Would the British FAA have been better off with the Brewster Buffalo?

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RCAFson said:
The F2A-2 came out after SS tanks and armour would have been required. Add these and the LG begins to fail at an unacceptable rate.
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RAF, There is undoubtedly a correllation between aircraft weight and gear failure time, which I don't think we know yet from the information at hand. the F2A-2 with armor (including bullet wind screen) and SS tanks isn't going to weigh quite as much as an F2A-3 because IIRC, there were other changes that increased its gross weight in addition to those two items. I don't know yet how much less such an F2A-2 would weigh or what else could be deleted without weight tables. The F2A variant weight data may be in the forum tech section, or someone may show pitty and clarify our mutual ignorance on this account by having ready access to AHT.

Websites which provide perhaps a ball-park start for such an analysis is Joe Baugher's:

Index of /navy_fighters

and Jack McKillop:

Brewster F2A Buffalo by Jack McKillop

Though frankly I don't think either provide enough information to be truly helpful. I didn't see any ammo capacity figures or engine weights,

According to the web sites, the weights of each F2A version was.
1. F2A-1 empty 3,785 lbs., Gross wt: 5,055 lbs., Max T/O wt.: 5,370 lbs. (Assume includes the 2 additional .5" HMGs)
2. B239 empty 3,900 lbs., Gross wt: 5,842 lbs., (assumd to include 2 additional .5" and the one .5" replacement gun, plus seat armor)
3. F2A-2 empty: 4,576 lbs, Gross wt.: 5,942 lbs., Max T/O wt.: 6,890 lbs.
4. B339B/E/D: empty: 4,576 lbs, Gross wt.: 5,942 lbs., Max T/O wt.: 6,890 lbs ??? (couldn't find any numbers)
3. F2A-2 empty: 4,732 lbs., Gross wt.: 6,321 lbs., Max T/O wt.: 7,159 lbs.

Web sites really don't seem to provide enough additional information beyond these weights and the data is inevitably suspect with many just rehashing and perpetuating misinformation.
 
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Ok, here are some more detailed weight charts for the F2A-1 and F2A-3 (sadly I don't have them for the -2):

F2A-1 F2A-3
Empty: 3810.5 4765.3
Wing Group: 732.8 870.9
Tail Group: 107.0 107.0
Body Group: 820.3 895.7
Engine Section: 143.4 165.1
Powerplant: 1555.3 2087.9
Crew: 200.0 200.0
Fuel: 960.0 1440.0
Oil: 68.0 83.1
Armament: 437.6 (4xguns) 692.5
Equipment: 128.1 132.8

So the big-ticket items in terms of weight gain were the engine, the fuel and the extra ammo for the guns. If we assume the same engine went into the F2A-2 as the -3 (which it did) then we're looking at a total increase of approx 762lbs for fuel, ammo, and the longer fuselage. This total compares to approx 427lbs increase for other sundry items (213.5lbs added to the wing and fuselage groups and the same amount for "fixed equipment).
 
According to the SAC data, the F2a-2 weighed 4253lb, empty, and all up weight with 160usg, 4 x .5in and 900rnds = 6194lb while the F2a-3 weighed 4894lb, empty, and all up weight with 160usg, 4 x .5in and 1300rnds = 7253lb

http://www.alternatewars.com/SAC/F2A-2_Buffalo_PD_-_1_May_1943.pdf
http://www.alternatewars.com/SAC/F2A-3_Buffalo_PD_-_1_December_1942.pdf

I have to admit that I find the F2A-3 performance figures, especially the climb rates, to be somewhat unbelievable, given the weight, power output and wing area of the aircraft. The wing loading is incredibly high for the F2A-3.
 
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Some comments:

1) The F2A was at least 50 km/h faster than the Fulmar or Sea Gladiator. This is, according to some, very little. Well, the Tempest was about 30 km/h (according to Frank Mason, 15 mph at about 20,000 ft if the Tiffie had a 4-bladed prop) faster than the Typhoon, and in many texts you'll find the former described as "greatly" faster...

