believe.

Admiral Beez · Mar 3, 2021

Peter Gunn said:
Well yes, on the face of it, but IJN CAP was very much a reactive, almost organic thing, a surface ship in the screen would spot EA, would then lay down smoke and fire in the direction of the incoming raid. At that moment, any Zeke/Zero flight that saw this began charging over to intercept. Consequently you had CAP from all four carriers going after the same inbound strike, there was no vectoring of units to stay/intercept, they just all went after the raiders.

Also remember that as wonky as USN radio communications were in 1942, in the IJN it was almost non-existent, Japanese aircraft radios of the day were dreadful to the point of them being removed in some cases I believe.

Was radio shielding really such a mysterious tech in the 1930s? Give the Japanese some German radios and operational discipline and Midway is a different battle entirely. The Kido Butai for all its apparent strength was an unfinished beast.

German radar would be useful too, but even the KM failed to put their Freya air search radar onto their warships, instead focusing on anti ship radar.

The Basket · Mar 3, 2021

You could argue with justification that Nagumo was the commander and he lost so gets the seppuku and job done.

But all the faults of the IJN are not his.

So blame him for the failure,of course, but unless you can point to a clear error or fault then I have to be cool with it.

He may have done the best he could have done while in a bad situation.

Admiral Beez · Mar 3, 2021

The Basket said:
You could argue with justification that Nagumo was the commander and he lost so gets the seppuku and job done.

Of note, he shot himself in 1944 rather than choosing the sword.

Circling back to my original question, I now see that Nagumo was relieved after Midway. Vice-Admiral Jisaburō Ozawa took over the Combined Fleet from Nagumo in Nov 1942. Though in October 1943 Nagumo was returned to command the IJN's carrier forces. Chūichi Nagumo - Wikipedia

Peter Gunn · Mar 3, 2021

I believe Nagumo was relieved after the Battle of the Eastern Solomon's but not 100% sure.

Admiral Beez said:
Was radio shielding really such a mysterious tech in the 1930s?

Apparently, in fact even in 1943 Thunderbolts were having issues with radio shielding. I remember reading where the 4th FG had quite a few issues with the radios in the P-47 when they first converted over from Spitfires.

GrauGeist · Mar 3, 2021

One of the key issues with WWII era two-way radios, are the lower frequencies they operated on: high KHz/low MHz.
At those frequencies, it's common to get interference from ignition systems, electric motors, florescent lights and so on. Plus, atmosoheric conditions can have an effect on it as well.
Add to that, the two-way technology of the time, didn't provide good enough shielding and grounding of the radio set and tuning was done via an air-gap. The receiver and transmitter amplifier also had exposed tubes.
So even if the aircraft's ignition system had shielded and grounded ignition wires and resistor spark plugs, the radio set would still get RFI.

Years ago, on my mobile CB radio (typically tuned to 27.175MHz - channel 18), I could clearly hear the Bosch electronic ignition system of a mid-70's VW 411/412 nearby in traffic.

Admiral Beez · Mar 3, 2021

GrauGeist said:
One of the key issues with WWII era two-way radios, are the lower frequencies they operated on: high KHz/low MHz.
At those frequencies, it's common to get interference from ignition systems, electric motors, florescent lights and so on. Plus, atmosoheric conditions can have an effect on it as well.
Add to that, the two-way technology of the time, didn't provide good enough shielding and grounding of the radio set and tuning was done via an air-gap. The receiver and transmitter amplifier also had exposed tubes.
So even if the aircraft's ignition system had shielded and grounded ignition wires and resistor spark plugs, the radio set would still get RFI.

Years ago, on my mobile CB radio (typically tuned to 27.175MHz - channel 18), I could clearly hear the Bosch electronic ignition system of a mid-70's VW 411/412 nearby in traffic.

I think a big issue for Japan is that unlike their postwar reboot, Japan in the 1920s to 40s did not have a big electronics industry or market, nor was the country wealthy enough to keep up with the Jones. I also doubt each home had a radio nor if there was a BBC-like service promoting radio use in Japan. By the mid-1930s many homes in Britain had radios, car radios were common and BBC was broadcasting television programs.

By Sept 1939, Britain with military spending at 9% of GDP was able to build and maintain:

RN: seven aircraft carriers with seven more building (including I72), fifteen battleships/battlecruisers with seven more building (including two Lion class), 66 cruisers with 23 more building, 184 destroyers with 52 more building, and 60 submarines with nine building. Royal Navy in 1939 and 1945
RAF: over 10,000 aircraft, of which 3,500 were front line units, plus a national air intercept radar system.
Army: over 1 million men and a smaller force of tanks and artillery

By comparison, in 1937 Japan was spending 28% of its GDP on the military. By 1939 this likely exceed 30%, to build and maintain a smaller navy and air force than Britain, let alone the USA.

This can't have left much money for radio development for the IJN's aircraft. Nagumo was let down by a lag in technology. Give the IJN radar, radios and effective signals encryption and Midway is a different game, and Nagumo is up there with Nelson as a naval genius.

