Would the British FAA have been better off with the Brewster Buffalo?

[parsifal]

Mal,

The Air Attache was Group Capt. Pirie, definitely RAF.

I remember Malcolm LeCompte raised the issue of this topic in a 1996 issue of the AAHS Journal (which seems, for the moment, to be misfiled in my mare's nest...err, library) and his conclusion was that the F2A-1 would have been invaluable at the time of fighting around Norway in 1940. But the British were not thinking of the Brewster as a naval fighter - their first assignment of the ex-Belgian 339B's was to a land-based squadron, 71 (and that didn't go well, of course). So I'm not sure that the mindset issue was so much two-seat versus single seat carrier aircraft, but rather carrier aircraft taking a (very) back seat to the air defence of Great Britain.

The other odd thing in the 1940 order is that the British insisted on four .50 caliber machine guns, based on some early recognition that .303's were a tad lacking in punch. But when the Buffalo came into full service a year and a half later, in south-east Asia, providing .50 ammunition became a great problem (for both the British and the Dutch). I wonder what the situation in metropolitan Britain was in 1940 re .50 ammunition?

One squadron was also briefly embarked on the Eagle. it was found to be inneffective in deck handling, and the lack of wing folding damned it from carrier operations. It became a strictly land based asset of the FAA, and even there saw only very limited operation....in Crete.

It wasnt that the F2A was not acquired in rather substantial numbers. Thirty were acquired in 1939-40, which compares well to the 130 Swordfish on strength at that time, and the 30 odd Skuas on order. But very quickly the FAA determined that the F2A was not suited to their ship borne requirements. it was the right decision IMO

 

[jimmaas]

Although some of the ex-Belgian aircraft started driting in in late 1940, they were really a 1941 addition, by which time Britain's domestic aircraft industry was Beaverbrooking away and the Brewsters were surplus to requirements. I know one or two 805 Squadron aircraft were trialed on Eagle but I doubt a whole squadron. Since all naval equipment had been removed (notably the tailhook) it is not surprising that the ex-Belgian aircraft weren't seen as ideal for carrier ops. Maybe you could expand on the issue of wing folding, though. I've heard that before but I don't recall the Sea Hurricane's wings folded any better, and that aircraft had a greater span than the Brewster.

 

[parsifal]

The real weakness in this argument is then the timing and focus on mission. The RN-FAA hadn't yet experienced the inadaquacy of its aircraft or anticipated the need for an aircraft to establish air supremacy.

Prewar the FAA never thought that their carrier borne aircraft were going to attain "air superiority". The FAA did not establish itself as an independant air service until 1938, it was consequently dominated by RAF imports, and the RAF was dominated by ideas of the "bomber always gets through".

Norway had virtually no impact on FAA thinking, because the few LW attacks made on RN ships were thought to be handled reasonably well by AA, which was considered at that time to be the only effective defence against air attack. The fact that AA ships did not seem to be enough doesnt seem to have sunk in. Even as late as November 1940, standard operating procedure for the FAA if a carrier was attacked was to strike down all aircraft to the hangar, clear the fuel line and fill them with CO2. The AA support would close to within 700 yards (inside the safe TD of a cruiser or a carrier) of the carrier, and a maximum of firepower put over the carrier to protect it from air attack.

The person most responsible for the turn around in FAA atitudes was Cunningham. Eagles CAG was initially 3 Sea Gladiators, which were promptly shipped ashore to malta to become "Faith Hope Glory". I believe they were replaced by 6 ex RAF machines held in Storage at Alexandria. These machines had similar problems to the Buffalo, no multi role capability and no wing folding, but they could at least land on the carrier with a reasonable margin of safety. That was obviously considered more important than the obvious higher performance and firepower of the buffalo. The F2As that had been trialled on the Eagle somewhere about that time had been landed because of problems in their deck handling abilities, lack of wing folding and constant problems in the armament. (Ive also read from one source that they leaked fuel incessantly). As a result they were shipped off to Greece and Crete, where thankfully, and mercifully, they never returned. They were given a good review there, to be fair, but I believe that F2As spent most of the campaign there grounded and with jammed U/S armament.

The RN NEVER operated on the principal of attaining "air superiority", not even on a localised basis, until much later in the war, when the resources and the carrier deck space was there to make such a concept an attainable goal. Seaborne air superiority is a a uniquely American concept (not even the Japanese believed they could achieve and hold air superiority from seaborne platforms) . The RN operated on the principal of providing credible air defence, of which ship board fighters are a part (right from the beginning). The RN never envisaged its carriers having toi operate within range of land based single engined fighters, and even though there were exceptions during the first year of the war , this remained substantially true. Where those exceptions did arise, it was generally against either weak opposition, or in conjunction with a specific operation....get in get out, as fast as you can. The RN was very successful at that kind of mission for the first two years of the war, and its apparently under performing a/c more than adequate to meet the requirements of that doctrine. And the so-called "inferior" types (such as the Skua and the Fulmar) proved highly successful as elements of that doctrine (no British carrier ever succumbed to air attack) . After the war in the RAN we adopted exactly the same strateegy. In a different age, with thankfully nobody actually shooting at us, we were among the first to adapt the A4 (a bomber) to the air defence role, and in the mission profile that we had for our carrier found them to be very good in the role. We used the A4s during the very first Afghan war (1979-81), when over 30 Bears were deployed to Yemen to provide armed recon for the Red Navy over the Indian Ocean, to intercept and escort out of our no-fly zones every "strike" the Russians simulated against us. Why did we use A4s? Because they could do their primary mission (Air strike) very well, and could be adapted to undertake a secondary role (air defence) reasonably well and cheaply. The RN in 1940 had the same issue...a very limited number of seaborne slots, and a need to make aircraft to do more than one thing per airframe. They also had to be reliable, stable platforms with as much firepower as could be brought to bear. performance was very much a secondary consideration.

