You are in charge of the Luftwaffe: July 1940

[Glider]

To be honest 2 knots or 6 doesn't really matter to me. At six you are looking for your troops to spend hours at sea in a converted barge and I promise they will be in no condition to fight.

What interests me is how the germans expected to control thousands of horses in the first wave?

 

[Juha]

To be honest 2 knots or 6 doesn't really matter to me. At six you are looking for your troops to spend hours at sea in a converted barge and I promise they will be in no condition to fight.

What interests me is how the germans expected to control thousands of horses in the first wave?

Hello Glider
IMHO you are unduly pessimistic. E.g. Vikings could sail long distances on their longships and be ready to fight at the moment they disembarked, IIRC they also sometimes had some horses with them but at lest Normans could transport easily heavy cavalry horses on their ships as they did in 1066.

Juha

 

[Gixxerman]

I've read about the war-gaming too.
Nobody could realistically engineer a German win without the most unlikely and unrealistic moves by the British.

If Germany had been in a position to mount an airborne assault on a large airfield (and hold it securely for at least the first couple of weeks) then there's the possibility that it might provide the start of an attempt to defeat the ill-equipped British army negate the Royal Navy's undoubed power to stop a sea-bourne invasion.
But the fact is they didn't.
They had neither the manpower, the necessary airbourne equipment nor the aircraft capable of achieving such a goal.
So they planned on the basis of what they had and what they might do, try barges.

I've yet to read any serious military historian say anything other than it would have been a disaster, for the Germans involved.

Had Dunkirk not happened the British political will might have been so lacking - and the UK so desperate to negotiate the return of such a huge number of her captured troops - as to render attempts at peace more likely to succeed.
But it did happen....and this coupled with Hitler's irrational views on British interests and likely actions together with his total blindness to British opinions about nazi Germany his likely future actions made peace absolutely unlikely in the extreme.

 

[vinnye]

I agree that any invasion would require the LW being able to keep the RAF and RN at bay.
This never happened and never really looked like happening. The LW caused the RAF and particularly No. 11 Group heavy casualties. But they did not get the support / co-operation from 12 Group that they should have had. If necessary, the RAF could have used its resources differently and maintained a presence over the South East coast. This would have made the losses that any armada trying to invade across the Channel prohibitive, and that does not include RN intervention.
I don't think that the LW would have been able to carry out a parachute landing - air superiority would be essential for this to even be considered!

 

[Vincenzo]

imho also if LW was able to keep RAF and RN at bay the invasion was not successfull, the naval capability were too low for invade the Great Britain
need some other changes from historical event

 

[bobbysocks]

I think I would travel around France looking for things to add to my collections (art, wines, etc) and take them back home.

Then I would tell Hitler what he wants to hear...

I would also send some bombers at night so that I could tell Hitler that I have a 24 hour effort and that Britain won't last much longer.

and when things fail i would blame my subordinates...telling hitler both he and i have been betrayed ... and then send those poor soles ( who actually did nothing but cover my @$$ ) to the russian front....

 

[Gixxerman]

That's about the size of it Bobbysocks.

....and don't forget the part about promoting your woefully ill-equipped pals who were supposed to be the show-biz end of things to important jobs they had no special skills for who will (have the honour to?) commit suicide over their own ineptitude allowing you to swan about as if it was any everyone else that had done the wrong thing(s).

 

[stona]

Hello Glider
IMHO you are unduly pessimistic. E.g. Vikings could sail long distances on their longships and be ready to fight at the moment they disembarked, IIRC they also sometimes had some horses with them but at lest Normans could transport easily heavy cavalry horses on their ships as they did in 1066.
Juha

The Vikings were sailing/rowing vessels designed to go to sea and were for the most part good sailors. You can't say the same about the average German soldier in WW2 being dragged across the channel in a flat bottomed river barge.

As for the Normans firstly the numbers are not comparable,William the Bastard probably landed about 8,000 men,the Germans would need to land tens or hundreds of thousands.

How many horses? Probably a lot. William was accompanied by 3,000 knights who would normally have at least one highly trained and expensive war horse each,maybe more.

More importantly they landed unopposed as Harold Godwinson and his army were not at the coast. The Normans had time to recover and some accounts claim that the Normans rather unsportingly attacked the Anglo-Saxons before they were ready.
Also crucially the invaders actually outnumbered the defenders,certainly in terms what we might call professional soldiers. Much of Harold's army was made up of men of the "fyrd" armed with their agricultural tools. The men who supplied and led these men,the "thegns", might be properly armed but Harold had only about 2,500 "housecarls" who were paid professional soldiers.

