WW2 Control of the skies over Europe

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The loss of air supremacy over Europe is too broad. The LW maintained parity over Kanal countries against RAF and AAF until late 1943/early 1944 when the P-51B and new P-38J extended the tactical footprint deep into Germany - and the array of twin engine fighters used effectively against AAF daylight raids were completely neutralized. The single engine day fighters were at a disadvantage to the P-38J and P-51B at B-17 and B-24 altitudes - but compelled to engage US bombers 'at all costs' and avoid the fighters. This strategy had the subtle effect of taking pre-1944 aggressiveness from LW in dealing with US fighters. Even if the performance advantage and average pilot skill were not in favor of US fighters and pilots, the LW was forced into a war of attrition of experienced fighter pilots that they could never win.

I tend to see it as a technical failure since although the Luftwaffe couldn't do much about their situation in terms of German manufacturing capacity or even pilot training as there was an underlying manpower shortage.

There would be several components to the loss of air superiority.
1 Falling behind quality wise technically especially engine power, high altitude performance.
2 Numerical Inferiority of axis fighters
3 Allied bombing campaign against German aviation industry reduces quantity and quality further
5 Numerical Inferiority of pilots and ability to train them. (Using flight instructors to pilot transports which caused high attrition on instructor pilots)
6 Pilot qualitive inferiority due to less training, less potential recruits and higher attrition.

The key areas of technical inferiority that grew.
1 Me 109G1 to Me 109G6 DB601A engine is typically 260hp less than the Merlin at the same time period, about 15% less). There was a sort of parity appearing in the latter half of 1944 but too little too late.
2 Airframe quality eg the bulges and bumps of the Me 109
3 No high altitude engine for the Fw 190A or for that matter a really good one for the Me 109G
4 No proximity fuse that probably would have increased allied FLAK losses from 0.6% to 2% or so.

So how would they remedy this? How do you get Daimler Benz to design a better lubrication system for the DB605?

The best scenario I can think of is that development of the bigger DB603 engine is not shut down by the German Air ministry which would lead it to being available early in the war and with higher performance levels.
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It would allow something like a Fw 190D to be in service in time to meet the P-51B/C Mustang.

The Germans shutdown their proximity fuse program in 1940 and reactivated it in late 1942 or early 1943. They got it to work to a degree. It didn't have the range of the allied fuse (15 yards) but it was probably unjammable (electrostatic) and they did get it to function to 4m which is enough since the lethal kill radious of a 8.8cm FLAK is about 3.5m. Had they not have shut it down for a while they might be getting production in mid 1943 given they were expecting production in 1945 and test firing in 1943.


The Luftwaffe never had air supremacy to be sure, the RAF was always up for a fight. However, it might have qualified for localized air superiority over south-east England, as they were strong enough to push their attacks through, albeit with casualties. I guess it depends on how mere superiority is defined.

It's an absurd notion that the Luftwaffe stood a chance in my view.

Take the range of a Me 109E4 as 650km/400 miles one ends up with an operational radius of 220 km/135 miles.
If you use then 'measure function' (right click on google maps) you can see that this barely covers London and Portsmouth from JG 26;s base around Abbeville, France.
It's pitiful. Using bases from Holland to Brest one is lucky to cover 10% of Britain's main land area. Fitting a 300L drop tank probably gets us 1000km/600 miles range for a operational radius of 350km/210 miles. That covers about 25% of Britain and barely gets to Britain's industrial heartland.

If the Luftwaffe had of had something with the fuel capacity of a P-40E (156 US gallons, about 600L, versus the Me 109E 400L) and we get a range of about 1100km/660 miles maybe 1500km/860 miles with a 66 gallon 300L drop tank the Luftwaffe could be capable of providing fighter cover over about 60% of the UK.

The Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms of the US Department of Defense defines air superiority as "that degree of dominance in the air battle of one force over another that permits the conduct of operations by the former and its related land, sea, and air forces at a given time and place without prohibitive interference by the opposing force."

