Worst Piston engined Bomber of World War Two

FLYBOYJ said:

You don't have to be instrument rated to fly at night but I believe all naval aviatiors of the period did have instrument training. Flying instruments in those days were very basic and there were few nav aids used for IMC verctoring and landing.

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I wasn't sure of their qualifications at that early stage in the War. After all, it was only a few days short of six months for us. Still, I'm thinking, these aren't heavy bombers, for example, flying level, but virtual acrobats, compared to those. Without any daylight reckoning they're going to need to lean on their instruments just to be sure of their attitude, when, for example, they come out of a dive, or otherwise get disoriented. They set a rudder or elevator wrong because they can't see and their inner-ear tells them they're right-side-up while in fact they're up-side-down, they go right into the ocean. Getting there, at night, I'll agree, they're OK. After all, both sides have launched carrier planes, before, at night.

VBF-13 said:

I wasn't sure of their qualifications at that early stage in the War. After all, it was only a few days short of six months for us. Still, I'm thinking, these aren't heavy bombers, for example, flying level, but virtual acrobats, compared to those. Without any daylight reckoning they're going to need to lean on their instruments just to be sure of their attitude, when, for example, they come out of a dive, or otherwise get disoriented. They set a rudder or elevator wrong because they can't see and their inner-ear tells them they're right-side-up while in fact they're up-side-down, they go right into the ocean. Getting there, at night, I'll agree, they're OK. After all, both sides have launched carrier planes, before, at night.

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Flying instruments for the most part is the same whether you're in a heavy bomber or in a SBD. For just staying level you're relying on airspeed indicator, vertical speed indicator and altimeter, add a compass in there and you have direction, add a directional gyro and that's even better. Understand that a trained pilot will recognize when they are about to enter instrument meteorological conditions (IMC) and begins what's called an "instrument scan" when they stop looking outside the cockpit and just affix their eyes on their instruments, ignoring their "inner ear" as you put it. While doing this they better be aware of what's around them (mainly mountains) and one would hope that no one is attempting aerobatics in IMC conditions, although during combat, a different story. A pilot should be trained to realize when they are disorientated and start using their instruments to get re-orinetated.

There's a lot more to this but I do know that during WW2 pilots received enough intrument training to hopefully keep them out of trouble. I do know later in the war there was expanded training. Bill (Drangondog) may have some input on this.

FLYBOYJ said:

Flying instruments for the most part is the same whether you're in a heavy bomber or in a SBD. For just staying level you're relying on airspeed indicator, vertical speed indicator and altimeter, add a compass in there and you have direction, add a directional gyro and that's even better. Understand that a trained pilot will recognize when they are about to enter instrument meteorological conditions (IMC) and begins what's called an "instrument scan" when they stop looking outside the cockpit and just affix their eyes on their instruments, ignoring their "inner ear" as you put it. While doing this they better be aware of what's around them (mainly mountains) and one would hope that no one is attempting aerobatics in IMC conditions, although during combat, a different story. A pilot should be trained to realize when they are disorientated and start using their instruments to get re-orinetated.

There's a lot more to this but I do know that during WW2 pilots received enough intrument training to hopefully keep them out of trouble. I do know later in the war there was expanded training. Bill (Drangondog) may have some input on this.

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That sounds pretty good to me. I would be interested in hearing more on the qualifications of these early pilots, though, just to be able to determine whether a night run at Midway would have been "on the table," so to speak.

VBF-13 said:

That sounds pretty good to me. I would be interested in hearing more on the qualifications of these early pilots, though, just to be able to determine whether a night run at Midway would have been "on the table," so to speak.

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The book "First Team, Pacific Naval Combat History, Pearl Harbor to Midway" States that the Advance Carrier Training Groups on both coasts in 1941 had a 75 hour sylabus that covered tactics, navigation, gunnery, bombing, carrier landings, carrier qualification, night flying and instruments. Appendix 1 page 454, 455. It doesn't specify how much time was allocated in each area. I'm sure the pilots who flew at Midway "would have" been able to to do a night run provided they had a lit carrier to come back to (another story).

That would seem to answer it. There's nothing relative to the pilots that would disqualify such a run. I'd do think it would be harder for them to manage, though, everything else being equal. For that matter, are you or is anybody aware of any such night runs off carriers? I'm having a little brain cramp on that at the moment.

Surely some missions took off in the early morning dark, so as to arrive over the target at first light ?

Then they could return in daylight.

