WWWII: worst losses in a day for a fighter Squadron?

Ermmm...from January 1st to May 9th 1945, the VVS lost ~12,000 (twelve thousand) planes to all causes: enemy planes, Flak, accidents and written off machines.

129 days of operations and about 12,000 planes lost, interesting data that can reveal significant aspects on the performance of the VVS.

Can you compare this figure with the losses endured, say hmmm...by the 8th and 15th AFs for the same period?

Jan 1st-May 9th 1945? Oh crap! What type of period for the Luftwaffe is this?
Can anyone tell? What about Bodenplatte losses? What about the critical fuel situation by this time? What type of air force -allied one- would lose some 12,000 planes during this period...

Since this is a discussion dealing with aerial war, is that it is easy to acknowledge the fact that in skies over the Kursk salient during Zitadelle, the VVS proved almost completely uncapable of dealing with the Luftwaffe, and not just that, several units of the Jagdwaffe who operated in Kursk where later on deployed to the Kuban region where the VVS too proved uncapable of attaining anything like control of their skies.

Udet said:

Ermmm...from January 1st to May 9th 1945, the VVS lost ~12,000 (twelve thousand) planes to all causes: enemy planes, Flak, accidents and written off machines.



129 days of operations and about 12,000 planes lost, interesting data that can reveal significant aspects on the performance of the VVS.

Can you compare this figure with the losses endured, say hmmm...by the 8th and 15th AFs for the same period?

Jan 1st-May 9th 1945? Oh crap! What type of period for the Luftwaffe is this?
Can anyone tell? What about Bodenplatte losses? What about the critical fuel situation by this time? What type of air force -allied one- would lose some 12,000 planes during this period...

Since this is a discussion dealing with aerial war, is that it is easy to acknowledge the fact that in skies over the Kursk salient during Zitadelle, the VVS proved almost completely uncapable of dealing with the Luftwaffe, and not just that, several units of the Jagdwaffe who operated in Kursk where later on deployed to the Kuban region where the VVS too proved uncapable of attaining anything like control of their skies.

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If the VVS was not able to deal with the Luftwaffe then how did the Russians win?

I dont quite understand where this is going Udet?

Adler:

It is going where this gentleman, Schlageter, suggested when saying the type of aircraft losses endured by the soviets in Kursk "had no effect on the VVS".

Nowhere did i say anything like the VVS "ceased to exist", or "was uncapable of responding" due to such losses; but to affirm no effect existed on the VVS is an extraordinary statement.

If during the war the Luftwaffe had managed to destroy something like 350 USAAF planes in less than 24 hours during late 1943, and even early 1944, i do not think God nor the Devil could come to tell us what the consequences would have been.

This prayer suggesting that it was only the Germans suffering the consequences of attrition, including an overall drop off in the quality of the performance of Luftwaffe pilots, while the allied armies, navies and air forces could withstand anything, feeling "no effect" in the attrition process requires further revision, more so in the case of the soviets.

My dear Udet.

As I said/implied, the losses at Kursk had a very short term effect on the Soviets ability to conduct air operations but in the overall scheme, it had no long term effect on Soviet ability to conduct operations in the defeating of Nazi Germany. The Germans still lost the Battle of Kursk with the sacrifice of the lives of Soviet air crew, and soldiers. You stopped reading after you read "Kursk had no effect on the VVS" and ignored what came after ("which got stronger as the GPW progressed"), for some obscure reason.

So let me repeat and read all the words with no selectivity. The Japanese were finished after the Turkey Shoot, being incapable of mounting any kind of serious defense that would reverse what happened during the Turkey Shoot. The same can not be said of the Soviets, who bounced back quickly, not by going on the defensive, which the Japanese did, but by going on the offensive, and chasing your Germans all the way back to Berlin.

Despite suffering large losses, and you can go on all you want to about the losses, it did not effect Soviet's ability to conduct an offensive war against Nazi Germany, and win. Fact!

