parsifal
Colonel
Comparing the combat environment against the Italian Navy in the Med at Taranto and the IJN at Midway is ridiculous. To begin with the harbor at Taranto was at a known position. The IJN fleet location was not exactly known and was moving to boot. To launch a night attack with VTs from a carrier against the IJN at that stage of the war, regardless of training would have been idiotic.
There is no comparison between the two operations, I agree, however each had its own set of problems no less daunting for the respective combatants. Whilst taranto was a known location, the location of the italian fleet was not. In fact it was an amazing strole of good luck that the italians remained in the harbour since they knew the strike was coming. They miscalculated the timing of the strike (believing it would not arrive until morning , believed the harbour defences would hold (particulalry the barrage ballons and netting would prevent an effective strike, and underestimated the range of the Swordfish.
And in any event Swordfish crews on repeated occasions demonstrated in spades that they could locate, attack and sink targets whose position was not known, moving. And they did it at night. They never did it against the Japanese carrier forces, mostly because they were given very little opportunity to try, but on the one occasion they (the FAA) did try, they came pretty close to pulling the stunt off.
You have not explained why attempting a night strike would be "idiotic". I would suggest that merely reveals set and predictable thinking. Thinking outside the box, the preconceived ideas on how a war should be fought "properly" is as bad or worse as British officers refusing to use the 3.7 in AA gun as an ATG, because "thats not what an AA gun does" . In my opinion, its not idiotic, because very similar missions could and were undertaken throughout the war....in the finish, by everybody, including the USN. The difference is that the RN perfected the techniques before anybody else and were the best at it. Why is it impossible to think that the USN could not have achieved similar resulta if they had similar training. They certainly seemed pr3etty adept at the role with their "Black Cat" operations. Are you saying there was something preventing the adaptation of USN equipment for night capability. something in the US training regime that prevented them from acquiring the necessary skills. I certainly am not. I believe it was entirely possible, though there was nothing in the US inventory that measured up to quite the standard set by the Swordfish as far as night capability was concerned, their equipment can be considered "good enough" for night operations in clear and still night conditions.
The VTs at Midway were not sacrificed on purpose for the VBs. There was supposed to be a coordinated attack but the USN forces really botched up the strikes and were fortunate to achieve the results they did.
Certainly botching and luck played their part in the outcome at Midway. But i would add that it was also due to the intiative and heroism of the USN pilots, as well as ther skill, the stupidity of the japanese in certain respects, and also the failure of the equipment, specifically the TBD performance, that dictated the outcome
The attack at Taranto was a magnificent display of seamanship and airmanship by the RN and the FAA but battle against the Italian armed forces and battle against the IJN were two different things. The primary reason that Fletcher withdrew at Coral Sea was that his air groups were pretty heavily attrited and his fuel situation was poor. Even if he had had a squadron of night trained pilots armed with the Stringbag and reliable torps he would have made the correct decision and retired.
I agree, except that there is more than one way to skin a cat. For a start with a night capable force, there was absolutely no need to get his TG so banged up as it was. The Japanese had absolutely no defence to night capability at that time. If the Carriers could be located and kept at range in the day(greater than 240 miles for the japanese strike aircraft), during the night Fletcher coul;d have turned his force around , launched at that range (240 miles) and be closing the range with his ships whilst his aircraft were enroute and eturning. His TG would have had about four hours at night to close, whilst the strike hit the japanese and returned. The round trip in that scenario is about 360 miles (240 out, 120 back) ....well within both the TBD and Swordfish capabilities. Provided the strike connects, the Japanese are going to be in no position to retaliate the next morning, and fletcher could have been home in time for tea, with barely a scratch. If the strike fails to connect, the Americans are in a world of hurt, but not really any worse off than they were historically
.An aside is that much is being made of the Swordfish's relative ease of operation from CVs and probably rightly so but the "Turkey" (Avenger) although a really big AC was noted for being an easy AC to operate from a carrier. Some were even used in the night fighter role and many were used from CVE decks
I agree,but the Swordfish was the dedicated ASW and patrol aircraft in the arctic. There was a reason for that, and the main reason it outlived its successor. there simply was no other aircraft of its time that could match it in poor conditions. Why? It certainaly wasnt designed with that in mind. Just that its low speeds and pleasant handling made it a lower risk in heavy conditions