I bet some of these Anglo-Saxon words look familiar to someone speaking a modern Scandinavian language. Harold's mum Gytha Thorkelsdottir was directly related to the King of Demmark.

Not sure how this relates to the Luftwaffe!

Cheers

Steve

 

[parsifal]

Parsifal so help me to find tell me the pages i can read for find this german port.
Again you've not source for tell that barges go only a 2 kts in 1940, and a 6 kts non need 30 hours for the passage, also in the far barges invasion bases were enough near to need less 20 hours probably less.

At the meeting of 21 July 1940,, the KM advised the heer that their plan would take 10 days to get the first wave ashore. That was with 260000 in the first wave. In the September permutation of the plan, the first wave had been reduced to about 100000 men. The heer expected that it would take 4 days to get the first wave from point of embarkation to to the landing sites. That was never confirmed or agreed to by the KM.

However assuming the Heer was about right, and further assuming the distance to travel was an average of say 80-100 miles, thats an average distance covered of 20 miles a day. Or less than 1 knot fleet speed.

However if you allow say 1 day for embarkation and 1 day to disembark, you can increase your best fleet speed to 2 knots.

If the flleet speed of the force was 6 knots and the distance to be covered is 80 miles, the time to traverse the distance will be about 13-15 hours. however there would need to be time to embark and assemble the fleet outside the ports of departure, and then time to disembark. If these elements of embarkation and disembarkation each take about 24 hours each, then a fleet speed reduces the duration of the operation to 3 days.

By comparison, the embarkation process for Overlord took 2 days and the disembarkation took about 6 hours, give or take. But Overloord was undertaken with speccially designed vessels, by people with vastly more amphoibious experience. One of the big problems for the Germans was how they would actually get their transports unloaded

 

[Tante Ju]

IMHO German headache would not be in landing the troops, but supply them with stores and ammo once they have landed...

Also the idea that quarter a million men could subdue the UK must have been extremely unlikely even to the most ardent nazis in the Wehrmacht. I wonder if they ever got to the "what should we do after we have landed" part. The plan was obviously unrealistic and was barely more than a study, and quite clearly, a political bluff.

 

[Shortround6]

Perhaps the quarter a million men were supposed to seize a few real ports so follow up troops could use normal shipping for transit? Unloading on beaches is one thing. Unloading onto docks/quays is another.

Unloading 100-200 tons of supplies per division per day after the first wave gets ashore might have been a bit of a problem until real ports were seized.

The list of problems goes on and on and on and........

 

[Jenisch]

The Luftwaffe came close in late August 1940 to defeating the RAF.

There is a consensus among historians that the Luftwaffe simply could not crush the RAF. Stephen Bungay described Dowding and Park's strategy of choosing when to engage the enemy whilst maintaining a coherent force as vindicated. The RAF proved to be a robust and capable organisation which was to use all the modern resources available to it to the maximum advantage.[215] Richard Evans wrote:
Irrespective of whether Hitler was really set on this course, he simply lacked the resources to establish the air superiority that was the sine qua non-of a successful crossing of the English Channel. A third of the initial strength of the German air force, the Luftwaffe, had been lost in the western campaign in the spring. The Germans lacked the trained pilots, the effective fighter planes, and the heavy bombers that would have been needed.[216][nb 26]
The Germans launched some spectacular attacks against important British industries, but they could not destroy the British industrial potential, and made little systematic effort to do so. Hindsight does not disguise the fact the threat to Fighter Command was very real, and for the participants it seemed as if there was a narrow margin between victory and defeat. Nevertheless, even if the German attacks on the 11 Group airfields which guarded southeast England and the approaches to London had continued, the RAF could have withdrawn to the Midlands out of German fighter range and continued the battle from there.[218] The victory was as much psychological as physical. Writes Alfred Price:
The truth of the matter, borne out by the events of 18 August is more prosaic: neither by attacking the airfields, nor by attacking London, was the Luftwaffe likely to destroy Fighter Command. Given the size of the British fighter force and the general high quality of its equipment, training and morale, the Luftwaffe could have achieved no more than a Pyrrhic victory. During the action on 18 August it had cost the Luftwaffe five trained aircrewmen killed, wounded or taken prisoner, for each British fighter pilot killed or wounded; the ratio was similar on other days in the battle. And this ratio of 5:1 was very close to that between the number of German aircrew involved in the battle and those in Fighter Command. In other words the two sides were suffering almost the same losses in trained aircrew, in proportion to their overall strengths. In the Battle of Britain, for the first time during the Second World War, the German war machine had set itself a major task which it patently failed to achieve, and so demonstrated that it was not invincible. In stiffening the resolve of those determined to resist Hitler the battle was an important turning point in the conflict.

