Glider
Captain
Your right, the German navy wouldn't be stomped, just sunk or scaterred to the four winds
You are in charge of the Luftwaffe: July 1940
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parsifal
Colonel
The speed of the approaching invasion fleet is critical to understanding why a cross channel invasion was unrealistic with or without air superiority. Remember what the definition of air superiority is. Perhaps with air supremacy it might be possible, but still unlikely. Thats not to say that I agree with any of this. I think the idea that this target or that target will deliver victory is utter nonsense and Ive put my reasons why and the evidence that attacking radar in particular was a waste of time (because the whole system was beyond the capacity of the LW to destroy).
But anyway, assuming that by some miracle the LW could achieve air superiority, that still leaves the invasion fleet the task of getting across the channel. The invasion fleet was coming from some pretty far flung points of embarkation, Le Havre, Boulogne, Calais, ports in Holland even Germany. On average the distance to be covered was not 20 or even 40 miles, it was a whopping 80-100 miles. The speed of advance for the invaders was at best 2 knots, but this did not take into account tidal flows and currents. In reality the rate of advance might be 1.5 or even 1 knot. That means the troops are embarked for 120-150 hours (allowing for embarkation, or 6-8 days. Who in this forum has spent any time in a landing craft. Its miserable. After 8 days cooped up in a makeshift barge men would be dying from thirst and exposure. And in no condition to fight I can tell you.
On top of that the actual journey is around 4 days, thats 3 consecutive nights that British Destroyers would unrelentingly play havoc with the invasion fleet. 3 days that the Luftwaffe, or the Kriegsmarine could do virtually nothing to protect them. Sure, destroyers would be lost to mines, the odd pop gun set up on the forecaastle of some trawler trying to protect the troops, or some very lucky LW pilot. Remember also that experience shows very clearly that only specially trained crews adept at anti-shipping operations could undertake attacks on Destroyers with any reasonable prospect of success. One only has to look at he experiences of the italians in the Med, torpedo armed or high level bombing, it really doesnt make a difference.....if your crews arent trained to attack ships, they are going to miss more than they hit. and the LW had few resources to attack ships a this time. Its specially trained shipping unit was still recovering from the Norway operation.
Anyone who thinks a cross channel attack was possible with the resopurces available to the germans in the fall of 1940, with or without air superiority is kidding themselves and trying to pull the wool over the eyes of the forum. An airborne operation was still a very long shot, but was at least plausible. But the airborne forces in 1940 were inadequate for the task and had suffered losses in the summer that they had not yet recovered. Previous wargame tests of this show it would need at least two airborne divs (which did not exist) in June or July able to capure forward airfileds and a port and hold it for 4-6 days whilst reinfor cements arrived. Virtually impossible in other words.
But anyway, assuming that by some miracle the LW could achieve air superiority, that still leaves the invasion fleet the task of getting across the channel. The invasion fleet was coming from some pretty far flung points of embarkation, Le Havre, Boulogne, Calais, ports in Holland even Germany. On average the distance to be covered was not 20 or even 40 miles, it was a whopping 80-100 miles. The speed of advance for the invaders was at best 2 knots, but this did not take into account tidal flows and currents. In reality the rate of advance might be 1.5 or even 1 knot. That means the troops are embarked for 120-150 hours (allowing for embarkation, or 6-8 days. Who in this forum has spent any time in a landing craft. Its miserable. After 8 days cooped up in a makeshift barge men would be dying from thirst and exposure. And in no condition to fight I can tell you.
On top of that the actual journey is around 4 days, thats 3 consecutive nights that British Destroyers would unrelentingly play havoc with the invasion fleet. 3 days that the Luftwaffe, or the Kriegsmarine could do virtually nothing to protect them. Sure, destroyers would be lost to mines, the odd pop gun set up on the forecaastle of some trawler trying to protect the troops, or some very lucky LW pilot. Remember also that experience shows very clearly that only specially trained crews adept at anti-shipping operations could undertake attacks on Destroyers with any reasonable prospect of success. One only has to look at he experiences of the italians in the Med, torpedo armed or high level bombing, it really doesnt make a difference.....if your crews arent trained to attack ships, they are going to miss more than they hit. and the LW had few resources to attack ships a this time. Its specially trained shipping unit was still recovering from the Norway operation.
