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Prior to planning a mission, they get the factory's location (through methods I mentioned), then it's co-ordinates are calculated and given to the Navigator who uses time/speed in conjunction with compass headings to guide the bomber(s) to the target.I think Tkdog was referring to aircraft navigation, not pre-flight intelligence gathering.
I took a train from Moscow 200-250 east to Vyksa, didn't see anything except trees and one stop in a small town on the way, you can navigate by rail lines as long as you choose the right one, in Russia if you choose the wrong one you are following it for many miles before you know it.
So simple! Why didn't bomber command and the 8th air force think of that!Prior to planning a mission, they get the factory's location (through methods I mentioned), then it's co-ordinates are calculated and given to the Navigator who uses time/speed in conjunction with compass headings to guide the bomber(s) to the target.
Waypoints are usually based on landmarks (lakes, villages, geological features, etc.) and roads/rail lines also aid in their ingress/egress.
It must be borne in mind that Soviet factories occupied a much larger portion of territory than their English, German and Japan counterparts as, to the contrary, there were no land space problems in the Soviet Union. Given the very low precision of the bombings of those times, the number of missions necessary to destroy the plants of the factories would have been impossible for the Luftwaffe to sustain, because most of the bombs would not have fallen on the sheds but on the surrounding open areas.
A very simple cost / benefit analysis immediately showed the Luftwaffe the futility of the strategic bombing of the Soviet Union, with any type of bomber conceivable at the time, regardless of the numbers of the engines.
Attacking Russia with a strategic bombing campaign is almost the opposite of attacking Britain.
No radar net for warning and control of interceptors.
Targets are hundreds of miles apart so the ability of the defending squadrons to be mutually supporting is not there.
I doubt if German navigators were significantly superior to those of the USAAF and RAF, who completely missed cities and, on occasion, entire countries. Without effective aids to navigation, which would be subject to jamming and other countermeasures, while Soviet aircraft are trying to shoot them out of the sky, may be a tad harder than doing so in peacetime, with various local aids-to-navigation that are both maintained and not actively trying to mislead.
Unlike the Boing B15 the Ju 89 had a successful history of evolution to the Ju 90 airliner/transport and then to the Ju 290 transport/bomber.
First some dates:
Manchester I: first flight July 39, entry into service Nov 40, power Vulture 1750hp, first missions Feb 41
Lancaster I : first flight Jan 41, entry into service Feb 42, power Merlin XX 1280hp, first missions March 42
Sterling I : first flight May 39, entry into service Aug 40, power Hercules 1500hp, first mission Feb 1941
Halifax I : first flight Oct 39, entry into service Nov 40, power Merlin XX 1280hp, first mission March 1941
A remarkable operation. This would seem to be one of the single most successful bombing raids of all time. (Wikipedia mind you, but still!)Regarding the low precision of the bombing and impossibility to destroy the Soviet factories. This theory has been disproved by history.
Please see my earlier comment:
WW2 bombers. If Germany had the allies heavy bombers would they have won the war?
The number of engines probably was not the most important factor, since the above-mentioned operation was done by He 111 and Ju 88. And carefully planned but never fulfilled Eisenhammer was to be conducted by Mistels.
Some more about the precision - an episode during the Operation Frantic, quoted from Wiki:
"On the night of 21 June, the Combat Wing of B-17s which earlier landed at Poltava sustained severe losses in a German air attack. ...
For almost two hours, an estimated 75 Luftwaffe bombers attacked the base, exhibiting a very high degree of accuracy. Nearly all bombs were dropped in the dispersal area of the landing ground where only B-17s were parked, indicating without question that the B-17s constituted the specific objective of the raiders.
Of the 73 B-17s which had landed at Poltava, 47 were destroyed and most of the remainder severely damaged. ...
The stores of fuel and ammunition brought so laboriously from the United States were also destroyed. Three days after the attack, only nine of the 73 aircraft at Poltava were operational. ...
Red Air Force losses included 15 Yak-9s, 6 Yak-7s, three trainers, a Hawker Hurricane, and a VIP DC-3. ...
