With the P-38K, was the P-51 and F4U even necessary?

Greetings!

This is what a P-38 commander in the MTO had to say about the P-38:

Col Oliver Taylor, commander of the 14th fighter group in Italy during the first half of 1944 had the following to say about the P-38 his group flew: (as recounted in "P-38 Lightning" by Jeff Ethell)

Bad Points:
Ease of Handling: It required at least twice as much flying time, perhaps more to achieve the level of skill which was necessary to realize the full capability of he ship compared with a single engine fighter. Only after about 150 to 200 hours could a man hope to be an expert but when he reached that point he could be unbeatable in a 38. (Italics added by me).

Vertical Dives: The 38 could not be controlled in a vertical dive if allowed to build up speed, and that happened awfully damned fast, with speed rapidly building up thereafter until something came apart. The (Axis) knew this well.

Distinctive silhouette: The (Axis), on seeing a lone plane off in the distance would generally leave it be unless he had absolutely nothing else in prospect at the moment. On seeing the unique P-38 silhouette, however, there would be no doubt at all and after it he would go knowing that it would not be a waste of time.

Good Points:
Stability: The plane could be turned into a tight turn, essentially right at the stall point, without snapping out or dropping. The counter rotating props eliminated any torque problems when passing through a range of speeds…..

Maneuverability: Generally we found that the 38 could out-maneuvered anything, friend or foe, between 18,000 and 31,000 feet (5490-9450 meters). Below 18,000 it was sort of a toss-up except that very near the ground we could run (the Axis) right into the dirt, since he apparently couldn't get quite such a fast pull-out response as we could.

Range: a 500 mile (800km) distant target was easily reached allowing for 30 to 45 minutes for possible diversions….

Single Engine Flight: The 38 was just as controllable turning into as away from a dead engine.

Engine Configuration: Aside from having another engine to bring you home in case one is lost, the two-engine arrangement provided exceptionally good visibility forward for the pilot and provided protection from flanking enemy fire , especially during low-level strafing runs.

Rugged Construction: The 38 could take a phenomenal amount of beating up and still make it home. One was hit by an ME-109, one wing of the 109 having slashed along the inside of the right boom, carrying away the inside cooler and slicing the horizontal stabilizer/elevator assembly in two. The 109 lost its wing and crashed. The 38 flew 300 miles (480km) on one engine to belly land …at base. (the pilot was Lt Thomas W Smith, 37th squadron; the mission took place on Jan 16, 1944. (Something similar happen to Jack Ilfrey a pilot in the 20th Group on May 24, 1944)

Ease of Maintenance: …The general feeling seemed to be that both the P-38 and the Allison engines were very easy to maintain. In our group we had an exceptionally high level of experienced ground crew types, and they did an extraordinary job. .....

Eagledad

tomo pauk said:

I've never held the rivet gun, let alone being in the aircraft business myself - but Lockheed managed to churn out almost 4200 P-38s in 1944 from one (granted, a big one) factory. Almost as much as Bell produced P-39s in 1943, or Curtiss' production of P-40s in the same year, both much simpler aircraft. Lockheed have had more than 1300 P-38s ordered before Sept 1940, yet both USAAF and Lockheed missed the opportunity to have either a second source of P-38s, and/or to have the production of the Hudsons and the like outsourced. Eg. Boeing was second source for early Boston III (~A-20) bombers.
For comparison sake, in Sept 1940, the USAF ordered 733 P-47, by Oct 14 1941 the order is totaled at 850, and 3 factories are to produce it.

The vision from the AAF is required more, I'm afraid
We know that Lockheed simply installed wing racks on the P-38F (and retrofitted it on the P-38Es in service) and that NAA installed not just racks, but also air brakes on the A-36, so I'd say that it was much more down to the current doctrine (dogma?) whether the wing racks will be on the P-47, rather than it is about the Republic's capabilities.

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We all agree it was within Republic's capabilities to 'design and build' a wing rack capable of holding bombs or external fuel tanks. Perhaps a design philosophy of installing all fuel in the fuselage hindered their thinking of 'easy approaches' than re-designing and entire wing - whereas the Mustang never had that barrier.

