You are in Charge of RAF Fighter Command - July 1940

Ermm where do we start

Fast, seems you don't know that war started in 1942?

tomo pauk said:

Fast, seems you don't know that war started in 1942?

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My bad need to watch more History Channel

SPEKTRE76 said:

I would have tripled the Avro Lancaster's production and bombed the begeesus out of Berlin and the Reichstag.

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The Lancaster didn't see combat until February 1942, so perhaps they'd appear a little late in the piece.

The RAF had trouble finding German cities in 1940, and picking out the Reichstag would have been quite a feat for the time.

And any an all German bomber airfields.

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What makes you think this wasn't done? Bomber Command visited a variety of targets during the BoB period, primarily canals and inland communication targets in Germany, followed by the invasion fleet and barges and then the ports themselves.

However, Blenheims and Hampdens made increasing numbers of low level day and night time intruder attacks against airfields through Holland and France in June, July and August. Through September and October, airfields became secondary targets, in favour of bombing the invasion fleets.

A bomber base at night time is a difficult target to make out, and an even more difficult target to bomb effectively.

Then I would have set a perimeter of AAA guns and mortars complimented by flak both at sea and ashore. The sea based flak and AAA would sit 5 mi of the coast of Cailis, FRA. The second fleet would sit 5 miles of the coast of England herself. The cliffs would be laden with AAA and flak. I would have done this on day one after 'Eagle Day'.

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And they'd have been sunk by day two.

Sitting ships in the channel just five miles off the coast invites attack from fixed emplacments, mobile artillery, high-altitude air attack, dive bombing, strafing, U-boat, E-boat and conventional naval assets.

UK AAA assets were tasked with defending air and naval bases, critical infrastructure and cities. Plonking them on the coast opposite France creates an easily passable barrier and allows the Luftwaffe the luxury of uninterrupted bombing of said air and naval bases, critical infrastructure and cities. Without fear of flak, the bombers could drop from lower heights while the fighter bombers could make unharrassed runs against Fighter Command and Bomber Command bases.

GB did have some sea forts.

Maunsell Forts - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

The Maunsell Forts were small fortified towers built in the Thames and Mersey estuaries during the Second World War to help defend the United Kingdom. They were named after their designer, Guy Maunsell. The forts were decommissioned in the late 1950s and later used for other activities. One became the Principality of Sealand; boats visit the remaining forts occasionally, and a consortium called Project Redsands is planning to conserve the fort situated at Redsand.

I dont think moving the anti aircraft guns would have any great benefit. Remember that AA was rarely that effective until proximity fuses were available. The guns were told to fire so that the public felt reassured that we were hitting them back.
Lots of smaller calibre weapons would be needed to make a barrage more effective - so get 20 mm , 40 mm etc made by the thousands and let rip!

The trouble with light and medium AAA like the 20 mm Oerlikon and the 40 mm Bofors is its short effective range.

The 40 mm Bofors had maximum altitude range of about 8,000 m and an "effective" altitude range of about 3000-3200 meters (British Bofors shells typically self destructed at about 3500 m). However, the limitations of visual fire control/basic diectors brought this back to about 2000-2500 meters.

Effective ceiling for the 20 mm is about 1100-1200 m.

Operating above 3500-4000 m gives German bombers virtual immunity to British light/medium AAA.

The British produced just under 1100 40 mm Bofors in 1940. 20 mm Oerlikon imports from Sweden were limited to about 100 before the fall of France and licenced production only really got underway in the UK in November. Even then, it was for the Navy rather than the Army.

Anyway, fighter command has no control over bombers, or AA, other than maybe the AA that's station at the airfields.

How much equipment was left at Dunkirk? If this scenario is July 1940, didn't GB need to re-stock things such as AA guns and wot?

On day one of my new job I would have sacked Viscount Nuffield, aka William Morris, from his position of head at Castle Bromwich and bought in Vickers management both there and at Supermarine - which is what happened later in any case. Nuffield's tenure at Bromwich served only to demonstrate to everyone in the world except himself that Spitfires couldn't be mass produced using the same methods as for motorcars, and while Supermarine had designed the best fighter in the world they completely out of their depth in organising its production. Sweeping both establishments out with the Vickers broom earlier than actually happened could have added hundreds of Spitfires to the bottom line when they were most needed.

I feel like Im letting the side down by criticising Dowding, because I know i couldnt have done a fraction of what he did.

But I question the effort put into the July battlesover the channel. These convoys could have been suspended, or moved at night with no real loss to Britain. Instead, for a time at least the Brits fought bitterly here as anywhere.

I also question the need of keeping Mansoton open, or even defending it. It was hit repeatedly, and defending it was difficult for the RAF. I would have parked a few Battles on the apron and let the LW waste effort plastering it all they like.