Anyone who thinks a cross channel attack was possible with the resopurces available to the germans in the fall of 1940, with or without air superiority is kidding themselves and trying to pull the wool over the eyes of the forum. An airborne operation was still a very long shot, but was at least plausible. But the airborne forces in 1940 were inadequate for the task and had suffered losses in the summer that they had not yet recovered. Previous wargame tests of this show it would need at least two airborne divs (which did not exist) in June or July able to capure forward airfileds and a port and hold it for 4-6 days whilst reinfor cements arrived. Virtually impossible in other words.
wuzak
Captain
I think I would travel around France looking for things to add to my collections (art, wines, etc) and take them back home.
Then I would tell Hitler what he wants to hear...
I would also send some bombers at night so that I could tell Hitler that I have a 24 hour effort and that Britain won't last much longer.
Then I would tell Hitler what he wants to hear...
I would also send some bombers at night so that I could tell Hitler that I have a 24 hour effort and that Britain won't last much longer.
parsifal
Colonel
The attached document assessing the capailities in April 1942 gives figures of 6 knots as you suggest. However the fact that some craft could do 30 knots, others 6 knots, and others still 2 knots (because they were towed) means that the fleet speed regardless of the speed of individual units is 2 knots. In 1940, a vaas number of the craft to be used were the so-called Rhine Barges......which had no motor and had to be towed. Because of stability of the barges they were estimated at the time to not be able to make better speed than 2 knots.
And, as you will see from the intelligence reports, the invasion barges were scattered from Germany to Le Havre.
Finally, thanks for the back handed insult about not knowing about barges.......
Glider
Captain
Its often forgotten that in May 1940 the RN were often bombarding Calais with light cruisers and at time BB's so the german control of the channel was at best a pipe dream
And the RN had every intention of contesting the Channel.
This is from the weekly resume for 5-12 September 1940,the very point at which the Luftwaffe gave up trying to break Fighter Command and turned to London.
There never was the slightest chance of the Wermacht getting across the Channel,let alone mounting a successful invasion of southern England. "Sealion" was a bluff and it got called.
Cheers
Steve
This is from the weekly resume for 5-12 September 1940,the very point at which the Luftwaffe gave up trying to break Fighter Command and turned to London.
There never was the slightest chance of the Wermacht getting across the Channel,let alone mounting a successful invasion of southern England. "Sealion" was a bluff and it got called.
Cheers
Steve
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parsifal
Colonel
at last steve, something that we agree on in this debate
Indeed!
On 12th November 1939,even before the fall of France,a letter was written to General Sir Walter Kirke at the headquarters of Home Forces. It said that the Germans had
"..been extraordinarily successful in keeping us in a constant state of panic."
It continued.
"The invasion scare is,of course,the wildest of the lot.We kept back tens of thousands of men who were needed in France in the last war to deal with this bogey. Invasion was unlikely enough then,but now,with the development of air power,the probability of its even being attempted appears to me to be infinitessimal."
That letter was written by Dowding and he never believed,even after the catastrophe in France,that an invasion was possible.
Even as the eagle was about to fall off its perch,rather than swooping to the kill on "adlertag",as Telford Taylor famously put it, Hitler's thoughts were turning East. According to Goering Hitler considered "the defeat of Russia to be the prerequisite for a collapse of British resistance."
As I said "Sealion" was a bluff,even the Germans knew they couldn't have pulled it off.
