Soren
I am wondering if your figures for 2.5 million include captured and wounded (and not returned to service). Thereis lot of debate about the figures you are quoting (if that is the source that this figure is derived from). They appear to be based on the reports prepared by OKW for presentation to hitler during the war (the Lage Ost Reports). There is now strong evidence that these reports were innaccurate, the more cynical explanation being that the people responsible were too afraid of him to tell the truth. Guderians chief intelligence officer (Gehlen) was ordered shot when one of his Ostfront situation reports (on which many postwar estimates of Soviet strength were based) were submitted to Hitler for consideration (it now appears likley that Gehlens Intelligence efforts, in the so called "Red Book" reports were shy of actual Soviet strengths by as much as 20%)
More accurate assessment of German Casualties and manpower availability can be made from the manpower returns from the Ersatz Command, which until July 1944 were under the command of General Fromm. This report was not presented to Hitler, so was a little less susceptible to political interference than the Lage Ost reports. It certainly explains better the real manpower shortages that Germany was experiencing in the latter part of the war. With just 2.5 million casualties, and a population of over 50 millions, there is no need for the Germans to recruit old men and boys into their 9.5 million strong armed forces. To put it in a crude form, the statistics and known facts just dont reconcile to each other
There are some researchers who have placed the actual german casualty lists (of all types , including prisoners, wounded and not returned, MIAs and KIAs) as high as 10 million. I personally dont buy that figure at all. Just basing it on the Ersatz manpower returns, it appears to me that the total casualty bill for Germany is in the region of 5.5 to 6.1 million. A demographic analysis indicates that with this number of casualties, the manpower shortages at the end of the war can be explained.
Whether the US study was correct or not, is not really the point, the point is that throughout 1943 and 1944, the Soviets were able to successfully defeat the germans in the field. The Soviets reached a peak strength of 13.2 million men (including the 1 million plus in the Far east) , whilst the total German armed forces strength was 9.5 million (all forces, all fronts, source Ellis) with a peak eastfront strength of about 6.5 million. This means that in terms of manpower (there are other ways of measuring the advantage, but this is one way), the German advantage was something less than 12.2/6.5, or about 1.87 for the war average. However, with that combat ratio, the Russians won convincingly, so the actual point of equilibrium, ie the point that neither side would win, is less than that number, say 1.3-1.5:1. Because the Panzer troops maintained a marked qualitative advantage right till the end, the comparison of Infantry to Infantry is much closer still. Its anybody's guess what that number might be, but it will certainly be approaching 1.2:1 IMO