The A-36 was THE key contract for the NAA as it enabled two key facets to the ultimate development of the P-51. Very importantly it prevented a cessation of operations on the Mustang airframe - but - it also provided NAA with the necessary funding to capitalize on production Lessons Learned to speed up the line. Secondly the NAA engineers capitalized on the Bomb load requirement as a dive bomber to integrate external to internal fuel transfer, thus enabling the P-51A and all subsequent versions to nearly double internal capacity with 75 gallon drop tanks..

From April 1943 to EOW Lockheed produced approximately 6600 P-38's from the H-1 and above.
From April 1943 to EOW NAA Inglewood produced 500 A-36, 310 P-51A, 1988 P-51B, 6502 P-51D-NA, 555 P-51H, (not to mention B-25, AT-6 etc) for a total of 9855 Mustangs. Dallas built (from August 1943) another 4850 P-51C/D/K's.

FLYBOYJ said:

This document has been posted here before. It's obvious Rau was not a fan of the P-38 and I would bet he also didn't like to fly multi engine aircraft. While He writes this memo the 475th FG is making history with the P-38..

"During World War II, the 475th Fighter Group, in combat for approximately two years, completed 3042 missions, (21,701 Sorties) and shot down 551 Japanese aircraft. On the other hand, the Group lost only 56 Planes to the Japanese. During the war, the Group took part in seven campaigns, and was awarded three Distinguished Unit Citations for outstanding performance of duty in action. In addition to Major McGuire, the unit boasted such "Aces" of the Pacific War as Col. Charles MacDonald (27), Capt. Daniel T. Roberts (14), Lt. Francis J. Lent (11), Lt. Col. John S. Loisel (11), and Capt. Elliot Summer (10), plus many more."

Aces

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The point I was making to Greg was that flying in teh Pacific and the ETO had different challenges.

In the Pacific a long range could be achieved because much of a flight would be over water with no anti-aircraft below and little chance f being bounced from above. So they could use the most economic cruise settings.

IN the ETO, on the other hand, that was not feasible.

wuzak said:

The point I was making to Greg was that flying in teh Pacific and the ETO had different challenges.

In the Pacific a long range could be achieved because much of a flight would be over water with no anti-aircraft below and little chance f being bounced from above. So they could use the most economic cruise settings.

IN the ETO, on the other hand, that was not feasible.

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While it is recognized that there were different challenges in the Pacific when compared to the ETO, what Rau was complaining about was the actual operation of the aircraft. If one was to look at the cockpit configuration of the P-38 there were two of everything, just like any other multi engine aircraft of the period. While Rau complained about the aircraft other pilots operated it with little issues. Rau said it himself.

After flying the P-38 for a little over one hundred hours on combat missions it is my belief that the airplane, as it stands now, is too complicated for the 'average' pilot.

As mentioned before, there was little multi engine transition training during the beginning of the war. Some of the better P-38 pilots had multi engine time in other higher performing aircraft

IdahoRenegade said:

Combat losses are difficult to directly compare, especially when attacking well defended ground targets. Were the targets comparably defended? Were the attackers bounced by enemy fighters? Was the number of attacking planes comparable (the '38 was typically available in lower quantities than the Mustang)? Did the pilots have comparable experience? Was similar damage done to the targets (was one group pressing an attack harder than the other)?

The statistics I gave you are extracted from Missing Aircrew Reports, parsed for strafing losses - both airfield and in support of Invasion from June-August when 8th AF had mixed escort and Fighter Bomber role. All P-38 Groups in 8th AF converted to P-51 (except 479th) They are not reduced to losses per sortie because many losses were experienced as random drop to the deck and strafe on the way home. Most of the strafing losses occurred when strafing heavily guarded LW airfields. The point I will make is that despite the arguably better P-38 armament and twin engine 'safety factor' the ratio of aircraft destroyed on the ground per P-38 lost was one third of the P-51. Spoken another way the P-38 strafing credit to loss ration was ~ 1.5:1 where as the P-47 was 3.7:1 and the P-51 was 5.6:1

By all records, the '38 had a significantly longer ACTUAL combat range than either the P-51 or P-47, at least in the hands of experienced pilots that knew how to operate it. In the Pacific, long range missions were the rule. A combat RADIUS of 1000 miles was not uncommon with later models of the '38, and some attacks on the Borneo oil fields were about 1200 miles one-way. Remember that the '38 could, and did, carry up to (2) 310 gallon external tanks.