Cheers
Steve
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From the source of Parsifal
speed: "unknown, but unlikely to exceed 6 kts with 2 barges" so is not 2
on the ports: (the barges) "but it is improbable that they would be used for a passage of any considerable lenghts" the english intelligence report time of passage also from ports from Germany but this is not the same that germans plans to use it. in the 1940 plan they used only french and belgian port maybe in '42 they planned also dutch ports.
speed: "unknown, but unlikely to exceed 6 kts with 2 barges" so is not 2
on the ports: (the barges) "but it is improbable that they would be used for a passage of any considerable lenghts" the english intelligence report time of passage also from ports from Germany but this is not the same that germans plans to use it. in the 1940 plan they used only french and belgian port maybe in '42 they planned also dutch ports.
parsifal
Colonel
Nope, that is incorrect. By 1942 the germans had made improvements to the brages that increased the speed of the invasion barges to 6 knots. that entailed plans to re-engine most of the tow vessels. in 1940, the German operational plan had estimated they needed about 1200 tugs, and this reduced the size of the tugs such that even vessels with only 250hp motors were expected to tow the large Rhine river barges. best sea speed of these craft was estimated (by the KM) to be no more than 2 knots.
The plan in its original form was a broad front affair, involving two complete army groups, one using Cherbourg, Le Havre and most of the Channel Ports as the ports of embarkation. The second Army Group was forced to rely on the Ports of Ostend, Antwerp, and everything as far east as Bremen as the embarkation points. This plan was resisted by the Navy, who advocated a much narrower frontage, undertaken by just a single army group. The Fuhrer accepted the navy' arguments and shipping began to be prepred for a crossing scheduled for August, but due to bad weather in August it was eventually put back to September 16. The poor weather played havoc with the fleet prepration. The rhine barges which still formed the bulk of the invasion transports had been concentrasted in German Ports, where changes and modifications were being undertaken. In total there were 2500 vessels involved including 168 MV transports totalling 414000 GRT of shipping. These were nearly all concentrated in Germany. In addition 1600 of the 2300 barges also remained in Germany awaiting their preprations for invasions.
There were insufficient dockyard spaces in the Channel to undertake either the barge modifications or the embarkations in anything like a reasonable time frame. So the Germans cooked up another hair brained scheme. They would undertake the necessary modifications in German ports, and embark some of the troops from those same ports. Mostly willhelmhaven and Bremen. Some transports would be moved along the coast to Antwerp and Ostend where it was hoped that the 2nd and third waves of the invasion could be embarkewd. But in order to get into position in time the transports needed to start movement before anyone else......a dead giveaway that the invasion was underway if detected, and the reason why the Navy absolutely needed air supremacy in order to have any chance. They needed to keep Bdetecting the barge movements for as long as possibloe.
The whole plan was a massive excercise in self delusion. it never had a snowflakes chance in hell of being pulled off.
To give you some idea of what the KM thought of its own plan, Ive attached a translated version of their own assessment. Its damning in its criticism.
The plan in its original form was a broad front affair, involving two complete army groups, one using Cherbourg, Le Havre and most of the Channel Ports as the ports of embarkation. The second Army Group was forced to rely on the Ports of Ostend, Antwerp, and everything as far east as Bremen as the embarkation points. This plan was resisted by the Navy, who advocated a much narrower frontage, undertaken by just a single army group. The Fuhrer accepted the navy' arguments and shipping began to be prepred for a crossing scheduled for August, but due to bad weather in August it was eventually put back to September 16. The poor weather played havoc with the fleet prepration. The rhine barges which still formed the bulk of the invasion transports had been concentrasted in German Ports, where changes and modifications were being undertaken. In total there were 2500 vessels involved including 168 MV transports totalling 414000 GRT of shipping. These were nearly all concentrated in Germany. In addition 1600 of the 2300 barges also remained in Germany awaiting their preprations for invasions.
There were insufficient dockyard spaces in the Channel to undertake either the barge modifications or the embarkations in anything like a reasonable time frame. So the Germans cooked up another hair brained scheme. They would undertake the necessary modifications in German ports, and embark some of the troops from those same ports. Mostly willhelmhaven and Bremen. Some transports would be moved along the coast to Antwerp and Ostend where it was hoped that the 2nd and third waves of the invasion could be embarkewd. But in order to get into position in time the transports needed to start movement before anyone else......a dead giveaway that the invasion was underway if detected, and the reason why the Navy absolutely needed air supremacy in order to have any chance. They needed to keep Bdetecting the barge movements for as long as possibloe.
