Shortround6
Major General
"Why didn't they build more than one P-38 prototype?"
Congress was CHEAP!!
Congress was CHEAP!!
With the P-38K, was the P-51 and F4U even necessary?
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davebender
1st Lieutenant
North Carolina-class battleship - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Congress authorized construction of two North Carolina class battleships during 1937.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/South_Dakota_class_battleship_(1939)
Congress authorized construction of four North Dakota class battleships during 1938.
USN Ship Types--Iowa class (BB-61 through 66)
Congress authorized construction of two Iowa class battleships during 1940. Followed by four more during 1941.
You could purchase thousands of P-38 prototypes for the cost of a single battleship. So I don't think Congress was the problem. Most likely it was the commander of the U.S. Army Air Corps who gave the P-38 program a very low budget priority.
Congress authorized construction of two North Carolina class battleships during 1937.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/South_Dakota_class_battleship_(1939)
Congress authorized construction of four North Dakota class battleships during 1938.
USN Ship Types--Iowa class (BB-61 through 66)
Congress authorized construction of two Iowa class battleships during 1940. Followed by four more during 1941.
You could purchase thousands of P-38 prototypes for the cost of a single battleship. So I don't think Congress was the problem. Most likely it was the commander of the U.S. Army Air Corps who gave the P-38 program a very low budget priority.
Lighthunmust
Banned
and nobody was shooting at us yet. I think building single prototypes was the norm not the exception. At the time the XP-38 was the most complex, innovative, and expensive fighter created. If I recall correctly other prototypes of later successful aircraft crashed but commitment to production had already been made because people were shooting at us.
No doubt by the time of the Conference the P-38's ergonomics were long in tooth. The original need to use two 1000hp engines for performance was no long necessary due to single engines making close to or more than 2000hp. Fighter pilots think more about what they need during the few minutes of fight than what they need to take with them, get them there, and get them back. The P-38 was superior to many of the other planes at the Conference with the latter mentioned items but that was not a foremost concern of the evaluators.
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Shortround6
Major General
Yeah, just like they ordered ONE XP-39 prototype.
and ONE XP-40 Prototype.
In Feb 1937 they ordered ONE XP-37 prototype and then ordered 13 YP-37s in Dec 1937. 6 months after the XP-37 flew.
ONE XP-41 Prototype
ONE XP-42 Prototype
Sure sounds like the P-38 had a lower priority than the other fighter programs.
The Army Budget was not the Navy budget. For instance while the 105mm howitzer was standardized in 1928 production was not started until 1940.
Lighthunmust
Banned
Yes I think you are right about USAAC Command (Bomber Mafia strikes again), but Congress considered Battleships far more important than the USAAC and their collection of "peashooters". Nobody had yet demonstrated the vulnerability of Capitol ships underway and defending themselves while subjected to aircraft attack. Billy Mitchell only proved that they could be sunk while at anchor and undefended. BTW there is not much of a wartime record for successful high altitude bomber attacks on moving defended ships. Furthermore, I don't think the commanders of the USAAC, many of whom made their careers supporting the doctrine of the bomber's virtual invulnerability to attack, would be keen to support an aircraft (Lightning) that is the origin of the term "interceptor" as applied to aircraft designed to attack in-bound bombers.
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davebender
1st Lieutenant
Boeing B-17 Flying Fortress - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
17 Jan 1936. USAAC orders 13 YB-17s.
Scaled back from 65 YB-17s ordered during 1935 @ $99,620 each.
Consolidated B-24 Liberator - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
March 1939. Contract awarded to begin B-24 program.
1 prototype flying at the end of 1939. Followed by 7 more YB-24s during 1940.
There appears to be no shortage of American heavy bomber prototypes. Apparently American fighter aircraft development got crumbs for funding during the 1930s. That's not the fault of Congress.
17 Jan 1936. USAAC orders 13 YB-17s.
Scaled back from 65 YB-17s ordered during 1935 @ $99,620 each.
