You are in charge of the Luftwaffe: July 1940

[Juha]

...Incidentally,in response to a comment way back in the thread,there was no plan to withdraw the RAF North of the Thames unless the Germans mounted an invasion because this was considered to leave too many vital targets unprotected. Such a move,prior to an invasion,would be an admission of defeat.

Cheers

Steve

In war you adapt or die, if enemy knocked out your best system you try something else. If enemy are overwhelming you you will try to evade the worst strikes. With prevailing winds being from SSW and SW, squadrons taking off a bit N or NE of London were at least already climbing to right direction.

Juha

 

[stona]

Following citations in a different thread,I've been revisiting Horst Boog,a man whose interpretation of history I rarely agree with. His research however is impeccable.

He makes some interesting points as to why the Luftwaffe failed.

Firstly the Luftwaffe assault only began on 12/13 August giving the RAF seven weeks after the fall of France to develop and test its defences. Boog ignores the effect the substantial losses suffered by the Luftwaffe in the Battle of France (more than the first six weeks of the BoB). The Luftwaffe also needed time to set up the essential ground organisation,stocks of fuel and weapons had to be gathered. Workshops and billets had to be prepared and a skilled and unskilled workforce assembled.

More saliently he highlights the complete lack of a coherent strategy on the German side. Should Britain be invaded? Should she be isolated by eliminating the Soviet Union,her only potential European ally? Should Germany sieze Gibralter and/or the Suez canal? Would she agree to peace on German terms?

He considers the German offensive against Britain to have been a hasty improvisation and here Cox agrees with him. Cox writes that in the Luftwaffe's campign everything was attempted but not in a logical order and,crucially,without persistence. A combination of over confidence and poor intelligence led to an ill directed campaign.

Cheers
Steve

 

[Glider]

E-4/N then..

Even this would be hard pushed to catch a PR Spit. Generally speaking the PR Spits roamed almost at will over occupied countries and Berlin throughout the whole war, why would this be any different in home airspace?
A PR Spit would only have to do its job, spot the raids with bombers and those without, then clear off. Compared to the 109 it had fuel to spare and a higher ceiling. Turn inland and either climb or simply go flat out.

 

[Shortround6]

A problem with using quotes from leaders at the time was that they KNEW what their own situation was but were GUESSING at what their opponents situation was. Both sides were over-claiming to a considerable extent and neither knew what the opponents replacement schedule was. British leaders KNEW what their losses and replacements were but were guessing as to what shape the Luftwaffe was in. Likewise the Luftwaffe KNEW what shape they were in but kept getting surprised when the supposedly destroyed RAF kept showing up. A bit like two boxers going into the 10th round. Both could be near defeat, it is a question of which gets lucky or looses heart first.

A problem for the Luftwaffe is the longer it drags on the worse it gets for them while the longer it drags on the better it gets for the British. Every week that it drags on the more equipment comes out of the factories to re-equip the men brought back from Dunkirk. In addition to aircraft, every week sees more AA guns. Every week sees the fall weather (Oct-Nov) get closer which reduces the threat of invasion. Every week brings more beach defenses and more preparation. The longer it drags on the less likely the British are to break and sue for peace unless the Germans can really inflect much more damage than they did historically.
Up until the BoB the Germans had never been stopped let alone beaten. Just fighting to a draw was the best result anybody had gotten so far. few people knew how hard a cross channel invasion would really have been. As the fear of the cross channel invasion fades the air war becomes the focus instead of the prelude.
The Germans to better than they did historically need to push the British harder than they did and make it seem much more like a sure thing than a close race. The Window of opportunity is small and gets smaller with each passing week.

 

[stona]

I'm not sure that PR Spitfires could have been used in this Recon role. Not least of all because in July 1940 there were only 12 of them and because in June 1940 they had been transferred to Coastal Command.
Alfred Price has written,
"During the summer of 1940,as the Battle of Britain raged over southern England,the lone Spitfires of the PRU ranged far and wide over north-western Europe and returned with photographs of enemy movements and dispositions."
It seeems they were doing what they were supposed to do,and I can find no reference to them reconnoitering Luftwaffe raids.
Cheers
Steve

 

[stona]

A problem with using quotes from leaders at the time was that they KNEW what their own situation was but were GUESSING at what their opponents situation was.

But respected historians like Taylor,Cox and even Boog aren't guessing.

You'll notice that many of the leaders' quotes are from after the event and with the benefit of hindsight.

I'm seeing a lot of contrary opinions expressed but I'm not seeing them backed up with a lot of historical references. I feel I have supplied a considerable number of references from the protagonists and from later historians and I'm not seeing much similar material posted to contradict my view.