The whole plan was a massive excercise in self delusion. it never had a snowflakes chance in hell of being pulled off.
To give you some idea of what the KM thought of its own plan, Ive attached a translated version of their own assessment. Its damning in its criticism.
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The Wermacht did not posses a single specialised landing craft of any type. Even had this fleet crossed the Channel (unlikely verging on impossible)they had no realistic means of getting ashore. Infantry were to paddle themselves in inflateable dinghys and on rafts,as for the armour in its concrete bottomed barges........
As Parsifal says the whole thing was ridiculous.
Compare it with the Allied effort on D day. Even that nearly came unstuck ,only with an outstanding effort did Americans get themselves off Omaha beach.
Cheers
Steve
As Parsifal says the whole thing was ridiculous.
Compare it with the Allied effort on D day. Even that nearly came unstuck ,only with an outstanding effort did Americans get themselves off Omaha beach.
Cheers
Steve
meatloaf109
1st Lieutenant
You forgot about having a few more uniforms made, and getting some more medals to display on them.
Sorry Parsifal what is the source for barges can not be towed to 6 knts in 1940?
on the port again in 1940 was planed to use french and belgian harbours the CONF102 agree with this, the early Army requirements for 2 army group never get a naval plan
on the port again in 1940 was planed to use french and belgian harbours the CONF102 agree with this, the early Army requirements for 2 army group never get a naval plan
parsifal
Colonel
suggest you have a close look at the KM plan again. The shipping was ordered to ports in germany, not the french coast. As were the majority of barges. The ports of departure for the initial waves were indeed the channel ports, but the embarkation and assembly of these elements were to be in those ports. There was no capacity to absorb the second and third waves, which by necessity had to come from German ports, where the shipping was being concentrated. i dont know how much you know about amphibious operations, but it takes several weeks or months to concentrate the shipping at the port of embarkation, then you move to the landing point. If the Germans wanted to undertake the operation in August or September, the shipping had to be at the point wherer the troops were going to be loaded. its not just a case of throwing a few troops on a transport over a few hours....its takes time to tactically load the trasnports so that everything comes out of the ship in the right order.
Since the ports in the channel were already filled with only a fraction of the barges, and none oe of the transports, and once they left the ports they would not hang around in the middle of the ocean, there was no other alternative other than to load and begin the movements of waves 2 and 3 from the more distant ports of embarkation. Quite simply the size of the plan dictated that some of the troops come from as far away as Germany. Moreover some 500 of the barges remained in Le havre and Cherbourg, so these too were being loaded in prepration from those ports.
its simply a physical impossibility to load and pass through all the necessary traffic from the Channel ports. The port of Antwerp was bigger, but ostend, calais and boulogne were basically fishing ports.
Dunkirk had been undertaken fom these ports. this was no invasion, it was an evacuation.....with no thought of tactical loading, or indeed any equipment at all. To get the troops out of that pocket, it still took from 26th May until 4 June using a greater tonnage of ships and involving a similar number of troops (338000 without equipment were evacuated, compared to about 300000 with equipment, with about 100000 in the 1st wave in the cut down german invasion plan). Contrary to popular belief, most of the troops in the evacuation were evacuated from the port, not off the beach. Why do you suppose it took eight days to complete this operation. the answer is simple, there was not the port handling capacity to deal with it any faster. You have more ports, but you have to undetake tactical loading and have the embarkation process finished in about 48 hours, give or take. The Germans would have faced a similar problem, but larger and more complex, hence the inescapable need to decentralise the embarkation points.
The reports Ive already given gives you the information on the engine sizes for the barges, and hence the speed. at home I have the report that will give the speeds for you if that is what you need. You can choose to not accept those figures if you want.