Consolidated B-24 Liberator - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
March 1939. Contract awarded to begin B-24 program.
1 prototype flying at the end of 1939. Followed by 7 more YB-24s during 1940.
There appears to be no shortage of American heavy bomber prototypes. Apparently American fighter aircraft development got crumbs for funding during the 1930s. That's not the fault of Congress.
Lighthunmust
Banned
Yes, but perhaps the congressman in those districts where the much more expensive bombers were being produced had some impact. I think you are right in that the lions share of the reason falls to USAAC command.
Shortround6
Major General
The Army can only spend what they are given, and as usual, selected facts from Wiki do not tell the whole story.
The contract for the XP-38 was signed June 23 1937, The plane was completed in Dec of 1938 and made it's first flight Jan 27 1939. It crashed on Feb 11 1939. 13 YP-38s are ordered April 27 1939.
Work on the XP-40 was started in July 1937, the plane was completed and flown for the first time in Oct 1938. In the Spring of 1939 the Army decides the P40 offers the best shot at getting modern fighters into service quickly, judging that they can be in service about ONE year sooner than the other contenders. On April 26th 1939 the Army places an order for 524 production P-40s. Not only is this the largest order for fighters since WW I it may be the largest dollar amount contract the USAAC has placed since WW I.
Back to the B-24. In Jan 1939 Consolidated pitches a concept to the Air Corp. By March 30th 1939 after mock ups and negotiations a contract is signed for ONE XB-24. On April 27th 1939 (Army is on quite buying spree on April 26th and 27th) the Army orders 7 YB-24s and on August 10th 1939 they order 38 more B-24As. Please note that none of these B-24s have turbos.
As can be seen from the dates the B-24 program had ZERO effect on USAAC fighter or pursuit programs of the 1930s.
A little mentioned fact of the B-24 story is that while North American is given a lot of credit for designing and building the Mustang in 120 days (and justly so) Consolidated designed and built a 4 engine bomber in about 270 days, the XB-24 flying on Dec 31st 1939.
Lighthunmust
Banned
I think the political connections of Curtiss-Wright with USAAC and Congress may have influenced the development of the P-38. Lockheed was a political pipsqueak compared to Curtiss-Wright. The same as today, soon to be retiring officers are often thinking about getting a job with a contractor, the bigger the better.
davebender
1st Lieutenant
V-1710 V12 engine.
Designed to a 1929 USAAC specification.
Prototype first run 1930.
High altitude performance issues not fixed until 1944. Or perhaps not at all, depending on which source you want to trust.
The V-1710 engine powered only USAAC fighter aircraft. Is it a coincidence that development was so protracted?
M1 20mm cannon.
American copy of French Hs.404 cannon.
Program began during 1941.
Problems not fixed for at least 10 years. Consequently the .50cal MG remained the standard USAAC fighter weapon right up to the Korean War.
This weapon was intended for fighter aircraft. Is it a coincidence that development was so protracted?
Designed to a 1929 USAAC specification.
Prototype first run 1930.
High altitude performance issues not fixed until 1944. Or perhaps not at all, depending on which source you want to trust.
The V-1710 engine powered only USAAC fighter aircraft. Is it a coincidence that development was so protracted?
M1 20mm cannon.
American copy of French Hs.404 cannon.
Program began during 1941.
Problems not fixed for at least 10 years. Consequently the .50cal MG remained the standard USAAC fighter weapon right up to the Korean War.
This weapon was intended for fighter aircraft. Is it a coincidence that development was so protracted?
Shortround6
Major General
I am not sure what you are getting at here.
There may have been political connections. On the other hand some of these factories/companies were mere fractions of what they would become in just a few years.
Lockheed had about a ZERO track record with combat planes until 1939 when the British, desperate for just about anything that could fly signed the contract for the Hudson bomber. A converted airliner. Lockheed, while it had quite a reputation for fast tough airliners had probably built under 400 airplanes (maybe closer to 300) from 1930 to 1939 when the British signed up. They didn't have the factory space or trained work force to handle large orders right away. Many other companies were in the same situation.