Perhaps not all strikes needed to be parried, but hard to tell which raids were duds and which might hurt.

perhaps integrate the RN radar equipped ships (and there were a few) so as to provide information on raids if the the LW target were radar sites ....not sure this might be possible, but similar arrangements were used elsewhere.

However I actually think its hard to improve on Dowdings handling

July 1940 is pretty late to make changes, but here goes.

1. Formations and fighter tactics

The Vic formation is to be abandoned immediately, as is the position of "Tail End Charlie".
Fighting area attacks to be abandoned immediately.
RAF to adopt loose finger four formation, consisting of two two aircraft elements.
Recommend use of head-on and slight abeam attacks on German bombers whenever possible.
Spitfires to be assigned to fighter interference/secondary role of attacks of opportunity against bomber target
Hurricanes to be assigned primary bomber destroyer role/secondary role of attacks against fighters

2. Training

Existing fighter pilots are to be given additional time for air fighting training in the July and August period, to adopt finger four. This includes more live target practice against towed targets, more maneouvering training, more communications training;
Pilots to practice fighter on fighter combat, with emphasis given to evasion/breaking contact when bounced;
Practice section-sized and squadron-sized scrambles, hard climbs and form-ups.;
Practice squadron-sized rendevous;
Pilots from squadrons involved in the Battle of France are to be posted to training squadrons to teach effective air fighting tactics.
Defiant and Battle squadron pilots to be shifted to fighter pilot training

3. Leadership

Squadron leaders from squadrons involved in the Battle of France to be rotated through Wing Commander positions to advise on tactics and formations;
Removed Trafford Leigh Mallory as commander of 12 Group, "promote" to head of fighter pilot training;
Have Douglas Bader moved to a training squadron;

4. Rescue

Introduce a rescure service for pilots that land in the channel
Introduce dye packs for pilots that land in the channel

5. Rotation

Pilots in 11 Group to be rotated to OTUs and 13 Group after 4-6 weeks
Squadrons rotating in from 13 Group to be deployed into 10 or 12 Group
Squadrons rotating into 11 Group to come from combat experienced squadrons in 12 Group or 10 Group
11 Group and coastal squadrons to have priority on Spitfire squadrons

6. Night fighters

Beaufighter production and deployment to be accelerated by all possible means
Defiant to be introduced as a night fighter as soon as possible (with or without AI radar)
Blenheim IF to be retasked as night intruder for missions over France/Holland

7. Day fighters

Accelerate introduction of constant speed props, modifications for 100 octane fuel, pilot armour and linatex covered fuel tanks for Spitfires and Hurricanes
Set fighter guns to be harmonised at 225 meters/250 yards and introduce the higher RoF modification for the .303 Browning
Introduce 'Miss Shilling's Orifice' early to allow Spitfires/Hurricanes to handle some negative G effetively
Don't bother with 20 mm experiments with fighters until after October


More big picture stuff to follow, when I've thought about it

Good stuff, esp. the adoption of finger four formation, intruder attacks vs. LW airfields, pilot rescue and plane allocations. Plus, seems we've got Bader L-M to contribute better to the effort, while removing them from potentially backstabbing Dowding.

Manston was a sector station,a synapse of the air defence system and had to be defended.

Some good and interesting points Jabberwocky.

1 The Vic was eventually abandoned but I agree it should have been done sooner. Some leaders (like Malan) copied the Luftwaffe system unofficially.
Head on attacks were way beyond the capability of most RAF pilots in 1940,even the experienced men were not trained for it.
Both Dowding and Park were adamant that the bombers were the target for all RAF fighters and discouraged them from becoming involved fighting the escorts.
As the realities of the battle were realised,Park did want to direct Hurricanes at bombers and if anything had to tangle with the escort he would prefer Spitfires. In reality it just didn't work that way,he had to send squadrons who were ready and in the right position,regardless of type,to intercept incoming raids whose make up was often unknown until they had crossed the coast and been seen by the (Royal) Observer Corps. We often forget today that at the time,the Hurricane was not seen as being inferior to the Spitfire. Both had relative strengths and weaknesses,but many pilots preferred the Hurricane and are quite happy to maintain that opinion to this day. According to Price's analysis of the battles of 18th August 1940,statistically you were more likely to survive flying a Spitfire,but no more likely to shoot down a German.
Fighting Area Tactics were not old fashioned,they were just complex and,in practice,unrealistic. I agree they should have been abandoned much sooner.

2 I've no problem with most of that, but experienced pilots who had fought in France were needed at the front line squadrons where men from the OTUs were supposed to finish their training,on the job.
There were probably not enough OTUs and Dowding opposed creating more as he thought that they would be a drain on his limited resources.
Not moving Defiant pilots,who came under Dowding's aegis,was a mistake. I don't think he could have got pilots from Bomber Command.