But it never ceases to amaze me how people even today, still seem to view the cross channel attack as some kind of glorified river crossing. It was anything but that. amphibious crossings are amongst the most complex of all military operations, and port capacities, shipping concentrations, points of embarkation and discharge capabilities are a part of that problem. we havenet even looked as yet at the movement of the tides and winds, let alone mines, and enemy activities.
Even if you want to insist that the fleet speed is 6 knots, that still equates to a travel distance of over 30 hours. When you allow for assmbly times, the need to negotiate relatively clear channels through minefields, the tides and currents, that will equate to about 50 hours in the water. Long enough for the British destroyers to attack over two nights.
The 1974 RMC wargame did see the germans getting ashore, having suffered 25% casualties in getting there. Thats greatrer than the casualties suffered at Gallipoli incidentally. But they only got ashore because the situation was fudged....the RN was not allowed to react for 24 hours, and all the Germans were loaded in the Channel ports. Neither of these assumptions were ever true, they were given simply to make a game of the excercise. nobody likes being sunk even before you have the chance to fire a shot.....
Attached is a map of the modified Sealion Plan
Since the ports in the channel were already filled with only a fraction of the barges, and none oe of the transports, and once they left the ports they would not hang around in the middle of the ocean, there was no other alternative other than to load and begin the movements of waves 2 and 3 from the more distant ports of embarkation. Quite simply the size of the plan dictated that some of the troops come from as far away as Germany. Moreover some 500 of the barges remained in Le havre and Cherbourg, so these too were being loaded in prepration from those ports.
its simply a physical impossibility to load and pass through all the necessary traffic from the Channel ports. The port of Antwerp was bigger, but ostend, calais and boulogne were basically fishing ports.
Dunkirk had been undertaken fom these ports. this was no invasion, it was an evacuation.....with no thought of tactical loading, or indeed any equipment at all. To get the troops out of that pocket, it still took from 26th May until 4 June using a greater tonnage of ships and involving a similar number of troops (338000 without equipment were evacuated, compared to about 300000 with equipment, with about 100000 in the 1st wave in the cut down german invasion plan). Contrary to popular belief, most of the troops in the evacuation were evacuated from the port, not off the beach. Why do you suppose it took eight days to complete this operation. the answer is simple, there was not the port handling capacity to deal with it any faster. You have more ports, but you have to undetake tactical loading and have the embarkation process finished in about 48 hours, give or take. The Germans would have faced a similar problem, but larger and more complex, hence the inescapable need to decentralise the embarkation points.
The reports Ive already given gives you the information on the engine sizes for the barges, and hence the speed. at home I have the report that will give the speeds for you if that is what you need. You can choose to not accept those figures if you want.
But it never ceases to amaze me how people even today, still seem to view the cross channel attack as some kind of glorified river crossing. It was anything but that. amphibious crossings are amongst the most complex of all military operations, and port capacities, shipping concentrations, points of embarkation and discharge capabilities are a part of that problem. we havenet even looked as yet at the movement of the tides and winds, let alone mines, and enemy activities.
Even if you want to insist that the fleet speed is 6 knots, that still equates to a travel distance of over 30 hours. When you allow for assmbly times, the need to negotiate relatively clear channels through minefields, the tides and currents, that will equate to about 50 hours in the water. Long enough for the British destroyers to attack over two nights.
The 1974 RMC wargame did see the germans getting ashore, having suffered 25% casualties in getting there. Thats greatrer than the casualties suffered at Gallipoli incidentally. But they only got ashore because the situation was fudged....the RN was not allowed to react for 24 hours, and all the Germans were loaded in the Channel ports. Neither of these assumptions were ever true, they were given simply to make a game of the excercise. nobody likes being sunk even before you have the chance to fire a shot.....
