Worst Aircraft of WW2

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The conclusion to the Boulton Paul Defiant regarding the OP is that is was far from meriting being in the war's worst aircraft list. Certainly not amongst the best either but served usefully within the situation at the time and could have been improved a little with the intended pilot gunsight and appropriate training in tactics. At night it was as good as anything else during it's main service and remained a very useful high speed target tug thereafter. One notes that a pilot operated radar was also still used on Fairey Fulmars and Grumman Gannets later on until twin engined types were accepted as fit for carrier use.
 
The Defiant was used, but the situation wasn't good for any of the types over the winter of 1940-41

Finally you're getting it. It's all relative. Again, to put the systemic failures on the Defiant as you repeatedly do - to dredge up the past - is not fair and doesn't reflect the situation - how many times have I had to say that?

to proclaim the Defiant as "the best" with such a poor sampling (and it's competitors had equally poor sampling) seems more like a PR campaign than a real assessment.

Show me where in this thread anyone's said it was "the best" night fighter? I don't think anyone has been so bold. This is what I said:

Where the Defiant shone was as a night fighter and it proved that in the dark of night its qualities, two sets of eyes and a turret that was multi-directional, proved highly advantageous. The other factor leading to its success was a lack of fighter opposition, but again, its lack of speed did hamper it and there are ample combat reports where the enemy bomber once acquired slipped away in the darkness.

I have repeatedly said that over its night fighter career it was a success, and yup, it's relative, but to say it wasn't is simply not true, as the figures you provide show...

With that said it appears that as a nightfighter The Defiant scored 1 kill in Aug 1940, 1 kill in Sep, 1 in Oct, 0 (?) in Nov and 1 in Dec 1940. Jan saw 1 kill, 2 in Feb,
7 (?) in March followed by 16 (?) in April and 18-19 (?) in May of 1941"


Different source says ALL Night fighters kill 8 planes in Sept-Oct. less than 8 in Nov-Dec-Jan, 22 kills in March, 48 kills in April and 96 in the first 2 weeks of May.

As noted 4 years ago the Defiant's claimed about 1/3 of the kills in March (7 out of 22?) and 1/3 of the kills in April (16 out of 48?) and 1/4 of the kills in May (19 out of 96).

Bearing in mind the RAF was operating five different types in this period the Defiant's kill ratio looks quite good, actually. It also runs contrary to this posted by you...

Trying things, like the Defiant, helped acquire the expertise. Keeping the experiments going for months/ years for little result wasn't adding anything.

So, can we agree it was a success under the difficult circumstances of the time, rather than being dismissive of the aircraft and not taking those circumstances into consideration?

Nice to see a plan come together.

I'd also like to add that by March 1941, since this is the agreed datum point, there were five Defiant squadrons either available or forming and by the end of March, 54 OTU had been formed at Charterhall, with 60 OTU being formed a month later at Leconfield, before moving to East Fortune when that station opened. So before March 1941, there was no operational night fighter training in the RAF except on squadrons equipped with night fighters. It was a tough time for crews being trained in techniques by their commanding officers, who had to learn the stuff themselves from manuals. It's no wonder the kill count was so low before then.
 
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From a purely strategic standpoint, I'd argue the Ohka could fit on the list. Sure, it technically does its job of being a manned cruise missile. But that's exactly the problem: It is marginally successful at feeding illusions that sacrificing men directly can win the war. It was far from the only aircraft used for "special attack missions", far from it. But many of the aircraft used for these missions at least have the excuse of being obsolete airframes, so you weren't incurring additional manufacturing costs on top of the manpower cost. Yes, technically the mortality rate per ship sunk was LOWER on Kamikaze missions than traditional attacks. But what that SHOULD say is that the situation has gone so pear shaped that they needed to fall back to fix both their air power and their training regimen. What is the POINT of fighting a war if you have no plans for if you WIN?

I would argue that the only thing that can be worse than a design for a good role, done badly, is a design for a self-destructive role, done at all.


I know, such a hot take: "kamikaze bad".
 
. This is when he applied the Lufbery Circle idea (named after Raoul Lufbery in the Great War, although its origins are uncertain) to Defiants when attacked by enemy fighters. having expressions of doubt about
Hi
In the RFC during WW1 this was known as the "roundabout" tactic when used by FE.2b/d pusher aircraft. It was to protect themselves from rear attacks by enemy fighters. However, the formation had to careful not to drift eastwards in the prevailing winds on the Western Front so had to gradually move the "roundabout" formation westwards as they circled. Also if the mission had yet to be undertaken (photo recce, bombing etc) the formation could hamper the completion of the task.