For large navies, like the USN, this is dinky and obsolete. For small navies it was, and still is, the way to go. F2As as a concept did not fit that philosophy, and they still wouldnt.

I believe that first became critically apparent during the Norway campaign. However it looks like the Sea Gladiator was incorporated into the FAA stable prior to September 1939 which suggests there was some institutional awareness of a deficiency in that area.
I can see the BPC, which I assume started its search for North American produced aircraft in late 39 - early 40, would have been seduced by the same prospect as the USN and at about the same time: the advent of the F2A-2 and wanted to get aboard that train too, not forseeing the end result once the aircraft was made acceptable for British service.

I would agree that some less well informed officers in the RN might be "seduced" by the concept of having a dedicated fleet defence fighter. In 1943 there was a detour via the Seafire in that very direction. However in 1940, the realities prevented any such strategy....limited numbers of pilots, no prospect of a rapid expansion and a limited number of at sea billets. It was rapidly deduced that the F2A was not really suited to RN fleet defence requirements because of its poor deck handling and lack of wing folding. Think about Cunninghams problem, and you will rapidly deduce that the decision to not ship the F2A was absolutely the right thing to do. He received no FAA pilots from June until November from memory. He had a single carrier with just 22 slots available. He managed to scrounge a few ex RAF aircraft and possible 3 or 4 pilots from the RAF to fly them who I assume were taught how to fly them on carriers at some point. He was outnumbered at sea, needed to primarily keep tabs on the RM, and undertake offensive strikes as well. With such limited resources, there was absolutley no place for an aircraft that could only do one mission, reduced the air capacity of the one carrier available even more (down to 16 a/c from memory if wing folding was not available) and which seemed to have had reliabilty and deck safety issues.

It strikes me that the real issue, that hindsight has obscurred, is that in mid to late 1939, when such a decision would have to have been made to faciliate introduction of the F2A-1 into the FAA in time to see action in early to mid 1940, no one really knew what the war would require of its aircraft.

Correct to a degree, but there were enough officers in the service who were aware of the need for ship borne air defence to make this statement untrue. What damns the concept of an F2A led air defence inititiaive are the charactisitics of the aircraft iteslf, coupled with the massively restricted resources available to the RN FAA at that time.

 

[parsifal]

Although some of the ex-Belgian aircraft started driting in in late 1940, they were really a 1941 addition, by which time Britain's domestic aircraft industry was Beaverbrooking away and the Brewsters were surplus to requirements. I know one or two 805 Squadron aircraft were trialed on Eagle but I doubt a whole squadron. Since all naval equipment had been removed (notably the tailhook) it is not surprising that the ex-Belgian aircraft weren't seen as ideal for carrier ops. Maybe you could expand on the issue of wing folding, though. I've heard that before but I don't recall the Sea Hurricane's wings folded any better, and that aircraft had a greater span than the Brewster.

Buffaloes were trialled on the eagle in in late 1940. The Bufaloes first arrived in the TO November, and it was somewhere between that time and January '41 that the landing trials were undertaken. i do not know how thorough they were. I do know that three aircraft were involved. Given that an air defence squadron at that time was 3 a/c, any number, even one aircraft, can be considered the equivalent of one squadron. But I will concede that I am not actually aware of the precise number trialled.

There were three aircraft sent to Crete, so I expect it was three. The brewsters history after that becomes clearer. 805 Squadron formed Feb 1941 with 12 Fairey Fulmar two-seat fighters, carrier capable, to support a planned invasion of Rhodes, off the coast of Turkey, held by Italians. Based at Maleme in northeastern Crete, the squadron also had three Buffaloes (AS419, AS420, AX814) along with 6 more Fulmars flew in from Dekheila on 6 March 1941. The Buffalo flight was commanded by Lt. Rupert Brabner, formerly Member of Parliament for Hyth. The Brewsters were equipped with an antique post-and-ring sight, proof that they were Belgian 339Bs rather than the British 339E model. These three a/c, alonmg with the rest of the squadron were evidently intended to fly from HMS Illustrious, but after the heavy damage that carrier received in Jauuary the Squadron appear to have been a land baased unit.

Sea Hurricanes were never adopted in a wing folding form. This was considered, but rejected, because it would have increased the cost of each airframe, and interfered with the flow of deliveries.

The Royal Navy's Fleet Air Arm lacked a 300 mph, modern fighter at the start of WW2. After unmodified RAF Hurricanes, attempting to escape Norway, had landed safely on the aircraft carrier H.M.S. Glorious in June, 1940, Winston Churchill enthusiastically endorsed the idea of producing a navalized Hurricane. It was selected for this purpose not only because of that. It was a very strong modular structure, and this allowed the wing folding issue to be somewhat addressed by the Sea Hurricanes being partially dismantled and hung like spare parts from the 'roof' of aircraft carrier hangars thereby not interferringwith overall capacities. it was blessed with a sturdy, wide-track undercarriage, much more suitable to deck landings than its successor, the Supermarine Seafire, and better than the Brewster. Its heavy and relaibale armament was a most welcome addition. These qualities more than offset its shortcoming that a folding-wing version of the Hurricane was never developed.