Attached is a map of the modified Sealion Plan
Attachments
![Sealionplan Map[1].jpg](/forum/data/attachments/201/201597-61195be906241b2363e5943437ced288.jpg)
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SPEKTRE76
Airman 1st Class
In addition to my previous post I would have fitted captured Spitfires and Hurricanes with some sort of plant killing spray in a drop tank and 'crop dust' all farms and fields that live stock or fowl were kept. This would be an attempt to starve the RAF and Her Majesty's Army.
Shortround6
Major General
Very shaky ground, It might open the door for the British to respond with "chemical warfare" of their own.
- Thread starter
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wiking85
Staff Sergeant
Operation Vegetation.
parsifal
Colonel
"The main planning for the operation came out of two directives from Hitler and a supplemental one from the OKW, the first of which was issued on 16 July 1940. Up to this point, various meetings had occurred and planning documents had been issued by all three services and their High Commands from as far back as late 1939, including a memo from Jodl dated 12 July 1940 which alluded to the operation being called Löwe (Lion) and being a broad front operation, not much more complex than an extended river crossing. While the Heer found the idea appealing, rivers are not tidal, are not subject to severe weather and don't have the enemy's Home Fleet in a position to contest the crossing. Following this was a meeting between Hitler, von Brauchitsch, and General der Artillerie Franz Halder (the Army Chief of Staff) on 13 July 1940, where Halder presented more detailed planning proposals that outlined an operation incorporating 39 divisions and around 500,000 men (published 20 July). Hitler authorised continued preparations but was puzzled over the lack of peace feelers from Britain, as he once again outlined that he would prefer a negotiated settlement as he did not wish to hand Britain a military defeat which would disrupt the empire and only be of benefit to Japan and the USA. Hitler also reviewed his decision to reduce the size of the army by thirty-five divisions to release additional manpower for the economy and scaled it down to a reduction of fifteen divisions.
Fuhrer Directive No. 16 issued on 16 July 1940 stated that the Wehrmacht would 'begin preparations for, and if necessary carry out, an invasion of England. The aim of this operation is to eliminate Great Britain as a base of operations from which the war against Germany can be fought and, if necessary, the island will be completely occupied.' An invasion would be carried out on a broad front and preparations completed by mid-August. The Luftwaffe would eliminate the RAF as an effective fighting force and interdict the Royal Navy should it try to intervene and the Kriegsmarine would furnish an invasion fleet and protect it. Current army plans would form the basis of the operation, although the line would be shortened slightly to between Ramsgate and the Isle of Wight. Hitler also confirmed that the operation would be codenamed Seelöwe (Sealion). In some ways, it seemed that the Luftwaffe was expected to almost defeat Britain by itself. Goring and his commanders however, mostly ignored the directive and continued with their own plans - they thought an invasion was going to be unnecessary anyway, while Raeder and the Kriegsmarine thought that OKW was insane. From this point, the Heer continued to be the main supporter of the plan, with the Luftwaffe lukewarm to the idea and the Kriegsmarine trying to torpedo the Heer's plan.
Following Fuhrer Directive No. 16, in which many historians highlight the words 'and if necessary carry out, an invasion' as an indication of Hitler's lack of commitment, the second half of July was filled with various staff meetings and proposals where the Luftwaffe confirmed it would be able to start a major air campaign against the RAF in early August but the Kriegsmarine would not be able to complete its preparations until mid-September. On 28 July 1940, they proposed that if the invasion were to go ahead that a beachhead be established near Dover, the closest point to the continent, where a narrow corridor could be protected by minefields to each side as well as groups of U-Boats and E-Boats beyond these. The Kriegsmarine estimated it would take ten days to put the first wave ashore and needless to say, the Heer was horrified. It had wanted landings all along the south coast to occur on a 24 hour timetable.
The plan at this point wanted wheeled and tracked vehicles and so all the car ferries were to be used along with all the cross-channel tourist facilities. The first wave was to be landed over three to four days and consist of 260,000 men, 30,000 vehicles and 60,000 horses. This was followed by a memo dated 31 July 1940, which advised that given the Kriegsmarine's preparations were complete . It could not however, guarantee to able to protect the invasion from the Royal Navy and would not be able to guarantee resupply if there was indeed bad weather. It was suggested that the invasion was put off until May 1941 when additional surface assets would be available and additional work be able to be carried out on converting or building vessels to allow for amphibious operations.