Heck, they left before sun-up for Pearl. Tyrodtom, I'm not having that much of a brain cramp!

Engagements at night. I'm just having trouble recalling any.

VBF-13 said:

That would seem to answer it. There's nothing relative to the pilots that would disqualify such a run. I'd do think it would be harder for them to manage, though, everything else being equal. For that matter, are you or is anybody aware of any such night runs off carriers? I'm having a little brain cramp on that at the moment.

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Oh yes....

During the Battle of the Philippine Sea on June 19th, Hellcat pilots from HORNET destroyed enemy aircraft with no losses in what came to be known as the "Marianas Turkey Shoot". The following afternoon, a TBM from Wasp (CV-18 ) spotted the retiring Japanese fleet and a strike was immediately launched. Pilots from HORNET were the first to attack, scoring lethal hits on Zuikaku-class carrier. It was long after dark when the returning aircraft arrived over the Task Force. All were critically low on fuel, many badly shot up and their pilots wounded. From flag plot aboard Lexington (CV-16), Admiral Mark Mitscher gave his famous order to "turn on the lights", thus risking the submarine threat, but allowing the exhausted aviators to find carrier decks upon which to land.

HORNET IN WORLD WAR II - Aircraft Carrier USS Hornet Museum

VBF-13 said:

In hindsight it may have been possible to have done the job on the carriers at Midway at night in just the SBDs, provided we could locate the carriers, and provided those pilots were instrument-rated. I know at least later in the War the pilots were trained on just that, instruments, and night dive-bombing. Still, I'll agree, a lot of practical problems, and I don't think I'd have taken the chance on committing my pilots and maintenance crews on an operation like that, personally, especially when I think of what was at stake.

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If you have just SBDs there is not the same need to convert to night capability. The dauntless was still able in 1942-3 to operate in daylight, the TBD was not. This is about finding a useful role for the TBDs, which just happens to also act as a force multiplier for the whole carrier group.

The Brits did a lot of carrier night ops, here's one from USN;

Carrier Division Seven

FLYBOYJ, thanks for those links. I've seen pictures of the Hellcats taking off for the Marianas at night but never thought to look into whether they engaged at night. That link on the Enterprise is all news to me, and it shouldn't be, as some of my Dad's flight squadron were on the Saratoga in 1945!

FLYBOYJ said:

Again, show me WHERE it says the Swordfish was specifically "Stressed" for divebombing?

I mentioned the 200 knot dive on post 89 - it was indicated in the book by Terence Horsley in "Find, Fix and Strike."
That does not mean you're diving with a torpedo at 200 knots

Again it proves? There is no argument that the Swordfish was able to dive bomb but it did have limitations. There is no evidence that during its design or inital deployment it was specifically "stressed for dive bombing." Again, it was able to divebomb agree, with limitations

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I found this book in a 2nd hand store:

The remarkable qualities of the Swordfish were the product of
the genius of Marcel Lobelle, the chief designer of Fairey Aviation
Company. In 1933 the Admiralty asked Sir Richard Fairey to
design an aircraft which would fulfil every naval requirement except
the air defence of the Fleet. They listed six for a start: reconnaiss-
ance, at sea and over the land; shadowing, by day and night;
'spotting' the fall of shot from ship's guns; convoy escort duties,
such as anti-submarine searches and attack; torpedo and dive-
bombing attacks against shipping; minelaying - and the carrying
of other heavy loads - which in the Second World War varied from
searchlights to rockets, plus depth-charges, bombs and flares.
To combine all these varied functions in one aeroplane was a
revolutionary concept. There were other complications which
had to be embodied into the design: the aircraft had to be capable
of landing in small areas, and on pitching decks at very slow
speeds. It also had to be able to carry heavy loads of nearly 2000 Ib
in a dive attack at speeds not far from 200 knots, if it was to sur-
vive. Therefore a low stalling speed when carrying all this weight
was essential....(p56)

