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On the taps and dies it is often mentioned as a big problem but surely manufacture is just a case of altering the machinery that cuts and grinds the taps and dies. Whitworth threads arent so far off Unified threads as many mechanics have found to there cost.
Please look at it again. Ford had NO existing facilities for aircraft engine production. You do NOT build aluminium 1650 cu in V-12s that weigh 1300lbs in plants that built 221-239 cubic in cast iron V-8s that weighed 400-500lbs.
Ford of England was building Merlin's using the standard British projection drawings which would have to be redone for Ford of America just like Packard had to redo them. ( Changing the order of projection used in the drawings confuses and causes mistakes in already trained machinists). Ford of England is either already using or or has ready access to Whitworth taps, dies and gauges, British fine thread taps, dies and gauges, British course thread and British pipe thread. Unless England sends tons of tooling to America Ford of America is going to have to either make this stuff themselves or find subcontractors to make it just like Packard did.
Packard started work in less than 30 days after Fords initial agreement. Where does the 3 1/2 month delay come from?
Please look again. It took Ford just about 14 months to build a New facility and deliver more than few engines. It took Packard about 18 months to do the same thing with much less help. ( R-R did send two engineers, one if not both who died after several years of exhausting work). Ford could rely on P&W for much more support, and a much easier time of getting subcontractors to supply small parts to normal american standards.
Ford may have had more workers, more engineers and more money than Packard but Ford had NO experience in building aircraft engines. Packards was about 10 years old. Packard was tooling up to build 2500 cu in V-12 torpedo boat engines ( based on their last aircraft engine). Packard went on to be ranked 14th out of all American companies in value of war production so it wasn't exactly a small job shop.
To build aircraft engines you also need test cells. Rooms were each and every production engine is run for several hours to check performance and do initial break in before being torn down, inspected and reassembled. Which means every test cell needs test instruments, dynamometers, cooling systems or fans for air-cooled engines.
In 1942 Packard built more engines that Ford did (by about 850 engines) but Fords engines( being larger and with more cylinders) had more total HP.
I would also note that Ford while building 4 engine bombers instead of single engine fighters just barley managed 600 planes a Month for a few months in 1944 and not the 1000 planes a day (30,000 planes a month?) he claimed he could make
I would also note that at some point in 1940 Allison was short about 800 machine tools to fill just completed factory space despite having an A1A priority rating. Structural steel was being rationed in 1940. There may have been limits as to how fast some facotires could be built and equipped no matter how large the parent organization.
12 months lost production is totally ridiculous. It would mean a NEW factory hitting Spring of 1942 production levels in the Spring of 1941, 6-9 months after breaking ground or signing the deal. NOBODY was anywhere near that fast.
Please see : http://www.enginehistory.org/References/WWII Eng Production.pdf
What this article does not say is how big some of these factories were or how much they were expanded. The Ford R-2800 plant was tripled in size by mid 1944 from the original plant that started making engines in late 1941.
Sorry, my eyes glossed over reading all the posts on this topic. Somehow, I came away from this fantasizing that if the Allison V-12 didn't make the cut, there may have been Wright R2600 P-36's running around at some point. Droooool.
Sorry, my eyes glossed over reading all the posts on this topic. Somehow, I came away from this fantasizing that if the Allison V-12 didn't make the cut, there may have been Wright R2600 P-36's running around at some point. Droooool.
Not to mention trying to fit a prop about 1 ft larger in diameter which means longer landing gear which means.................
I agree, it is intriguing. But lets look at it objectively and not like either a press agent or Ford fanatic.
4 valve pent roof combustion chambers date back to at least the 1913 Peugeot Grand Prix car if not even earlier. A number of race cars and WW I aero engines used 4 valve heads with angled chambers so it was not a "new" idea in the 1930s and any engine designer worthy of the job description was aware of them. Like many items or details they have both advantages and disadvantages.
Harry Miller designed at least two "aircraft" engines that never flew. One never made it off paper, and the other ( a straight 8 ) for use in the Tucker XP-47 ( same Tucker as the post war car) had component parts built that were used a in a few post war racers, while similar to the "normal" Miller/Offenhauser design it was different in detail and NOT just two Offenhauser engines place nose to tail.
While intriguing they were of no practical value.
I am not anti-Ford. The tales of the Continental IV-1430 and the Lycoming O-1230 (both chronically under funded for much of their lives) should also point out the problems with thinking you can design, develop and build aircraft engines in months instead of years. If you could bring an new engine from drawing board to production in 3 years or under you were doing a great job. It often took longer and that is by aircraft engine companies with experience in aircraft engine design. I would note that both Continental and Lycoming not only built small aircraft engines but built car, bus, truck and marine power plants for a variety of customers in the 1930s. They were not small shops specializing in one or two low production engines. They were smart enough not to sink too much company money into the US Army designed "hyper" engines though. I would note again that the proposed power output of the Ford engine was well into the hyper range.
In article ,
(RON) writes:
Reading a book,Wheels for the World by Douglas Brinkley, Henry Ford, his
company. In it he states that the British government approached Bill
Knudsen with "a dire order for production of the Rolls-Royce Merlin
engine" in 1940.
