Would the British FAA have been better off with the Brewster Buffalo?

[Kryten]

Not sure the Buffalo was suitable for replacing the Fulmar early in the war, simply because of the roles the Fulmar covered!

the extra crewmen in the fulmar were invaluable for recon and anti U-Boat operations, extra eyes are always a major advantage!

 

[oldcrowcv63]

Aircraft landing on carriers, using a hook, always land hard. A CV landing = about 100ft of deck roll, at most followed by a severe deceleration, and if you have ever seen an aircraft make an arrested landing, you will know what I'm talking about. The Finns experience with de-navalized F2A-1s tells us nothing about how they would fair on a carrier.

Peal harbour was on Dec 7th and the nearest carrier with F2A-3s was lexington:

View attachment 206728
First team, p26

so by 11 Dec, VF-2 was forced to "cease all operations until enemy contact became imminent" because of progressive LG failure. The Buffalo hasn't been a top pick for "worst fighter" for nothing, and there's no way the FAA would have ever accepted this aircraft for service; it just wasn't carrier ready and never would be.

"Also RAFson..." thanks, no worries.

If you have read the prior threads related to this topic you'll see I am not now nor have I ever been a great advocate of the F2A-3. My issue is the carrier sutiability of -1 or -2. But since you seem to be arguing that the -3 experience is indicative of what could be expected of the lighter -1 and -2 aircraft's carrier suitability, it's worth examining the Lundstrom quote more closer. The quote poses something of a conundrum. My earlier post implicitly referred to the F2A-3 exerience after PH to its removal from CV service on 25 January. My bad, I should have been more explicit. But the experience prior to Ramsey's December 11 comments is certainly worth examining.

VF-2 had been operating the F2A-3s for perhaps about 3-4 months prior to December 7 and had probably accumulated the bulk of the USN's experience with that new type (introduced to fleet service in summer 1941). During the attack on PH the Lex was and had been at sea conducting flight ops for some time prior to December 7. It was during that period that Ramsey cites the problems whose tally I had not included in my previous description.

So, on December 11, Ramsey writes of 12 examples of progressive strut failure and 3 outright failures. I can imagine Ramsey with his maintenance officers generating a steady stream of alarming massages to BuAer alerting it to the problem.

On December 13th Lex returned to PH and spent a day in port. The ship departed the 14th and commenced a series of at-sea periods including multi-week intervals of flight operations. Lundstrum and other sources cite the ops conducted as including IAP ASW and training missions. These are certainly not operations one would conduct with enemy contact imminent or with an aircraft responsible for air defense of your task force that was perceived to be at serious risk, unless Lexington's Admiral Brown, Captain Sherman or Air Group Commander Ault were incompetent; which they were not. So at one point Ramsey is reluctant to fly the F2A-3 and a week later he is flying them regularly on what are essentially routine ops. What do we make of this? Well Ramsey seeing the writing on the wall for the F2A-3 was anxious to dump them and get his hooks into the newer F4Fs (inbound as cargo carried by the Yorktown). So its possible he exagerates the progressive failure of the gear. That's just saavy politics. It's not a lie, but he sees the writing on the wall.

However, the quote contains the line: "The squadron desparately required "reinforced struts to replace those in use" This suggests the existence of an engineering fix.

So, the perhaps more likely scenario is that, during the Lex's brief time in port, VF-2 took possession of the "reinforced struts" mentioned in the quoted text which might have been sent as a package for squadron organizational maintenance to install at sea, restoring the embarked aircraft to some semblance of operational capability, albeit temporary.

Well that's pretty much what happens with introduction of any new aircraft into the fleet. I've been through that process. You introduce a new aircraft and discover problems. You rush development of an engineering fix, then issue it to the fleet squadrons. The fix effectiveness may or may not be permanent and warrant subsequent work. In the case of the F2A-3 I assume the fix, if it existed and was issued, was anticipated to be temporary especially with Grumman's much faster production line and more robust F4F in the offing. Why bother to pursue a permanent solution? Just get it off the USN flight decks as quick as possible and replace them with Wildcats, which is what happened.

Your comments seem to be suggesting that the F2A-1's landing gear problems were so severe, that the USN deployed it to the Sara in 1940 AFTER adding the full armanent option and its associated added weight and then purchased the heavier F2A-2 and operated it from carriers until the F2A-3 bcame available in mid-1941. The F2A-3 was built to a navy specification that increased its weight even more which argues against a perception of the F2A-1 and -2's gear problems were considered serious except in retrospect with the -3.