 

[oldcrowcv63]

Parsifal, as usual, your comments are detailed, well informed and to the point. I especially appreciate the Non-USN perspective on carrier ops for modest-sized navies and your comments on the scooter, which was a truly versatile aircraft. (One of my big regrets when on active duty was missing the opportunity to go through VF-126 instrument training detachment in San Diego that used TA-4Js for training flights.) You have provided a very different perspective on carrier ops than the one within which I was raised. I will only take some small issue with a couple of your points wrt to FAA adoption of the F2A and an airsuperiority mission for embarked FAA fighters. I believe your point about the lack of a AFAA air control mission is particularly relevant to adoption of the F2A-1.

1. The export F2A-1 in FAA service would possess a tail hook. That's the way they were built, unlike the Belgium B-339B which in every account I have read did not, because the B-339B's did not come so equipped. I believe the lack of a folding wing would have posed minimal problems on the older carriers (Eagle and the Courageous class). Based on measurements, I believe its elevators could have handled the F2A-1 wing span. With an all F2A-1 airwing (which most probably would never have happened), I recall doing a measurement of the Hangar deck (I believe it was Eagle's but it's been awhile) and found dimensions that indicated the hangar could accomodate perhaps a dozen, or perhaps more F2A-1. It'll be a while before I get back home to look in my files for the original graphic depiction of plane and hangar to see which carrier and what is the actual number. A mixed airwing a 3-6 F2A-1 might include a dozen of so Swordfish. IIRC, Eagle's hangar capacity was about 24-30 folding wing aircraft, while that of the Courageous Class was about double that number.

2. The fact that even a few GSGs were already embarked during the early war ops suggest the air defense deficiency was recognized to some extent and that triple A alone was insufficient.
3. Soon after Norway, (circa 9/40 and thereafter in the Med, Fulmars, which were of course multirole (with minimal strike capability) aircraft were serving in an air defense role as a ready or standing CAP.
4. HMS Audacity initially went to sea in September 1941 with a purely F4F airwing. It's primary mission was air defense from the threat posed by FW-200. (Possibly interpretable as establishing air control over the convoy). So when the need arose, the RN could respond when it had the equipment to do so. It certainly had the skilled pilots to do the job.
5. By 1942, a typical RN carrier airwing was balanced between assets (F4F, Sea Hurricane and Fulmar) devoted to air defense and those devoted to strike. With the advent of the Sea Hurricane and eventually the Seafire, you had adoption of the deck park. (I believe one of a very few purely USN innovations)
6. You can't perform a mission if you don't have equipment capable of performing it. This is where I think perhaps Greg misses the full innovation value of the F2A-1. It had vitually all of the qualities we associate with modern fighters but it also had legs even longer than most US fighters of the early war years let alone those of other nations. In this aircraft, you could see in its infancy, the iability to project airpower over enemy territory from the sea. To its credit the RN seemed to have a history of quickly adopting whatever doctrine or equipment it needs at a given time. Had the RN had that ability (in the form of the F2A-1), I think it would have used the hell out of it.

This is my final point: The way I see it, it was a tragedy that the RN FAA didn't have the F2A-1 when it could have been used to greatest effect. It was the one aircraft of its time that might have made a decisive, if temporary difference, in the role for which it was designed. The fact that it did make a difference for Finland mitigates the magnitude of the tragedy I (evidently alone) perceive to have occurred during 1940-41. I am glad the Finns had it, sad the RN didn't.

Ironically, this post was entered whilst awaiting a connecting flight in Helsinki Airport.

 

[oldcrowcv63]

I can't help but wonder if there weren't a few soon to be independent (as in non-RAF) circa 1938 -1939 FAA pilots looking over their shoulders with some little envy at developments in the USN wrt to the F2A-1. That is just aviator-DNA and separate from organizational doctrine or policy. So while as an organization, FAA procurement may have been guided by perceptions of its future mission requirements, I wonder what individual pilots thought about their equipment compared to developments in other navies with significant embarked aviation components. (e.g. USN, IJN, France and visible on the near horizon, Germany)

 

[RCAFson]

I can't help but wonder if there weren't a few soon to be independent (as in non-RAF) circa 1938 -1939 FAA pilots looking over their shoulders with some little envy at developments in the USN wrt to the F2A-1. That is just aviator-DNA and separate from organizational doctrine or policy. So while as an organization, FAA procurement may have been guided by perceptions of its future mission requirements, I wonder what individual pilots thought about their equipment compared to developments in other navies with significant embarked aviation components. (e.g. USN, IJN, France and visible on the near horizon, Germany)

Very few F2As of any variant ever saw service in the USN and even fewer aboard USN CVs. In 1939 the FAA was not really behind either the USN or IJN in terms of CV aircraft design, IMHO, it was not till 1941/42 that the FAA really fell behind the USN and IJN in terms of design, as both the IJN and USN reequipped with new types while the FAA's planned aircraft were delayed due to lowered production and design priorities following the BofB.

 

[oldcrowcv63]

Very few F2As of any variant ever saw service in the USN and even fewer aboard USN CVs. In 1939 the FAA was not really behind either the USN or IJN in terms of CV aircraft design, IMHO, it was not till 1941/42 that the FAA really fell behind the USN and IJN in terms of design, as both the IJN and USN reequipped with new types while the FAA's planned aircraft were delayed due to lowered production and design priorities following the BofB.