At no time was Britain's ability to defend its territory during the Battle of Britain disrupted to the point of the Luftwaffe establishing even local air superiority. Reconnaissance aircraft were tracked and routinely shot down, air raids were tracked almost immediately as they formated over France, plotted and intercepted - not always were the interceptions successful, but the mere fact that they were plotted and could have been successful but weren't for whatever reason is contrary to the Luftwaffe holding even local air superiority.

Statistically, the entire campaign by the Germans didn't go well for them. Between mid July and the end of August there were only five days where the Luftwaffe achieved a favourable kill to loss ratio against the defenders. Throughout the entire Battle of Britain however, RAF Fighter Command achieved a higher kill to loss ratio - it managed to shoot down on average two German aircraft to every British fighter shot down. By September 1940, the British aircraft industry was in a position where more fighters were being produced and were available than what was being lost. The same could not be said for the Luftwaffe.

Put drop tanks on the Me 109 so that more of the bomber missions are escorted and that statistic would I think swing considerably towards the Germans, not enough, but considerably.
Exchange ratios of RAF fighters versus Luftwaffe fighters was in favour of the Luftwaffe, drop tanks puts more fighters over the UK over a deeper area and reduces Bomber losses. It's still not enough in my view.
 
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I remember one interesting quip saying 'The ANZACs may have lost Crete, but they saved Malta'.
Many a true word said in jest, Hitler and Germany were dissuaded from repeating the losses suffered at Crete in a successful mission, so they didn't repeat it at Malta and 250,000 Germans surrendered in 1943 in North Africa with everything they had there.
 
Put drop tanks on the Me 109 so that more of the bomber missions are escorted and that statistic would I think swing considerably towards the Germans, not enough, but considerably.

They would still need to:

(1) Hit British fighter production aggressively. It isn't enough to shoot down the enemy's aircraft, you also need to hinder its ability to replace its losses. Britain was outproducing Germany throughout the Battle.

(2) Stick to the "free-chasing' role for its fighters and not chaining them to the bombers where they are less effective.

(3) Have good intelligence on what truly was the strength of the RAF and its rate of production.

When it comes to winning air superiority over the heart of the enemy's homeland, I always think a good reference point is the USAAF campaign to win air superiority over Germany in the first six months of 1944. It required a huge, coordinated effort.
 
They would still need to:

(1) Hit British fighter production aggressively. It isn't enough to shoot down the enemy's aircraft, you also need to hinder its ability to replace its losses. Britain was outproducing Germany throughout the Battle.

(2) Stick to the "free-chasing' role for its fighters and not chaining them to the bombers where they are less effective.

(3) Have good intelligence on what truly was the strength of the RAF and its rate of production.

When it comes to winning air superiority over the heart of the enemy's homeland, I always think a good reference point is the USAAF campaign to win air superiority over Germany in the first six months of 1944. It required a huge, coordinated effort.

The Germans apparently didn't have much success with espionage in the UK, its claimed all German agents were eventually turned, though its possible some may have been unnoticed.

Aerial photographic reconnaissance of the Luftwaffe was inadequate. They used bombers and Me 110 but radar ensured they were often intercepted. They probably needed an unarmed and unarmoured version of the Me 109 (windscreen armour removed). The Fw 187 would likely have been the best. Towards the end of the Battle of Britain Me 109 started receiving drop tanks (Me 109E4/B and Me 109E7N)
 
The Germans apparently didn't have much success with espionage in the UK, its claimed all German agents were eventually turned, though its possible some may have been unnoticed.

Aerial photographic reconnaissance of the Luftwaffe was inadequate. They used bombers and Me 110 but radar ensured they were often intercepted. They probably needed an unarmed and unarmoured version of the Me 109 (windscreen armour removed). The Fw 187 would likely have been the best. Towards the end of the Battle of Britain Me 109 started receiving drop tanks (Me 109E4/B and Me 109E7N)

The Double Cross program was quite effective. I don't know why, but I suspect it may be that British police and other internal security forces had a long history of having to actually, you know, investigate crimes instead of just rounding up a bunch of suspects and torturing them until they get the answers they previously decided were right.
 