2) According to a wartime lecture by Hans Wind, no. 2 ace of FiAF, the Hurricane was easy to shoot down and caught fire very easily. So apparently its SS tanks weren't too effective.

3) FiAF no. 1 ace, E. I. Juutilainen criticised wing armament (based on his experiences with the F2A) very heavily on the grounds that their dispersion was too great and the varying rate of fire between left and right wing guns caused greatly disturbing directional snaking. He suggested moving the wing guns either in the fuselage or the wing roots, i.e. he felt that closely mounted synchronized guns were far better than unsynchronized wing guns.

4) Though some undercarriage problems were encountered by FiAF too, it has to be remembered that they remained in service throughout the war basically without any spares support from the manufacturer. IIRC one Buffalo amassed nearly 1000 flying hours.

5) The field conditions weren't too easy. In Robert Winston's book "Lento Suomeen" a report is reproduced containing e.g. a Finnish complaint about how some minor rear fuselage damage was incurred after taxying through a 20 in high snow bank...
 

IIUC, you share the skepticism of some Naval aviators who flew and commented on the Buff F2A-3 performance. I believe there is an aneccdotal story passed among them that cast doubt on the company advertised performance of both the F2A-3 and F4F-4. Of course the user community was more than a bit disappointed at both designs when they arrived in those particular incarnations. I Believe Lundstrom quotes Grumman performance as ~1,800 to 20,000 ft while one pilot source found the F4F-4 climbed more like 1,500 fpm to 15,000. (page 140-141)

(One of the penalties suffered by the F4F-4 were somewhat redeemed in its FM-1 version whose decreased ammo supply (source of one complaint) was increased in an amount that negated the weight loss obtained by deleting two .5" HMGs. In that case, with the FM-1 largely flying from escort carriers providing a secondary ground support role. the increased firing time made more sense than a minute or two improvement in its time to climb to 30,000 ft, a capabiity more important in 1942 before the advent of the Hellcat and Corsair.

To be fair, its possible your skepticism may be influenced by the decades of "trash talk" about the later "Buffaloes" and masked whatever few performance quality the bloated later-progeny may have possessed. As I understand it, the heavy export buffs didn't have the slightly more powerful engine of the F2A-3 and by many accounts related in this forum. Even those weren't THAT bad. I underestimated the time the B-239's spent in service for the FiAF. Evidently it was about 4.5 years of flying (early 1940 to early Fall 1944) and perhaps even longer, with just over 3 years in actual combat..
 
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The SAC data suggest that at 6194lb that the F2A-2 had a time to 20,000ft of 10.4 minutes, while at 7253lb the F2A-3 had a time to 20,000ft of 10.2 minutes, yet both aircraft had the same engine!

Obviously, this can't be true.
 
For what it's worth,I found this on another forum. Interesting stuff and note the dates given of the beginning of the landing gear failures...

1932: The Brewster Aeronautical Corporation is formed. The company build aircraft parts for the big manufacturers

1935: The USN accepts a Brewster design for a monoplane dive bomber,

1936: Brewster and Grumman make bids for the Navy´s new fighter

1937: Brewster's fighter prototype flies in December. Production of the SBN will be done in the Naval Aircraft Factory as Brewster lacks the capability to produce the 30(!) planes the USN orders.


1938:

March: Brewster´s, Grumman´s and Sewersky´s prototypes are tested

June: The USN orders 54 Buffalos, Navy designation F2A-1

August: Brewster looks for partners. Brewster knows it lacks the capability to manufacture the fighters, while Consolidated Aircraft does not have a fighter on offer. Thus both companies merge. Production of aircraft parts remains in NYC, while Brewster's successful design team and [edit] fighter production is moved to Buffalo(NY),


1939:

May: Delivery of the F2A-1 begins. The USN is not amused about the late delivery.

August – December: The UK, Poland, Finland and Belgium order almost 500 Buffalos


1940:

February: VF-3 on USS Saratoga is fully equipped with F2A-1 and almost immediately begins to suffer landing gear malufunctions.
March: Production of the F2A-2 starts

April: VF-3 gets it´s first F2A-3 and continues to experience landing gear troubles. BruCon´s engineers take notice and action!