You are having trouble seeing the forest for the trees, nit-picking on a word and ignoring the whole statement.

Udet said:

Adler:

It is going where this gentleman, Schlageter, suggested when saying the type of aircraft losses endured by the soviets in Kursk "had no effect on the VVS".

Nowhere did i say anything like the VVS "ceased to exist", or "was uncapable of responding" due to such losses; but to affirm no effect existed on the VVS is an extraordinary statement.

If during the war the Luftwaffe had managed to destroy something like 350 USAAF planes in less than 24 hours during late 1943, and even early 1944, i do not think God nor the Devil could come to tell us what the consequences would have been.

This prayer suggesting that it was only the Germans suffering the consequences of attrition, including an overall drop off in the quality of the performance of Luftwaffe pilots, while the allied armies, navies and air forces could withstand anything, feeling "no effect" in the attrition process requires further revision, more so in the case of the soviets.

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As AL said it had no affect on the Soviets putting up a large quantity of aircraft and pilots that were good eneogh to go to Berlin.

Udet said:

Adler:

If during the war the Luftwaffe had managed to destroy something like 350 USAAF planes in less than 24 hours during late 1943, and even early 1944, i do not think God nor the Devil could come to tell us what the consequences would have been.

This prayer suggesting that it was only the Germans suffering the consequences of attrition, including an overall drop off in the quality of the performance of Luftwaffe pilots, while the allied armies, navies and air forces could withstand anything, feeling "no effect" in the attrition process requires further revision, more so in the case of the soviets.

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If the US had experienced losses like Oct 14, 1943 and Berlin on April 29, 1944 for very many more days - I wonder if the USAAF would have ever become the USAF and separate from the Army. I had the privelege to sit in the back ground during whiskey conversations in which LeMay and JC Myers and Pat Timberlake and Nathan Twining talked about the 'dark' days of USAAF Strategic campaign in ETO.

The US public had no real idea how many ships were written off and how many crews were killed or wounded in the ships that returned home before the Mustang could provide cover over the target.. it was a testimonial to the courage of FDR to believe in Hap Arnold's vison that he had the latitude to continue taking the losses in late 1943 and early 1944.

The USSR had no such political pressures re: losses... so it was a different war in the air altogether.

I think the 4th FG had the two worst days for US 8th AF FC losing 12 Spits in Sept 26, 1942 to combination of weather/fuel, flak and German fighters (all 336FS), then lost another 9 on August 18,1944 when they were caught strafing by JG2 and JG26 and lost most to enemy air - but it was three squadrons combined loss... I think this was the worst single loss to GAF by 8th FC during WWII.

AL Schlageter said:

My dear Udet.

As I said/implied, the losses at Kursk had a very short term effect on the Soviets ability to conduct air operations but in the overall scheme, it had no long term effect on Soviet ability to conduct operations in the defeating of Nazi Germany. The Germans still lost the Battle of Kursk with the sacrifice of the lives of Soviet air crew, and soldiers. You stopped reading after you read "Kursk had no effect on the VVS" and ignored what came after ("which got stronger as the GPW progressed"), for some obscure reason.

So let me repeat and read all the words with no selectivity. The Japanese were finished after the Turkey Shoot, being incapable of mounting any kind of serious defense that would reverse what happened during the Turkey Shoot. The same can not be said of the Soviets, who bounced back quickly, not by going on the defensive, which the Japanese did, but by going on the offensive, and chasing your Germans all the way back to Berlin.

Despite suffering large losses, and you can go on all you want to about the losses, it did not effect Soviet's ability to conduct an offensive war against Nazi Germany, and win. Fact!

You are having trouble seeing the forest for the trees, nit-picking on a word and ignoring the whole statement.

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*YAWN*

Udet said:

*YAWN*

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Does that intelligent yawn include DerAdlerIstGelandet's posts?

"As AL said it had no affect on the Soviets putting up a large quantity of aircraft and pilots that were good eneogh to go to Berlin."