The well-planned German attack was led by Oberstleutnant Wilhelm Antrup of KG 55 and carried out by He 111Hs and Ju 88s of KG 4, KG 53, KG 55, and KG 27 operating from bases at Minsk. The operation was nicknamed Zaunkoenig. After the He 111s left, the Ju 88s strafed the field at low altitude. He 177s from Night Reconnaissance Squadrons performed target reconnaissance, pathfinder duties and bomb damage assessment. There were no German losses."
Operation Frantic - Wikipedia
A remarkable operation. This would seem to be one of the single most successful bombing raids of all time. (Wikipedia mind you, but still!)
But to play Devil's advocate: Was it posssibly the exception, and not the rule?
Had the Japanese visited the same sort of damage they did at Pearl Harbor every time they showed up, things would have had a different flavor in the PTO.
The FAA, delivering a Taranto raid success reliably suddenly becomes a totally different animal.
I'm just saying the mean and average of bombing raid effectiveness is the real data. Cherry picking the runaway successes shows maximum potential capability, but I suspect the LW also bombed their share of fields and non-strategic buildings.
To me it looks like the FN.64 was a power driven turret aimed by a the single lower rear gunner through a periscope. I cant find much on line information on it. The gunner sat in the belly of the aircraft and had no direct view out, not even a downward looking window behind the turret. All target acquisition and aiming had to be done exclusively through a periscope. It would probably work during the day to close of a blind spot.
Regarding the low precision of the bombing and impossibility to destroy the Soviet factories. This theory has been disproved by history.
Please see my earlier comment:
WW2 bombers. If Germany had the allies heavy bombers would they have won the war?
The number of engines probably was not the most important factor, since the above-mentioned operation was done by He 111 and Ju 88. And carefully planned but never fulfilled Eisenhammer was to be conducted by Mistels.
Some more about the precision - an episode during the Operation Frantic, quoted from Wiki:
"On the night of 21 June, the Combat Wing of B-17s which earlier landed at Poltava sustained severe losses in a German air attack. ...
For almost two hours, an estimated 75 Luftwaffe bombers attacked the base, exhibiting a very high degree of accuracy. Nearly all bombs were dropped in the dispersal area of the landing ground where only B-17s were parked, indicating without question that the B-17s constituted the specific objective of the raiders.
Of the 73 B-17s which had landed at Poltava, 47 were destroyed and most of the remainder severely damaged. ...
The stores of fuel and ammunition brought so laboriously from the United States were also destroyed. Three days after the attack, only nine of the 73 aircraft at Poltava were operational. ...
Red Air Force losses included 15 Yak-9s, 6 Yak-7s, three trainers, a Hawker Hurricane, and a VIP DC-3. ...
The well-planned German attack was led by Oberstleutnant Wilhelm Antrup of KG 55 and carried out by He 111Hs and Ju 88s of KG 4, KG 53, KG 55, and KG 27 operating from bases at Minsk. The operation was nicknamed Zaunkoenig. After the He 111s left, the Ju 88s strafed the field at low altitude. He 177s from Night Reconnaissance Squadrons performed target reconnaissance, pathfinder duties and bomb damage assessment. There were no German losses."
Operation Frantic - Wikipedia
Of course there's a great difference in between destroying a nearby airport crowded of bombers ( a tactical operation, in wich Germans were masters) and a very far tank factory (a strategic operation, which the Germans were not equipped to perform ).
A remarkable operation. This would seem to be one of the single most successful bombing raids of all time. (Wikipedia mind you, but still!)
But to play Devil's advocate: Was it posssibly the exception, and not the rule?
Had the Japanese visited the same sort of damage they did at Pearl Harbor every time they showed up, things would have had a different flavor in the PTO.
The FAA, delivering a Taranto raid success reliably suddenly becomes a totally different animal.
I'm just saying the mean and average of bombing raid effectiveness is the real data. Cherry picking the runaway successes shows maximum potential capability, but I suspect the LW also bombed their share of fields and non-strategic buildings.
Over the years I've seen a number of threads on a number of websites wondering if World War II might have ended differently had the Germans done X or Y. I suspect that had Germany won, right now there'd be discussions about the Allies would have won if only Roosevelt hadn't insisted on turning all the P-59s into trainers...
But in the end, I suspect all the technical revisions could never have seen Germany prevail. My reasoning is simple -- God hates Nazis.
Cheers,
Dana