December: BruCon send mod-kits for the landing gear to the USN. After the installation no more landing gear failures occur.


1941:

January: The USN orders 108 F2A-3 with self sealing fuel tanks. BruCo engineers conclude the two main 80 gallon tanks are too closely integrated into the wing structure that they are de facto unprotetable. They suggest the following stop gap measures; closing off one 80 gallon tank in a combat area, the installation of three smaller protected tanks with 80 gallons of fuel and a CO2 purging system for the remaining 80 gallon tank. USN officials appreciate the high quality of BruCon´s workmanship and especially the quick problem fixing, but they are sceptical about a total re-design of the wing structure. Until BruConn engineers tell them the fuel capacity after the re-design might be as high as 200 gallons if all five tanks are retained. At that point the USN officials almost start to drool and tell BruCon to go ahead ASAP.

May: the XF4F-4 with a folding wing is tested

June: the USN changes the specs for the F2A-4, they want the plane to have a folding wing. Since that folding mechanism sits roughly where the main fuel tanks are BruCon has to go back to square one. The engineers go to work, but not before requesting a large number of photos of the naval officers in charge of the Buffalo program. The pictures are immediately used for dart practice and other forms of aggression relief by BruCon engineers.

December 7th: The F2A-4 is not yet ready. Given the rather limited looses of naval fighters the USN does not want the production to start until all tanks are protected.



1942:

mid-January: In light of the massive setbacks in SEA the USN orders the production of the Buffalo to resume immediately. The F2A-3.5 as wiseasses call her, is basically an A-3 with the more reliable P&W-engine and it´s superior two stage supercharger, while still having the unsatisfactory fuel tank protection of the A-3. About 50 are send to units in the continental USA to free Wildcats for combat. The remaining 70 are send to Australia as Lend&Lease.

Mid-February: the first F2A-4 rolls off the production line. Due to the protective measures, the re-desinged wing and the wing folding mechanism the two main fuel tank´s capacity has dropped form 160 gallons to 100. Thus total internal fuel is 180 gallons – 36 more than a Wildcat has. The USN is still pleased.

March: The first A-3.5 fighters arrive in Australia. RAAF pilots could hardly be happier to exchange their Wirraways for a real warplane.

May: BruCon get an order for 1,000 de-navalized(=lighter) Buffalos. Internal fuel capacity of the fixed wing fighter is 200 gallons.

June: after the Battle of Midway a surviving VMF-221 pilot says: "It is my belief that any commander that orders pilots out for combat in an F2A-3 should consider the pilot as lost before leaving the ground." RAAF pilots acidly reply: "Anybody who enters a dogfight with a Zero should be considered insane!"

July: Delivery of the P-45A to the USAAF starts. 5th AF has been utterly disappointed at the inability of the P-39 and P-40 to intercept high flxying Japanese bombers and equally impressed by the good performance of the F2A-3.5

September: The first P-45A arrive in Australia. It becomes a standing joke that a koala bear could out climb a fully loaded P-45, but the fighter get´s good ratings. The lower speed is not appreciated, the good performance over 15,000 get´s nothing but praise, firepower and protection are good, the almost bubbly canopy deeply impresses P-40 pilots, just like the excellent range(authors note: a P-40 with 161 gallons of internal fuel and a 75g drop tank had a combat radius of 300 miles, an OTL F2A-3 got 350miles with 160 gallons internal fuel only). Furthermore the P-45 still being a navy fighter needs about a third of a P-40´s take off distance, allowing the Buffalos to operate literally from half finished airfields no Army fighter could possibly use.
This and the fine range wins the still overloaded and underpowered P-45 a lot of admiration.


1943:

March: Grumman start the mass production of the F6F Hellcat

May: Production of Army and Navy Buffalos ends as more advanced fighters enter production, like the F6F, P-47 and BruCon´s F8F. The de-navalized Army version is called P-48. Both planes go by the name "Bison".