Mike
 
In the RFC during WW1 this was known as the "roundabout" tactic when used by FE.2b/d pusher aircraft. It was to protect themselves from rear attacks by enemy fighters. However, the formation had to careful not to drift eastwards in the prevailing winds on the Western Front so had to gradually move the "roundabout" formation westwards as they circled. Also if the mission had yet to be undertaken (photo recce, bombing etc) the formation could hamper the completion of the task.

Hi Mike, yup, there's no agreement whether or not the roundabout tactic was its first application in combat, hence my brief, barely a sentence statement. The name for this manoeuvre has come to be described as the Lufbery Circle. Why? Don't know without looking it up. Raoul Lufbery isn't even credited with inventing it. Interestingly, within the context of the Defiant, Boulton Paul historian Alec Brew, when describing tactics that Sqn Ldr Hunter applied in training operational tactics for the Defiant, described the manoeuvre as a "Defensive Circle", which is possibly (but I don't know this for sure) what Hunter called it, but it's the same thing as a Lufbery Circle or Roundabout tactic and I'm sure the Germans have a different name again for what is essentially the same manoeuvre.
 
Hi Mike, yup, there's no agreement whether or not the roundabout tactic was its first application in combat, hence my brief, barely a sentence statement. The name for this manoeuvre has come to be described as the Lufbery Circle. Why? Don't know without looking it up. Raoul Lufbery isn't even credited with inventing it. Interestingly, within the context of the Defiant, Boulton Paul historian Alec Brew, when describing tactics that Sqn Ldr Hunter applied in training operational tactics for the Defiant, described the manoeuvre as a "Defensive Circle", which is possibly (but I don't know this for sure) what Hunter called it, but it's the same thing as a Lufbery Circle or Roundabout tactic and I'm sure the Germans have a different name again for what is essentially the same manoeuvre.
Hi
I have not come across the term "Lufbery Circle" being used by the British or French, so I presume it is a US, probably post WW1 term used in US publications. The book 'Dog-Fight, Aerial Tactics of the Aces of World War I' by Norman Franks, does mention below a comment on using a "revolving wheel" formation by No. 43 Sqn. flying Sopwith 1 1/2 Strutters (two seat):
WW2turnround016.jpg

I suspect an author (as writers have a tendency to do) put a 'famous name' to something they had nothing to do with originally, which is later repeated by other writers making it 'fact'.

Mike
 
But what that SHOULD say is that the situation has gone so pear shaped that they needed to fall back to fix both their air power and their training regimen. What is the POINT of fighting a war if you have no plans for if you WIN?
In the late stages of the Pacific war, the Japanese command new that victory was no longer an option.

Their strategy, however, was to make Allied victories so costly, that they would be able to negotiate peace on their terms.

That idea may have sounded good on paper, but the Allies weren't going along with the plan.
 
Comparing the figures earlier posted, the co-relation between the OTUs getting up to speed and the rise in kills from April 1941 onwards is of interest...
It is of interest. I am sure the OTUs helped quite bit. So did a number of other factors. Many of which I have mentioned.

So, can we agree it was a success under the difficult circumstances of the time, rather than being dismissive of the aircraft and not taking those circumstances into consideration?
No, we can't.

Was it a total failure?
No.
Now where on the total failure to success spectrum was it?

Chart.png

You seem to think it was in the green, I think it was in orange area.


Where the Defiant shone was as a night fighter and it proved that in the dark of night its qualities, two sets of eyes and a turret that was multi-directional, proved highly advantageous. The other factor leading to it success was a lack of fighter opposition, but again, its lack of speed did hamper it and there are ample combat reports where the enemy bomber once acquired slipped away in the darkness. Some 13 RAF squadrons fully or partially equipped with the Defiant between late 1940 and the end of 1942, when the type was finally withdrawn from the frontline.
Shone as a Night fighter????/
Shone???????
Shine......................to be eminent, conspicuous, or distinguished
..................................to perform extremely well
.................................. to be conspicuously evident or clear



Bearing in mind the RAF was operating five different types in this period the Defiant's kill ratio looks quite good, actually. It also runs contrary to this posted by you...
During the time period in question the Blenheim started at 6 squadrons and decreased, the Defiant started at 3 squadrons and increased to 5 The Havoc didn't even start until Feb/March and had two squadrons in April, The Beaufighter started in October but it was a slow replacement into some of the Blenheim squadrons at first. Some Squadrons may have started on Beaufighters as production ramped up? It took some months before the 1st three squadrons got up to full compliment.
In March of 1940 1/2 of the 22 German aircraft claimed were by Beaufighters vs the 1/3 claimed by Defiant's leaving 1/6th for everybody else?