In my career, I've attributed to the Navy some actions that I've judged to be downright stupid but I stop short of imagining the USN and BuAer would intentionally acquire progressively heavier versions of a carrier based aircraft whose landing gear was judged and shown by experience to be unsound. At some point the USN modified nine sets of F2A-3 wings to accomodate the even heavier 20 mm cannon instead of the standard .50's. (Mass) Maas also makes the point that landing gear failures decreased significantly simply by increasing tire pressure.

I assure you, you don't need to remind me what it's like to land on an aircraft carrier. I've experienced dozens of landings in a 25+ ton aircraft during carrier quals and deployments on three different carriers, two of which were WW2 era (abeit modified to have an angle) flight decks including the Lexington (CVT-16) and the Hancock (CVA-19). Yes, you are correct, carrier landings are generally harder. Hopefully the hardest one you make doesn't happen when the ship is riding a swell causing it to rise and meet you halfway. But field landings can also be every bit as hard. I've been in aircraft that were planted on runways every bit as hard as any carrier landing I experienced. Over a period of 3 years, virtually all pilots are going to have a bad day and plant one on the runway. Some do it more often than others. We typically call the ones that do it repeatedly: "plumbers." So, the Finns extended experience does tell us something about the F2A-1. It held up well under trying combat conditions for over three years, including their share of hard landings, each being flown by a variety of pilots. Most imporatant of all, it was an aircraft designed from the start for carrier landings and had performed satisfactorily for the USN in that capacity.

 

[oldcrowcv63]

Pars, on reflection, I'd probably choose a Fulmar over a B-339B, for its many good qualities and in hindsight for its excellent service.

 

[parsifal]

Just be aware that i am not saying the fulmar was a better fighter. But its the utility of the fulmar over the brewster that makes the difference.

oddly enough, as a choice for the USN, i would pick the brewster over the fulmar. USN didnt need GP aircraft. They needed the best of each category that they could lay their hands on

 

[oldcrowcv63]

Not surpisingly, I agree with your assessment. The utility of the Fulmar in its varied roles was impressive. Everything I've read about it suggests it was an aircraft as sweet to fly as its elegant lines suggest.

 

[RCAFson]

In my career, I've attributed to the Navy some actions that I've judged to be downright stupid but I stop short of imagining the USN and BuAer would intentionally acquire progressively heavier versions of a carrier based aircraft whose landing gear was judged and shown by experience to be unsound. At some point the USN modified nine sets of F2A-3 wings to accomodate the even heavier 20 mm cannon instead of the standard .50's. (Mass) Maas also makes the point that landing gear failures decreased significantly simply by increasing tire pressure.

You have to go back in time and look at the situation facing the USN in 39-40; It seemed to many that Britain was facing defeat during the BofB. Japan was rapidly re-arming and the need for new, high performance monoplane fighters was critical. There were demands for US built aircraft from all quarters and Grumman was having lots of trouble getting a new monoplane design sorted out (the F4F), and Brewster was the only other game in town. Consequently the USN held their nose and ordered the F2A, in small quantities, pending service evaluations. None of the F2A variants subsequently proved to be reliable in service, and as soon as practicable, the USN removed the F2A from carrier servive and then from front line service. The F2A only ever found itself in USN/USMC service because of a combination of dire events and a lack of alternatives.

 

[Juha]

Not sure the Buffalo was suitable for replacing the Fulmar early in the war, simply because of the roles the Fulmar covered!

the extra crewmen in the fulmar were invaluable for recon and anti U-Boat operations, extra eyes are always a major advantage!

Hello Kryten
I and I believe also oldcrowcv63 are playing with the idea that FAA instead of FiAF had got the ex-USN F2A-1s early in 1940, a few months earlier than Fulmar arrived. It might well be a stretch that in that case F2A-1 could have operated from Glorious during later part of Norway Campaign but in any case the lifts of pre-Ark Royal RN carriers could handle it, so it might have been useful aboard those older carriers, Eagle, Furious and Hermes for ex in Med, it climbed clearly better than Fulmar and was 30+km/h faster but had more or less same range and loiter time. Against Italian bombers Fulmar might well be better armed but not against LW planes and F2A-1 could have hold its own against Italian MC 200 and Fiat G.50bis, same goes to F2A-2. F2A-3 was clearly an overburden plane.

