'Wilde Sau' - what they were good for?

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tomo pauk

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Apr 3, 2008
Basically - how much damage were the Luftwaffe day-fighter aircraft in that task (radar-less night interception) were doing during the night against the RAF BC? Actual losses to themselves, either due to enemy action, or 'self-inflicted'?
 
The best reference for what the units shot down is probably the Nachtjagd War Diaries by Theo Boiten, while JG300 by Lorant and Goyat has a loss list for that unit.

The idea had some merit in the summer/good weather, but not in winter/bad weather. The fact the units were borrowing aircraft at times means tracking losses can be a problem and because they were fighting over the target there was doubt whether they of flak shot an aircraft down, means it is hard to figure out what actual effect they had.

For example, Boiten notes 17/18 August 1943, JG Hermann made 4 claims, and matches 1.

23/24 August 1943, JG300 made 12 claims, Boiten matches 1, plus 2 others possibly being the same RAF aircraft. No losses listed in JG300 book.
 
My 'history' feature on wilde Sau ace Friedrich-Karl Müller of JG 300 and NJG 11 complete with rare photos and first person accounts is available to read in the free 76-page November 2019 issue of Eduard INFO - download it here
I would like to give the above post a very high -- go read -- thumb. In fact go through the other stuff from him. Its good.
 
thank you very much indeed!

The free Eduard Info for July 2020 has a small feature I compiled on the more 'technical' aspects of flying wilde Sau sorties
here
in the Eduard INFO for July 2021 I wrote a feature on wilde Sau operations from September 1944 ..
here

" ...By the late summer of 1944 wilde Sau operations were a distant memory for the majority of pilots in JG 300. All night-fighter actvities in the Geschwader had been concentrated in a 'specialised' Moskito-hunting Staffel designated 10. (N)/ JG 300. This was the so-called 'Kometen' or comet Staffel, established to combat the almost nightly incursions over Berlin by DH Mosquito bombers of the RAF's LNSF (Light Night Striking Force.). Operating out of Jüterbog, south of Berlin, under Staffelkapitän Hptm. Boettcher, 10. Staffel flew a 'modified' Wilde Sau system— guided by two vertical searchlight beams and a ground controller, the unit's high performance G-14/AS fighters loitered at high altitude (10,000 metres) above the 'corridors' used by the Mosquitoes flying into Berlin....."

..I have to say though - no-one can write anything on wilde Sau without reference to Lorant/Goyat's history of JG 300!
 
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Wasn't there a member here who was writing a book on JG300?

no, he was looking at Moskito-hunting in the Luftwaffe. I doubt that will ever come to fruition. Besides other writers/researchers have covered the subject in some depth now. My own 18-page e-article " wilde Sau und Moskitojagd " is still available from Air War Publications here and features rare photos and first-person accounts from JG 302/JG 301/JG 300. and NJG 11. Andreas Zapf has written the history of Kurt Welter's 10./NJG 11 in his 'The jet night fighters'. More on my blog here
 
No, Siegfried Baer flew in 5./JG 301

I wrote about his last combat here

"...'Here we are....' The 82 year old gazed out over the meadow in the vicinity of Nettelrede. Clear blue skies above - the landscape has changed somewhat since the huge airbattle that raged overhead sixty years ago to the day. " Over there is where Josef Löffler crashed ", recalls Willi Reschke referring to that day. 26 November 1944 - Jagdflieger Reschke recounted events as if they had happened yesterday. One of the biggest air battles of WWII.

"Wir hatten gar nicht damit gerechnet - we were not expecting to have to get airborne that day. There was thick fog hanging over the airfield - visibility was nil." But then suddenly the order to take off came through at 11:40. Reschke, and with him thirty nine of his comrades at the controls of their machines, climbed for altitude...

