But still we are talking about a roughly consistent 2:1 fighter to fighter kill/loss ratio regardless of "declining" Luftwaffe training. We are a long way from 20:1 or 19:1 US claims.
Actually you are a long way from understanding the difference between overall operations and air combat results. Where does the 20:1 ratio come from and what do the numbers count?
USAAF ETO reportedly lost 1,691 fighter to enemy aircraft out of 5,324 lost on operations, claiming 7,422 enemy aircraft shot down, the overwhelming majority being Luftwaffe fighters. Overall 4.4 claims for each air loss, 1.4 claims for each loss. Claims in 1944 were 5,602 while there were 3,765 losses on operations. ER Hooton in Eagle in Flames says in 1944 Luftflotte Reich reports 3,706 day fighters lost from 36,006 sorties while Luftflotte 3 lost 2,634 from 44,255 sorties, total 6,340 fighter losses. Of course the USAAF bomber, RAF etc. claims have to be totalled as well.
Actually, in an article I recently read, Luftwaffe units deployed in France lost around 250 pilots killed and made around 500 claims (in an Eduard Store Info Eduard article of the past year, can't look up the exact one right now). This does not include pilots shot down that survived, so while 1 to 1 may not be correct, 1.5 or 2 losses per German victory is not massively out of line...
No time period given, is this 1.5 to 2 German losses per Luftwaffe victory claimed or is it multiply German claims by 1.5 or 2 to become accurate? Meantime to repeat myself, Given these claimed adjustments (add "lot" more, subtract "some") do Luftwaffe fighter claims head toward 1 claim to 1 shoot down? While allied claims subtract "huge amount" go below 2 claims to 1 shot down or more? Please present the numbers you must have to make the above statements.
I don't see why the USAF ratio should not be similar to British pilots flying Spitfires in 1944,
Apart from the widely reported better performance of the Mustang and Thunderbolt versus the Spitfire IX? Including the range to stay to force fights? How about we declare the Fw190A and Bf109F in 1941/42 "I don't see why the ratio should not be similar", even though the Fw190A of the time was reported to have better performance.
Another major aspect completely skewing the period view of the P-51's relative effectiveness is the Luftwaffe's "bombers only" directive, which created a huge number of P-51 "ace in a day" when introduced in the month of May 1944.
Given your idea of dates perhaps a reference to exactly when it happened might be in order, USAAF says it lost 201 fighters to enemy aircraft in April 1944, 176 in May and 147 in June, its top 3 loss months, heavy bombers for the three months are 314, 211 and 112. Also explain why the near 100% casualties the Luftwaffe fighter force took in the first 5 months of 1944 are not considered.
May (or April?) 1944 is also the period where the US escorts were first allowed to free hunt, which massively upped their opportunities and created surprise in the German tactics: They were now being caught on the climb....
8th Air Force.
20th December 1943 The first freelance fighter mission is flown when the bombers turn up 30 minutes late and the 55th fighter group "puts into action a plan much discussed by fighter pilots - ranging ahead of the bombers as they converge on the bomber path. The 55th fighter group scores no victories on this day, but its new tactic gets the attention of VIII fighter command and there ensures a healthy debate that, in the end, will free the fighters from the outmoded close-escort doctrine of the day." Window is first used on this day as well. Some 491 fighters were used as escorts for 546 bombers, 12 of which were pathfinders.
6th January 1944 Doolittle gained command
7th January Phased escort tactics used, fighters fly to rendezvous points to relieve other fighters rather than a formation of fighters stays with a formation of bombers for the entire mission, 571 fighters for 502 bombers.
11th January the first officially sanctioned test of freelance fighter tactics, where fighter formations range ahead and to the side of the bomber formation hoping to catch Luftwaffe fighters as they are forming up, 592 fighters for 663 bombers. The USAAF mounts 2 raids that day, the one with the freelance experiment, to Oschersleben and Halberstadt, has the Oschersleben bomber formation hit hard by fighters and flak, losing 34 from 177 bombers despatched, the Halberstadt formation loses 8 from 114 despatched. The 221 escorting fighters for these two formations claim 29 kills for 3 fighters lost, 11 of the kills by the freelance fighters. Only the 56th fighter group freelances, with two formations of 36 and 48 fighters respectively. All the bombers were B-17s.
The second raid that day, to Brunswick, was largely reduced to targets of opportunity and lost 16 B-17s and 2 B-24s. Of the 58 to 62 B-17s lost that day (sources vary again), including write offs, some 44 were lost to enemy fighters, 8 to flak, 2 to "battle damage" and 5 "operational" losses, according to my counts. So the initial experiment would have a mixed report, the freelance fighters did above average but the bombers were clearly exposed to significant fighter attack.
21st January 56th fighter group turn in the first strafing kill claims, it is not until late March that strafing becomes a significant source of kill claims. In April according to the USAAF statistical digest fighters will lodge 418 kills in the air and 527 on the ground, versus 469 in the air and 76 on the ground in March.
24th January the first attempt at having fighters patrol an area for a time, not stick with a particular bomber formation, abandoned due to weather problems.
As far as I am aware the escort tactics ended up as a mixture of phased, freelance, patrol and close escorts, the mixture varying according to perceived needs. Doolittle and Spaatz were not operating in a vacuum, they had their experience in the Mediterranean and decided to try new tactics various lower HQs had been discussing. It was not all their idea, equally it was their responsibility if things worked or failed.