Juha

 

[RCAFson]

Now the separation of Fulmars from the strike planes seemed to have been intentional, at Kirkenes to distract Germans and at Petsamo the Fulmars used blocking tactics flying between Petsamo and the nearest German fighter base. Both formations lost 2 Fulmars, one of those lost near Petsamo seemed to has been lost because of engine failure, and the only lost Bf 110 was shot down by a Albacore rear gunner.





Juha

The FAA plan can be read here:
http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/UN/UK/LondonGazette/38300.pdf
and it clearly states that the Fulmars were to have joined up with the Albacores prior to the attack:

2. A striking force consisting of 12 Albacores
of No. 827 Squadron and 8 Albacbres of No. 828
Squadron was flown off in one range at 1400 on
30th July. All aircraft were armed with torpedoes
fitted with duplex .pistols set to non contact
at 14 feet. At 1430 a fighter escort of
9 Fulmars of No. 809 Squadron, and a fighter
patrol of 3 Fulmars of 809 Squadron was flown
off, the former Having been ordered to over-
,take the striking force en route for the objective
arid the latter to patrol over the 'Fleet.
3. The fighter escort 'on making a landfall
proceeded at a height of 4,000 feet to a position
between Renoy and Prestoy Islands where
, heavy anti-aircraft fire was encountered. It was
therefore decided to circle this area in the hope
of drawing the fire from the striking force.1
4. Approximately ten minutes later at least
three M.E. 109s and six ME110s were seen
approaching from the direction of Vadso and
Kirkenes aerodromes.
5. During the ensuing combats two M.E.110s
and one M.E. 109 were shot down for certain
and confirmed, and a further M.E.110 was
possibly shot down. Two of this Squadron are
missing, but the pilot of one was seen to escape
by parachute.

Luftwaffe records confirm the loss of one Me110 to a Fulmar, and a Ju-87 to an Albacore forward gun.

 

[Juha]

Hello RCAFson
Fulmars had their orders but the formation leader decided to ignore them because of the heavy AA fire, they overtook the Albacores but then the Fulmar leader decided to act according to his judgement. The Bf 110 crew survived and at least the pilot survived the war and visited Finland less than year ago, according to him they were shot down by an Albacore rear gunner. With the rear seat man onboard, it would have been very difficult for Fulmar attack them unnoticed during low level combat.

Juha

 

[parsifal]

This is what is written up on the FAA website about the buffaloes in FAA service. Its hard to envisage the buffalo entering service in time to fight at Norway in april 1940, even if the Finnish order was acquired. FAA had a lot of trouble with the conversions as the following discussion shows:

"The F2A Buffalo was the first monoplane carrier fighter of the USN, designed in response to a requirement issued in 1935 with specifications for a replacement for the Grumman F3F biplane equipping ythe USNs four carriers. Brewster Aeronautical Corporation developed a design for a modern monoplane fighter with an enclosed cabin and retractable landing gear.The F2A had a small barrel-shaped fuselage, small wings, retractable narrow-track landing gear and an enclosed cockpit. The undercarriage was insufficiently strong for carrier operations. Development of the F2A Buffalo began in 1936. The first prototype XF2A-1 flew on 2 December 1937.

Since the aircraft was superior to the Seversky XNF-1 and its chief competitor, the Grumman XF4F-2 (Grumman F4F-2 Wildcat), was not ready, the Buffalo was initially selected as a new fighter for the US Navy. The Navy accepted the XF2A-1 during June of 1938 and ordered series production of the F2A-1 for its carriers. Fifty-nine aircraft had been built by 1939. Altogether, 750 were built.

A total of 27 Buffaloes entered the Fleet Air Arm register. 26 Buffalo Is were diverted from a Belgium contract following the invasion by Germany in 1940. In September 1940, the Royal Aircraft Establishment at Farnborough tested Brewster serial 430 built for Belgium. Flight testing the Brewster Buffalo These are excerpts from reports from the UK to the USA and subsequently archived at the National Air Space Museum.

The first RN delivery was to TOC 804 sqd at Hatston - tested on July 1940-September 1940 (AS422). By March 1941 Buffaloes were serving with 805 squadron based at Dekheila, HMS Eagle and Maleme. The aircraft saw limited action with the Fleet Air Arm.