Eventually the plan was pared down to the point of proposing a first wave odf some 100-150000 men. It remained a totally unworkable and unrealistic plan.
With regard to vulnerability, one only need examine the british Destroyer dispositions to realize just how dangerously exposed this plan was
Fuhrer Directive No. 16 issued on 16 July 1940 stated that the Wehrmacht would 'begin preparations for, and if necessary carry out, an invasion of England. The aim of this operation is to eliminate Great Britain as a base of operations from which the war against Germany can be fought and, if necessary, the island will be completely occupied.' An invasion would be carried out on a broad front and preparations completed by mid-August. The Luftwaffe would eliminate the RAF as an effective fighting force and interdict the Royal Navy should it try to intervene and the Kriegsmarine would furnish an invasion fleet and protect it. Current army plans would form the basis of the operation, although the line would be shortened slightly to between Ramsgate and the Isle of Wight. Hitler also confirmed that the operation would be codenamed Seelöwe (Sealion). In some ways, it seemed that the Luftwaffe was expected to almost defeat Britain by itself. Goring and his commanders however, mostly ignored the directive and continued with their own plans - they thought an invasion was going to be unnecessary anyway, while Raeder and the Kriegsmarine thought that OKW was insane. From this point, the Heer continued to be the main supporter of the plan, with the Luftwaffe lukewarm to the idea and the Kriegsmarine trying to torpedo the Heer's plan.
Following Fuhrer Directive No. 16, in which many historians highlight the words 'and if necessary carry out, an invasion' as an indication of Hitler's lack of commitment, the second half of July was filled with various staff meetings and proposals where the Luftwaffe confirmed it would be able to start a major air campaign against the RAF in early August but the Kriegsmarine would not be able to complete its preparations until mid-September. On 28 July 1940, they proposed that if the invasion were to go ahead that a beachhead be established near Dover, the closest point to the continent, where a narrow corridor could be protected by minefields to each side as well as groups of U-Boats and E-Boats beyond these. The Kriegsmarine estimated it would take ten days to put the first wave ashore and needless to say, the Heer was horrified. It had wanted landings all along the south coast to occur on a 24 hour timetable.
The plan at this point wanted wheeled and tracked vehicles and so all the car ferries were to be used along with all the cross-channel tourist facilities. The first wave was to be landed over three to four days and consist of 260,000 men, 30,000 vehicles and 60,000 horses. This was followed by a memo dated 31 July 1940, which advised that given the Kriegsmarine's preparations were complete . It could not however, guarantee to able to protect the invasion from the Royal Navy and would not be able to guarantee resupply if there was indeed bad weather. It was suggested that the invasion was put off until May 1941 when additional surface assets would be available and additional work be able to be carried out on converting or building vessels to allow for amphibious operations.
Eventually the plan was pared down to the point of proposing a first wave odf some 100-150000 men. It remained a totally unworkable and unrealistic plan.
With regard to vulnerability, one only need examine the british Destroyer dispositions to realize just how dangerously exposed this plan was
Attachments
![sealion naval german order battle [1].jpg](/forum/data/attachments/201/201611-089ad04ac924c3068eb728e4944bc5eb.jpg)
![sealion german order battle [1] - Copy.jpg](/forum/data/attachments/201/201612-d92aede6d3c27ed9f6220af97a41e5d0.jpg)
Parsifal so help me to find tell me the pages i can read for find this german port.
Again you've not source for tell that barges go only a 2 kts in 1940, and a 6 kts non need 30 hours for the passage, also in the far barges invasion bases were enough near to need less 20 hours probably less.
Again you've not source for tell that barges go only a 2 kts in 1940, and a 6 kts non need 30 hours for the passage, also in the far barges invasion bases were enough near to need less 20 hours probably less.