...Of all its many weapons the most devastating was the aerial
torpedo. This weighed 1610 Ib and was capable of sinking a
10000-ton ship within minutes of the moment of impact. To
deliver this weapon in the face of intense opposition in daylight,
pilots were taught to attack from a steep dive, at speeds of ISO
knots and more. They have been known to reach 200 knots in
that dive - in extremis - but there was then a real danger of the
wings folding back, or tearing off. In that headlong rash to sea
level, the pilot had the impression that he was standing on the
rudder bar, looking over the top of the centre-section of the uppet
mainplane. His face was only partially screened, so that a helmet'
and goggles were a 'must' for all normal individuals. Those dives
had to be very nearly vertical. Any modern clean-surfaced aircraft
needs many thousands of feet to pull out of a dive, but the Sword- :
fish could be eased out, with a pull-out of less than five hundred
feet. After straightening out and throttling back, the forward
speed came right down to 90 knots very quickly, because of the
drag provided by the fixed undercarriage, and all the struts and
wires between the mainplanes. This violent alteration in speed
made the aircraft a difficult target for the gun-aimer on the ground,
or in the ship being attacked, and the sudden deceleration helped
the pilot to deliver his weapon very accurately. Nevertheless there
was never any doubt that the Stringbag was a very slow machine,
and a vulnerable target for all, especially in daylight...(p57)

War in a stringbag,

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David Brown, in his book "Carrier Operations In WWII - Vol II - The Pacific Navies" makes a comment relating to Night Operations. he is referring to the IJNs carrier raids into the Indian Ocean in April 1942. He says "Admiral Somerville had just one strong card: the RN had developed night operations to a degree unknown in either the US or Japanese Navies. Night landings were regularly practised, the cordination of strikes, and ASV radar was installed into a high proportion of his Albacore strike aircraft Crews were proficient in its use for both search and attack. Attacks involved location by radar, and also used target illumination and moonlight or dusk light for target illumination. With this advantage Somerville intended to remain out of reach of the Japanese by day, closing by night, to launch airborne searches with radar equipped aircraft. Daylight movements of the IJN were to be monitored by Catalinas based in Ceylon. Once located, torpedo strikes were to be launched by the carriers".

Somerville was untroubled by the prospect of being intercepted by the japanese at night. He detached his "slow division"....most of his fleet, to be well outside the engagement area for most of the fight.

Implicit in all of this is that whilst US aircrew might have some of the skills necessary to fly at night, they had not the full suite of skills, the experience, the equipment (particulalry the ASV radar, fitted to their carrier birds) or the doctrine to adopt such a strategy. My opinion is that if, in 1939 or 40 they had specifically designated their TBD squadrons as "night strike" squadrons, they would have given those formations the opportunity and the motivation to train their personnel, and modify their equipment, to complete that mission. With a force of aircraft night capable on each CAG carrying TBDs, it might have opened the eyes of the US carrier admirals to the possibilities of night operations. Even if that was limited to maintaining searches at night it would have left the USN in a far stronger position than it was historically, because if it could maintain contact with the japanese fleet during darkness.

My suggestion does not reduce the day capability of the US Carriers, does not increase their vulnerability, and gets a lot more value out of their TBDs than was historically achieved. I would go so far as to say that if the TBDs had been used in that way, we would be singing a different song about them than we are....

RCAFson said:

I found this book in a 2nd hand store:

The remarkable qualities of the Swordfish were the product of
the genius of Marcel Lobelle, the chief designer of Fairey Aviation
Company. In 1933 the Admiralty asked Sir Richard Fairey to
design an aircraft which would fulfil every naval requirement except
the air defence of the Fleet. They listed six for a start: reconnaiss-
ance, at sea and over the land; shadowing, by day and night;
'spotting' the fall of shot from ship's guns; convoy escort duties,
such as anti-submarine searches and attack; torpedo and dive-
bombing attacks against shipping; minelaying - and the carrying
of other heavy loads - which in the Second World War varied from
searchlights to rockets, plus depth-charges, bombs and flares.
To combine all these varied functions in one aeroplane was a
revolutionary concept. There were other complications which
had to be embodied into the design: the aircraft had to be capable
of landing in small areas, and on pitching decks at very slow
speeds. It also had to be able to carry heavy loads of nearly 2000 Ib
in a dive attack at speeds not far from 200 knots, if it was to sur-
vive. Therefore a low stalling speed when carrying all this weight
was essential....(p56)