Early in 1941, as test pilot for the Royal Navy, Capt Eric Brown RN flew scores of aircraft from many nations, including a Belgian-order Brewster 339 at Royal Naval Air Station, Yeovilton along with a Grumman Martlet. He described them "They were both tubby little single-seat fighters with a very purposeful air about them,". Brown noted that there were 40 of these planes, acquired when Belgium fell to the Germans, and shipped to Britain aboard HMS Furious. They were assembled at Burtonwood, later an American base.

Of the 27 Buffalo with the FAA only one is known to have been shot down- Aircraft AX813 failed to return from a patrol, after being shot down North West of Sidi Barrani on 17 June 1941 (Lt KL Keith taken POW, died of wounds 26 June 1941).

Service:
With FAA, Australia, US Navy, navy of Finland, Belgium, and Holland
Modifications:
F2A-1 : first production version
F2A-2 : upgraded engine, released October 1940
F2A-3 : improved airframe, upgraded electronics
B-239 : export version of F2A-1
B-339 : export version of F2A-2


One of the Belgian Buffalo subsequently entering FAA service

Fleet Air Arm history

Total FAA 1939-1945: 27
First delivered to RN: 1940.TOC 804 sqd Hatston tested 7.40-9.40 (AS422), 8.40
TOC RN 10.40 (AS413)
First squadron 1939-1945: as above and then 805 sqdn at Dekheila/HMS Eagle and
Maleme 3.41. May 1941 to 759 sqdn Yeovilton
Operational squadron: 804 sqdn at Hatston 7. 40, and 805 sqdn Dekheila/HMS Eagle and Maleme March 1941
Last served with RN 1941/1942


Aircraft Type: Brewster F2A Buffalo
Mark: F2A
Primary Role: Carrier borne Fighter
First Flight: prototype was on 2 December 1937
Date operating with FAA squadrons: 19401-1941
Manufacturer: Brewster Aircraft Corp.
Engine: One 1200 hp Wright R-1820-40 engine
Wing Span: Length: Height: Wing Area: Wingspan: 10.67 m
Length: 8.05 m
Empty Weight: Max.Weight: Weight: 2957 kg
Max. speed: 518 km/h
Ceiling : 10000 m
Range: 2400 km
Armament: Four 12.7mm guns
Crew: 1
Squadrons: 759,760,
804,805,813,885
Battle honours: Mediterranean
Additional references and notes: -


Battle Honours and Operational History

Although only serving with the Fleet Air Arm for a relatively short time the Buffalo saw combat action in the Mediterranean. Elsewhere, the only US unit to use it in combat was an USMC squadron defending Midway.
The one operation Fleet Air Arm squadrom with Buffalo, 805 Squadron formed in February 1941 with 12 Fairey Fulmar two-seat fighters, carrier capable, to support a planned invasion of Rhodes, off the coast of Turkey, held by Italians. Based at Maleme in northeastern Crete. Three Buffaloes (AS419, AS420, AX814) along with 6 more Fulmars flew in from Dekheila. The Buffalo flight commanded by Lt. Rupert Brabner, formerly Member of Parliament for Hyth. "The Buffalo was a delight to fly--very maneuverable (compared to the Fulmar). It would have been an excellent fighter but the guns could not be fired because the ends of the wires which were part of the interrupter gear, failed and 805 did not have the necessary spares."

On 18th March, Lt. Brabner had his first skirmish, chasing a Ju88 without catching it--while flying a Fulmar, perhaps indicative of his opinion of the Buffalo. He was up again next day, mounted on AS419, only to turn back because of engine trouble. He crash- landed short of the airfield, and the Brewster flipped over on its back, fortunately without injury to the MP. A photograph shows it resting very sturdily on its plexiglass canopy. That seems to have been the Brewster's only sortie from Crete. By the end of April: "The two remaining Buffalos were also totally unservicable now." When German paratroopers over-ran Crete at the end of May, the Brewsters were apparently left in the boneyard. German photographers delighted in photographing their planes landing over the hulk of a derelict Brewster. Christopher Shores et al: Air War for Yugoslavia Greece and Crete 1940-41 (London: Grub Street 1987)"

 

[oldcrowcv63]

You have to go back in time and look at the situation facing the USN in 39-40; It seemed to many that Britain was facing defeat during the BofB. Japan was rapidly re-arming and the need for new, high performance monoplane fighters was critical. There were demands for US built aircraft from all quarters and Grumman was having lots of trouble getting a new monoplane design sorted out (the F4F), and Brewster was the only other game in town. Consequently the USN held their nose and ordered the F2A, in small quantities, pending service evaluations. None of the F2A variants subsequently proved to be reliable in service, and as soon as practicable, the USN removed the F2A from carrier servive and then from front line service. The F2A only ever found itself in USN/USMC service because of a combination of dire events and a lack of alternatives.

