You are in charge of the Luftwaffe: July 1940

Given that I am quoting someone elses accounts of those meetings, and you are just saying they are falsel with nothing to back up your claim that they are false , I cant see much point in arguing with you. you believe.....something, i dont know what, but it looks like you might be thinking the plan was in some way feasible . If you do, then give us your critique as to why you think it possible. obviously i dont, and a lot of other people agree with me. ive given you some reasons as to why i think it an unworkable plan, all you have said so far is that anything you dont like...."thats false" or "thats false" What the hell are you basing your rebuttals on? Which version of the plan do you think had any chance of success, and why.

I actually used several sources for my quote, hence the absence of a reference, but most of the material came from this place. If you have a problem with what theyve said,, take it up with them.

http://www.historyofwar.org/articles/operation_sealion_primer.html

Other wise you are just demonstrating dumb stubborness and an acute lack of conviction and authority on the issue, and getting into a pissing contest with me.

Lets keep this civil.

I think that everyone might be missing the fact that AT THE TIME, many thought it WAS feasible and prepared for it. Hindsight is wonderful.

" AT THE TIME, many thought it WAS feasible and prepared for it."

IF the British made NO preparations, it may have been feasible as the landings would have been pretty much unopposed or defense in depth not planned.

EVERY preparation the British made, no matter how small, increases the odds against the Germans, even if it is only by increasing morale or the will to fight.

For small, see:



tracks are 15" apart.

Every week the RAF delayed the Germans was another week of arms/munition production and another week of construction of defense projects and another week of training for the ground troops.

Which means the German troops that did make it to shore would have a harder job with each week that goes by.

The Romney Hythe and Dymchurch Railway is still in operation after 90 years.

The Romney Hythe and Dymchurch Railway

My source is conf102 "German Planes...." if you don't read that you post as your source it's not my fault, incidentally that was also my source. Only, relatively my last post, for the distance the source is in conf103 in the appendix.

Jenisch said:

Well, that applies to everything. A better defense of France could have well hold the Germans in 1940. There are many contemporany works that dispell the myth of the ultra superior WM and the "WWI" French Army, such as Ernest R. May's Strange Victory: Hitler's Conquest of France. A similar situation could have existed for the RAF in 1940. History is dynamic. =D

Click to expand...

The original title of the thread supposed that I was in charge of the Luftwaffe in 1940.
It's not about the historical campaign specifically. My argument has been all along that with a few technical changes to the equipment that I would have in 1940,all of which were possible,and a campaign run rather differently, I could have defeated the RAF. I would have swooped to the kill and not fallen from my perch !
That is an opinion held by many emminent and respected historians and which I share.

If the original thread had put me in charge of the French army in 1939/40 then the Battle of France may or may not have had a different outcome,but that wasn't the question.

Cheers
Steve

Steve

Maybe its possible, but I would issue strong words of caution to would be armchair generals. Command of real people and real campaigns is a lot harder than it looks, or is portrayed even in professional excercises. I would be very careful about making claims that go "if they put me in charge I could tinker at the edges and win hands down" Sorry, but you cannot make that claim. You can point out the weaknesses of the historical battle, and how it might be improved. You cannot predict how the opponent will react, and you cannot be sure that the panacea that you so passionately believe in will work quite as well as you think. I happen to think, that the radar network you think so vulnerable, was not nearly as vulnerable overall as you think.. In fact I think it was beyond the capabilites of the LW to eliminate the system, keep it so, and then destroy the RAF as was needed. There are a few attacks historically on which to base that assessment, and nowhere does the historical record show that the LW could complete boith missions successfully or comprehensively. On the few occasions they did manage to knock out the radar network, the resulting exploitation attacks were amongst the most costly the LW undertook . Moreover the stations themselves were never out of action for more than a few hours or days at most, and there was never a comprehensive, region wide knocking out of the system. Quite a few of the commanders on the spot questioned the wisdom of the strategy in the first place, since the object was to draw the RAF into battle and destroy it, not break through and romp allover the countryside.

Maybe you are right. maybe a little tweak here or there might have changed history. Maybe you could succeed, where some of the most experienced and competent german commander s could not. But you cannot prove or even claim any probability to any of those conditions. So dont make them, because they (the claims) cheapens your obvious great knowledge on this topic.