The Combat Radius is a Defined parameter developed by AAF following flight tests. It specified, warm up, taxi, climb to altitude and cruise to the radius endpoint, drop tanks to fight, 13 minutes of MP, 5 minutes WEP, cruise back, let down and have 20 minutes of internal fuel remaining. By THAT standard the P-38J with leading edge fuel cells, 330 gallons external, full internal fuel and ammo w/GW=20,200 pound had a Combat Radius, defined above, as 650 miles at 25000 feet. From the same chart the P-51D with full internal fuel and 220 gallons external, full combat load GW=11,100, at 25,000 feet, was 700 miles.

Take the external tanks away with otherwise same loading and the P-38J goes 275 miles and the P-51D goes 375 miles. For internal fuel only plus two 1000 pound bombs the P-38J goes 200 miles and the P-51D goes 350 miles.

True a Borneo trip was possible but it had to fly the mission as a Ferry Mission Profile versus the Combat scenario - and- had to shut one engine down at altitude to enable single engine consumption rate. If that mission was ever attempted it is flying very slow at 25,000 feet and very vulnerable to attacker flying 150 mph faster.

On internal fuel only, no tanks the P-38J single direction Range is 1170 miles with TO GW= 17,500 pound. The P-51D with all internal fuel at TO GW 10,100 flies 1275 miles.

Note: All the above table values were developed by AAF following extensive flight test for multiple GW, fuel consumption, cruise speeds and altitudes... intended for planning purpose but only as a guide as combat mission itself, for different altitudes as wellas length of escort leg dictated the settings the Leader would communicate.

This link makes for some interesting reading, though I can not vouch for it's accuracy: The P-38 (C.C. Jordan; MakinKid; CDB100620)

Also keep in mind that, while the '51 had a higher dive speed (due to a later onset of comprehensibility) it was a fairly poor climber vs the '38 (4750fpm vs 3200) meaning that the '38 climbed nearly 50% faster (even without the K model). Climbing ability makes it possible to gain an energy advantage quite quickly.

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You should be Very careful when comparing climb rates as the internal fuel and GW should be compared directly and not cherry pick a 'light' P-38J versus P-51B as an example. As noted above the Flight test report recapitulating Lockheed Claims for P-38K did not have a full internal load of fuel at the beginning of the Flight ---> thereby inflating the performance against the fully Combat loaded P-38J. Also the presence or absence of wing racks is about a 10-12mph drag factor.

Next - go to Mike Williams site P-51 Mustang Performance and take a look at the P-51B-15 test with 265 gallons of internal fuel but only the 67" War Emergency Power settings - not 75" Boost. Go also to the 5 July 1944 Flight Test of the P-38J-15 at similar combat GW loading of 17,363 Pounds with 410 gallons
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/p-38/p-38j-28392-climb.jpg

Note that at 60" WEP for the P-38J-15 at combat load the ROC is:
3590@SL
3410@10K
3050@20K
2380@25K and
1590@30K

P-51B-15 20 May 1944 report full Combat load at 9355 pounds and 67" WEP
3680@SL
3300@10K --------> P-38 110fpm faster --- or approx. 2 ft per sec
3170@20K
2380@25K
1600@30K-------------> extremely close at WEP without 150 Octane fuel boosted to 70" (P-38 ) and 75" (P-51)

The P-51B1-5 is out climbing the P-38J-15 at most of the altitudes. Check for yourself.

Asking spec manifold pressure is fraught with timeframe issues. The Allison had early. mid-war, and late war type models. The early Allisons were rated for rpms less than 3000 even though they were designed with a 4000 - 4500 rpm failure limit. When I worked with Joe Yancey we rarely had any over 45" MAP on the test stand because we were breaking them in and seating the rings. If we got that high it was on very briefly, for a few seconds. Once the rings seated, out run-in was done and it was the customer's turn to run the engine, install it and go fly.