RAFson, this seems wide of the mark to me. True only 10 of the 11 USN F2A-1s saw service in VF-3 on the Sara, and of these, it looks like 9 were evidently intermittently embarked for from 10 months to a year. During this time, the USN had in service a variety of aircraft including the flawed BT-1 which quickly evolved through the XBT-2 (first flight: 4/25/38 ) into the winning SBD design. The advanced TBD certainly outlived its service, but for its time appeared to be well advanced over the venerable Swordfish. Only war time service would show the inadaquacy of the TBD and USN Torpedoes in their very different role than that employed by the relatively antiquated but enormously useful SF armed with a superior weapon than what the USN was using. I think the Skua was a noble effort but don't believe it compares to either the F2A-1 or SBD as either a fighter or a dive bomber. On the other hand the legendary SF is truly immortal.

Different F2A variants saw USN service in squadrons as follows:

F2A-1: VF-3
F2A-2: VF-2, VF-3 and VS-201
F2A-3: VF-2

The number of all F2A variants constructed amounts to 11 x F2A-1 and 42 or 43 x F2A-2 and 108 x F2A-3s and can be compared to the number of GSG built: 98 and Skua: 192

I might also count VMF-221 but that really wouldn't count as their CV embarked service was AFAIK very brief being limited to the Wake relief mission.

IIRC, from reading Eric Brown's Wings of the Navy the FAA appeared to give brief consideration to replacing the Skua with the Vought SB2U armed with 4 .30" LMGs, but found it was not as significant an improvement as hoped. It's been a while since I read his account so it may be inaccurate.

 

[oldcrowcv63]

During and prior to 1939: the IJN flew and introduced the A6M Zeke, the D3A VAL and the B5N Kate.

 

[parsifal]

The advanced TBD certainly outlived its service, but for its time appeared to be well advanced over the venerable Swordfish. Only war time service would show the inadaquacy of the TBD and USN Torpedoes in their very different role than that employed by the relatively antiquated but enormously useful SF armed with a superior weapon than what the USN was using. I think the Skua was a noble effort but don't believe it compares to either the F2A-1 or SBD as either a fighter or a dive bomber. On the other hand the legendary SF is truly immortal.

We are back to where we started I can see....TBD was a superior design only in top speed to the Swordfish. The Swordfish was a more stanle platform, slower, but more accurate. The Swordfish was a bigger aircraft, more suited to rough weather conditions. It had more space intermnally to put stuff, and was an overall stronger airframe, as its use as a divebomber and its ability to aerobat (allbeit at a very slow speed) were also qualities hidden in the appearance of the a/c, but present nevertheless. There were very good reasons why the Swordfish became a legend, and the unfortunate TBD a costly footnote in history.....

As far as superior armament, the problems with the Bliss Levitt were real enough, but not nearly as big a problem as the poor crew training and aircrafdt deficiencies. Ive just fnished reading a post war interrogation of the Japanese leader of the "Genzan" air corps which undertook the successful attacks on the PoW and Repulse in 1941. In theory, Japanese torpedoes could be dropped from 200feet and at speeds in exces of 250 mph. But at that speed less than 10% of launches ran true or detonated. Really, to have a better than 70% success rate, speeds had to be kept under 200mph and drop heights below 20 feet for the japanese. This means, quite frankly, that US torpedoes were not as bad as is often used to excuse the destruction and lack of success faced by the TBDs at Midway. British Torps faced similar reliability issues at Taranto, where about 30% either failed to detonate, and or failed to run true either in depth or heading. The problem with the TBD was not as much atributable to the admittedly poor torpedo as is so often presented. it was more to do with the aircraft and/or its crews. The aircraft was a dud as far as a day aircraft, and unfortuantely, thats all it could do....

Skua in no way compares to the SBD, but it has advantages over the f2a in terms of multi role capability, wing folding, reliability over the brewster. we have covered this previously, and made very clear why the Brewster was not suited at all to FAA requirements. Too specialized, not enough performance superiority to matter, unreliable armament, no wing folding, poor serviceability and possibly leaky fuel tanks . For a struggling service like the FAA this made it (the F2A) a totally unnacceptable mount

 

[oldcrowcv63]

We are back to where we started I can see....TBD was a superior design only in top speed to the Swordfish. The Swordfish was a more stanle platform, slower, but more accurate. The Swordfish was a bigger aircraft, more suited to rough weather conditions. It had more space intermnally to put stuff, and was an overall stronger airframe, as its use as a divebomber and its ability to aerobat (allbeit at a very slow speed) were also qualities hidden in the appearance of the a/c, but present nevertheless. There were very good reasons why the Swordfish became a legend, and the unfortunate TBD a costly footnote in history.....

As far as superior armament, the problems with the Bliss Levitt were real enough, but not nearly as big a problem as the poor crew training and aircrafdt deficiencies. Ive just fnished reading a post war interrogation of the Japanese leader of the "Genzan" air corps which undertook the successful attacks on the PoW and Repulse in 1941. In theory, Japanese torpedoes could be dropped from 200feet and at speeds in exces of 250 mph. But at that speed less than 10% of launches ran true or detonated. Really, to have a better than 70% success rate, speeds had to be kept under 200mph and drop heights below 20 feet for the japanese. This means, quite frankly, that US torpedoes were not as bad as is often used to excuse the destruction and lack of success faced by the TBDs at Midway. British Torps faced similar reliability issues at Taranto, where about 30% either failed to detonate, and or failed to run true either in depth or heading. The problem with the TBD was not as much atributable to the admittedly poor torpedo as is so often presented. it was more to do with the aircraft and/or its crews. The aircraft was a dud as far as a day aircraft, and unfortuantely, thats all it could do....

