Wildcat during the Battle of Britain

[RagTag]

Wildcats would be an ideal tool against the He 59's, but so also were Blenheims, Defiants, Ansons, and grandmothers with slingshots!


I tried....

 

[ThomasP]

FWIW I agree about the move. I was thinking the same when I uploaded the Red Cross-Geneva Convention pdfs.

 

[FLYBOYJ]

Hey Joe, would it be possible to get the Seenotdienst comments moved to it's own thread?
This is one of thise cases where a good thread got hijacked by an equally good side discussion.

Agree but It's easier if someone started a new post.

 

[Mad Dog]

......Not all raids into England were high altitude. Plenty of photographs from Do17 crews showing the bomber over their target in the hundreds of feet, not thousands....

At the start of the Battle, the Luftwaffe still mounted many attacks with the Do.17 at low level. But, as the Battle progressed and the targets were further inland, the Luftwaffe switched their bombers to as high an altitude as they could manage, with their escorts stepped up even higher and also sweeping ahead of the raids. By the end of the Battle, any Luftwaffe bombers flying low-level attacks were doing so on those days were they flew singleton nuisance raids in bad weather.

......With Great Britain strapped for fighters, the Martlet would have been a boost to interception numbers.....

Yes, but the actual RAF shortage was in trained pilots. Hawkers in particular kept production humming well ahead of the loss rate, and Fighter Command had considerably more fighters at the end of the Battle than the start, whilst the Luftwaffe had shrunk due to losses. If the production of Hurricanes and Spitfires had not kept pace, the RAF had several local emergency fighter designs (Martin-Baker MB 2 and Miles M.20) that would have been quicker and simpler to introduce than the Martlet.

 

[GrauGeist]

But, as the Battle progressed and the targets were further inland, the Luftwaffe switched their bombers to as high an altitude as they could manage, with their escorts stepped up even higher and also sweeping ahead of the raids. By the end of the Battle, any Luftwaffe bombers flying low-level attacks were doing so on those days were they flew singleton nuisance raids in bad weather.

By September, the Do17 was operating at medium altitudes and by October, was sidelined while the Ju88 and He111 operated at night.

The Do17's production had been halted mid-1940 and unsustainable losses during the Bob along with the Do217 entering production is why it was withdrawn.

 

[Mad Dog]

....the cowl guns on the Tomahawks (and P-39s the British got) were noted for rarely exceeding 500rpm.....The P-40D/E doesn't show up until the middle or fall of 1941 and those should have had M2 guns. Doesn't mean they performed at book performance either to start with......

When the pilots of 112Sq RAF switched from Tomahawks IIBs to Kittyhawk Is (roughly P-40C to P-40D/E) in January 1942, they commented on how much more reliable the nose-mounted Tomahawk's guns were than the wing-mounted Kittyhawk's. Whilst they did get the odd round through the prop due to interrupter gear timing issues with the nose-mounting, they found the nose-mounting reduced the impact of G on the .50s, whereas the wing-mountings were notorious for jamming up during dogfights. The Kittyhawk's wing-mounted .50s were great for level strafing, but they needed the reliability for the air superiority mission against the Bf109Fs. In effect, those two nose-mounted .50s were worth more than four or six wing-mounted .50s because they could still be relied on to fire until the ammo was exhausted. This plus the fact the Kittyhawk Is climbed slower than the Tomahawk made pilots like Neville Duke say they preferred the Tomahawk.

 

[Mad Dog]

.....Remember AT THE TIME of ORDERING the Mustang the Merlin engine DID NOT YET have the 2 stage supercharger !!!!! Why the Brits were NOT too concerned about the single stage supercharged ALLISON !!! Them facts of history....again raising hell with the Brits BULLSHIT stories !!!