Well, I must admit, that's a version of history to which I had not been previously exposed, although I do see as through a glass darkly a history I recongize. I have never gotton the impression that the USN was "holding its nose" at the delvery of F2A-1 or -2 products, quite the contrary, The it is my understanding that the USN wanted all the F2A-1s Brewster could produce; at least until the advent and promise of more powerful engines made the F2A-1 less desirable then a more modern aircraft. The USN was certainly holding its nose in having to deal with the Brewster corporation. The problem was Brewster couldn't fullfill its USN ontracts in a timely fashion. If Brewster had produced all 54 of the F2A-1s by late 1938 or early 1939 (especially before the XF4F-3 flew on 2/12/39), the USN might very likely have bought more of them. If that had forestalled the USN issuing the contract to Grumman for 54 F4F-3s, what a disaster of epic proportions that would have been. At the time, 54 aircraft constituted three squadron's allotment of aircraft It was a standard first order for a new aircraft and was probably all the government could afford in a pinch.

The F2A-1 had won the (early 1938) competition with the F4F-2 handily but couldn't get deliveries of the NACA-improved production model out the factory door. It was a better airplane that the F4F-2 and that's why the USN wanted it. Grumman went back to their drawing boards and thru 1938 produced a greatly improved version (the XF4F-3), essentially a different aircraft, that took to the air for the first time in ealy 1939. My understanding is that in 1939, Grumman was not having problems with the F4F airframe but with the P&W 1830-76 engine which was prone to overheating. The Grumman itself is reputed to have had landing gear problems, obviously not ever as severe as those of the F2A-3. My guess is that whatever the problems seen early in the history of the F2A-1 and -2, they were statistically similar to those of the Grumman. Clearly the Grumman's gear, designed for a heavier aircraft and backed by roughly a decade of engineering development proved more robust and accomodated weight gains the Brewster product could not.

The USN had taken delivery of only about half a squadron of what was clearly an aging design by the end of 1939. From wikipedia:

In April 1939, the Finnish government contacted the Roosevelt administration in a search to hastily acquire modern combat aircraft for its air force. On 17 October that same year, the Finnish Embassy in Washington, DC, received a telegram clearing the purchase of fighter aircraft. Prompt availability, and compatibility with 87-octane fuel, were the only requirements stipulated by the Finns.[45] The U.S. Navy and State Department arranged to divert the remaining F2A-1 fighter aircraft,[N 9] in exchange for its order of F2A-2 Buffalos scheduled to be delivered later (and hence sent to the U.S. Navy, instead).

(Of course at that point the F2A-1 wasn't yet the Buffalo.) Strapped for cash to buy advanced fighters? Let's make a deal! I'l give you my old model in exchange for a newer higher performing model. Of course, by then the question had become would the new model (F2A-2) compare favorably to the up and coming F4F-3? Turns out it did.

However, the first F4F-3 flew in early 1939, was ordered into production 8/8/39 with the first USN squadron taking possession of its A/C in late 1940 which happened to be about the same time as the F2A-2 production order of 44 aircraft had been completed. I believe, that's about as good as Brewster ever got in production quantity and even then it was behind Grumman.

with respect to the carrier suitability of either the F2A-1 or -2

I have heard of one anecdotal instance of an F2A-1 gear failure during ops on the Sara during the summer of 1940. If you have references that cite additional chronic landing gear failures gear problems or failures of the F2A-1 and F2A-2 during carrier operations through their years of service (1940-41) I'd certainly be grateful to be enlightened. In the meantime, I can offer a record of the history of F2A-1 and -2's in USN service: While landing gear is mentioned as damaged in a number of incidents, it isn't in the context of chronic problems which would come from the maintenance records. When gear does collapse in the -2 the incident is identified.

