Italian contribution to the Battle of Britain (1 Viewer)

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True, but would it have made a difference? The Afrika Korps in June 1941 consisted of two divisions, the 15th Panzer and 5th Light. By Nov 1941 a second Panzer division was added, with a second motorized division joining in early 1942. That's it, four German combat divisions. Meanwhile, per Wikipedia Germany fielded 153 divisions for Barbarossa, which included 104 infantry, 19 panzer and 15 motorized infantry divisions. Though, Italy staying out of the Balkans and Greece might have helped the Germans focus.
Some quick numbers of what Germany lost during the North Africa campaign:
202,000 men KIA/POW/MIA
8,000 aircraft lost
2,550 tanks lost
6,200 artillery pieces lost
70,000 trucks lost
240,000,000 tons of shipping lost.

And these were just the German's losses. This doesn't include the surviving assets that were still active and committed in Africa during the opening stages of the Eastern Front.

The numbers listed above would have made a substantial contribution to the opening assault on the Soviet Union.
 
Some quick numbers of what Germany lost during the North Africa campaign:
202,000 men KIA/POW/MIA
8,000 aircraft lost
2,550 tanks lost
6,200 artillery pieces lost
70,000 trucks lost
240,000,000 tons of shipping lost.

And these were just the German's losses. This doesn't include the surviving assets that were still active and committed in Africa during the opening stages of the Eastern Front.

Thise numbers listed above would have made a substantial contribution to the opening assault on the Soviet Union.
Out of curiosity, were these losses incurred over the same period of time as the Russo-Ukranian War? Except for aircraft, trucks and shipping, the losses seem pretty close.
 
Out of curiosity, were these losses incurred over the same period of time as the Russo-Ukranian War? Except for aircraft, trucks and shipping, the losses seem pretty close.
The North African Campaign was just shy of three years: June 1940 to May 1943.
Of course, it was the Italians who started that dog and pony show and Hitler sent Rommel down in February 1941 to try and bail Mussilini's ass out.

So the German effort was from February 1941 to May 1943, just over two years.
 
The North African Campaign was just shy of three years: June 1940 to May 1943.
Of course, it was the Italians who started that dog and pony show and Hitler sent Rommel down in February 1941 to try and bail Mussilini's ass out.

So the German effort was from February 1941 to May 1943, just over two years.
I read a long time ago that the armour and troops tied down in Greece alone to repel a non existent invasion would or could have been decisive in Moscow 1941/2
 
I read a long time ago that the armour and troops tied down in Greece alone to repel a non existent invasion would or could have been decisive in Moscow 1941/2
Agreed.

Those additional forces would have been instrumental in Germany's push into the Soviet Union well beyond what they accomplished historically.
 
True, but would it have made a difference? The Afrika Korps in June 1941 consisted of two divisions, the 15th Panzer and 5th Light. By Nov 1941 a second Panzer division was added, with a second motorized division joining in early 1942. That's it, four German combat divisions. Meanwhile, per Wikipedia Germany fielded 153 divisions for Barbarossa, which included 104 infantry, 19 panzer and 15 motorized infantry divisions. Though, Italy staying out of the Balkans and Greece might have helped the Germans focus.
In fact no second PzD was sent but 5th Light was reorganized as 21st PzD and the motorized division was partly formed from units of the German Afrika Korps already located in the NA and later renamed as 90. Light Africa Division.
 
Well, some Italian aircrew were very professional. During the Axis attacks on the convoys from UK, Iceland to Murmansk in Russia, the German torpedo bombers chickened out by dropping their fish at maximum distance to avoid the fire from the flak trawlers. Italian pilots flew between the ships to drop their torpedoes - usually just a few feet above the water to be below the ship's gun depression.
The Germans simply elaborated new tactics in order to reduce high losses after they tried to fly between the ships - at least you can find some evidences in Russian sources. And the correct term for "flak trawlers" is "american and british destroyers".
 
How would've German logistics coped with yet another batch of divisions requiring food, fodder, fuel and ammo many hundreds of kilometers from Berlin?
I am willing to bet that the supply and logistics for the additional Luftwaffe and Wehrmacht units fielded on the Ost front instead of North Afrika would be much easier.

As it was, Germany lost a tremendous amount of supplies being shipped or flown across the Med. as it was. Add in the lost men and equipment that were transporting the supplies and the cost increases further.
 
I am willing to bet that the supply and logistics for the additional Luftwaffe and Wehrmacht units fielded on the Ost front instead of North Afrika would be much easier.

As it was, Germany lost a tremendous amount of supplies being shipped or flown across the Med. as it was. Add in the lost men and equipment that were transporting the supplies and the cost increases further.