The Pilot's Operating Handbook for the P-38J lists the War Emergency manifold pressures as:
P-38J, L and
P-38H F-5B
Altitude--------B-13 turbo----- B-33 turbo------------- B-33 turbo
7,000------------60----------------60---------------------60
20,000-----------55----------------55---------------------60
25,000-----------45----------------52---------------------60
30,000-----------35----------------49---------------------53
35,000-----------30----------------44---------------------45
40,000-----------20----------------36---------------------37

Takeoff was 54" at sea level, 3000rpm. WER was 60" at 10,000 ft, 3000 rpm. Military was 54"at 24,900 ft, 3000 rpm. Max continuous rated power was listed at 44" at 34,000 ft and 2,600 rpm. Max cruise was listed as 35" at 2,300 rpm at 38,000 ft. All that was with ram except takeoff, which was with no ram.

At max cruise, fuel flow in auto-lean was 63 US gal.hr. War Emergency was 180 US gal/hr.
The above were for the V-1710-89 (right hand turning) and V-1710-91 (left hand turning). These engines were rated at 1,425 HP for takeoff and military and 1,600 HP at WER.

Later Allison came out with the G-series engines for the F-82, it never went into a P-38. WER was 2,250 HP at 3200 rpm at 101" MAP with ADI. Some have been raced at 110" MAP and 3600 rpm with twin turbos (tractors and boats). One of the tractor guys in Europe is turning his 4500 rpm … but a tractor pull is short duration. On the order of some 10 – 15 seconds max.

Some of the dash 89/91/100 series were able to safely be operated at 75" in the planes and were actually cleared for 70" MAP after 150 PN avgas was made available. The only thing limiting then to 70" was the throttles and the pilot. They were all easily able to exceed that.

Our P-38J is cleared to 60" MAP and Steve Hinton has flown airshows with it at up to military power in a show with the horsemen. See below. They flew this show for three days straight. These days they are mostly doing it in F-86s.

View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Yc94Tj7SP8o

Steve is easily able to pull more power, but there is no need during an airshow and he only very rarely gets it that high. As a museum aircraft it never needs to see WER again and only hits military on rare occasions. He was mostlly at slightly reduced MAP and rpm from miltary to give the wingmen surplus power to easily keep formation, as one might expect. These guys are good. They flew at higher power settings to make the loops big and round and didn't get slow going through the vertical. They went over the top with plently of airspeed and no mushing. That's never good in formation.

The three Horsemen these days are Steve Hinton, Dan Friedken, and Ed Shipley. Ed is a founding member of the Horsemen. You should see Dan's P-51 up close. It is beautifully detailed and immaculately kept. Ed's ain't bad, either. Pretty birds.

Unsurprisingly, our museum P-51s are also operated conservatively since WE are paying for the Merlins. One is Ed Maloney's P-51 (Spam Can) and the other is Steve's P-51 (Wee Willy). Steve's occasionally sees higher power settings, but not often or for long durations. Mostly for "fun time."

We have two P-38s, three P-51s, and two B-25's operating from Chino, plus quite a few other warbirds and even jet warbirds. They are normal sights at the airport. We see everything from Fouga Magisters to F-86s , a MiG-15, a CT-133 Silver Star, several L29s and L-39s (mostly L-39s) plus assorted piston warbirds from T-28s to our own museum fighters. We even get a regular visit from a guy who flies a French Max Holste Brussard. That's a bit of a rare warbird. One guy flies a Folland Gant occasionally. It is still in the Red Arrows paint scheme. We have one Embraer Tucano operating from Chino, too. It has a full Garmin glass panel complete with GTN 650/750 for both seats. Now THERE is a well-equipped turboprop. We should all be so lucky.

I will comment on the article by Corey Jordan - a pilot I respect very much. Having said that it is curious regarding referencing Woods career as a major "P-38" reference. I am not denigrating Woods' record but will point out some facts missed by Corey.