http://www.warbirdforum.com/f2a1.htm

For the 42 F2A-2:

http://www.warbirdforum.com/buffno.pdf

Bureau No. Squadron Delivered Carrier Incidents in squadron service
1398 VF-3 9/16/40 CV-3 damaged 3/19/41
1399 " 9/13/40 "
1400 " " " Crash 10/2/40
1401 " " "
1402 " 9/16/40 "
1403 " " " Crash 9/2/41
1404 " 10/7/40 "
1405 " " "
1406 VF-2 " CV-2
1407 " 10/14/40 " Crash 1/29/41
1408 " " " wing damage 8/1/41
1409 " " "
1410 " " "
1411 " 11/28/40 " delivered late due to engine problem
1412 " 10/21/40 "
1413 " " " Belly landing 3/3/41
1414 " " "
1415 " "
1416 " 10/25/40 "
1417 " " "
1418 " " "
1419 " " " Landng Gear Collapsed CV-2 5/22/40
1420 " " " Crash 2/24/41
1421 " " " Crash 4/1/41
1422 " " " Deck Crash 3/3/41
1423 " 10/28/40 "
1424 VF-3 10/28/40 CV-3
1425 " 11/8/40 " Crash 7/24/41
1426 Retained at Brewster
1427 VF-3 11/8/40 CV-3 Crashd 10/31/41
1428 " 11/5/40 "
1429 " 11/12/40 "
1430 " 11/8/40 " Crashed 5/25/41
1431 " 11/18/40 "
1432 " 11/19/40 " Belly Landing 9/12/41
1433 " 11/28/40 "
1434 " 11/19/40 "
1435 " 11/18/40 "
1436 " 11/27/40 "
1437 " 11/28/40 " Crashed, destroyed 12/23/41
1438 VF-2 11/28/40 "
1439 " 11/28/40 "

Bottom Line:

In a listing for the F2A-2 Bureau numbers 1397 - 1439, one Landing gear collapse is cited on 5/22/41 during ops on the Lexington during a deployment to Hawaii, and for an aircraft that had been in squadron service for 5 months and at sea operating for two months among a squadron of about 20 F2A-2s. That sounds to me pretty much like fleet average. Before that sea tour, the squadron would have flown out to the boat for its carrier qualification period, during which each pilot would have landed his aircraft probably at least half a dozen times. Those are typically the hardest landings for an aircraft to shake off, as the aviators get the feel of their aircraft. Bottom line is the F2A-2 was like its older brother, a perfectly sound, if in hindsight, somewhat obsolescent carrier aircraft and either probably an improvement for the CAP role over what was in the FAA stable.

As to the British nearly losing the BoB, well my understanding from revisionist historians is that that was never close to happening and was simply a Churchillian propaganda ploy to separate Uncle Sugar from his aircraft.

 

[RCAFson]

with respect to the carrier suitability of either the F2A-1 or -2

I have heard of one anecdotal instance of an F2A-1 gear failure during ops on the Sara during the summer of 1940. If you have references that cite additional chronic landing gear failures gear problems or failures of the F2A-1 and F2A-2 during carrier operations through their years of service (1940-41) I'd certainly be grateful to be enlightened. In the meantime, I can offer a record of the history of F2A-1 and -2's in USN service: While landing gear is mentioned as damaged in a number of incidents, it isn't in the context of chronic problems which would come from the maintenance records. When gear does collapse in the -2 the incident is identified.

Look at VF-2; Aircraft were being removed from service as their LG deteriorated, and progressive deterioration was being noted in nearly all the rest. Aircraft were then progressively removed from service as the LG reached it's limits. This is why the accident stats don't show a high number of LG failures.

 

[RCAFson]

Hello RCAFson
Fulmars had their orders but the formation leader decided to ignore them because of the heavy AA fire, they overtook the Albacores but then the Fulmar leader decided to act according to his judgement. The Bf 110 crew survived and at least the pilot survived the war and visited Finland less than year ago, according to him they were shot down by an Albacore rear gunner. With the rear seat man onboard, it would have been very difficult for Fulmar attack them unnoticed during low level combat.

Juha

Regardless, the Fulmars were not with the Albacores when the Albacores were attacked.