I think you are getting confused between single-speed and single-stage superchargers. The Rolls-Royce Merlin III used by the Spitfire and Hurricane in the BoB had one speed and one stage, but its design was to produce maximum power at a higher altitude (the rated altitude) than the single-speed and single-stage Allison V-1710-33 engine used in the P-40C. The USAAC had decided to go with turbocharging for high-altitude requirements and the USAAC requirement for the P-40 was for a fighter to provide low-altitude air superiority over the battlefield, so Allison had designed the V-1710-33's supercharged to be best for lower altitudes. That is why the Tomahawk was judged unsuited to RAF Fighter Command operations in the UK in late 1940, because combats were moving to 30,000ft, an altitude the Tomahawk struggled at. In the Middle East, it was presumed their opponent would be the Italian fighters like the Macchi C200, Fiat CR42 and G50, all of which had even worse altitude performance and speed than the Tomahawk. So the RAF sent the Tomahawks to the Desert and Palestine.
The first production version of the Merlin with a two-speed supercharger was the Merlin X, and this was already in production before the BoB. But it had been designed for bombers, not fighters, and used 87 Octane fuel. Instead, the Merlin III was replaced in the Spitfire II by the Merlin XII, which was still single-speed and single-stage, but had a different impeller to produce more power at a higher rated altitude. The Merlin X was developed into the two-speed Merlin XX with 100 Octane fuel, and this was the engine used in the Hurricane II. The Merlin XX was the first version to benefit from Stanley Hooker's supercharger redesign. In some ways, it might have produced a better Spitfire if the Mk V had got the Merlin XX rather than the Merlin 45. As it was, the first two-stage Merlin was the 61, which didn't appear in production until late 1941.
The Mustang was ordered from North American in May 1940 with the first flight in October 1940, so - in theory - it could have been designed to take the Merlin XII or XX, but the only available and tested inline engine in the US at the time was the V-1710. A Mustang with a Merlin XX would have been superior in speed, range and altitude performance to a Spitfire V, and superior at altitude to the P-51A with the Allison V-1710-81, so it's a great shame the Americans didn't get their finger out and tell the Nazi-loving Henry Ford to make Merlins in 1940.

 

[Mad Dog]

By September, the Do17 was operating at medium altitudes and by October, was sidelined while the Ju88 and He111 operated at night.

The Do17's production had been halted mid-1940 and unsustainable losses during the Bob along with the Do217 entering production is why it was withdrawn.

The Do.17 was an old design, having seen action in the Spanish Civil War, so it's not surprising that production was ended in he Summer of 1940. But, if you look at September 15th 1940, which is celebrated as Battle of Britain Day and considered the height of the Battle, the Dorniers were still operated in the day-bomber role that date by KG2, KG3 and KG76 (one of the latter famously with a flame-thrower mounted to deter fighter attacks!). At this time, the Do.17's replacement, the Ju88 (the Do.217 didn't appear until mid-1941), was operating in numbers, but the pilots actually preferred the old Do.17Z to the Ju88A-1, and the Do.17Zs soldiered on with frontline units until the end of 1941. All KG units were already flying night-bombing operations before the BoB, it's just after September 15th the Luftwaffe switched from day- to night-bombing as the main operational aim. Hitler postponed Sealowe on September 17th because he knew the Luftwaffe had lost, hence the switch to night-bombing, whilst the Jagdgruppen switched to high-altitude and jabo raids. Do.17Z operations tailed off because their airframes were the oldest and most worn-out of the Luftwaffe bombers, but after repairs and refits they went on to operate in 1941 as day-bombers in the Med (particularly over Greece), the Desert and also the early part of Barbarossa with KG2.

 

[Mad Dog]

Wow. Ok.
By a vote here, how many people think hitting the enemy plane with bullets is important in actually shooting him down?
How many people have read John Thach's idea on how to attack a bomber and shoot it down without getting shot down yourself by defensive guns?
Those of you that don't believe training pilots to shoot accurately so they can actually hit the enemy plane, how many of you guys hunt, shoot or actually own guns?
At Midway, John Thach and 2 other Wildcats supposedly engaged around 20 Zeroes at low level. Thach knocked down 3. He didn't have time to take a long steady aim, he fired head on shots of opportunity, BUT he hit them and knocked them down. How? He had practiced! It's like shooting skeet.

If we go skeet shooting I take 10 guys who have 2 weeks training in shooting skeet and you have 10 guys that have never fired a gun, who will have the higher score? Works the same way in air to air gunnery

if a gaggle of 109's is attacking you, you turn and fight. If a Hurricane passes in front of you with a 109 on his tail, wouldn't it be nice if you were trained in deflection shooting so you could actually hit him and knock him of the other Hurricanes tail? When you do make a pass at a bomber wouldn't it be great to be able to actually hit them with a good solid concentrated burst instead of just spraying the sky in the general direction?