GrauGeist · Mar 3, 2021

Not sure where that 10,000 aircraft number for Britain comes from.
Britain had several delays in their defense program and by September 1939, the RAF had on strength:
609 fighters
536 bombers
96 recon aircraft.
The Fleet Air Arm had 204 aircraft.
Coastal Command had 216 aircraft.

These numbers would quickly change within the next year (and the Years following), but if Britain had 10,000 aircraft in 1939, Germany would have never had a chance...

Just Schmidt · Mar 3, 2021

The area in which many of the pacific battles were fought imposed special challenges on radio communications, connected to 'local' geo-magnetism. After a brief presentation of the problems relating specifically to the radio installation in the A6M, this video go on to discuss these factors not directly related to (but no doubt exacerbated by), sub optimal radio installations. The relevant part starts about 1:45:30, the geographical peculiarities follows two minutes later.

The A6M Naval Carrier Fighter - Zero or Hero? - YouTube

RCAFson · Mar 3, 2021

GrauGeist said:
Not sure where that 10,000 aircraft number for Britain comes from.
Britain had several delays in their defense program and by September 1939, the RAF had on strength:
609 fighters
536 bombers
96 recon aircraft.
The Fleet Air Arm had 204 aircraft.
Coastal Command had 216 aircraft.

These numbers would quickly change within the next year (and the Years following), but if Britain had 10,000 aircraft in 1939, Germany would have never had a chance...

This is the exact quote:

In September 1939, the RAF had 10,208 aircraft in service, approximately 3,500 being in operational units. Of the latter number, about half were modern.
RAF Squadrons in September 1939.

so the vast majority were probably training aircraft.

Reluctant Poster · Mar 3, 2021

The Basket said:
Good point that man. You need good sailing into the wind to launch heavily laden attack aircraft. Zig zagging and turning crazy ain't that.

Doctrine is doctrine. To use a phrase just because you can doesn't mean you should.

A few points. Dive bombers were armed on deck and engines were started on deck. So that's from cold.

Carriers in ww2 were one trick ponies. You can launch, spot or recover aircraft but not at the same time.

Also Midway was the 2nd carrier battle in history and the Japanese didn't even know that until it was too late.

So no finding the great carrier history book or finding out what Napoleon would do.

Here is a list of chores to launch a strike on a IJN carrier. To launch 20 aircraft would take roughly 45 minutes.

• Bringing the aircraft up to the flight deck
• Spotting the aircraft, unfolding its wings, and chocking wheels
• Warming up engines
• In the case of dive-bombers, arming the aircraft
• Delivering final briefings to the pilots
• Moving crew to planes and performing final preflight checks
• Launching the strike

Yamamoto was the true cause of the Midway disaster. If the Ryujo and Junyo were present instead of being hundreds of miles away in the Aluetians they could have been tasked with CAP or at least contributed to it. Between the 2 of them they carried 30 Zeros. Having the Yamato in the vincinity might have soaked up some of the attackers. As it was the battleship force was just a waste of Japan's limited fuel supply. Yamamoto apparently never read Clausewitz. I think he is one of the most over rated admirals of all time.

Admiral Beez · Mar 3, 2021

RCAFson said:
This is the exact quote:

In September 1939, the RAF had 10,208 aircraft in service, approximately 3,500 being in operational units. Of the latter number, about half were modern.
RAF Squadrons in September 1939.

so the vast majority were probably training aircraft.

And likely spread across the empire.

Admiral Beez · Mar 3, 2021

Reluctant Poster said:
Yamamoto was the true cause of the Midway disaster. If the Ryujo and Junyo were present instead of being hundreds of miles away in the Aluetians they could have been tasked with CAP or at least contributed to it.

Zuikaku should have also been deployed with the Midway attack. Okay, her CAG was depleted at Coral Sea.... but if USS Yorktown can make it to Midway, so can Zuikaku.

Reluctant Poster · Mar 3, 2021

Admiral Beez said:
Zuikaku should have also been deployed with the Midway attack. Okay, her CAG was depleted at Coral Sea.... but if USS Yorktown can make it to Midway, so can Zuikaku.

According to Lundstrom Zuikaku had 24 Zeros ready for action after Coral Sea with 1 more easily repaired. This was more than she started the battle with. Her bomber complement wasn't that bad. 17 Vals and 14 Kates. This would have been a very worthwhile contribution. The other plus is that the more targets the more diluted the attack becomes.

Thumpalumpacus · Mar 3, 2021

Admiral Beez said:
Zuikaku should have also been deployed with the Midway attack. Okay, her CAG was depleted at Coral Sea.... but if USS Yorktown can make it to Midway, so can Zuikaku.

Doctrine aside, you're correct -- but flag officers steeped in doctrine probably find it hard to override. The military culture can be doctrinaire to a fault.

Why was Nagumo in command at Santa Cruz?

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