British anti aircraft defences in the summer of 1940 were in a parlous state,but that's another topic.

Cheers
Steve

 

[Glider]

I'm not sure that PR Spitfires could have been used in this Recon role. Not least of all because in July 1940 there were only 12 of them and because in June 1940 they had been transferred to Coastal Command.
Alfred Price has written,
"During the summer of 1940,as the Battle of Britain raged over southern England,the lone Spitfires of the PRU ranged far and wide over north-western Europe and returned with photographs of enemy movements and dispositions."
It seeems they were doing what they were supposed to do,and I can find no reference to them reconnoitering Luftwaffe raids.
Cheers
Steve

It was only a guess, clearly they used something Presumably normal Spits with orders to get out once the job was done.

 

[stona]

It was only a guess, clearly they used something Presumably normal Spits with orders to get out once the job was done.

Yes,I'm not disputing that it was done but I'm b*ggered if I can find out by who
Cheers
Steve

 

[Juha]

I'm not sure that PR Spitfires could have been used in this Recon role. Not least of all because in July 1940 there were only 12 of them and because in June 1940 they had been transferred to Coastal Command.
Alfred Price has written,
"During the summer of 1940,as the Battle of Britain raged over southern England,the lone Spitfires of the PRU ranged far and wide over north-western Europe and returned with photographs of enemy movements and dispositions."
It seeems they were doing what they were supposed to do,and I can find no reference to them reconnoitering Luftwaffe raids.
Cheers
Steve

Now they were not PR Spits but Spit Mk IIAs, when LW high flying 109E fighter-bombers proved to be hard to intercept, FC formed No 421 Flight to fly "Jim Crow" missions on 8 Oct 40, one or two Spits would patrol the coast and over the Channel at high altitude in order to report on movements of enemy a/c, and the tactics they adopted in combat. 421 became later on No 91 Sqn.

Juha

 

[stona]

Now they were not PR Spits but Spit Mk IIAs, when LW high flying 109E fighter-bombers proved to be hard to intercept, FC formed No 421 Flight to fly "Jim Crow" missions on 8 Oct 40, one or two Spits would patrol the coast and over the Channel at high altitude in order to report on movements of enemy a/c, and the tactics they adopted in combat. 421 became later on No 91 Sqn.
Juha

Thanks for that.
8th October lies outside what the British at least consider the Battle of Britain.
Cheers
Steve

 

[Juha]

Thanks for that.
8th October lies outside what the British at least consider the Battle of Britain.
Cheers
Steve

If there had been need the unit would have been formed earlier.

 

[stona]

If there had been need the unit would have been formed earlier.

I understand that it was a response to a change in Luftwaffe tactics and the need not to be suckered into rising to "Jabo" raids but still to respond to raids by escorted bombers. Radar could not distinguish the make up of a raid.
The change in tactics had effectively signalled,for the British,the end of the Battle of Britain. The pressure was off Fighter Command and it could now afford the fuel,wear and tear on aircraft and tiring of air crews which Dowding had been so desperate to avoid in early 1940.
Park always thought that Battle of Britain day should have been the 7th not the 15th of September.
421 Flight was effectively just another and new link in Britain's integrated air defence system.It was certainly not a substitute for any part of it.
Cheers
Steve

 

[parsifal]

I think it was Plautus who said (somethig along the lines of) "it is a poor commander who devises a plan that is so inflexible that it cannot be adapted to meet the changing fortunes of battle".

On that logic, Dowding was a fool, the Germans incredibly stupid people and the Battle Of Britiain a battle that should have been lost.

Plautus was certainly correct. his maxim on military operations remains as valid today as it did in 209BC.

I do not believe any of the other three conclusions that must be reached if the FC defence system was so vulnerable, are in fact true. Dowding in fact was brilliant. The Germans were not stupid, and the battle Of Britain was not a battle easily lost. And thats because the FC defensive system was so flexible, so hard to knock over because it was so flexible.


Why would I say that. If Dowding devised an air defence system (and he was its heart and soul) that could be easily taken out, and that system was so dependant on each part working efficiently, why the hell didnt the germans, who gave it a hell of a shuv albeit in many different directions, could not get the better of it. the reason is because the basic premise behind the claim.....that it was an inherently vulbnerable system, is so wrong as to be laughable.

Radar was critical alright. But knocking out the system, enmasse was anything but simple. Saying that the Germans didnt know what it was for is also a smoke screen....if they didnt know what it was for, why were they busy building a similar network (and better) themselves?