Germany opting to not play a role in the Med means British and CW forces on the Mareth line (Tunisia-Libya border) already in 1941.
Summer-time logistics are child's play when compared to the adverse weather logistics (especially for the food, fuel, shelter and clothing), so there is no 1:1 'replication' of German logistics from the Med to the Eastern front. Also leaves a lot of British and US equipment for the Soviets to receive, and Op Torch can be of the much less conservative nature - talk all units go to Algeria and Tunisia, and wrapping up the NA by January-February 1943 (December of 1942 if the French collapse fast?), instead of May.
 
Germany still had control of Southern Europe through Greece and Bulgaria, so noy sure how this would benefit Russia other than the usual channels via Mutmansk or the northern Pacific route.

In regards to German supplies: the Germans lost a large number of transport aircraft to Allied interception. Had these transports not been used in North Africa, they would be able to augment the numbers used historically.

Aboard those lost aircraft, were supplies: food, fuel, ammunition, uniforms, medical supplies and much more. These lost supplies would have been of great benefit on the Eastern front.
The transports themselves, consumed a large quantity of fuel, which could have been put to use for the war effort on the Eastern Front.

The transport ships lost, also carried large tonnage of supplies, including men, machines, fuel, food and more which could have been of great use in the east.

And the above does not include all the forces deployed (Luftwaffe, Wehrmacht and Kreigsmarine) along with their vast quantities of fuel, ammunition and other support.

On a typical day, the Luftwaffe was flying about 100 transport missions between Italy and Tunisia. That is a tremendous expenditure of fuel alone, just to move those transports. Fighters were also assigned escort duties for these transports, which also consumed a great deal of fuel.

The list goes on, but the point being, that had Germany not been involved in North Africa, all of these vast amounts of fuel, food, ammunition and other supplies would have been available to the invasion of the Soviet Union.
Add to that, all the fighters, transports and bombers, plus tanks, AFVs and more that were commited to North Africa, would have bolstered the German's numbers in the offense as well.
 
Because one of the main problems for Germans was how to get supplies and reinforcements to the frontline, more supplies and equipment would not have been so much help. This for later part of 1941 and from later part of summer 42 onwards. If one could not adequately supply the troops he had, more troops did not help much. German main problem was that their logictics were based on railways but SU/Russian railways had a different gauge than used in the Central Europe and the SU railway network was much sparcer than that in the Central Europe and the retreating SU forces usually thoroughly destroyed the railway installations and took the rolling stocks with them. In 1942 IIRC both the Caucasus and Stalingrad attacks relied on one railway line each.
 
Some quick numbers of what Germany lost during the North Africa campaign:
202,000 men KIA/POW/MIA
8,000 aircraft lost
2,550 tanks lost
6,200 artillery pieces lost
70,000 trucks lost
240,000,000 tons of shipping lost.

And these were just the German's losses. This doesn't include the surviving assets that were still active and committed in Africa during the opening stages of the Eastern Front.

The numbers listed above would have made a substantial contribution to the opening assault on the Soviet Union.

Most of those figures look a bit dubious, except perhaps for the first statistic on personnel losses. 8,000 aircraft would translate to approx.. 10 aircraft a day (presumably to all forms of combat/non-combat losses).

AS for 240 million tons of shipping lost - that's the equivalent of about 10,000 Liberty class cargo ships.
 
You.do realize that losing 8,000 aircraft over the entire campaign is not unrealistic, right?

That number covers all types, not just fighters. i.e.: transport, ground attack, bomber, observation, liason and fighter.
Given the length of the campaign and the fact that Germany lost it doesnt surprise me at all.
 
Given the length of the campaign and the fact that Germany lost it doesnt surprise me at all.
Plus Germany was hard pressed to protect their transports from the RAF during the transit between Italy and Tunisia.

The loss number posted above, was lost aircraft to all causes, but if we look at the Luftwaffe loss number for aircraft lost to all causes in the time period between July and September 1940, during the Battle of Britain, it was 1,636.

So that 8,000 doesn't seem so "dubious" after all.
 
Here are some monthly figures for German aircraft losses to all causes in the Mediterranean theatre:

January 1941: 40
February 1941: 47
March 1941: 28
April 1941: 77
May 1941: 290
June 1941: 49
July 1941: 23
September 1943: 449
October 1943: 256
November 1943: 218
December 1943: 131
July 1944: 141
August 1944: 93
September 1944: 258
October 1944: 95
November 1944: 31

I don't have the other figures to hand, but 8,000 for the entire war in the Mediterranean theatre seems quite possible.

Cheers,
Andrew A.
 

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