Skua in no way compares to the SBD, but it has advantages over the f2a in terms of multi role capability, wing folding, reliability over the brewster. we have covered this previously, and made very clear why the Brewster was not suited at all to FAA requirements. Too specialized, not enough performance superiority to matter, unreliable armament, no wing folding, poor serviceability and possibly leaky fuel tanks . For a struggling service like the FAA this made it (the F2A) a totally unnacceptable mount

It certainly wasn't my intent to argue the superiority of the TBD over any aircraft let alone the SF. It was an advanced design that fell short in a number of ways.

The above is as succinct a declaration of the inappropriateness of the F2A-1 as I have seen compiled in one spot. I could have collected these comments from the thread into as coherent an argument as you've given above but I felt your deck handling argument inherently weak based on my assumption that you were merely talking about a different aircraft: the hookless B-339B.

I have no doubt whatsoever the F2A-1 would have provided good service to the FAA. They would have made it work IMO. As to the multirole capabilitis of the Skua? IMO, it was a terrible air-to-air platform which astonishingly managed some a2a kills. Wing folding becomes a non-issue with the adoption of the Hurricane, so why couldnt it have been done earlier? Multirole F2A-1? Their lackluster F2A-3 prodgeny were evidently used as search A/C and on ASW patrol and I see know reason why they couldn't have had the same multirole capability as the Fulmar or to some extent the Skua (obviously not as capable in the strike role). You make do with what you have. Some of these other points seem to me to be put forward as strawmen to attempt to mask the evident shortcomings in equipment capability of the FAA of the time. Unreliable armament? Please, what 50 cal. didn't have teething problems early in the war. If any organization could have solved them it was the FAA. Not enough performance superiority? What are you comparing it to? The GSG the Skua? The F2A-1 was essentially a modern fighter capable of over 300+ mph, rapid climb armed with 50 cal. guns. and a range of nearly 1,000 miles. (tanslating to a combat radius of about 200+ miles.). leaky fuel tanks? How leaky? So leaky they demanded the removal of the type from service? I doubt it, based on its history. The Skua's "multirole" capability meant it had to fly into ememy territory with its payload and fight its way back out.

As to not suited to FAA service. I'd want the opinion of a pilot offered the opportunity to have a choice to fly a strike mission in an unescorted Skua or one with a few F2A-1s in company. JMHO

 

[RCAFson]

During and prior to 1939: the IJN flew and introduced the A6M Zeke, the D3A VAL and the B5N Kate.

The A6M2-11 did not enter service trials until July 1940:

The new version was so promising that the Navy had 15 built and shipped to China before they had completed testing. They arrived in Manchuria in July 1940...
...After the delivery of only 65 aircraft by November 1940, a further change was worked into the production lines, which introduced folding wingtips to allow them to fit on aircraft carriers. The resulting Model 21 would become one of the most produced versions early in the war.
Mitsubishi A6M Zero - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

The Val:

The D3A1 commenced carrier qualification trials aboard the Akagi and Kaga during 1940, while a small number of aircraft made their combat debut from land bases over China.
Aichi D3A - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

SBD:

The Northrop BT-1 provided the basis for the SBD, which began manufacture in 1940. Ed Heinemann led a team of designers who considered a development with a 1,000 hp (750 kW) Wright Cyclone powerplant. A year earlier, both the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps had placed orders for the new dive bombers, designated the SBD-1 and SBD-2 (the latter had increased fuel capacity and different armament). The SBD-1 went to the Marine Corps in late 1940, and the SBD-2 went to the Navy in early 1941
Douglas SBD Dauntless - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Only the B5N Kate could claim to be superior to a contemporary FAA design, but even here the history of this aircraft is quite confused, and the much superior B5N-2 variant was only coming into service by late 1941. AFAIK, even the B5N-1 was not in CV service during 1939.

Engine data for the B5N:

Engine
(B5N1) One 770 hp Nakajima Hikari 3 9-Cylinder radial
(B5N1 Model 12 ) 970 hp or 985 hp Sakae 11 14-Cylinder 2-row radial
(B5N2) 1,115 hp Sakae 21 radial
http://www.angelfire.com/fm/compass/jtp.htm

It seems doubtful that the B5N1 was CV capable, and the first CV capable variant would probably have been the B5N1 Model 12, which is often called the B5N2. Here is a description of the B5N2 ( possibly a B5N1 Model 12) taking off:

On board Hiryu, attack leader Lieutenant Tomonaga watched as her nine escort fighters departed, led by the athletic and energetic Lt. Shigematsu Yasuhiro. Right after them, three Zeros under Lt. Tori Shigeru, whose shots was leading the morning's first combat air patrol watch, departed with similar alacrity. Getting Tomonaga's kanko in the air, however, was a different story altogether. Fully loaded, his plane weighed more than four tons, almost 400 pounds more than a dive-bomber, and more than a ton heavier than a Zero. Yet his horsepower-to-weight ratio was the lowest of the three types of carrier planes in the fleet. In a word, the Type 97 was a pig. He would need every ounce of power to make it off the deck.