"Udet you are failing to see the point and it does make you look rather silly when you say some of the things that you do.

The Soviets were able to make up for there losses. The Luftwaffe was not. That is a proven fact. Germany lost a war of Attrition."

Now if, as you say, the Soviet losses had an effect on Soviet operations in the defeating Nazi Germany, kindly show us how these losses did. History shows the losses did NOT but I am interested in your alternate revisionist history.

AL Schlageter said:

Does that intelligent yawn include DerAdlerIstGelandet's posts?

"As AL said it had no affect on the Soviets putting up a large quantity of aircraft and pilots that were good eneogh to go to Berlin."

"Udet you are failing to see the point and it does make you look rather silly when you say some of the things that you do.

The Soviets were able to make up for there losses. The Luftwaffe was not. That is a proven fact. Germany lost a war of Attrition."

Now if, as you say, the Soviet losses had an effect on Soviet operations in the defeating Nazi Germany, kindly show us how these losses did. History shows the losses did NOT but I am interested in your alternate revisionist history.

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I think we can say with all candor that if the LW had shot down every VVS aircraft in existnce - it would have affected VVS air ops (as the losses did) but would not have had any material affect on the prosecution of the war. The VVS had the resources to rebuild, take the losses necessary to re-construct a capable air force and continue - but each one of those 'bad days' was a setback on the efficiency of the VVS.

For all intents and purposes the LW was on the opposite side of that equation. If every German fighter had been shot down prior to D-Dy it would not have altered the outcome of the war... or cused it to shorten materially.

When you consider the forces (industrial/resources/population) arrayed against the Germans and Japanese - the only thing that could alter the course of the war would have been large supply of nuclear weapons - maybe.

drgondog said:

I think we can say with all candor that if the LW had shot down every VVS aircraft in existnce - it would have affected VVS air ops (as the losses did) but would not have had any material affect on the prosecution of the war. The VVS had the resources to rebuild, take the losses necessary to re-construct a capable air force and continue - but each one of those 'bad days' was a setback on the efficiency of the VVS.

For all intents and purposes the LW was on the opposite side of that equation. If every German fighter had been shot down prior to D-Dy it would not have altered the outcome of the war... or cused it to shorten materially.

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Agreed and that is what Udet seems to not understand. Ofcourse large losses did affect the VVS but in the long run it did not affect the war due to the Russian ability to build large quantities of aircraft and put crews up in them. The Lend Lease helped matters as well.

The allies, as victors, often form an ideal figure out of every aspect related to their performance in the war: nearly perfect -or at "minimum" far superior to anything fielded by Germany- weapons, intelligence, tactics, logistics, training programs, etc.

Most of the times, when each aspect comes under closer scrutiny, they can not quite have it that way, especially the soviet business partner.

For centuries, the writings of three renowned literates in the ancient world: Arrian, Diodorus Siculus and Plutarch ruled that at Gaugamela, Alexander´s rough 30,000 pezhetairoi, 10,000 peltasts and 7,000 cavalry had defeated Darius´army which numbered "more than 1,000,000 men"...during the times of the Roman Empire, a few centuries after Alexander´s dissapearance the deed was praised by several of the most noted Roman military officers...well, also after centuries of further research and re-assessment the facts of the battle are seen with somewhat newer eyes...estimates suggest Darius could have effectively fielded no more than 100,000 men for the battle (with various sources using different figures). Yes, Alexander won inflicting a decisive blow on the Persians but in a "less" spectacular way if you will.

Difference in times and ages acknowledged, the availability of records and sources, an identical thing is occurring when we referr to world war two.

Travelling through time to more recent moments in human chronology, for decades, allied literature had announced the world Kursk had not only been the "Wehrmacht´s last offensive posture" in the east, but also a "massacre"...hundreds of burning SS Tigers and corpses -the soviet literature is obssessed with dead germans- littering the field; entire units that were assembling for battle were "caught in the open" by soviet barrages and were either wiped out or seriously diminished; those units who took on the offensive advanced very little and were rapidly halted by the soviets; Ferdinands and Panthers breaking down here and there;the Luftwaffe promptly wiped out in the sector!!!...blah, blah, blah, and more blah.