111Sq were just one of a number of RAF fighter units that preferred to make head-on attacks on Luftwaffe bomber formations as a matter of choice in 1940, its just opportunities were rare because the RAF fighters were often climbing to catch the bombers, and then didn't have the time to get into position for a head-on attack before being pounced on by the escorts. You seem to be failing to understand the realities of the situation faced by the RAF pilots.
And in fighter-vs-fighter combat, it was widely acknowledged that the Germans did not like getting into level turning fights with Hurricanes or Spitfires because the ME109 couldn't turn as fast as either British fighter, the Germans preferring to hit and run. Your comparison to Thach and the Japanese, who preferred to stay and turn, is invalid.

 

[Mad Dog]

......Perhaps the RAF should have followed the pre-war American example, and just ordered some Bell Airacuda's for bomber interception.....

It Fighter Command had been using only Airacudas then they would definitely have lost!

 

[GrauGeist]

(one of the latter famously with a flame-thrower mounted to deter fighter attacks!)

A prototype that failed to work and was designed to deter stern-on attacks.

Yes, the Do17 was used beyond September 1940, but not in the Bob. It was used in limited numbers in the Balkans and other secondary fronts. The He111 and Ju88 were better suited to the switch to higher altitudes (medium to higher)

Of the many pilot accounts I have read, the pilots transitioning from the "Flying Pencil" to the Ju88 appreciated the Ju88's performance.

 

[yulzari]

The Do.17 was an old design, having seen action in the Spanish Civil War, so it's not surprising that production was ended in he Summer of 1940. But, if you look at September 15th 1940, which is celebrated as Battle of Britain Day and considered the height of the Battle, the Dorniers were still operated in the day-bomber role that date by KG2, KG3 and KG76 (one of the latter famously with a flame-thrower mounted to deter fighter attacks!). At this time, the Do.17's replacement, the Ju88 (the Do.217 didn't appear until mid-1941), was operating in numbers, but the pilots actually preferred the old Do.17Z to the Ju88A-1, and the Do.17Zs soldiered on with frontline units until the end of 1941. All KG units were already flying night-bombing operations before the BoB, it's just after September 15th the Luftwaffe switched from day- to night-bombing as the main operational aim. Hitler postponed Sealowe on September 17th because he knew the Luftwaffe had lost, hence the switch to night-bombing, whilst the Jagdgruppen switched to high-altitude and jabo raids. Do.17Z operations tailed off because their airframes were the oldest and most worn-out of the Luftwaffe bombers, but after repairs and refits they went on to operate in 1941 as day-bombers in the Med (particularly over Greece), the Desert and also the early part of Barbarossa with KG2.

The Royal Bulgarian Air Force was still using Dornier 17s against the Germans in 1945.

 

[Mad Dog]

I re-read this. I think there might be a mis-understanding here. Early in the war the RAF had a 'spread pattern' that they used where they didn't focus all of the guns on a fighter at a specific range. they literally pointed each of them in a different direction. (This is hard to explain by typing. I hope someone posts a pic of what I'm talking about). It wasn't that they focused all 8 at 200 or 300 or 400 or 500 or 600 yards, they would point them all over the place (poor description on my part). For instance an HE111 straight and level a Spitfire straight and level 200 yards behind it, both parked on a runway, only maybe 2 or 3 of the Spitfires guns would hit the HE111. Do you see the problem? Instead of having all 8 hit in say a 3 foot circle at that distance (not sure that was even possible as a machine gun shoots a large group, unlike a rifle) So instead of a Spitfire or Hurricane saddling up behind an HE111 and putting to sight on the left engine and then pumping 160 rounds a seconds into that 1 engine, he might only be able to get 1 gun to bear on that engine. Does that make more sense?