By the time of the Invasion of Russian No 604 squadron (which had scored the first radar Beaufighter kill in March) was claiming 50 kills.
Granted most of these kills were by a handful of pilots whatever people may have thought in the winter of 1940/41
So, can we agree it was a success under the difficult circumstances of the time, rather than being dismissive of the aircraft and not taking those circumstances into consideration?
Define success, Shooting down 1 or 2 aircraft a month out of 5-6000 aircraft penetrating British airspace is not a success.
Beaufighter scored it's first radar kill on Nov 19/201940, a second kill was scored several weeks later? Granted several more months went by before another kill. Hints of the future but not a a success at the time.

Shooting down almost 100 a month was a success, Or at least close do it. Could the Germans sustain that level of losses or higher as the nights got shorter and the British night fighters (and controllers) got even better?

The "experiments", whatever their merits were Jan-April of 1941 should have been shut down in the summer of 1941.
The 2000ft cable with mine on the end wasn't shut down until Nov of 1942!!!!!
The Turbinelite wasn't shutdown until 1943 ( 70 Bostons/Havos with eight/twelve 303 guns and radar in the same plane could have done something in 1942. Shooting down one German would have tied the Defiant record in late 1941/and 1942)
And the last points out the gaslighting that is part of the Defiant's record.
The majority of Defiant night fighter squadrons weren't equipped with Defiants until after the Invasion of Russian. Even if all 13 were not equipped at the same time and even granting that you need a least some planes to fill up squadrons the results don't justify the costs.
The MK II Defiant didn't show up until Sept 1941. Radar, due to development problems didn't show up until Sept 1941.
Defiants scored 1 kill from Sept 1941 on? and yet accounts of full of the Defiant providing valuable service as a nightfighter well after the summer of 1941.

Selective use of dates can also skew things.
When did the "Blitz" end?

Some sources say May 11th.
But the Luftwaffe didn't show up on May 11th and then stop on May 12th. Things tapered off considerably but on 19/20 May 1941 Night fighters (of all types?) claimed 24 German aircraft while AA claimed 2.
These 24 aircraft should not be counted in the 96 destroyed in the first 2 weeks of May but I don't know who was counting.
 
So the Defiant Mk.II entered service in Sept 1941 and was radar equipped from the get go.

But there are references to some squadrons having to "make do" with radar equipped Mk.IA. But none of them make clear when they first appeared on squadrons.

Anyone got any positive source of confirmation for a date of entry for the Mk.IA and not just an assumption based on Mk.II?
 
I don't know if the Defiant service aircraft showed up with both the Merlin XX engines and radar in the same aircraft or not. Bill Gunstons book indicates they did not.

Bill Gunstons book claims Boulton Paul had completed the installation drawings on Nov 19th 1940 for the AI V radar. Parts were in the right wing, behind the turret, in-between the turret and pilots seat, the display on the left and the controls on the right.
The Installation suffered from moisture and bad electrical screening and was not cleared until Aug 1941. By which time they had changed to the AI MK VI radar with wider bandwidth and with a beacon facility.
Bill Gunstons book says that radar equipped Defiant IA served with Squadron 264 and later with squadrons 96, 125, 256 and 410.
The MK IIs served with Squadron 141 and with 151 and 153 squadrons.

I have no idea what later the later mix of aircraft was and/or what other squadrons were using Defiants to get up to 13 squadrons using them as night fighters at some point.
Not saying they were used at the same point.
 
The Defiant was a beautifully executed machine. The fact that we're discussing radar installations for the Defiant tells me that it has positive qualities. It was built to a government requirement and built well. It's what the customer ordered. As they say in Thailand, "good idea, low IQ".
I'm sticking with the Lerwick.
 