The compound wind over Hiryu's flight deck generally needed to be around thirteen meters/second (twenty-six knots) to launch aircraft, but Tomonaga's Type 97s really were better off if the relative wind was closer to fifteen meters/second (thirty knots). This created problems for the older Kaga, whose top speed of twenty eight knots (on a good day) meant that she could barely launch her Type 97s if there was no wind. Too much wind, though, could be a problem in itself—at speeds above twenty-five meters/second the planes were impossible to control on the flight deck. On Hiryu, creating relative wind wasn't an issue—Yamaguchi's flagship had plenty of speed. But even under ideal conditions, Tomonaga's heavily laden bird still needed around 120 meters to make it into the air. On the shorter flight decks of Hiryu and Soryu this was problematic, particularly for the lead strike aircraft spotted at the head of the pack. Tomonaga's nose was almost atop the central elevator. From here it was 135 meters to the forward end of the flight deck—doable, but hardly comfortable.

Under the circumstances, the only thing Tomonaga could do was jam his throttle all the way to the stops, pop the brakes, and hope for the best. If worse came to worst and he went into the drink, hopefully Hiryu wouldn't run over his plane. Then the guard destroyer would pluck him and his men to safety. He gunned his engine. His kanko began plodding down the deck, gaining speed with agonizing slowness. He could see his plane coming up on the white-painted wind gauge and the steam jet at the forward end of the flight deck—it was happening all too quickly. Then, seemingly at the last second, his plane nosed up and lifted grudgingly from Hiryu's deck. Cheers rang out again from the crew galleries. Tomonaga immediately began circling to port, putting his plane into a waiting pattern as the rest of his squadron took off. One by one, Hiryu's kankotai, clutching their deadly cargoes to their bellies like great, green dragons, lumbered into the air. Across the water, the other carriers were doing the same—sending their heavy attack planes up into the growing light. The last to leave the decks were a Type 97 kanko apiece from Kaga and Akagi. These two planes were slated to join the search missions that were already getting under way from the cruisers and battleships...

Shattered Sword, p128-129

Obviously, these aircraft would have been problematic for TO from an older RN CV, and the B5N1 would have been impossible; it simply wouldn't have been operable from a CV, except under the most favourable conditions. In fact the Hosho was still operating the B4Y1 biplane TB at Midway:

Before its replacement, the B4Y1 had flown during the Second Sino-Japanese War and served at the Battle of Midway during June 1942, where eight of them were operated from Hōshō.[2] It was one of these planes from Hōshō which took photographs of the burning Hiryū on 5 June 1942.[3]
[2]: Shattered Sword, p453
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yokosuka_B4Y

 

[oldcrowcv63]

Very few F2As of any variant ever saw service in the USN and even fewer aboard USN CVs. In 1939 the FAA was not really behind either the USN or IJN in terms of CV aircraft design, IMHO, it was not till 1941/42 that the FAA really fell behind the USN and IJN in terms of design, as both the IJN and USN reequipped with new types while the FAA's planned aircraft were delayed due to lowered production and design priorities following the BofB.

USN:
XF4F-2 first flown in September 1937 with design initiated prior circa 1936
XF4F-3 first flight January 1939, introduction in early 1940.
XF2A-1 first flight in December 1937, Introduction (albeit at a Glacially slow pace) begun in May 1939. design in circa 1936
BT-1 first flight August 1935, design early 1935, BT-2/SBD-1 first flight April, 1938 design 1937, SBD introduction circa 1940
TBD-1 first flight April 1935, design 1934. introduction circa 1937

IJN:

A6M Zeke: first flight 1939, design circa 1938
D3A Val: first flight January 1938, design 1937
B5M Kate: first flight: January 1937, design 1936

So please tell me what prompts you to believe the FAA designs were on a par with either naval air arm prior to 1940? What FAA designs possessed performance competitive to those of these two navies? Please cite the designs of the FAA, not simply the deficiencies of those of the IJN and USN.

If I can be presumptuous I might suggest a rewording of your statement to be:

"FAA designs circa (1937-40) were more appropriate for (or well suited to) its carrier's specific design atributes than those of other navies."

Of the USN aircraft listed above only the folding wing F4F proved to be well suited to RN carriers while perhaps none of those of the IJN would have been.

 

[oldcrowcv63]

I have to admit RAFson, your most recent post and the earlier ones of Parsifal have provoked me to consider some new aspects of this whole issue. First, considering the importance of the Mediterranean campaign, why was the FAA in March of 1941 so desparately short of fighter aircraft it considered deployment of the entirely carrier unsuitable B-339B?

 

[parsifal]

Youve answered your own question. The FAA was short of three things. Carrier deck space to field dedicated specialist types. AC had to be multi role, or the FAA coulod not complete all that was expected of it. Secondly pilots, there was a critical shortage of them. Ive read sources that the grand total of aircrew additions in 1939 was just 16 pilots....in 1940 I recall it was about 80 pilots, but some of them were seconded to the RAF during the BoB. Thirdly there was a critical shortage of new airframes due to the priorities given to FC. The development of new types to replace the Fulmar/Albacore (principally the Firefly, a bit later the Fury, and the Barracuda) were all badly delayed by other priorities. The FAA did need a high performance fighter, I am not really disputing that, but they also had other problems that ruled out the usage of the Brewster early on.

The Brewster would have been useful, but far from a panacea, if the following issues could have been overcome

1) Additional carrier deck space (perhaps earlier introduction of CVEs
2) A much greater and plentiful supply of aircrew that could allow specialised aircraft onboard.
3) Overcoming the relkiability and wing folding issues of the brewster prewar
4) Better foresight on the part of the FAA that did not blinker the FAA of the need to provide better more high performance a/c so that it could operate better in enemy controlled airspace

 

[RCAFson]

I have to admit RAFson, your most recent post and the earlier ones of Parsifal have provoked me to consider some new aspects of this whole issue. First, considering the importance of the Mediterranean campaign, why was the FAA in March of 1941 so desparately short of fighter aircraft it considered deployment of the entirely carrier unsuitable B-339B?