1. Woods flew P-40 and P-38 in PTO for a complete tour. He achieved 2-1-0 air VC's in 112 missions. He returned to States and then joined 479th FG (Olds/Zemke) to fly another tour of 48 missions P-38-J-15, plus 12 missions in P-51. He achieved 1-0 VC's on the ground before returning on Leave again. He joined the 4th FG in February, 1945. He achieved 5-0-0 Air (one mission) and 2-5 ground in 9 missions before hit by flak strafing on April 16, 1945 - POW.

He was flying the P-38 in ETO in a target rich environment as Group Ops and PTO in a target rich environment as a Flight leader and Squadron CO.

Total Record in P-38? 2-1-0 air, 1-0 ground in 172 missions. P-51? 5-0-0 air, 2-5 ground In 21 missions... for one loss to flak (himself).

Questions about the narrative? The P-38 (C.C. Jordan; MakinKid; CDB100620)

Quote from article

"Sidney flew P-40s and P-38s with the 49FG. He participated in the Battle
of the Bismark Sea. He flew 112 combat missions with the 49th. After a
rest stateside, he went to the 4th FG in Europe. He flew 68 combat
missions in Europe in P-51s. I don't know what he may have flown
stateside.

Sidney shot down two Japanese planes with the 49th and 10 with the 4th
(one of these on the ground, as the USAAF in the ETO counted aircraft
destroyed on the ground as kills. AAF in the PTO did not). Five of
the air kills were FW-190s. Among the medals awarded him that I know
about, were the Silver Star, the DFC, the Croix de Guerre and the Air
Medal. DSC, DFC(2),Croix de Guerre in P-51 in ETO; SS, DFC in P-38 in PTO

ETO record as above was 0-0-0 air, 1-0 ground 479th, 5-0-0 air, 2-5 ground 4th) for total ETO of 5-0-0 air; 3-5 ground

Sidney described the Mustang as a super P-40. He did not consider it in
the same class with the P-38. He often said that the P-40 and P-51
represented pre-war air combat thinking, and that the P-38 represented the
future. That's a broad statement, and I can't recall his specific reasons
for making it, but it does give you a sense of his feeling for the
aircraft.
Sidney said that were he flying the P-38 in Europe he could have shot down
more planes than he did. On more than one occasion, for example, he noted
that while he was closing in to wing-gun range an FW would execute one of
its fabulous snap-rolls and split-S away. Had he been in a P-38 he could
have opened fire seconds earlier, gained strikes for certain, possibly
destroying the aircraft.

]Woods flew P-38s for the entire operational P-38 experience for the 479th FG from May through September 28, 1944 - 48 missions in P-38 by him personally. He then transitioned to P-51s just like Zemke and Olds for his last 12 missions before leave to US in December, 1944. How could Woods forget that? or possibly did Jordan mis-remember the narrative? So, in 48 missions in the vaunted P-38J-15 described above, Woods scored 0-0-0.

Sidney believed the poor showing of the P-38 in the ETO was the result of
AAF brass, who, pre-war were wedded to the unescorted heavy bomber
concept, and didn't dare admit, in the face of terrible bomber losses,
that they had a perfectly capable fighter capable of escorting their
bombers from day one to the farthest target they ventured to--but they
chose not to use it. Instead, they mutually, if unconsciously, fixed on
every reason they could find to discount the P-38 as a capable fighter.
They could then say they had no choice but to go unescorted until the P-51
came along. Had they said, Yeah, we had a good escort fighter in the P-38
but decided not to use it, congressional committees would have been
demanding to know who screwed the pooch (his phrase).

Nope. The very first operational mission for the P-38 in ETO was the day after Black Thursday - October 14, 1943. After that experience following Regensburg/Schweinfurt the AAF RECOGNIZED that escort all the way to the target was required. Additionally the P-38H did not have leading edge fuel cells and could go no further than medium radius targets like Brunswick, Stuttgart until late February when the J-15s were in the 20th and 55th FG's just in time for Berlin. Even the J-15 was limited to 100+ miles shorter radius than the P-51B with 85 gallon tank. In summary, 8th AF commanders were Desparate for hoped for success in the P-38, but the P-38 was Never capable of flying escort to the farthest targets in ETO using combat tactics of fast but economical cruise above, and level with B-17 bomber altitudes. Neither Sidney Wood (nor Robin Olds)ever flew a mission past Berlin range (550 miles) while flying a P-38. Woods was, however, shooting up an airfield at Prague when he was shot down (~675 miles from Debden).