...Of all its many weapons the most devastating was the aerial
torpedo. This weighed 1610 Ib and was capable of sinking a
10000-ton ship within minutes of the moment of impact. To
deliver this weapon in the face of intense opposition in daylight,
pilots were taught to attack from a steep dive, at speeds of ISO
knots and more. They have been known to reach 200 knots in
that dive - in extremis - but there was then a real danger of the
wings folding back, or tearing off. In that headlong rash to sea
level, the pilot had the impression that he was standing on the
rudder bar, looking over the top of the centre-section of the uppet
mainplane. His face was only partially screened, so that a helmet'
and goggles were a 'must' for all normal individuals. Those dives
had to be very nearly vertical. Any modern clean-surfaced aircraft
needs many thousands of feet to pull out of a dive, but the Sword- :
fish could be eased out, with a pull-out of less than five hundred
feet. After straightening out and throttling back, the forward
speed came right down to 90 knots very quickly, because of the
drag provided by the fixed undercarriage, and all the struts and
wires between the mainplanes. This violent alteration in speed
made the aircraft a difficult target for the gun-aimer on the ground,
or in the ship being attacked, and the sudden deceleration helped
the pilot to deliver his weapon very accurately. Nevertheless there
was never any doubt that the Stringbag was a very slow machine,
and a vulnerable target for all, especially in daylight...(p57)

War in a stringbag,

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Keep looking in bookstores - I don't buy it and I'll tell you why. You keep bringing up "stressed for dive bombing," but there is NO evidence from the AM that this was part of the original specification. The Swordfish's pilot's notes under limitations specifically says that "light" G loads are acceptable. Light G loads? +3.5 1.5 for normal for civilian aircraft +6 -3 for aerobatic aircraft, probably a tad more for the stringbag. Compare the airframe loading with say the Albacore whose original AM specification called for dive bombing. Check to see what other bonafide dive bombers were stressed for. As far as the Swordfish, divebombing was not part of it's original design, there is nothing to show it was "stressed" for divebombing but it did accomplish the task regardless.I even have question about the quote;

"In 1933 the Admiralty asked Sir Richard Fairey to
design an aircraft which would fulfil every naval requirement except
the air defence of the Fleet. They listed six for a start: reconnaiss-
ance, at sea and over the land; shadowing, by day and night;
'spotting' the fall of shot from ship's guns; convoy escort duties,
such as anti-submarine searches and attack; torpedo and dive-
bombing attacks against shipping; minelaying - and the carrying
of other heavy loads - which in the Second World War varied from
searchlights to rockets, plus depth-charges, bombs and flares."

From wiki and several other sources...

The Swordfish was based on a Fairey Private Venture (PV) design; a proposed solution to the Air Ministry requirements for a spotter-reconnaissance plane, spotter referring to observing the fall of a warship's gunfire. A subsequent Air Ministry Specification S.15/33, added the torpedo bomber role. The "Torpedo-Spotter-Reconnaissance" prototype TSR II (the PV was the TSR I) first flew on 17 April 1934. It was a large biplane with a metal frame covered in fabric, and utilized folding wings as a space-saving feature for aircraft carrier use. An order was placed in 1935 and the aircraft entered service in 1936 with the Fleet Air Arm (then part of the RAF), replacing the Seal in the torpedo bomber role.

I give you a B+ for persistence

FLYBOYJ said:

Keep looking in bookstores - I don't buy it and I'll tell you why. You keep bringing up "stressed for dive bombing," but there is NO evidence from the AM that this was part of the original specification. The Swordfish's pilot's notes under limitations specifically says that "light" G loads are acceptable. Light G loads? +3.5 1.5 for normal for civilian aircraft +6 -3 for aerobatic aircraft, probably a tad more for the stringbag. Compare the airframe loading with say the Albacore whose original AM specification called for dive bombing. Check to see what other bonafide dive bombers were stressed for. As far as the Swordfish, divebombing was not part of it's original design, there is nothing to show it was "stressed" for divebombing but it did accomplish the task regardless.I even have question about the quote;

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I found the July 1993 pilot's notes for the Swordfish II at Scribd, but I'm pretty certain these are for the existing Swordfish and reflect restrictions imposed upon a 50 year old airframe and sound impossibly low for a combat aircraft. I have purchased Swordfish flight manuals from WW2, but it will be a day or so before I can download them.

RCAFson said:

I found the July 1993 pilot's notes for the Swordfish II at Scribd, but I'm pretty certain these are for the existing Swordfish and reflect restrictions imposed upon a 50 year old airframe and sound impossibly low for a combat aircraft. I have purchased Swordfish flight manuals from WW2, but it will be a day or so before I can download them.

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Those 1993 pilots notes from Scribd are duplicate from earlier ones I seen. I believe you're going to find that more than likely that there isn't going to be a full blown flight manual, but pilot's notes as you just found; I'm not British bashing here but compared to US manuals are pretty sparse with some information.