Because FAA aircrew training and aircraft production was crippled by the higher priority given to the RAF during and immediately after the BofB; the FAA actually loanded 50 pilots to RAF Fighter Command!. Fulmar production was limited to 25/month despite the desperate need for more and 25/month was barely covering the inevitable wastage rates incurred during a shooting war. The GSG had been out of production and no more were available, while the HSH was just entering service trials.

 

[RCAFson]

USN:
XF4F-2 first flown in September 1937 with design initiated prior circa 1936
XF4F-3 first flight January 1939, introduction in early 1940.
XF2A-1 first flight in December 1937, Introduction (albeit at a Glacially slow pace) begun in May 1939. design in circa 1936
BT-1 first flight August 1935, design early 1935, BT-2/SBD-1 first flight April, 1938 design 1937, SBD introduction circa 1940
TBD-1 first flight April 1935, design 1934. introduction circa 1937

IJN:

A6M Zeke: first flight 1939, design circa 1938
D3A Val: first flight January 1938, design 1937
B5M Kate: first flight: January 1937, design 1936

So please tell me what prompts you to believe the FAA designs were on a par with either naval air arm prior to 1940? What FAA designs possessed performance competitive to those of these two navies? Please cite the designs of the FAA, not simply the deficiencies of those of the IJN and USN.

If I can be presumptuous I might suggest a rewording of your statement to be:

"FAA designs circa (1937-40) were more appropriate for (or well suited to) its carrier's specific design atributes than those of other navies."

Of the USN aircraft listed above only the folding wing F4F proved to be well suited to RN carriers while perhaps none of those of the IJN would have been.

In CV service types
1939
FAA = Swordfish, GSG, Skua
USN = TBD, F2F, SBC ( I won't include the F2A because it was essentially a failed experiment)
IJN = B4Y, A5M, D1A

1940
FAA = Swordfish, Albacore, GSG, Skua, Fulmar
USN = TBD, F3F, SBC, SBD ( I won't include the F2A because it was essentially a failed experiment)
IJN = B4Y, B5N-M12, A5M, A6M*, D1A, D3A was just entering CV service

1941
FAA = Swordfish, Albacore, HSH, Fulmar II (this variant had dive bombing capability = 500lb bomb at 60deg at up to 310 knots)
USN = TBD, F3F, F4F, SBC, SBD
IJN=B4Y, B5N-M12, A5M, A6M, D1A, D3A
1942
FAA = Swordfish, Albacore, HSH, Fulmar II (this variant had dive bombing capability = 500lb bomb at 60deg at up to 310 knots)
FAA plan = Barracuda, Firefly
USN = TBD, TBF, F4F, SBD
IJN=B4Y, B5N-M12, B5N-2 ,A5M, A6M, D3A

The Swordfish was only used as frontline CV aircraft from 1939 because of Albacore production problems.


*Production of the folding wingtip A6M-2-21 didn't begin until Nov 1940.

 

[oldcrowcv63]

I must say, I am learning a bit about the FAA circumstances in 1941 (although not much directly germaine to the thread topic). Most of all, I am gaining a new and profound respect for Dwight Eisenhower.

 

[oldcrowcv63]

You suggest that the F2A was a failed experiment when the F2A-1 and -2 equipped two of the USN's embarked fighter squadrons from 1940 through 1941. These two squadrons were the USN's premier units (VF-2 -3), before being progressively replaced by the seriously flawed F2A-3 and the more promising and capable F4F-3 and F4F-3A which incidentally didn't replace the F2A-2s then in service but rather were used to equip the squadrons using obsolescent biplanes. VF-2 itself reequipped with the newly acquired F2A-3, which suggests there was little official anticipation of the failure it would prove to be. (Not what you'd predict for a failed experiment) As has been stated repeatedly, the real issue limiting deployment numbers of the F2A was the failure of the company not the aircraft but of course, in retrospect Brewster's failure to produce was a blessing. Ignoring the F2A-1 -2, is IMO stacking the deck to make a point that IMHO is simply untenable.

As an example of what appears to me to be an apparently biased perspective, you ignore in your accounting not only the service of the F2A-1 and -2 in 1941 but also the 81 Martlet-1s and IIIs most of which entered FAA service in 1940 and early 1941. Had the USA not been giving away aircraft to an embattled West, those F4Fs would have been taken in hand by the USN, completed to USN standards as F4F-3 or 3A and filled most of the remaining USN squadrons: VF-7, VF-42, VF-6 and VF-71 and half of VF-5. It seems a bit ungracious of you to neglect their contribution to the FAA stable and not include the F4F as "in service" regardless of whether USN or FAA. Although I do wonder why the roughly 60 surviving naval-equipped airframes were assigned to shore bases while the short-legged Sea Hurricane was introduced onto RN Flight decks. Could it have been the probable early (pre-Grumman TBF F6F) logistical and handling advantage of the HSH or a bit of NIH? Just wondering. In truth, from a purely risk-avoidance perspective, I'd rather land a HSH on board any CV than an F4F. I just like that wide stance as do I suspect most naval aviators would prefer.