It was hollywoodesque to say the least.

Now one must come across fresher publications, such as George Nipe´s "Decision in the Ukraine" to learn that even if in fact Germany´s objectives for the Kursk offensive were certainly not attained, a very different thing indeed took place on the battlefield...there were only a fistful of Tigers at Kursk, so forget about the "hundreds littering the Prokhorova sector"...the II SS Panzer Korps supplied the soviets with more than a brutal battering while taking truly moderate losses in return...

Who knows what type of new "surprises" scholars, historians and fans will confront in the year 2100 that will "further clarify" the atmosphere, in a time when all of us in here will be nothing but dust.

As a child, and during my early teens, during the 1990s, when i was not really attracted to world war two, my countless evenings at the flats of veterans of both the red army and the soviet air force contributed to form what i can call a sound view of the war in the east.

The Doctor touched a significant issue: the soviets had almost full capability to continue waging a war on an offensive posture from half 1943 to the very end of it all.

Replacement of losses, however, functioned in quite a different fashion in the soviet side; their training programs were nowhere near close to USA standards, so quality of training programs was not really an issue, the issue was the prompt replacing of such horrendouse losses to allow the offensive posture to keep going.

I am sure that if the USAAF would have been taking losses similar to those endured by the VVS over and over again, not even the high standards of their training programs could have helped enough to catch up and maintain a competitive air force in combat operations; if you want your air force (USAAF in this case) to remain a truly competitive air force then you will have at minimum to protract the war for an uncertainly long period of time, something the soviets of course did not do. They had terrible political pressure from the regime to carry on with the offensive, plus an essential competing connection: in the second half of 1943 the western allies have landed in continental europe, therefore, you have to advance as much as possible, faster than your western allies -which by the way you do not trust yet demanding for more of their support- before they commence occupying vast zones of Europe.

I have what i can say is a large file of papers regarding the contribution of Marshall Aleksandr Novikov, who is presented as the man who revamped the whole thing, bringing the VVS "back" from the depths of the USSR to "crush the Luftwaffe". It is interesting to read it, but the flaws in the case are easy to detect here and there.

In short, if you are trying to prove, with an attitude, that by the time of Kursk the VVS was more than in terms with the Lutwaffe, yet records show that (air-to-air only) you lost ~350 planes before the first 24 hours of the battle, i will respond to you: "shut the pie hole". This said, let´s not move further and talk of the rough 12,000 planes lost in the last 129 days of the war.

Ladies, Gentlemen...

Udet said:

The allies, as victors, often form an ideal figure out of every aspect related to their performance in the war: nearly perfect -or at "minimum" far superior to anything fielded by Germany- weapons, intelligence, tactics, logistics, training programs, etc.

Which, of course was not true.. I think most of us who have really studied the war realize that it would have been tough to impossible for a free state with differing political factions to suffer the kind of losses that the USSR did w/o throwing in the towel and suing for peace.

As to the 'innate superiority' of Allies to Nazi - I think most of us realize that if we had to choose between nearly as good to better in many examples but have nearly unlimited resources to fight against a foe with many examples of better engineering but stupid leaders at the top, and scarce resources - well rational people would pick the former - politics aside.


Who knows what type of new "surprises" scholars, historians and fans will confront in the year 2100 that will "further clarify" the atmosphere, in a time when all of us in here will be nothing but dust.

As a child, and during my early teens, during the 1990s, when i was not really attracted to world war two, my countless evenings at the flats of veterans of both the red army and the soviet air force contributed to form what i can call a sound view of the war in the east.