3 The first point was attempted to a degree. As for Mallory and Bader I'd have shot them if I could have

4 Yes,and provide better survival equipment. Marker dye,flares that actually worked.The Luftwaffe's was much better,a german "Schwimmveste" was much prized booty for an RAF pilot.

5 The problem with this is simply a serious lack of experienced combat fighter pilots. Overy,with whom I disagree in this instance,thinks it could have been done,so its a fair point.

6 A different topic all of its own

7 The constant speed propellers started to be fitted retrospectively in June 1940 and all Spitfire and Hurricane squadrons were converted in time for the BoB.
100 octane fuel was being used in a limited capacity as early as November 1937. Sixteen fighter squadrons were to be converted by September 1939 but it wasn't tested in a Spitfire until September 24th 1939. It cost £53 5s 0d to make the conversion on a Merlin II which was a significant sum then. Supply of 100 octane fuel (from the US) was also initially a worry until supplies from Abadan (Persia) came on line.Didn't most front line fighters run on 100 octane by July 1940? I can't find the numbers anywhere.
The advantage for the Spitfire was 25mph at sea level,34mph at 10,000 feet which must have been useful. There was no advantage above the FTH for the Merlin II and III. I have seen it argued that the BoB was won by this narrow margin,a view with which I don't agree.

All Spitfires and Hurricanes had pilot armour and armoured windscreens by the BoB. The self-sealing tanks were also adopted as far as possible. The upper tank in the Spitfire was too tight a fit to add the layer of Linatex.

You can't fit Miss Shillings nifty "RAE restrictor" until she invents it. They started fitting it in early 1941,too late for the BoB.The problem wasn't properly solved until late'41 early '42 with the development of the diaphragm type carburettor fitted to the Merlin 50 series in late Mk V production.

Fighter Command was quite keen on cannon armament in theory,though not impressed with the actual performance of the Oerlikon cannon in early installations. They were only tried by one squadron in July/August 1940 and they soon swapped back to 8 machine gun armament. These aircraft had two 20mm cannon as their only armament.
Mitchell had close ties with the Oerlikon company pre-war and came up with various schemes for arming fighters with cannon.Oerlikon had developed the "FF" version in 1932 specifically for installation in an aircraft wing.

Cheers

Steve

Thanks for the info on the light / medium AA performance Jabberwocky.
If these were placed near to the radar stations and airfields, they woul still be very useful against either a dive bombing attack from a Ju 87 or from low level bombing or straffing attack.

Double posting!

There was one RAF squadron who trained before the battle in Head on Attacks on their own initiative. IIRC it was very effective in breaking up the bombers but depended on a lot of training which took time they didn't have and being in the right place at the right time. Something else that didn't often happen.

the 100 octane fuel was in use by all fighter squadrons by May/June when the fighting started to ramp up. The first combat reports commenting on the use are in Feb 140

Jabberwocky said:

The Lancaster didn't see combat until February 1942, so perhaps they'd appear a little late in the piece.

The RAF had trouble finding German cities in 1940, and picking out the Reichstag would have been quite a feat for the time.

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Ahhhhhhhhhhhhhhhh why did I say that? I meant the Wellington's!!!!! LOL. I was thinking in my head about them but I typed Lancaster, LOL. It's been a long week.

Glider said:

the 100 octane fuel was in use by all fighter squadrons by May/June when the fighting started to ramp up. The first combat reports commenting on the use are in Feb 140

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Thanks,I thought so but couldn't find a quick confirmation.
Cheers
Steve

Re Channel convoys. The rail network was working at it's maximum. Volume heavy road transport was in it's infancy and was also at it's maximum on the existing narrow roads and existing slow lorries. To move necessary goods across the country coastal convoys were vital (as they had been to the economy pre war). So convoys had to use the Channel.

The Channel is narrow and replete with hazards at the best of times and modern radar. To try sailing loaded vessels at night without shore and lightship lights for navigation will soon mean you lose your shipping either to general navigation hazards or to the enemy through approaching the French/Belgian coast too closely.

They had to go and they had to go by day. In 1940 the Luftwaffe had the numbers and types of aeroplanes to seek and attack these, generally, small coastal cargo ships. Later they lacked the reconnaissance to seek shipping through reassignment of the aeroplanes and increasing radar directed RAF interception. It would have been a waste to keep bombers waiting in case a convoy were found and an incredible waste to send them off in the hope that they would come across one by chance. Once the Luftwaffe moved to inland attacks then the pressure was off the convoys but light naval attacks continued into 1945 IIRC.

The German shore based guns were far too inaccurate to track a moving target even if Kent was frequently shelled until the guns were overrun in 1944. Ah the delights of the war in Kent. 6 years of being attacked by artillery, bombs and cruise missiles. Never mind the current hazard of a 1.5 kiloton explosion just off Sheerness town from the US freighter Richard Montgomery sunk in the war.