By the autumn of 1944, JG 301, like other former Wilde Sau night fighting Geschwader had long since converted to the daylight fighter role. Its Gruppen were organised in 'heavy' and 'light' wings, with Staffeln to provide high cover and a Staffel dedicated to attacking the bombers. Unlike the majority of the pilots airborne on 26 November 1944 Reschke had at least acquired some combat experience. The young Nachwuchs of the unit such as Unteroffizier Siegfreid Baer were flying only their second or third mission.
..."
 
no, he was looking at Moskito-hunting in the Luftwaffe. I doubt that will ever come to fruition. Besides other writers/researchers have covered the subject in some depth now. My own 18-page e-article " wilde Sau und Moskitojagd " is still available from Air War Publications here and features rare photos and first-person accounts from JG 302/JG 301/JG 300. and NJG 11. Andreas Zapf has written the history of Kurt Welter's 10./NJG 11 in his 'The jet night fighters'. More on my blog here
Thanks for your excellent Blog. Always interesting reading.


Just one comment to the page "The Jet Night Fighters: Kurt Welter & the Story of the Messerschmitt Me 262 Night Fighters by Andreas Zapf. A look at the Me 262 B twin-seater "night fighters", Herbert Altner 10./ NJG 11, Jägerblatt 1/1998".
You state that Herbert Altner is downing a Mosquito of 305 Squadron flown by S/Ld. Hanbury.

This is not correct, the one in question is a Mosquito of 157 Squadron NT369 (RS-A), flown by F/Lt. H. Leland (Pilot) and F/O R. C. Thornton (Navigator). They are caught in the search light over Berlin and attacked by a jet (as the crew state due to the high approaching speed and confirmed by 157 Squadron Mosquito NT382 (RS-T) flown by F/O R. S. Hoy (Pilot) and F/Lt. W. K. Hodge (Navigator)). They are attacked 4 times and hit by two grenades in one of the engines. By violent corkscrewing they manage to escape and returns to base. All this happens in the night of April 3-4th. 1945. With take off 21:45 and landing at 02:15. NT369 (RS-A), again piloted by F/Lt. Leland, is back over Berlin April 8-9th. 1945, this time being hit by frendly fire from a Lancaster. NT369 was finaly decommissiond Dec. 26th. 1946.

All this also matches Altners recollection, as he made four passes and that his guns jammed so that he was "flying in formation" with the Mosquito.

The 305 Squadron Mosquito (SZ998 SM-J) is crashing on a night intruder mission to Bremen on April 6-7th. 1945, killing S/Ld. P. H. C. Hanbury (Pilot) and F/Lt. J. P. Hart (Navigator).
 
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Basically - how much damage were the Luftwaffe day-fighter aircraft in that task (radar-less night interception) were doing during the night against the RAF BC? Actual losses to themselves, either due to enemy action, or 'self-inflicted'?
From my understanding of it - Wilde Sau was a response to Allied EW and the resulting disruption of traditional night-fighter tactics.

In an ideal world the Germans would want to be able to guide in their night fighters all the way and to make best use of the units they had available. With Window/Chaff and various other antics (look up 100 Group) the British were doing their level best to upset that guidance and it worked often enough. Add in specialised Intruders that would make hunting Night Fighters their express task and the otherwise capable German Ground Controlled Intercept system would struggle.

Was it effective? It was better than nothing (possibly one of the few things they could do until the technological battle swing back their way) but probably not as effective as dedicated night fighters being guided into the bomber streams. Had the Germans got compact, higher resolution AI radar like on the Beaufighter, Mossie, etc. then the concept might have had some legs? However even with modern jets with vastly more powerful sensors - you ideally still need either someone on the ground or in the air (AWACS) to make best use of them in a defensive capacity. The sky is a big place!

The above is just my impression - others might take a different view.
 
The basic idea was that the single engine fighters were doing nothing during the night, so why not use them as night fighters?
The navigation was aided by light "streets", search light signals for city identification etc. One of the main differences towards the normal night fighting was that the Wilde Sau would operate in the FLAK zones over the cities and that the FLAK would be limiting there Hight of coverage to allow the Wilde Sau pilots to operate above. Using the light from the burning cities and search light they would attack the bombers illuminated from beneath.