Major technical changes to the TL:


-Brewster merging with a bigger company resulting in well made planes that are delivered on time(with the exception of the first batch) that´s sooner than in OTL.
-quick fix of landing gear failures, that remaind unfixed in OTL
-wing, fuel tank re-design
-change of engine


Please note:
My F2A-3.5 and -4 have the Wildcat´s engine and a two speed, two stage supercharger. An actual F2A-3 had a less advanced 2-speed, 1-stage supercharger. With a normal load it climbed as fast to 10 and 20,000 feet as a P-39(4.5 and 9.2 minutes) But even with 300 pounds extra weight it beat the P-39 to 25,000 feet by 2 minutes(12/14). A typical P-40 needed 12 minute to reach 20,000 feet. I can not provide data for 25,000 feet, becasue the diagramm in my book ends at 17 minutes. By that time an Allison powered P-40 has reached appx. 23,000 feet and the climb rate is pretty flat already.

A Wildcat with unprotected tanks had a fuel capcity of 160 gallons. Self-sealing decreased that by 10% to 144g. I put the decrease for the Buffalo at 37% for the folding wing version(110g) and at 25% for the fixed wing version(120g).
 

Thanks BF, I think its fair to say (since the weight of a tail hook and raft aren't likely to tip the scales against it) that the F2A-1 was a viable candidate for an early effective higher performance gap-filler fighter for the FAA. To answer Parsifal's legitimate concern that there just isn't enough time to integrate the F2A-1 into the FAA to make a great contribution: To get it into service in the Spring of 1940, The USN would have had to allow preliminary FAA aircrew training on at least a few of the half dozen or so F2A-1s that slowly became available between June and November of 1939. Something similar to this was apparently done with later types although probably not so early in the production run. By late December (early January at the latest) there should have been enough F2A-1's available to outfit at least one or two squadrons of 12 aircraft each. Pilot's back armor installed prior to or post delivery. I would expect these F2A-1s (hopefully supplemented by Fairey Fulmars as these became operational) to have been effective through september 1941 when the Martlet I's were introduced. IIUC, the FAA was in such desparate straights that it would deploy small detachments of GSGs on its older decks just to provide them some sir defense capability, although I recall
reading that the RN's early philosophy was to depend on AAA and the carrier's armored box for its primary air defense.

I don't know whether the logistics considerations of such a scenario make it unreasonable. I suppose that could be.
 
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Good stuff FBJ, That's probably the initial incident I had heard about for the F2A-1. I suspect it was a hard landing and seen in retrospect as indicative of inherently non-robust design and the chronic problems the later, heavier aircraft would be subject to.

Looking at the maintenance records of the F2A-1s its not clear what incident that may have been. What is clear is that nearly all appear to have been upgraded to the -2 variant later in their career so whatever problems they had weren't serious enough to cause them to be surveyed (retired). This batch of F2A-2s ended up as the fighter detachment VS-201 serving on the USS Long Island (CVE-1) in 1941-42. Once again another indication of the longevity of the F2A-1 on carrier flight decks. At least that's the way I interpret it.
 
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Ummmhhh....the timeline that is being quoted is from an 'alternate history' website, not one grounded in fact. For example, VF-3 could never have received a full complement of eighteen F2A-1's for the simple reason that the Navy never got that many - 43 of the 54 aircraft order were reallocated to Finland, to be replaced by 43 F2A-2's. (Yes, I know Finland got 44, Brewster was planning to manufacture and sell as many as 66 F2A-1's but the imminent end of the Winter War put a halt to the Model 239 production.)
 

Hi Jim - enjoy your site...

So when did the fist one get to VF-3 and when was the first landing gear failure encountered?

Point to be made - I think the landing gear failures were happening well before the weight increases
 
Actually, Dan Ford runs the Buffalo forum, not me. I don't know anything about running a webpage.

The F2A-1's were taken on charge by VF-3 in the first half of December 1939 - most on the 11th.