You'll excuse me if I'm skeptical about that. None of the Albacores claimed an Me-110, while the Fulmars claimed 2 and a probable. Maybe there was another Me-110 loss not noted in the "incomplete" Luftwaffe loss register cited on the wikipedia page?

 

[oldcrowcv63]

Look at VF-2; Aircraft were being removed from service as their LG deteriorated, and progressive deterioration was being noted in nearly all the rest. Aircraft were then progressively removed from service as the LG reached it's limits. This is why the accident stats don't show a high number of LG failures.

Do you have a reference for that? Or are you infering it from the website record? If not the website, I'd sure like to see it. From what I've gathered to date, the F2A-2s that weren't destroyed during regular ops were kept circulating among CV embarked squadrons (basically exchanges between VF-2 and VF-3) until they were put ashore when replaced by either F2A-3 or the F4F-3. In other words, the time to failure for the F2A--1 and -2 was long enough to be kept doing CV ops for up to a year at least. THat exceeds the RN FAA requirement for a gap filler and so ignoring the problems with the Brewster Company and the stuggle to accelerate introduction of the A/C to the FAA at warp speed, the F2A-1 would have enhanced the capability during its most problematic year.

 

[RCAFson]

Do you have a reference for that? Or are you infering it from the website record? If not the website, I'd sure like to see it. From what I've gathered to date, the F2A-2s that weren't destroyed during regular ops were kept circulating among CV embarked squadrons (basically exchanges between VF-2 and VF-3) until they were put ashore when replaced by either F2A-3 or the F4F-3. In other words, the time to failure for the F2A--1 and -2 was long enough to be kept doing CV ops for up to a year at least. THat exceeds the RN FAA requirement for a gap filler and so ignoring the problems with the Brewster Company and the stuggle to accelerate introduction of the A/C to the FAA at warp speed, the F2A-1 would have enhanced the capability during its most problematic year.

Please read the last paragraph again:
http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/at...better-off-brewster-buffalo-first_team_26.jpg
and note that the squadron was effectively grounded to prevent the loss of F2A-3s due to progressive LG failure ; the aircraft were not simply flown to destruction! Also not that 3 LG struts had already failed, but there are not 3 corresponding F2A-3 losses, because these aircraft were simply unservicable rather than written off.

 

[buffnut453]

But Oldcrow's post was about F2A-2s not F2A-3s. In the 1940 timeframe the FAA would have been looking at the F2A-2.

 

[RCAFson]

But Oldcrow's post was about F2A-2s not F2A-3s. In the 1940 timeframe the FAA would have been looking at the F2A-2.

The F2A-2 came out after SS tanks and armour would have been required. Add these and the LG begins to fail at an unacceptable rate.

 

[buffnut453]

And you know this because???

 

[oldcrowcv63]

The F2A-2 came out after SS tanks and armour would have been required. Add these and the LG begins to fail at an unacceptable rate.

You actually have a pretty good point even with respect to the F2A-1. I think its time to do a weight study. The added weight that proved fatal to the landing gear won't come from the added twin .50's but it will accumulate with other changes to make it FAA combat ready. So, it's looking like we have a sliding scale. The lightest variant, F2A-1 flew carrier ops for a period of about a year, and was reasonably sound. The F2A-2 appeared to fair well over a similar time frame. In contrast the F2A-3 began to suffer chronic failure about 2-3 months after its introduction. My guess is that you could weigh the F2A-2 down to a GW short of the F2A-3 and it would still be an effective gap filler; although it wouldn't appear in service until late 1940 - early 1941. The F2A-1 remains a question, not so much for the gear issue in my mind, but how much weight gain will that lower-power Wright engine allow? Since I am on the road, and don't have mycopy of AHT, I can't do a decent weight gain analysis.
The FiAF was happy with minimal back armor and that was my going-in assumption. Would the FAA accept that sparse protection as readily as the FiAF? I doubt it, but I don't know how much armor/SS tanks the Skua or Gladiator had as an indicator or reference. In the end it may be a matter of just how desparate was the FAA for a high performance fighter. As desparate or committed as the IJN? As Desparate as the FiAF? I don't know the answer. I do feel certain the F2A-1 equipped as the Finn B239's would have been a real boost for the FAA during a period between the stop-gaps: GSG and Skua and adoption of the Martlet. JMHO

 

[oldcrowcv63]

Double Post

Don't know how that happened???