What also skews this picture even further is that the Bubbletop P-47, arriving in April 1944, was in my opinion significantly inferior in air to air combat handling than the Razorback version.
Right, now try the real dates and the real results from early 1944, the ones already given for Big Week, next is the idea the later P-47 could not turn as well or something? Which fight test states "significant inferiority".
It seems to me the claims of 20:1 air to air cannot be accurate
You are the only person making them, and everyone agrees the claim is not accurate.
but the number of actual air to air kills is also questionable. I know for a fact US leaders were frequently using their seniority to get confirmation blurbs out of lower ranked wingmen...
So present the factual material to back up the apparent systematic faking of reports, also explain how the people making the claims managed to get around the universal fitting of gun cameras in 1944.
I'll just use as an example of my suspicions a famous and narrowly specific example: The Palms Sunday massacre,
I think everyone agrees it confirms their suspicions but not about USAAF fighter claims.
"On Sunday, 18 April 1943, 65 Ju 52s were returning to Sicily from Tunisia, which were escorted by 15 Bf 109s of II./JG 27 and 7./JG 53 and 4 Bf 110s and Me 210s destroyers of ZG 1 and ZG 26. This formation was intercepted by 46 P-40s and 11 Spitfires. This date became to be known among the Allies as Palm Sunday Massacre. According to Eric Hammel's Air War Europa, 61 Ju 52s and 15 Bf 109s were shot down by the Allied fighters which included claims by three American fighter pilots who were credited with five apiece. The loss was six P-40s and one Spitfire.
The latest information I have from the German side comes from Jochen Prien's Die Jagdfliegerverbände Vol.11/I which states that 24 Ju 52s crashed into the sea and another 35 were forced to land in Tunisia. There is no indication of how many, if any, were written-off or to what degree, if any, they were damaged. One twin-engine destroyer was lost in addition to one Bf 109 of JG 27, plus one damaged 20% and one forced to land due to engine defect. The Germans claimed one Spitfire and three P-40s.
It appears that the Allies heavily over-claimed, especially the 15 Bf 109s(!) and the Germans underclaimed Allied fighters."
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Looking at this specific example, we see here that the US overclaiming in fighters was 15:1 for the Me-109s... The Ju-52 overclaiming was nearly 3:1.
As the transports turned back the fight started over the sea and continued inland, the claim for the Spitfire was inland.
Meantime the series The Mediterranean Air War by Shores et. al. finds after review the USAAF allowed claims were 59 Ju52, 14 Bf109/MC202, 2 Bf110. Old references report 24 Ju52, 9 Bf109, 1 Bf110 lost 35 Ju52 force landed, but that includes 8 Bf109 from II/JG27 with all pilots saved. Their new results are 37 transports shot down, 9 crash landed with implications these 9 did not fly again. When it comes to Bf109 JG53 lost 3 that day, they were part of the transport escort, but no JG27 losses listed, throw in 1 from JG27 which Prien reports and the US fighters are over claiming transports about 3 to 2 and single engine fighters maybe 3.5 to 1, twin engine 2 to 1 or possibly 1 to 1, since 2 Me210 were lost.
The allies lost 4 P-40 and 1 Spitfire, the Germans claimed 4 P-40, 1 P-38 and 4 Spitfires. Given the transports had defensive fire and were at zero feet the probability is 1 or more P-40 were shot down by the transports and/or misjudged and hit the sea/land, the 9 to 5 raw score can easily become 3 to 1.
On another note the Mediterranean Air War series indicates German combat claims were generally more accurate than RAF ones in the western desert.
There is no doubt this is one of the worst defeats the Luftwaffe ever experienced, yet apparently that was still not enough, and the embellishment was considerable...
You should stop doing it then.
This is why I think several narrow events, with the return to base data on both sides, is more likely to be accurate and informative as to what things looked like.
21 November 1944, big Luftwaffe attempt to intercept 8th Air Force raid, Werner Gerbig reports 40 Luftwaffe pilots killed, 20 wounded, Donald Caldwell reports 84 Luftwaffe fighters lost, Luftwaffe quartermaster reports Reich lost 65 fighters lost to enemy action, 2 to other causes, 16 on operations not enemy action, 4 not on operations,, Luftflotte 3 says 2 fighters lost on operations, plus a Bf109 reconnaissance machine, 1 fighter on operations not enemy action, 1 not on operations, John Foreman says the RAF claimed 2 kills, Roger Freeman notes 1 claim lodged by a heavy bomber, USAAF fighters made 76.5 claims.
In August 1940, Luftwaffe fighter units lodged claims for 300 Hurricanes and 458 Spitfires, some of these claims were disallowed, the RAF reports it lost 220 Hurricanes and 118 Spitfires in combat, raw score 758 claims to 338 losses, deduct the RAF losses to bomber fire, so say 750 to 280. In September 1940, it was 293 Hurricanes and 545 Spitfires claimed versus 228 and 130 actual losses, 838 to 358, more like 830 to 330 as it looks like the average fighter to bomber exchange rate was around 1 fighter to 3 bombers.
Other note 348th Fighter Group Chronology from Air War Pacific by Eric Hammel, 23 June 1943 arrive Port Moresby, 25 July 1943 first combat mission, 16 August 1943 first air combat, looks like 3 claims made.
Odd title thought, the Mustang at Zenith and What Might Have Been, the P-51D and later.
And if anyone writes yet another book on the Armoured Vehicle Royal Engineers (AVRE), My Other Tank is Even Funnier.