Information I have found was that Lt. Commander Williamson successfully launched his torpedo against the Conte di Cavour before being shot down.

According to "The Royal Navy in World War II", out of ten torpedo drops, six were successful , or 60%.

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I would like to respond to this, because its incorrect

Record of hits at Taranto
1st Wave (6 a/c carrying torps, 5 a/c carrying bombs and/or flares)

At 11:14 PM, the Italian battleship Cavour is struck by a Royal Navy torpedo delivered via Swordfish L4A. L4A is later downed by anti-aircraft fire, though both crew members survive

(1 hit)

At 11:15 PM, the Italian vessel Doria is struck twice by torpedoes in her forward section.
(2 hits)

11:15 PM The Italian ship Littorio is struck by a torpedo along her starboard side. Swordfish L4M follows with another strike to the same side.
(2 hits)

Unknown A Swordfish torpedo meant for the Vittorio Veneto fails to reach its mark, exploding harmlessly on the sea floor.
(1 miss)

2nd Wave 5 a/c carrying torps, 5 a/c carrying bombs and/or flares
At 11:35 PM, the second wave of Royal Navy torpedo-laden aircraft moves into position.

The Libeccio is hit by a Royal Navy torpedo but the munition fails to explode. (some sources claim this is from an aircraft in the4 1st wave
(1 hit)

Two signal aircraft attack the oil depot at Taranto but fail to produce much damage. It is unknown how many bomb hits were achieved with these aircraft, but they divert 8 of the 60 (odd) bombs dropped away from the ships in harbour.

(time uncertain) The Italian battleship Caio Duilio is struck at her bow by a Royal Navy torpedo
(1 hit)

At 1:01 AM, The sinking Littorio is struck by another torpedo
(1 hit)


At 1:01 AM, The sinking Littorio is struck by another torpedo
(1 hit)


At approximately 1:05AM Swordfish E4H is downed by enemy anti-aircraft fire, killing her co-pilot.

Swordfish E5H misses her mark against the Vittorio Veneto.

(1 miss)


For the 1st wave, thats 5 hits out of 6 launches, or 83%. For the second wave, it was 4 hits out of 5 launches, but one fish failing to detonate. Thats a hit rate of 80%. If you want to use faulty statistical analysis (although possibly acceptable in this case, as the events and the circumstances do appear similar) we have an average hit rate of 81.7%. One of the Torpedo Bombers was shot down, but it achieved a launch and a hit.

I am less sure aboiut the bombers. There were 10 bombers, 4 of them were also acting as flare droppers. The dedicated bombers were each carrying 6 x 250lb bombs, whilst the flare droppers were carrying 4 x 250lb bombs. Two of the bombers attacked the oil storage farms, achieved an unknown number of hits, but failed to inflict serious damage. one of the bombers attacking the ships was shot down before it could reach drop position. I calculate from all that that 34 bombs were dropped on the ships. Ive read that there were nine bomb hits on the ships (cant confirm yet, will cross check sources tonite. The bombs were delivered using steep controlled dives with the aircraft not exceeding 180 knots in their dives. 9 hits out of 34 releases is a bomb hit rate of about 26%.

There was a reason why torpedo bombing was preferred over divebombing by the Swordfish.

parsifal said:

If you have just SBDs there is not the same need to convert to night capability. The dauntless was still able in 1942-3 to operate in daylight, the TBD was not. This is about finding a useful role for the TBDs, which just happens to also act as a force multiplier for the whole carrier group.

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Let's back up a minute. If I'm not mistaken the Hornet sent some Avengers out there that were chopped to pieces, as well. These torpedo bombers were flying into the mouth of hell (apologies to Tennyson) without any cover. That was the grave mistake. By the time they leveled off their dives and got ready for business they were sitting ducks that low to the water. And these planes just don't zip up and away like dive-bombers. It didn't matter how old or new or fast or slow they were or what their range was. Once they got there, they were up against too much, both from the ships and the fighters.

Second issue, a night deployment. I don't even know, even had they been so equipped, what an unescorted torpedo-bombing hop against a five carrier task force would have accomplished any different than in daylight. Maybe an element of surprise going for it? I don't know. I can certainly envision the IJN looking at their radar screen at night, and going, "What the heck!" But beyond that, it's encountering the same firepower, only it can't find its targets as well. And some advantage that would appear to be.

So have we decided if the TBD, Swordfish, or something else, was the worst piston-engined bomber?