The gun harmonisation pattern you are referring to was based on the idea that the RAF fighters would be engaging only formations of enemy bombers, and have time to get into formation behind them and then shoot off all their ammunition. To aid the pilot in judging the correct range to fire, the RAF had an excellent reflector gunsight, and the pattern was supposed to concentrate fire to hit the vulnerable engines and wing fuel tanks.
The gunsight had a a central dot, two rings for deflection, and two horizontal bars. The bars could be adjusted to suit a range and the wingspan of the target aircraft by two adjustment wheels. Turning the upper wheel adjusted the range setting, and turning the lower adjusted the bars for the wingspan of his target. In operation, the range wheel was usually set to one range position and then locked in place, either by soldering or by a piece of sticky tape. Then the pilot just had to set the range bar for the wingspan of his target, and when the horizontal range bars exactly overlapped the wings of his target he knew he was at exactly the required range behind the target.
As operational experience grew, the RAF armourers started putting blobs of coloured paint on the wingspan selector for the most common Luftwaffe aircraft, so all the pilot had to do was remember "red is a 109, blue is a 110, and green is a 88" and turn to the required paint blob, rather than having to remember a 109 had a wingspan of 32 feet, etc. This system was perfect for formating behind enemy bomber formations.
But, because the RAF was already aware of the difficulty of shooting down all-metal aircraft with .303s even before the War, they chose a pattern designed to hit both engines of a twin-engined bomber when flying behind the bomber. The most common 1940 Fighter Command harmonisation plan, the so-called "Dowding Pattern", was a box at 250 yards of twelve feet wide by eight feet tall, which was designed to overlap the target's engines. The problem of this big box was also exaggerated in the Spitfire by the wing flexing during hard turns and the fact the Spit was more sensitive to recoil, the nose "wandering about" when the guns fired (the Hurricane was always considered a much steadier and more accurate gun platform). Whilst the Dowding Pattern gave a greater chance of a hit for an inexperienced pilot, those with shooting experience hated it. Many squadrons had their own preference (64Sq's was a six-foot circle at 200 yards) and some RAF squadron leaders switched to a "point harmonisation" of all guns aligned to coincide 250 yards ahead, even before the BoB. The harmonisation pattern was re-evaluated in mid-1940 after Fighter Command reported too many German bombers surviving lots of dispersed hits, and Fighter Command switched to point harmonisation at 250yds from September 1940. In theory, point harmonisation concentrated all the bullets onto one point on the airframe, but the realities of having to take snapshots at enemy aircraft that didn't fly straight and level, at whatever range presented itself, meant the cone of fire from a Hurricane or Spitfire could all be missing even when the pilot had got everything else right.

 

[pbehn]

The gun harmonisation pattern you are referring to was based on the idea that the RAF fighters would be engaging only formations of enemy bombers, and have time to get into formation behind them and then shoot off all their ammunition. To aid the pilot in judging the correct range to fire, the RAF had an excellent reflector gunsight, and the pattern was supposed to concentrate fire to hit the vulnerable engines and wing fuel tanks.
The gunsight had a a central dot, two rings for deflection, and two horizontal bars. The bars could be adjusted to suit a range and the wingspan of the target aircraft by two adjustment wheels. Turning the upper wheel adjusted the range setting, and turning the lower adjusted the bars for the wingspan of his target. In operation, the range wheel was usually set to one range position and then locked in place, either by soldering or by a piece of sticky tape. Then the pilot just had to set the range bar for the wingspan of his target, and when the horizontal range bars exactly overlapped the wings of his target he knew he was at exactly the required range behind the target.
As operational experience grew, the RAF armourers started putting blobs of coloured paint on the wingspan selector for the most common Luftwaffe aircraft, so all the pilot had to do was remember "red is a 109, blue is a 110, and green is a 88" and turn to the required paint blob, rather than having to remember a 109 had a wingspan of 32 feet, etc. This system was perfect for formating behind enemy bomber formations.
But, because the RAF was already aware of the difficulty of shooting down all-metal aircraft with .303s even before the War, they chose a pattern designed to hit both engines of a twin-engined bomber when flying behind the bomber. The most common 1940 Fighter Command harmonisation plan, the so-called "Dowding Pattern", was a box at 250 yards of twelve feet wide by eight feet tall, which was designed to overlap the target's engines. The problem of this big box was also exaggerated in the Spitfire by the wing flexing during hard turns and the fact the Spit was more sensitive to recoil, the nose "wandering about" when the guns fired (the Hurricane was always considered a much steadier and more accurate gun platform). Whilst the Dowding Pattern gave a greater chance of a hit for an inexperienced pilot, those with shooting experience hated it. Many squadrons had their own preference (64Sq's was a six-foot circle at 200 yards) and some RAF squadron leaders switched to a "point harmonisation" of all guns aligned to coincide 250 yards ahead, even before the BoB. The harmonisation pattern was re-evaluated in mid-1940 after Fighter Command reported too many German bombers surviving lots of dispersed hits, and Fighter Command switched to point harmonisation at 250yds from September 1940. In theory, point harmonisation concentrated all the bullets onto one point on the airframe, but the realities of having to take snapshots at enemy aircraft that didn't fly straight and level, at whatever range presented itself, meant the cone of fire from a Hurricane or Spitfire could all be missing even when the pilot had got everything else right.