It seems that up to the end of 1942, the Luftwaffe had contested control, or at least had the upper hand in the skies over Europe. Both the FW190 and the Bf109 F and early G models held air superiority. When did the Luftwaffe started loosing the war in the skies over Europe? Why?

I wrote a book which basically explains the engines side of that, which is I would say 2/3 of it. From 1941>mid 1943 the Luftwaffe was flying with severely degraded engine performance. For most of that period, the 190`s and 109`s were flying without maximum boost &/or having a high rate of engine failures. By the time that was sorted out, it was far too late. (260,000 words condensed into 42, so thats a bit of "the short version").

109F and 190 were definitely (on paper) superior to the Spitfire V, however, the real aircraft rarely met their specified performance due to engine calamities, in short, without these engine disasters the RAF would have been in serious trouble (and it was already pretty bad as it was). The likely result would have been earlier total curtailment of Circus operations until the IX came in.
 
There was several Luftwaffe aces of 'NCO' rank that were active in the early years, some even aces. Granted most pilots were of officer rank.

Example:
Franz Schulte, Feldwebel
46
JG 77
Knight's Cross
KIA 12 August 1942

List of World War II aces from Germany - Wikipedia

Yes, some of the famous ones
Oberfeldwebel Edmund "Paul" Rossmann 93 confirmed
Oberfeldwebel Heinrich Bartels 99
Fahnenjunker-Oberfeldwebel Heinz "Negus" Marquardt 121

Beerenbrok, had 102 kills when promoted to Leutnant
Alfred Grislawski had already 91 confirmed kills when he was promoted to Leutnant
Anton "Toni" Hafner got 82 kills before he was promoted to Leutenant
Otto "Bruno" Kittel got 127 kills before he was promoted to Leutenant

US was an exception, most of AFs had NCO pilots, some even airman or aircraftman flying combat sorties. Our No. 1 ace was a Warrant Officer as was the 4th and 5th. 8th was vääpeli/Feldwebel
 
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How important was Malta? I think it was Italian author Michele Armellini who claimed that for all the interference, the Italian navy delivered 90+% of the supplies they set out with and that the problem was rather getting them from the North African harbors to the front.
 
How important was Malta? I think it was Italian author Michele Armellini who claimed that for all the interference, the Italian navy delivered 90+% of the supplies they set out with and that the problem was rather getting them from the North African harbors to the front.

Had the British lost Malta, getting those supplies to Africa would have been much less expensive, in blood and treasure.
 
Aerial photographic reconnaissance of the Luftwaffe was inadequate. They used bombers and Me 110 but radar ensured they were often intercepted.

Aerial reconnaissance alone has its own problems, namely, accurate bomb damage assessment. The Allies frequently overestimated the damage done by a bombing raid. A photo from 30,000 feet showing a bomb-scarred landscape looked impressive, but at ground level, the damage done was often far less than it appeared from far above.

In this regard the Allies were helped later by signals intelligence and ULTRA.
 
Germany had an extensive network of spies in UK, unfortunately it was completely fictitious. Juan Pujol García - Wikipedia
Recently read that MI6 deliberately botched some counter-insurgency op. The idea was to let the Germans figure out that this particular agent was turned, so they wouldn't get suspicious and wonder whether all their agents ahd been turned (as was the case).

The MI6 failed there, because the Germans didn't realize the agent had been turned even though MI6 tried to let them figure it out.
 
The Double Cross program was quite effective. I don't know why, but I suspect it may be that British police and other internal security forces had a long history of having to actually, you know, investigate crimes instead of just rounding up a bunch of suspects and torturing them until they get the answers they previously decided were right.

Pretty much Hollywood movie fantasy.