The 'Brass' didn't 'have it in for' the P-38. It just couldn't do the escort job that the P-51B/D could achieve for 8th AF. The 9th AF and PTO were very happy with the P-38 because it did fit their profile of medium and low altitude. The P-38s were PLAGUED with major issues arising from cold, high altitude ops; compressibility issues and general unreliability as a result of both mechanical issues and maintenance complications in between missions.

One more point to ponder on. The 332nd FG (Redtails) were the Lowest scoring escort Fighter Group in ETO/MTO combined, but They scored more enemy aircraft in the air from their first day of combat ops than ANY P-38 Group after that day. That includes the Very good 1st, 14th, 82nd with rich combat experience and leadership compared to the 332nd. The P-38s in the MTO had been relegated to Penetration and Withdrawal support for long range targets from Italy - just like P-47s in the ETO.

As far as a combat type went, I recall Sidney talking about how it was
impossible to overshoot an aerial target in a dive with the P-38. If you
saw that you were overtaking faster than you liked, you popped the speed
brakes. Couldn't do that with any other plane. He also liked the low
speed maneuvering flaps, the hydraulically boosted ailerons, and the overall
ruggedness of the airplane.

He felt that the AAF made a mistake in not standardizing the P-38 as "the"
fighter and having Republic and North American build it as well as
Lockheed."

So, my comments in bold above.

Nothing succeeds like success, but a tally of enemy fighters was not the only measure. The basic idea of having escort fighters was prevent or reduce enemy fighter attacks on the bombers under protection by the escorts.

Several German pilots testified that the unique shape of the P-38 allowed for quick identification, which made their job easier. They had more time to decide if they wanted to fight or flee. Single-engine fighters looked much the same until the pilots got close enough to see national markings. That is why so many were shot down in error by both sides.

It was almost impossible to mistake a P-38 for another aircraft, and it's easy to see how that sometimes worked in favor of the Lightning pilots.

Because the P-38 was easily identified from a great distance, it was easily avoided by German fighters when numbers and position did not suit them. So on the debit side, Lightning pilots had fewer opportunities to engage enemy fighters. On the plus side, the bombers under escort by Lightnings were sometimes left unharmed because the Germans intentionally avoided contact with the P-38s and instead attacked bombers under escort by P-51s or P-47s.

The P-38 pilots at the 479th Fighter Group gave mixed reviews for the P-51, which was often referred to as the "Spam Can". Colonel Hubert Zemke said that he preferred the P-51, but he had very low hours on twin-engine fighters. The guys who liked the P-51 said that it could climb higher and fly further than a P-38. The guys who did not like the P-51 cited control problems and the uncomfortable seat, which was noticable on long flights.

EKB said:

Nothing succeeds like success, but a tally of enemy fighters was not the only measure. The basic idea of having escort fighters was prevent or reduce enemy fighter attacks on the bombers under protection by the escorts.

Several German pilots testified that the unique shape of the P-38 allowed for quick identification, which made their job easier. They had more time to decide if they wanted to fight or flee. Single-engine fighters looked much the same until the pilots got close enough to see national markings. That is why so many were shot down in error by both sides.

It was almost impossible to mistake a P-38 for another aircraft, and it's easy to see how that sometimes worked in favor of the Lightning pilots.

Because the P-38 was easily identified from a great distance, it was easily avoided by German fighters when numbers and position did not suit them. So on the debit side, Lightning pilots had fewer opportunities to engage enemy fighters. On the plus side, the bombers under escort by Lightnings were sometimes left unharmed because the Germans intentionally avoided contact with the P-38s and instead attacked bombers under escort by P-51s or P-47s.