Also the FLAK would use flare grenades to bring "light into the sky" as well as using clouds as screens "leichentuck"(cloth covering a dead body) to illuminate the bombers. Later on a number of German bombers would fly high above the bomber strems dropping flare to illuminate the enemy bombers to alow both regular night fighters as well as Wilde Sau fighters the posibility to see the enemy and attack.
This meant that the regular night fighters that at this stage of the war in the skyes did not enter over the cities or into the FLAK zones, but were operating on the rout to/from the targets, and Wilde Sau over the targets, giving even more exposior of the bombers for attack.

Wilde Sau pilots were instructed to bail out if they could not find a suitable airfield for landing or running out of fuel.
 
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The basic idea was that the single engine fighters were doing nothing during the night, so why not use them as night fighters?
The navigation was aided by light "streets", search light signals for city identification etc. One of the main differences towards the normal night fighting was that the Wilde Sau would operate in the FLAK zones over the cities and that the FLAK would be limiting there Hight of coverage to allow the Wilde Sau pilots to operate above. Using the light from the burning cities and search light they would attack the bombers illuminated from beneath.

Also the FLAK would use flare grenades to bring "light into the sky" as well as using clouds as screens "leichentuck"(cloth covering a dead body) to illuminate the bombers. Later on a number of German bombers would fly high above the bomber strems dropping flare to illuminate the enemy bombers to alow botj regular night fighters as well as Wilde Sau fighters the posibility to see the enemy and attack.
This meant that the regular night fighters that at this stage of the war in the skyes did not enter over the cities or into the FLAK zones, but were operating on the rout to/from the targets, and Wilde Sau over the targets, giving even more exposior of the bombers for attack.

Wilde Sau pilots were instructed to bail out if they could not find a suitable airfield for landing or running out of fuel.
Hi
In principle the 'Wilde Sau' tactics were not much different to the Hawker Hurricane night missions at the beginning of the German night Blitz of 1940/41 or indeed the night fighters of WW1. In both cases they would work in 'concert' with searchlights, also these night flying aircraft like the Hurricane and Sopwith Camel also undertook night intruder operations in their respective wars. In all cases without the aids that dedicated fully equipped night fighters had the single seat 'day' fighters could never be as effective at night.

Mike
 
The Luftwaffe War Diaries by Cajus Bekker has a chapter on the Wilde Sau. It seems it was act of desperation, try it and see if it works.
 
It did basically. The wilde Sau came to prominence just as the entire Nachtjagd organisation was laid low by 'Window'. Only problem was their feats required exceptional airmanship. While they may have been guided by searchlight avenues etc,, take offs and landings were carried out in almost total darkness. Navigating through banked ice clouds and then attempting to find an airfield to put down on in darkness was beyond the capabilities of most pilots, especially regular Luftwaffe fighter pilots who were not necessarily instrument-trained.
 
The Luftwaffe War Diaries by Cajus Bekker has a chapter on the Wilde Sau. It seems it was act of desperation, try it and see if it works
The book was published in 2000, a lot of research has been done since then, bringing new information to light.
It did basically. The wilde Sau came to prominence just as the entire Nachtjagd organisation was laid low by 'Window'. Only problem was their feats required exceptional airmanship. While they may have been guided by searchlight avenues etc,, take offs and landings were carried out in almost total darkness. Navigating through banked ice clouds and then attempting to find an airfield to put down on in darkness was beyond the capabilities of most pilots, especially regular Luftwaffe fighter pilots who were not necessarily instrument-trained
Indeed, that was also why most of the pilots were coming from bombers or had been commercial pilots (like Friedrich-Karl Müller - "Nasen-Müller") with instrument flying skills. Also many of the pilots were flying instructors with massif experience in handling the aircrafts under all conditions and again instrument qualifications.
 
The book was published in 2000, a lot of research has been done since then, bringing new information to light.

Indeed, that was also why most of the pilots were coming from bombers or had been commercial pilots (like Friedrich-Karl Müller - "Nasen-Müller") with instrument flying skills. Also many of the pilots were flying instructors with massif experience in handling the aircrafts under all conditions and again instrument qualifications.
I think Bekker was published in the 70's. I read it in high school
 

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