I don't have specifics on dates for landing gear failures. Although I know some occured with the F2A-1 and -2, an interview with a VF-2 pilot ( http://www.warbirdforum.com/fire.htm ) suggests that the problem was really associated with the F2A-3, a much heavier aircraft. I've gone through the BuAer Change Orders for the F2A's and found Bulletin 1 for the F2A-3 dated 23 February 1942 [the references mentioned are from October-November 1941]:

"1. References (a), (b), (c) and (d) reported cases of damage to main landing gear tires and wheels, also to oleo struts and main landing gear struts due to hard landings.

2. VF-2 has reported that when tire inflation pressure is raised to sixty (60) pounds tire and wheel failures were almost entirely eliminated.

3. It is recommended that the air pressure in the main landing gear tires be increased to sixty (60) pounds in lieu of the original recommended thirty-five (35) pounds, for carrier operations."

Maybe it was a solvable problem.
 

Sounds like somebody dropped the ball.
It sounds like the planes were landing hard enough to flatten the tire to point that the rim was hitting the ground/flight deck/folded tire sidewall.

There were charts available showing the weight the available aircraft tires were supposed to handle at a range of pressures. If the tire wasn't working properly because of harder than normal landings either pump up the tires or shift to the next higher tire ( some times a matter of plys rather than changing sizes, depends if the original tire was the max ply model for that size) or? The information was available from the tire makers. The Chart I am looking at is for low pressure Firestone tires and was published in the "Aircraft handbook" by Colvin 1942 edition. I am sure it is not the complete line of tires. There is one column in one of the charts headed " Approx. collapsing load for full radial deflection, lb." this is roughly 3 times the max rated static load. Like I said, the information was available.
 

Jim,

I am not familiar with an "alternate history website." As for grounded in fact if you've read the the entire thread I'd hope you would come to a different conclusion. The alternate history originally suggested here (I only know one site where it is described) suggests that the Finns didn't get their 44 B-239 and that they were procured by the FAA instead. The Navy got 11 F2A-1s before the end of 1939 and in order for ~40 (or similar number) to be in FAA service as early as possible, some of these would have to have gone to the FAA as well. All done in exchange for higher performance F2A-2s.

I believe that the Navy received about 5 F2A-1 before December 1, 1939. and 3 of those before September (from:
http://www.warbirdforum.com/f2a1.htm)

If you are talking about Dan Ford's Annals of the Brewster Buffalo, this thread has a definite connection with the similar discussion on that site. You may be surprised to realize you have a bigger part in the current thread than you may realize going back a couple of decades in time and related to (I hope you are aware) the important part you played in the discussion on Dan Ford's site. I"ve always appreciated the photo in your In Action account of the Buffalo's history that showed the B-339 being handled on the HMS Eagle's flight deck and reproduced it on this thread.

Good to hear from you,

Mal
 
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The initial reaction, in November 1939, of the British Air Attache to Brewster's offer of 100 F2A's starting in March 1940 was "so fantastic, the production organization so indifferent, and the financial standing of the company and its setup so doubtful that I would be adverse to entering into any contract with this firm except with the most stringent safeguards." (quoted from "Brewster 339E Buffalo" by Jarmo Nikkonen in AAHS Journal Summer 1998 p 127) Although a test pilot flew one of the Model 239's intended for Finland and gave a positive report to the British, from everything I've seen the British had no interest in the 239 (F2A-1 equivalent) but wanted the 339 like those being built for Belgium. Because of the Air Attache's initial negative position when the F2A-1's might have been available, there was no way those could have been available in the spring of 1940 for the FAA to use.
 

Jim,

Of course, I was not aware of the Air Attache's report, but reading the above, I have to wonder, who was the air attache' at the time. Was he RAF or FAA? If FAA, was he a senior officer (I'd assume so) who was thoroughly indoctrinated with the FAA's devotion to Multi-seat fighters for the RN's CV's? The interest in B-339s suggests that FAA procurement of navalized B-239s was not considered at all. The air attache's report seems terribly contradictory? He thoroughly pans the company but wants models of the B-339 that do not yet exist?