My upbringing was just the same with a different cast of characters.. while proud of their accomplishments I never heard words which in any way reflected disparagingly on either the toughness or the skill of both German and USSR pilots..and quality of the weapons - in the latter example, particularly in the MiG vs Sabre duels, when our guys spoke of running into blue and green eyed 'honcho's" and nobody was fooled into thinking they were Chinese

The Doctor touched a significant issue: the soviets had almost full capability to continue waging a war on an offensive posture from half 1943 to the very end of it all.

Replacement of losses, however, functioned in quite a different fashion in the soviet side; their training programs were nowhere near close to USA standards, so quality of training programs was not really an issue, the issue was the prompt replacing of such horrendouse losses to allow the offensive posture to keep going.

Udet - this actually WAS my point. The German Luftwaffe inflicted brutal casualties - Kursk being the focal point - and it had to have an effect on both leadership and near term ability of VVS to perform efficiently. If the 8th AF Fighter Command had suffered such losses in mid to late 1943 - the bombing campaign would have been even bloodier. It would have less effect (militarily) for one or two such losses on US side because we DID have such a huge pipeline of well trained pilots and aircraft in full production.. but even the US would have ultimately faltered if Germany was able to continue such pressure - but I think politically more than resources

I am sure that if the USAAF would have been taking losses similar to those endured by the VVS over and over again, not even the high standards of their training programs could have helped enough to catch up and maintain a competitive air force in combat operations; if you want your air force (USAAF in this case) to remain a truly competitive air force then you will have at minimum to protract the war for an uncertainly long period of time, something the soviets of course did not do. They had terrible political pressure from the regime to carry on with the offensive, plus an essential competing connection: in the second half the western allies have landed on continental europe, therefore, you have to advance as much as possible, faster than your western allies -which by the way you do not trust yet demanding for more of their support- before they commence occupying vast zones of Europe.

I have what i can say is a large file of papers regarding the contribution of Marshall Alekandr Novikov, who is presented as the man who revamped the whole thing, bringing the VVS "back" from the depths of the USSR to "crush the Luftwaffe". It is interesting to read it, but the flaws in the case are easy to detect here and there.

In short, if you are trying to prove, with an attitude, that by the time of Kursk the VVS was more than in terms with the Lutwaffe, yet records show that (air-to-air only) you lost ~350 planes before the first 24 hours of the battle, i will respond to you: "shut the pie hole". This said, let´s not move further and talk of the rough 12,000 planes lost in the last 129 days of the war.

Ladies, Gentlemen...

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It is easy to tell how much importance the Luftwaffe placed in stopping the Western Allies Air Forces versus Soviet - by the distribution of assets dominantly in Germany (LuftFlotte Reich) and that the VVS was held at bay basically with 1/4 or less of the manpower and equipment available to the Luftwaffe.

My own limited studies of Kursk supported Udet's points of view. It is very true that the VVS never accepted defeat but they took such brutal shots that they frequently had to re-start at a lower point of combat capability. Kursk was one of those moment

You could point to October 14, 1943 Schweinfurt mission in which we (US/8th AF/USAAF) took a similar, smaller scale, beating and it was several months before we could re-start deep penetrations because we lost too many skilled leaders and crews and we weren't willing to risk the loss of daylight bombing vision to the expected political pressures of continuous losses like that.

We lost more attacking Berlin on 6 March and April 29, 1944 but we had turned the corner in capturing control of the air

As the theme of this discussion is 'worst losses' Kursk and Mariana's are at the top of my list - everything else pales in comparison

As has been alluded to, the Russians were able to eventually make up their losses by Russian production and lend-lease replenishment. (I wonder what the total of the (mainly) U.S. contribution in aircraft was.)

The Japanese had no such luxury. They were being strangled by blockade, pummeled by air attack, losing territory, and trained pitifully few qualified replacement pilots. The Marianas Turkey Shoot did to their naval air power (they did have substantial land-base airpower but much of that was spread out and ineffectively used as kamikazes) what the Battle of Leyte Gulf did to their surface fleet.

tom