The gestapo were a professional police force used the usual professional police techniques and was effective. The Abwhere was fairly effective but eventually penetrated by the Soviets. (Not as badly penetrated as the US services or State Department). The problem was Heydrich/Himmler tried to take over intelligence via the SD and SS. They eventually did. This sidelined the professionals.
 
Pretty much Hollywood movie fantasy.

The gestapo were a professional police force used the usual professional police techniques and was effective. The Abwhere was fairly effective but eventually penetrated by the Soviets. (Not as badly penetrated as the US services or State Department). The problem was Heydrich/Himmler tried to take over intelligence via the SD and SS. They eventually did. This sidelined the professionals.

I have no doubt that parts of the German police forces were competent, but anti-democratic regimes tend not to have checks on police power or behavior. They will also tend to have some level of prejudice against certain groups, be they religious, ethnic, or political. Germany also had to deal with spies in occupied territories, where there were virtually no checks on the treatment of prisoners.

There are, of course, no perfect police forces, and it is far from unheard of for police forces in democratic countries to engage in "selective" enforcement (John Connolly's protection of Whitey Bulger) or leap, without evidence, from accusation to guilt (Dreyfus in France, likely Sacco and Vanzetti in the US), or to use torture, perjury, or forced confessions.
 
The UK is part of Europe the LW did not gain control over UK skies
Well yes, clearly he meant the parts of Europe controlled by Germany. Do you really think he was suggesting the Luftwaffe had air supremacy over the UK or western Russia, or for that matter non-combatants like Switzerland, Ireland and Spain?
 
Well yes, clearly he meant the parts of Europe controlled by Germany. Do you really think he was suggesting the Luftwaffe had air supremacy over the UK or western Russia, or for that matter non-combatants like Switzerland, Ireland and Spain?
No, but they didn't have air superiority over Malta, they didn't have superiority over anywhere at night, they didn't have superiority over the French coast. The Schweinfurt raid showed the Germans still could contest their own skies but it was escorted to the Dutch border where they definitely didn't have air superiority.
 
"It seems that up to the end of 1942, the Luftwaffe had contested control, or at least had the upper hand in the skies over Europe." doesn't mean air superiority or domination over skies in all theaters of war. It is a general assumption, or at least a reasonable one, to state that the Luftwaffe had superiority in pilots and machines over the allies in early 1942 but in a scant two years, early 1944, the tide had turned and it was the allies who held contested control over Europe. The Luftwaffe had inferior performing planes while allied pilots where gaining experience.
 
No, but they didn't have air superiority over Malta, they didn't have superiority over anywhere at night, they didn't have superiority over the French coast. The Schweinfurt raid showed the Germans still could contest their own skies but it was escorted to the Dutch border where they definitely didn't have air superiority.
With the exception of temporary and narrow tracks of territory in Russia, I would argue the Germans never achieved air supremacy anywhere. After a sketchy start in 1939, by May 1940 the RAF was bombing Germany and didn't stop until VE Day. https://www.secondworldwarhistory.com/raf-bombing-campaign.php
 
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"It seems that up to the end of 1942, the Luftwaffe had contested control, or at least had the upper hand in the skies over Europe." doesn't mean air superiority or domination over skies in all theaters of war. It is a general assumption, or at least a reasonable one, to state that the Luftwaffe had superiority in pilots and machines over the allies in early 1942 but in a scant two years, early 1944, the tide had turned and it was the allies who held contested control over Europe. The Luftwaffe had inferior performing planes while allied pilots where gaining experience.
Well yes, but there are many theatres and Germany had many assets to protect. The "Channel Dash" was in part because Brest was no longer safe for German ships. Losses in the bay of Biscay meant the U boats would lose the Battle of the Atlantic, it was as much an air war as it was on the sea, a similar problem in the North Sea. The first 1000 bomber raid was on Cologne in May 1942. As far as photo reconnaissance goes the LW were never able to operate over UK in the way the allies operated over axis controlled areas, the first PR Spitfire was made in October 1939.
 

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