The P-38 pilots at the 479th Fighter Group gave mixed reviews for the P-51, which was often referred to as the "Spam Can". Colonel Hubert Zemke said that he preferred the P-51, but he had very low hours on twin-engine fighters. The guys who liked the P-51 said that it could climb higher and fly further than a P-38. The guys who did not like the P-51 cited control problems and the uncomfortable seat, which was noticable on long flights.

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That was a double-edged sword. While the shape of the Lightning was unique and easily identifiable, not only could enemy pilots identify it, but so could our own. Several stories I've read from bomber pilots and crews indicated they preferred that, over the "pucker factor" of seeing a single engine fighter and not knowing if it was a 'Bolt or FW, or 109 vs '51. Equally important our AA crews (land and sea based) had far less of an issue identifying them. IIRC that was a major reason they were used so heavily to cover the Normandy landings.

At the end of the Day, historians will note that the objectives of the Combined Bomber Offensive and POINTBLANK was to destroy the ability of the LW to oppose Overlord. The P-38 was less effective than either the P-51 or the P-47.

The importance of the P-51 in ETO and MTO was that they successfully escorted the bomber force to the fsrthest reach of the Reich - including Czechoslovakia, Austria and Poland, dropping average losses from near 10% to 2% while destroying nearly as many LW Fighters as the P-38 and P-47 combined.

The P-38 was designed as an interceptor - a role it virtually never assumed, was placed in the breach as a long range interceptor and air superiority fighter in the ETO and did not succeed to expectations because of technical and reliability issues. Its highest value in both the MTO and ETO was strangely CAS role - for which it was never conceived to perform. It replaced the P-40 and A-36 and competed with the P-47 - another Interceptor design.

The Mustang was designed as an all around fighter with better performance than the P-40 and P-39 and became to premier air superiority fighter in the ETO and MTO - and once again in the PTO over Japan.

It was a very strange war.

IdahoRenegade said:

That was a double-edged sword. While the shape of the Lightning was unique and easily identifiable, not only could enemy pilots identify it, but so could our own. Several stories I've read from bomber pilots and crews indicated they preferred that, over the "pucker factor" of seeing a single engine fighter and not knowing if it was a 'Bolt or FW, or 109 vs '51. Equally important our AA crews (land and sea based) had far less of an issue identifying them. IIRC that was a major reason they were used so heavily to cover the Normandy landings.

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During the Normandy landings P-38's were the only combat aircraft allowed to use the first airfields established near the landing sites because it was thought that other aircraft would suffer unacceptably high blue on blue losses.

A former B-17 pilot told me that he got his multi-engine training in AT-6's. That was early in the war and the multi-engine school that he was sent to hadn't received any twin engine trainers yet so they used AT-6's. Okay for instrument and formation training and he got multi-engine training in B-17 school. So if you decide to build P-38's instead of P-51's, you also need to build lots more twin engine trainers which we already weren't able to build fast enough. Since the aircraft engine industry was already working hard to build as many engines as possible, you'll have to settle for half as many P-38's as P-51's. Also, when looking at contract prices for aircraft, almost all military aircraft programs have engines, propellers, armament and instruments as Government Furnished Equipment and their cost is not included in the contract price for the aircraft.

no engine for trainers??...not a problem at all. the RAF perfected a work around for that in ww2....

View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=izhlm5J1wKc

BobB said:

A former B-17 pilot told me that he got his multi-engine training in AT-6's. That was early in the war and the multi-engine school that he was sent to hadn't received any twin engine trainers yet so they used AT-6's. Okay for instrument and formation training and he got multi-engine training in B-17 school. So if you decide to build P-38's instead of P-51's, you also need to build lots more twin engine trainers which we already weren't able to build fast enough. Since the aircraft engine industry was already working hard to build as many engines as possible, you'll have to settle for half as many P-38's as P-51's. Also, when looking at contract prices for aircraft, almost all military aircraft programs have engines, propellers, armament and instruments as Government Furnished Equipment and their cost is not included in the contract price for the aircraft.

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Multi engine training was lacking during the beginning of the war in all accounts, although you'll find that many of the more successful P-38 drivers got time in aircraft like the B-25 and A-20.