The Ford Motor Company had previouslr accepted a contract to build
Rolls-Royce engines for French warplanes. The contract never came to
fruition due to the fall of France in June 1940. Henry Ford refused to
buld the engine,"we are not doing business with the British government
or any other government".
Alvin Macauley,president of Packard Motor Company, agreed with Knudsens
request to build the engine.
I always thought that Packard was chosen because of their expertise in
building fine engines. Evidently not?
The story's a little on the complicated side.
Let's not forget that there were Ford affiliates in France and Britain
before the War. In late 1939, the French Ford affiliate was
approached by the French Government to undertake prosuction of Merlin
Engines. The U.S. Ford headquarters dispatched an engineering team to
France to assist with evaluating the production potential. Due to a
number of factors (Production Engineering and design difficulties in
the basic Merlin, and the inability, for a variety of reasons for
French Industry in general to get off the dime) they weren't able to
produce any engines. At about the same time, The Air Ministry
approached British Ford to second-source Merlins. This, in fact, was
done, after much grunting and swearing. (Rolls really didn't know much
about mass production, and the Merlin required a lot of work to build
on a high volume basis.) At about the same time, the British
Purchasing Comission approached Edsel Ford (Henry's son, a pilot an
aviation enthusiast) about producing the Merlin in the U.S. This was
agreed, and Rolls sent copies of the Merlin drawings to
Dearborn. (This wasn't a minor matter. There are a lot of parts in a
Merlin, and duplicating drawings was done by hand.) When old Henry
Ford found out about the agreement, he basically passed down an edict
that Ford would not build anything for a foreign government. (Henry
Ford was a strange combination of organizational insight,
pig-ignorance, and some of the nastiest sides of U.S. Midwestern
values of the time. It's really hard to say if his decision was based
on his affinity for Hitler, an earnest desire to keep the U.S. out of
a European conflict - He'd humiliated himself during the First World
Wat by single-handedly attempting to end it with a shipload of
platitudes. Then too, the fact that it would **** off Roosevelt if he
didn't take the contract probably didn't hurt, either)
Note that this did not preclude British, French,
Australian, or, for that matter, German Ford subsidiaries fron taking
contracts from their governments. This killed the deal, although Ford
was willing to build engines under U.S. contract - this was before
Lend-Lease. Ford decided to proceed with the design of their own 12
cylinder inline aircraft engine. In the event, this was never built,
but the block was cut down to 8 cylinders, and the supercharger
removed, and it became the basis of the Ford GAA engine used in M4A3
and M26 tanks.
The British still were casting about for offshore Merlin production.
Packard, which had an excellent reputation for manufacturing quality
and engineering, and a track record in building large aircraft
engines,(The built a series of big V-12s in the 1920s, derivatives of
which were used through WW 2 to power PT boats) stepped forward, and
convinced Rolls that they could take on the job. Rolls, in fact,
ended up learning wuite a bit about production line design, and
production engineering from Packard, and a number of Merlin
improvements (2-piece engine blocks, improved supercharger drives,
improved bearing technologies, and injection carburetors were Packard
improvements.
A good source, if you can find it, is "The Merlin at War", by the
Rolls-Royce Heritage Trust.
--
Pete Stickney
Ford Merlin Engines? - AviationBanter
I found this on the web:
So Ford's involvement did begin in 1939 and Ford engineers had had previous experience with the Merlin, both in terms of design and production; thus Ford USA was ideally situated to begin production of the Merlin under license.
Running an engine at part RPM ( even 90%) or so solves a few problems and ripping the supercharger off solves a whole bunch more. Lowering the average pressure in the cylinders to a third ( or less) or what they were expecting from the airplane engine (for the GAA) certainly makes things a whole lot easier.
Chrysler started work on their IV-16 2200cubic engine in the summer of 1940, it didn't fly until the summer of 1945.
P&W started work on both the R-2800 "C" series engine and the R-4360 (used R-2800 cylinders) in 1940. The R-2800 "C" series doesn't see combat use until the fall of 1944 and a short History of the R-4360 is here.
http://www.enginehistory.org/P&W/R-4360/R-4360History.pdf
Good luck!
When we tried something as simple as getting some prop pitch specs for a WWII 6-bladed club propeller from Hamilton Standard, we were told "These data were produced for and at the request of the US Army Air Force. Since you are not the USAAF, the data will not be transmitted in any fashion to you. They are the property of the USAAF."
Explaining to them that the USAAF was no longer in existence and the USAF didn't care (we even included a letter from the USAF to that effect on official USAF letterhead to that effect) in the least did not do any good and they simply ignored us going forward. We came up with our opwn pitch data and now use that prop to break in just-overhauled Allisons. It was easier than we thought. We simply chose a pitch and ran the Allison at break-in power, noted the rpm possible, and adjusted until we achieved the desitred rpm. That pitch works for all Allison model at break-in and results in rapid piston ring seating.
The companies these days are more worried about potential laibility if the restored equipment breaks in a test they can be shown to have helped with than they are about preserving a historic piece of equipment in running condition.