200-250 yards was considered close, but in reality is not close at all, no one would expect someone to hit a moving target at 250 yards running with a rifle or machine gun. Most ex BoB pilots I have heard speak on it said you had to be point blank range to guarantee a victory, I take that to be 100- 50 yards.

 

[XBe02Drvr]

the RAF fighters were often climbing to catch the bombers, and then didn't have the time to get into position for a head-on attack before being pounced on by the escorts. You seem to be failing to understand the realities of the situation faced by the RAF pilots.

the Germans did not like getting into level turning fights with Hurricanes or Spitfires because the ME109 couldn't turn as fast as either British fighter, the Germans preferring to hit and run. Your comparison to Thach and the Japanese, who preferred to stay and turn, is invalid.

I fail to see the invalidity of this. Even if circumstances put you in the position of frequent bounce victim, with appropriate tactics the opportunities arise for brief snap shots at your tormentors. These opportunities are useless to the careful, fastidious, sniper-like "aimed" shooter, but valuable to a dynamic wing shooter.
I'm reminded of the time my uncle (the former ASW jeep carrier Avenger pilot) who was later a USIA officer, took my brothers and I out to the gravel pit at camp to burn up his mandatory 90 days allotment of self defense ammunition. He had a veritable arsenal of concealment-friendly Berretas and Smith&Wessons. We all took turns trying to hit cereal boxes with minimal success. After my brothers and I had demonstrated our incompetence, Uncle Ned showed us how these weapons were supposed to be used. He put a snub nosed S&W in a holster under his jacket and walked away from the five single-serving cereal boxes he had arrayed on the hillside. At a signal from us, he whirled around in a crouch, bounding side to side as he charged the hillside, and hit each one of those itty-bitty cereal boxes, starting from about forty yards away. He was shooting so fast it sounded almost like an automatic weapon. He then slapped another cylinder in the gun and from the same distance fired five carefully aimed rounds, only scoring 2 for 5. "You don't aim a hand cannon like this. Your sight radius is too short. You throw the bullets at the target. Did you notice how I thrust the gun toward the target with each shot? That's how you practice to develop the skill. It takes lots of practice. Here, you try it." Both my brothers had had enough, but I tried it, and after four cylinders of ammunition, actually hit a full size Wheaties box from twenty paces. My wrist and elbow were not happy with me. .38 Special out of a two inch barrel wears you down pretty quick if you're not used to it.
The point of all this (at last!) is that dynamic shooting is worth the time and effort it takes to achieve it.
PS: He also was deadeye Dick on the pitcher's mound. He could fire the ball past you in the corners of the strike zone in a way that was frustratingly unhittable.

 

[wuzak]

I think you are getting confused between single-speed and single-stage superchargers.

I am not confused at all, but you seem to be confused by who said what.

The words you ascribed to me were not mine, but those of a recently banned member.

The USAAC had decided to go with turbocharging for high-altitude requirements and the USAAC requirement for the P-40 was for a fighter to provide low-altitude air superiority over the battlefield, so Allison had designed the V-1710-33's supercharged to be best for lower altitudes.

Allison designed the V-1710 in the P-40 to be an altitude rated engine, as opposed to a sea level rated engine, which would be used with a turbocharger.

The turbochargers used in the XP-37 and YP-37 had poor reliability, so it was dropped from the P-40.

The P-40 was not designed as a low altitude aircraft at all, rather a general pursuit type.

That is why the Tomahawk was judged unsuited to RAF Fighter Command operations in the UK in late 1940, because combats were moving to 30,000ft, an altitude the Tomahawk struggled at.