Battle of Britain - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

 

[Juha]

Hello Steve
Many of Vikings, if not most, were farmers, and because of Germans probably planned to make the landing during calm weather, the flat bottoms would not have made much difference. Ihave some experience on flatbottomed boats/crafts from Buster outboard engine boat through army assault boat (like German Sturmboot) to navy's fast landing crafts. Ride was hard at 30+ knots but more comfortable at lower speeds.

Of course medieval armies were much smaller than the mass armies of industrial major powers. The point is that if it was possible to transport several thousands horses then with more resources it was possible to transport tens of thousands horses.

And I'm aware of the structure of Anxlo-Saxon armies, the last exam I had to pass before I got my MA on General/World history was on the structure of Anglo-Saxon society.
And don't underestimate too much armed peasants, 250 years later Swiss showed to Burgunds and Austrians that peasant armies could be very effective against professional feudal armies.

Juha

 

[stona]

There is a consensus that the historical attempt by the Luftwaffe to defeat Fighter Command was doomed to failiure.It was an ill conceived and badly executed shambles. I would agree with that,though not always Price's jingoism. Incidentally I like Price and have many of his books,that doesn't make him correct all the time
The shortage of trained fighter pilots in September 1940 was critical.
There is certainly not a consensus that a better organised and coordinated attack could not have succeeded. Had the eagle "swooped to the kill" rather than "falling of its perch" things may have gone differently.
If you read through this thread I refer to several emminent and well respected historians who share this view.
I'm not going to go over the whole thing again.
Cheers
Steve

 

[Jenisch]

The shortage of trained fighter pilots in September 1940 was critical.

It could have been. But the LW was also not well.

There is certainly not a consensus that a better organised and coordinated attack could not have succeeded.

Well, that applies to everything. A better defense of France could have well hold the Germans in 1940. There are many contemporany works that dispell the myth of the ultra superior WM and the "WWI" French Army, such as Ernest R. May's Strange Victory: Hitler's Conquest of France. A similar situation could have existed for the RAF in 1940. History is dynamic. =D

 

[Vincenzo]

At the meeting of 21 July 1940,, the KM advised the heer that their plan would take 10 days to get the first wave ashore. That was with 260000 in the first wave. In the September permutation of the plan, the first wave had been reduced to about 100000 men. The heer expected that it would take 4 days to get the first wave from point of embarkation to to the landing sites. That was never confirmed or agreed to by the KM.

However assuming the Heer was about right, and further assuming the distance to travel was an average of say 80-100 miles, thats an average distance covered of 20 miles a day. Or less than 1 knot fleet speed.

However if you allow say 1 day for embarkation and 1 day to disembark, you can increase your best fleet speed to 2 knots.

If the flleet speed of the force was 6 knots and the distance to be covered is 80 miles, the time to traverse the distance will be about 13-15 hours. however there would need to be time to embark and assemble the fleet outside the ports of departure, and then time to disembark. If these elements of embarkation and disembarkation each take about 24 hours each, then a fleet speed reduces the duration of the operation to 3 days.

By comparison, the embarkation process for Overlord took 2 days and the disembarkation took about 6 hours, give or take. But Overloord was undertaken with speccially designed vessels, by people with vastly more amphoibious experience. One of the big problems for the Germans was how they would actually get their transports unloaded

Again you change the facts
The first directive for the operation was on 2nd july (was request to navy for landing 25/40 divisions). The 9th the Navy ask to Army and to LW their operational intentions wich would form a basis for Naval preparations. In the discussion of 15th July already were talking if embarking port in franco-belgian coast. 16th July the 2nd directive, (Sealion codename), The 20thJuly the Navy knewn that the Army want a 100,000 men first wave (embarked from the area cherbourg-dunkirq). the 25th July the first wave go down to 90,000 (from Ostend-Cherbourg), the 2nd wave would be 160,000 men this wave was not possible simultaneus so need 4/5 echelons at intervals of 2 days (this 260,000 were 13 divisions). The timetable of 2nd wave was inaceptable for the Army.