Curtiss connections or not, was one of the largest aircraft companies in the United States and had a factory and work force that had just finished or was in the process of finishing up an order for 210 P-36 fighters which had many of the same components as the P-40 and could be built on many of the same jigs and fixtures. If the Army needed hundreds of modern fighters just as fast as it could get them then the P-40 was about the only game in town.
with new bigger factories have to built from scratch it was going to be 1 1/2 to 2 years before large numbers of planes could be built. Who got the contracts to build what may have depended on connections. It may have depended on salesmanship, Preston Tucker got money for a fighter to be powered by a straight eight engine designed by Harry Miller, essentially money that was flushed down the porcelain facility. It may have been decided by fear of possible invasion of bombardment, an awful lot of new factories were built in Ohio, Detroit, Milwaukee, and in wheat fields in Kansas rather than close to parent factories in coastal towns/cities.
In many cases companies wound up building planes that were almost competitors of their own. Vega, a division of Lockheed, built B-17s as did Douglas. Douglas had 8 different bomber projects sandwiched in between the Boeing B-17 and B-47.
renrich
Chief Master Sergeant
One prototype is not that unusual. There was only one XF4U that the Navy bought. The Navy sponsored a design competition in early 1938. Vought won the contract in June 1938 and the prototype was built. The prototype flew first in May, 1940 and the prototype ran out of fuel and crashed in July, 1940. It was rebuilt and in October, 1940 the Corsair set a record.
Lighthunmust
Banned
I think you did well getting what I am getting at; that there where many factors small and large affecting the issue of procurement of aircraft, of which politics is one. Your post is an excellent summation of the procurement situation at that time. I often wonder how much politics influence decisions that should not be influenced by politics. I know it has always influenced these decisions far more than what is in the best interests of the nation as whole.
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Shortround6
Major General
I don'y find too much fault with how a lot of programs started. Things were pretty chaotic and a lot of pre war theories were turned on their heads. There did seem to be a bit too much unwillingness to change things once they got started or to call a turkey a turkey and stop pouring good money after bad.
There were a few programs that never should have gone as far as they did but in general they were 1940-42 programs, not 1938-40 programs.
The P-39 and P-40 were programs that should have gone on in 1939-41 but by 1943 somebody should have taken a much harder look at them as by the beginning of 1943 they were essentially trainers or lend-lease planes for allies and not used to equip new US squadrons. Politics could have played a bigger part in keeping them going than in starting them.
There were a few programs that never should have gone as far as they did but in general they were 1940-42 programs, not 1938-40 programs.
The P-39 and P-40 were programs that should have gone on in 1939-41 but by 1943 somebody should have taken a much harder look at them as by the beginning of 1943 they were essentially trainers or lend-lease planes for allies and not used to equip new US squadrons. Politics could have played a bigger part in keeping them going than in starting them.
Didn't the "Truman Committee" investigate that?
Shortround6
Major General
They did but then again a congressional investigation is politics.
they also had to "prove" wrong doing vs just bad or inept decisions. And if you don't give the Russian's P-40s and P-39s what do you give them and when?
It seems to come down to a matter of degree. What crosses the line from bad decision to actual negligence or ineptness to actual Malfeasance and if money was involved you have to find the money trail.
they also had to "prove" wrong doing vs just bad or inept decisions. And if you don't give the Russian's P-40s and P-39s what do you give them and when?
It seems to come down to a matter of degree. What crosses the line from bad decision to actual negligence or ineptness to actual Malfeasance and if money was involved you have to find the money trail.
Lighthunmust
Banned
I agree. Compared to the the American Civil War, what was happening before and during American involvement in WWII was as close as possible to a demonstration of Military/Government/Industry altruism directed toward the Nation and Allies.
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