By your reasoning I could argue the Skua was a failed experiment that foreshadowed the overdue development of the Fulmar I and II, which finally brought to fruition the FAA goal of an effective carrier based multirole fighter. But I am wondering, did the Fulmar ever drop a 500 pound bomb on an enemy target or sink a ship.

I have no problem calling the F2A-3 or export B-339s failed anything you care to call them, but to me that has no bearing on whether the F2A-1 or F2A-2 or even a hypothetical navalized B-339 could have made a difference flying from RN CVs in 1940-41. I think on this account we'll just have to agree to disagree.

 

[RCAFson]

You suggest that the F2A was a failed experiment when the F2A-1 and -2 equipped two of the USN's embarked fighter squadrons from 1940 through 1941. These two squadrons were the USN's premier units (VF-2 -3), before being progressively replaced by the seriously flawed F2A-3 and the more promising and capable F4F-3 and F4F-3A which incidentally didn't replace the F2A-2s then in service but rather were used to equip the squadrons using obsolescent biplanes. VF-2 itself reequipped with the newly acquired F2A-3, which suggests there was little official anticipation of the failure it would prove to be. (Not what you'd predict for a failed experiment) As has been stated repeatedly, the real issue limiting deployment numbers of the F2A was the failure of the company not the aircraft but of course, in retrospect Brewster's failure to produce was a blessing. Ignoring the F2A-1 -2, is IMO stacking the deck to make a point that IMHO is simply untenable.

As an example of what appears to me to be an apparently biased perspective, you ignore in your accounting not only the service of the F2A-1 and -2 in 1941 but also the 81 Martlet-1s and IIIs most of which entered FAA service in 1940 and early 1941. Had the USA not been giving away aircraft to an embattled West, those F4Fs would have been taken in hand by the USN, completed to USN standards as F4F-3 or 3A and filled most of the remaining USN squadrons: VF-7, VF-42, VF-6 and VF-71 and half of VF-5. It seems a bit ungracious of you to neglect their contribution to the FAA stable and not include the F4F as "in service" regardless of whether USN or FAA. Although I do wonder why the roughly 60 surviving naval-equipped airframes were assigned to shore bases while the short-legged Sea Hurricane was introduced onto RN Flight decks. Could it have been the probable early (pre-Grumman TBF F6F) logistical and handling advantage of the HSH or a bit of NIH? Just wondering. In truth, from a purely risk-avoidance perspective, I'd rather land a HSH on board any CV than an F4F. I just like that wide stance as do I suspect most naval aviators would prefer.

By your reasoning I could argue the Skua was a failed experiment that foreshadowed the overdue development of the Fulmar I and II, which finally brought to fruition the FAA goal of an effective carrier based multirole fighter. But I am wondering, did the Fulmar ever drop a 500 pound bomb on an enemy target or sink a ship.

I have no problem calling the F2A-3 or export B-339s failed anything you care to call them, but to me that has no bearing on whether the F2A-1 or F2A-2 or even a hypothetical navalized B-339 could have made a difference flying from RN CVs in 1940-41. I think on this account we'll just have to agree to disagree.

No F2As or any of its variants ever flew a single combat mission from a CV, despite the considerable incentive for the USN to have continued to use this type after Pearl Harbour. The F2A-1, appears to have been used for protracted service trials, while the F2A-3 was demonstrably a failure. So trying to classify the F2A is problematic; IMHO it was never a true service type, rather it was a type which essentially flew very protracted, and ultimately unsuccessful service trials. The USN was never loathe to use a type for extended CV (IE the TBD) service and the failure to continue to use the F2A-2 suggests serious problems with all variants.

Regarding the Martlet, the first deliveries to Europe were via the cash and carry policy so these aircraft were not given away. 2ndly the Martlet required considerable modification, after UK delivery, before they even usable for shore based operations, and the fact that the HSH preceded the type into FAA CV service gives us more than a hint that this was so, especially when the FAA is making desperate attempts to fly the B339 off CVs in early 1941. This of course suggests that the F2A might have been used by the FAA as a CV based fighter; this would probably have been true in an extreme situation, where the type might have been able to by-pass proper service evaluations and trials. NIH never applied to the FAA! The first F4F type to win approval to enter USN CV service was the F4F-3, which carried a two-stage, two speed engine, production of which was problematic, so more potential F4F airframes would probably not have brought the type into USN CV service before 1941. In some ways the F4F had a analogous development to the A6M, where the earliest production types were not CV capable. Anecdotally, the F4F appears to have suffered a somewhat higher CV attrition rate than the HSH.

The Skua was not "a failed experiment" but rather an aircraft whose performance was no longer adequate and was withdrawn from service prematurely, on that account when the Fulmar arrived, rather than a type which was withdrawn due to it's own inherent defects. If the FAA had more decks available, then the Skua might have lasted a bit longer in a pure divebomber/recon role, where even the Roc would have had some utility.

The Fulmar never had a chance to fully exploit its potential as a fighter bomber, because the FAA rarely had the opportunity to bring enough CVs together to allow the Fulmar to act as a strike aircraft, or to demonstrate pre-war FAA CV operational doctrine. However during the Raid on Kirkenes and Petsamo, on July 31 1941, Fulmars did carry out a fighter-bomber mission. Although this mission was ultimately unsuccessful (surprise was lost due to Luftwaffe recon and German AW radar), it was one of the few examples of the FAA being able to undertake a multi-CV "fast carrier raid" where the Fulmar could undertake non fighter missions. The official dispatch makes for interesting reading:
http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/UN/UK/LondonGazette/38300.pdf