From a purely strategic standpoint, I'd argue the Ohka could fit on the list. Sure, it technically does its job of being a manned cruise missile. But that's exactly the problem: It is marginally successful at feeding illusions that sacrificing men directly can win the war. It was far from the only aircraft used for "special attack missions", far from it. But many of the aircraft used for these missions at least have the excuse of being obsolete airframes, so you weren't incurring additional manufacturing costs on top of the manpower cost. Yes, technically the mortality rate per ship sunk was LOWER on Kamikaze missions than traditional attacks. But what that SHOULD say is that the situation has gone so pear shaped that they needed to fall back to fix both their air power and their training regimen. What is the POINT of fighting a war if you have no plans for if you WIN?

I would argue that the only thing that can be worse than a design for a good role, done badly, is a design for a self-destructive role, done at all.


I know, such a hot take: "kamikaze bad".
I don't think it's a hot take; what you say is well reasoned.

All the suicide weapons (including aerial torpedoes to some extent) were a misallocation of resources. By 1944-45, the Japanese had developed (or were developing) a variety of guided missiles, such as the Ke-Go heat-seeking missile. Even from a cost perspective, I can't imagine that even 100 heat-seeking missiles is worth the life of one top-of-their-class college student who would otherwise go on to become a productive member of society. So from that perspective, I can't think of a more expensive weapons program that had very little impact on the war.

It's as GrauGeist GrauGeist said: a terror weapon designed to force Allied political leaders to the bargaining table.
 
The Defiant was a beautifully executed machine. The fact that we're discussing radar installations for the Defiant tells me that it has positive qualities. It was built to a government requirement and built well. It's what the customer ordered. As they say in Thailand, "good idea, low IQ".
I'm sticking with the Lerwick.




The Defiant was a lot better than either Lerwick or the Botha.

It was what the Customer ordered. It was well built.

Still leaves a lot of room before the needle gets into green. ;)
 
Those pilots trained to fly the Ki-115 were given basic stick and rudder instruction and only take off knowledge. Some authors say the pilots are to be mid teenagers.

Regarding the defensive circle, in Vietnam when MiG-17s were caught together, they formed the classic defensive circle against the F-4s. Since there were not generally enough MiGs to completely fill the circle ( and no rear gunner), the F-4 driver tactic was to use superior speed to bisect the circle and hope to get a hit or at least break up the circle.
 
I don't know if the Defiant service aircraft showed up with both the Merlin XX engines and radar in the same aircraft or not. Bill Gunstons book indicates they did not.

Bill Gunstons book claims Boulton Paul had completed the installation drawings on Nov 19th 1940 for the AI V radar. Parts were in the right wing, behind the turret, in-between the turret and pilots seat, the display on the left and the controls on the right.
The Installation suffered from moisture and bad electrical screening and was not cleared until Aug 1941. By which time they had changed to the AI MK VI radar with wider bandwidth and with a beacon facility.
Bill Gunstons book says that radar equipped Defiant IA served with Squadron 264 and later with squadrons 96, 125, 256 and 410.
The MK IIs served with Squadron 141 and with 151 and 153 squadrons.

I have no idea what later the later mix of aircraft was and/or what other squadrons were using Defiants to get up to 13 squadrons using them as night fighters at some point.
Not saying they were used at the same point.
The 13 Defiant squadrons:-
85 - Mk.I Jan-Feb 1941 alongside Hurricanes in the night role. Only flew 3 sorties on them before switching to Havocs.

96 - converted from a Hurricane night fighter flight in Dec 1940. Defiant Mk.I/IA Feb 1941- June 1942. Mk.II from Feb 1942-Jun 1942. Converted to Beaufighter II.

125 - formed as a Defiant NF unit Jun 1941. Operated Mk.I to Apr 1942. Beaufighter II started arriving Feb 1942.

141 - Defiant Mk.I day fighter Oct 1939-Sept 1940. Sept 1940 det sent to southern England in NF role with rest of squadron following in Oct. Began to receive Beaufighter I in Jun 1941 and last Defiants left in Aug.

151 - Hurricane squadron switched to NF role in Nov 1940 when Defiants began to be received. Hurricanes left Feb 1942. Defiant Mk.I Dec 1940-Apr 1942. Mk.II Apr 1942-Aug 1942. Mosquito II began arriving in Apr 1942.