 

[parsifal]

Again you change the facts
The first directive for the operation was on 2nd july (was request to navy for landing 25/40 divisions). The 9th the Navy ask to Army and to LW their operational intentions wich would form a basis for Naval preparations. In the discussion of 15th July already were talking if embarking port in franco-belgian coast. 16th July the 2nd directive, (Sealion codename), The 20thJuly the Navy knewn that the Army want a 100,000 men first wave (embarked from the area cherbourg-dunkirq). the 25th July the first wave go down to 90,000 (from Ostend-Cherbourg), the 2nd wave would be 160,000 men this wave was not possible simultaneus so need 4/5 echelons at intervals of 2 days (this 260,000 were 13 divisions). The timetable of 2nd wave was inaceptable for the Army.

Do the math. If the second wave is coming from ports as far away as Rotterdam, Le havre and Cherbourg, and the fleet speed is 2-6 knots, and there is a need to assemble the TF outside the ports of embarkation , then those second waves have to start their part of the operation before the 1st waves. Thats a dead give away to the RN that something is coming.

Im not changing anything. im just over arguing with someone who has abslotely no idea what they are talking about.

Have you ever set foot on a ship in your entire life, or been involved in any amphibibious excercise. If so, you are hiding the experience really well.

This is all shown in the plan I posted, which relates to the plan as adopted 1 September

 

[michaelmaltby]

"... The plan was obviously unrealistic and was barely more than a study, and quite clearly, a political bluff."

Indeed. But the bluff failed, you see - instead of putting fear into the British it did just the opposite - it rallied the British public after Dunkirk and the fiasco of France.

Rahm Immanuel - Obama's advisor early first term - is quoted for "never let a public crisis go to waste" or words to that effect. The public crisis was Sea Lion and Churchill knew Britain [with a history of being invaded] would rally and stand. The RAF delivered.

Hitler's bluff failed and Sea Lion was never anything than a combined arms military school exercise, IMHO.

MM

 

[parsifal]

The embarkation aspect of the whole operation is also completely unrealistic. Just looking at one or two aspects of the plan immediately reveals it for the fraud that it was.

Transport Fleet "E" was based at le Havre and was tasked with the movement of VII and X Korps which included 8, 26 and 6 mtn troops. Normally that would ba a force of at least 60000 men, however for the operations in Narvik, the germans pared down their assault forces from an average regimental size of about 3500 men, to about 2100 men. Lets assume they do something similar here. that means the assault force being carried by Transport Fleet "E" is about 36-40000 men. We know that each transport on average was going to carry about 400 men and their equipment.

From the attached map of modern Le havre harbour, we can see that the barbour entrance is less than 200m. thats going to constrain the departures to a single file exit, in prepration for form up outside the harbour. We can assume a safe working radius for each ship of around 200m. Im being extremely generous. There were, I think 5 jetties in 1940 and to load 400 troops and their equipment (assuming some level of prior prepration) I would estimate at least an hour for each ship. Thats 5 transports per hour for the port. Or, 2000 men stated another way. Just to getr the transports loaded it will take about 18-20 hours, during which time the port would be alive with activity. The British would need to be blind deaf and dumb not to know something was up. Then we need to get those transports out of the harbour and into the form up position. If only one transport can leave the harbour entrance at a time, and there is a 200m separation between each transport, and those transports are able to move at a best speed of 5 knots, it will take those transports about 8 hourd just to clear the harbour. All up the form and loading times are about 28 hours just to get ready to kick off. Edit: I forgot the impact of tides.....normally from a given harbour you might get 6 hors in a 24 hour cycle in which to exit a harbour with a low power vessel such as these barges. So it is entirely plausible that theharbour exit and form up might take up to 52 hours to complete, if it cant be done in one tidal cycle.

When the heer thought that it could get its first waves asdhore in four days after commencement of the operation, they were being wildly optimistic

 

[Vincenzo]

Im not changing anything. im just over arguing with someone who has abslotely no idea what they are talking about.

ahah

you writed "At the meeting of 21 July 1940,, the KM advised the heer that their plan would take 10 days to get the first wave ashore." this is false was the 2nd wave would take until 10 days.
"That was with 260000 in the first wave." this is false this was the sum of first and 2nd waves
" In the September permutation of the plan, the first wave had been reduced to about 100000 men" this is false the 1st wave was 100,000 already the 20th july
"However assuming the Heer was about right, and further assuming the distance to travel was an average of say 80-100 miles, thats an average distance covered of 20 miles a day. Or less than 1 knot fleet speed. " this is full speculation the max distance were around 80-100 miles, was not covered a 20 miles of day, they thinked of use the ship of 1st wave after 48 hours after the 1st wave start so in 48 they start landing and back and are ready to restart.