The reason that the Tomahawk was judged unsuitable was that it lacked armour and self sealing fuel tanks, and its performance was lacking.

In the Middle East, it was presumed their opponent would be the Italian fighters like the Macchi C200, Fiat CR42 and G50, all of which had even worse altitude performance and speed than the Tomahawk. So the RAF sent the Tomahawks to the Desert and Palestine.

I am not sure that any assumptions were made as to what would be faced in North Africa. The theatre was considered secondary, but still needed aircraft to be deployed there. Hurricanes and, in particular, Spitfires were required for home defence, so other available aircraft were sent to the desert.

 

[Shortround6]

The USAAC had decided to go with turbocharging for high-altitude requirements and the USAAC requirement for the P-40 was for a fighter to provide low-altitude air superiority over the battlefield, so Allison had designed the V-1710-33's supercharged to be best for lower altitudes.

This is one of the most persistent aviation myths of WW II. To date no one has produced a letter, memo, specification or any other document to back this up.

A simple comparison of other engines OF THE TIME, shows the fallacy. ONLY the Merlin, of all the production aircraft engines in the World (OK Russian M-35 might slip in here) had a higher full throttle/critical altitude than the V-1710-33 in the spring of 1939 when the P-40 was ordered.
1040hp at 14,300ft. (4358 meters) beats the early 1939 DB 601, it beats any production French Hispano (or licenced engine), it beats any single speed radial engine (except perhaps the R-2600) from any country like Japan, Italy, France, England and.................................

But somehow, when the production planes are introduced into combat almost two year later and are outperformed by newer aircraft the excuse that the P-40 was designed for low altitude combat seems to crop up.
The V-1710-33 was the best altitude engine the US had available in the near future and it was in the top 3 in the world counting the unknown in the west Russian M-35 (if it was even available in 1939). Time to put this myth in the "busted" pile.
Please note the Germans were on their 3-5th supercharger design on the DB 601 by mid 1941 and Hooker had taken the already first in the world supercharger design to even great heights by mid 1941 (forget the 2 stage supercharger). But that has no bearing on what the P-40 was designed to do in 1938-39.

 

[Mad Dog]

I've read this numerous times in pilot notes, they had no actual gunnery training, just how the sight worked, there are many video's and photo's of pilots opening fire at ridiculously long range.....

Pre-BoB RAF fighter pilots were taught that the .303 Browning was effective from 1000 yards, and in the hurry to get a burst in before the escorts attacked, many RAF pilot did indeed open fire at ranges as great as 1000yds. The aces learnt to get in close, and many talk about not opening fire until the enemy a/c "filled the windscreen". I have notes on the gunnery training camp of RAF 263Sq before they were sent to Norway in 1940, and it really is a lot of straight dives and passes at target sleeves also being towed in a straight line - not very realistic, but it did teach the pilots about the lead-off required to get hits with the Brownings. By most accounts, those training camps were rare events, not weekly exercises, and a lot of the RAF gunnery training was skeet shooting with shotguns!
The RAF could have had the most realistic pre-War gunnery training if they had been allowed to use maneuvering drones (like the de Havilland Queen Bee) as targets, but these were considered too expensive for individual pilot training and were kept for the RN fleet to shoot at (badly).

 

[Mad Dog]

This is one of the most persistent aviation myths of WW II......

Strange, then, that the service ceiling of the P-40C was lower than the Hurricane, Dewotaine 520, and ME109, given that you insist the Allison was at no disadvantage to the inline engines powering those other fighters.
The XP-40 came out of the failed XP-37 of 1937, which was the turbocharged Allison in a much-modified P-36 airframe. The XP-40 was a much simpler modification, but came with the Allison V-1710-19 pegged to a rated altitude of 11,000 feet. The P-40/B/C's V-1710-33 had a rated altitude of 12,800ft, lower than the Dewotaine 520's Hispano-Suiza 12Y-49 (rated altitude 17,224ft) and the Bf109E's DB601A (14,800ft). Sorry, but the high-altitude pursuit policy of the USAAC was turbocharged, fullstop. Everything else was meant for the low-level role.

 

[GrauGeist]

Explain, then, why the Mustang Mk.I had the same engine (V-1710-39), but was built to British specifications.

Did the British want a low altitude fighter too?