Even the air attache' rendering of a completely negative report on procurement of the B-239 doesn't mean the aircraft wouldn't have been the right one for the FAA to asert a greater influence on events and it doesn't mean the procurement couldn't have been done. Such decisions are fairly common in the course of history and doesn't mean we should give up pondering the might have beens had a different decision been made. Also, the report you cite describes events that appear to have occurred after the decision to send the B-239s to Finland. That's way too late for the argument being presented here.

Are you saying you don't believe the F2A-1 would have been the right naval fighter in the hands of FAA pilots early in the war? Whatever the air attache's position or the subsequent decision of the British Purchasing Commission, that seems the relevant question posed by this thread. It's also a question you may be the best qualified person from a historical perspective to answer.

Going back over the thread, I think Parsifal's suggestion (post #44) that, at least in 1939, the F2A-1 was a naval fighter design better suited to the needs of the USN than the FAA, whose perceived requirement for a multiseat-multirole fighter was a virtual cultural paradigm. I think this attitude might have been an even greater deterent to selection of the F2A-1 than the report of an air attache', especially one who may very well have been raised in the RAF's culture regarding the FAA as a second class air-arm of the RAF. At least until events forced the paradigm shift to single seat aircraft such as the GLoster Sea Gladiator, Martlet, Sea Hurricane and SeaFire.
 
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Mal,

The Air Attache was Group Capt. Pirie, definitely RAF.

I remember Malcolm LeCompte raised the issue of this topic in a 1996 issue of the AAHS Journal (which seems, for the moment, to be misfiled in my mare's nest...err, library) and his conclusion was that the F2A-1 would have been invaluable at the time of fighting around Norway in 1940. But the British were not thinking of the Brewster as a naval fighter - their first assignment of the ex-Belgian 339B's was to a land-based squadron, 71 (and that didn't go well, of course). So I'm not sure that the mindset issue was so much two-seat versus single seat carrier aircraft, but rather carrier aircraft taking a (very) back seat to the air defence of Great Britain.

The other odd thing in the 1940 order is that the British insisted on four .50 caliber machine guns, based on some early recognition that .303's were a tad lacking in punch. But when the Buffalo came into full service a year and a half later, in south-east Asia, providing .50 ammunition became a great problem (for both the British and the Dutch). I wonder what the situation in metropolitan Britain was in 1940 re .50 ammunition?
 
The real weakness in this argument is then the timing and focus on mission. The RN-FAA hadn't yet experienced the inadaquacy of its aircraft or anticipated the need for an aircraft to establish air supremacy. I believe that first became critically apparent during the Norway campaign. However it looks like the Sea Gladiator was incorporated into the FAA stable prior to September 1939 which suggests there was some institutional awareness of a deficiency in that area.
I can see the BPC, which I assume started its search for North American produced aircraft in late 39 - early 40, would have been seduced by the same prospect as the USN and at about the same time: the advent of the F2A-2 and wanted to get aboard that train too, not forseeing the end result once the aircraft was made acceptable for British service.

It strikes me that the real issue, that hindsight has obscurred, is that in mid to late 1939, when such a decision would have to have been made to faciliate introduction of the F2A-1 into the FAA in time to see action in early to mid 1940, no one really knew what the war would require of its aircraft. Trying to put myself in the mindset of senior leaders in the infant FAA to understand what guided their thinking only works well if one is ignorant of the subsequent history; not to mention not fully cognizant of the peculiar culture that was British military aviation. The FAA, brought into existence in mid-1939, evidently couldn't yet operate in a proactive, visionary mode (and with probably a limited purse), until circumstances brought the full consequences of earlier decisions to the fore. It seems a case of a tantalizing might-have-been that, due to circumstances unrelated to the desirability of the aircraft's performance or its production schedule, could never have actually been.

In other words, adoption of ANY foreign fighter wasn't sought because in mid to late 39 there wasn't yet a percieved to motivate the FAA to make such a move.
 
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