153 - formed Oct 1941 from a flight of 256 Sqdn. Defiant Mk.I until May 1942. Beaufighter I started arriving Jan 1942.

255 - formed Nov 1940 as Defiant Mk.I NF squadron, which it used until Sept 1941. Also Hurricanes from Mar-July 1941. Beaufighter II began to be received in July 1941.

256 - formed Nov 1940 as Defiant Mk.I NF squadron. July 1941 received some Hurricanes. Both types swapped for Beaufighter I in May 1942.

264 - Defiant day fighter squadron switched to NF role at end of Aug 1940. Defiant Mk.I to Sept 1941 then Mk.II. Converted to Mosquito II in May 1942.

307 (Polish) - formed as Defiant NF squadron Sept 1940. Used Mk.I until Aug 1941 when it swapped them for Beaufighter II.

409 - formed as Defiant Mk.I NF squadron Jun 1941 which it used until Oct 1941. But Beaufighter II began to arrive in Aug 1941.

410 - formed Jun 1940 as Defiant Mk.I NF squadron which it used until Jun 1942. But Beaufighter II began arriving in April 1942.

456 - formed June 1941 as Defiant Mk.I NF squadron which it used until Nov 1941. But began receiving Beaufighter II in Sept 1941.

So we have squadrons using Defiants in the NF role for as little as 2 months (85) and as long as 2 years (410) with several also using Hurricanes in that role alongside them. Conversion to more able twin engined NF types begins in early 1941 as aircraft become available (Havocs, then Beaufighters then Mosquitos).

The ASR squadrons began to receive Defiant Mk.I/IA from Nov 1941.

Taken from Halley's "Squadrons of the Royal Air Force and Commonwealth 1918-1988.". There seems to be little distinction between Marks used however.
 
The Defiant was a lot better than either Lerwick or the Botha.

It was what the Customer ordered. It was well built.

Still leaves a lot of room before the needle gets into green. ;)
Never said it was a world beater. It just doesn't deserve to be listed with the truly awful. It wouldn't to try kill you just by being in it.
 
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Never said it was a world beater. It just doesn't deserve to be listed with the truly awful. It wouldn't try kill you just by being in it.
As long as you didn't try to use it in combat ;)

Somewhat kidding.

However, like a number of American Aircraft, it's combat numbers are seriously overblown by claimed victories during wartime. Which was fine at the time, that is all they knew. It was OK in the 1950s, nobody was doing a lot of research but we are getting the same kind of inflated statistics about the Defiant as we are from the Dauntless and the F6F (19 to 1 kill ratio?).

The Defiant's claim of 37 (or 38) in one day (My 29th 1940) is claimed by some to be only 14 by German records.
Ok, everybody over claimed, but that is one of the Defiants main claims to fame, one squadron on one day.
SBDs overclaimed like crazy during the battle of Coral Sea and established that whole "used as a fighter" thing that has persisted to this day.
Skua has a much better claim as a fighter based on what it actually did. And only about 3 squadrons used Skuas?

The Defiant as a night fighter is another rathole.
Yes, they used them, But it doesn't seem that they were much better than anything else? (maybe better than Hurricanes?)
The 6 squadrons of Blenheims (don't know if they added to that number or how quickly replacement by Beaufighters cut the number of squadrons) changed.
There were 3 squadrons of Defiants in Sept of 1940 and another 4 were added by May of 1941 during the Blitz (not counting Squadron 85 with 3 sorties)

The Biggest use was after the Blitz ended and since the Luftwaffe did not cooperate by sending large numbers of bombers over Britain for Defiant to shoot down in late 1941 and early 1942 we don't know how well they would have done or not done. The Defiants flew, they don't seem to have crashed at a higher than normal rate compared to other planes of the time and that is about it for the after Blitz record.

The Blenheims were in 6 squadrons but only about 1/3 had radar at the start of the Blitz and a number of those squadrons were slowly up graded to Beaufighters. By the end of Dec 1940 5 squadrons had at least some Beaufighters.

For a number of these nightfighters during the Blitz operational losses (crashes) exceeded enemy kills until about March, just due to hazards of night flying.
The machines were getting better radios and homing beacons over the winter and with more pilots getting experience things got better, but No 604 Squadron lost it's most experienced pilot (in number of night hours flown) in late spring of 1941 (?) so things were never easy.

Perhaps the Defiant belongs on a list of most overrated and not worst aircraft.
 

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