The key to understanding FC system is three words, not one. Those three words are "integrated", "interlocking" and "resilient" . "Integrated" means that it was a massive force multiplier.....it was able to call on the resources of all the forces available to deal with all the threats appropriately, or to the maximum potential available to the defending force. "Interlocking" means that as an opponent seeking to neutralize it you needed to knock out the whole system or at least most of the system. "Resilient" means that the system had very good powers of recovery.

Admittedly we dont have a lot of history to base what might have happened if the Germans had somehow decided to concentrate on one thing, or one aspect of the system. But the attack of the 12 August do show that they tried to knock out a large portion of the radar netowk, using their prcision bombing unit, through which poured a sizable force of bombers. One would expect that given the alleged vulnberabilty of the system, that there might be some inkling of faltering RAF effort or worsening loss ratios. To be fair, the Germans did break through and pasted one airfield. They temporaily knocked out 4 stations, but 3 for less than 24 hours. Manston (the airfield knocked out of business) should have been closed, but not because of these raids, mearely because it was too exposed. Dowding evidently wasnt phased enough by losses to allow its closure....it remained open throughout the battle for propaganda reasons (suggesting the British had resources enough to waste onm propaganda).

But in reality the attacks on the 12th were no more successful than some of the other raids the Germans undertook, and decidely less than one or two at least. There was no significant change in the loss ratios (in fact they may have tipped slightly in favour of the RAF. If the German losses included losses to their specialised precison bombing unit, then it was an unqualified victory for the RAF that day).

So despite all the posturing going on over this issue, what evidence have we that on the one occasion the Germans did make a serious effort at taking out the British defence system, that it had any significant effect at all. There is none.

 

[stona]

Historians of air warfare like Cox and Boog,historians of the intelligence war like Thomas,and military historians like Taylor have studied this in considerably more depth than any of us and reached a diametrically opposite conclusion to you. They all believe that a better informed and better coordinated campaign by the Luftwaffe in 1940 could,not would have defeated Fighter Command.
You don't have to accept my view or theirs,but I have ploughed through many of their(and others) publications and some of their sources and their arguments are persuasive for me.
Your opinion is yours and you are entitled to it just as I am to mine. I feel I have some illustrious backers for mine.
With that I bid you good day. I shall not be returning to this thread as I have no more to add.
Cheers
Steve

 

[Tante Ju]

Even this would be hard pushed to catch a PR Spit.

No. Even a common Emil could do that. The PR Spit wasn't anything special during 1940. Just a regular Spit, with some polish and marginally higher top speed. Some had huge bulges on the wing, that definitely did not help to make them faster.

Generally speaking the PR Spits roamed almost at will over occupied countries and Berlin throughout the whole war, why would this be any different in home airspace?

Because when roaming over Europe the problem with PR (Spit or any other) aircraft was to locate them and vector the fighters on a good vector to make contact. It was the difficult part, since the interceptors would need a good time to climb to their altitude, and make a good vector. Once that happened, catching them wasn't all that hard. This was why Jabo 109s were so difficult to shoot down in 1940.

If a PR Spit is used to spy on formations, the root of the problem is eliminated. Enemy fighters are already in contact, all they have to do is to point to nose towards the singe dot in the sky and firewall the throttle.

A PR Spit would only have to do its job, spot the raids with bombers and those without, then clear off. Compared to the 109 it had fuel to spare and a higher ceiling. Turn inland and either climb or simply go flat out.

That should work if the PR Spit would had have performance or endurance advantage but it simply did not. What you have in mind is a magic uninterceptable plane, which the PR Spit was not. Good tactics can help, but a lone aircraft tailing a large formation is a extreme high risk job once fighters are near. What is likely to happen is that a 109 Rotte leaves the bombers chases down and shoots down the lone plane, just like they would do with any other Spitfire. PR Spits weren't any different. And at this point, you are probably better off polishing regular fighter Squadron machines for the occasional odd job.

 

[wiking85]

Historians of air warfare like Cox and Boog,historians of the intelligence war like Thomas,and military historians like Taylor have studied this in considerably more depth than any of us and reached a diametrically opposite conclusion to you. They all believe that a better informed and better coordinated campaign by the Luftwaffe in 1940 could,not would have defeated Fighter Command.
You don't have to accept my view or theirs,but I have ploughed through many of their(and others) publications and some of their sources and their arguments are persuasive for me.
Your opinion is yours and you are entitled to it just as I am to mine. I feel I have some illustrious backers for mine.
With that I bid you good day. I shall not be returning to this thread as I have no more to add.
Cheers
Steve

Could you list other sources so we can check out their publications for ourselves?

 

[parsifal]

Historians of air warfare like Cox and Boog,historians of the intelligence war like Thomas,and military historians like Taylor have studied this in considerably more depth than any of us and reached a diametrically opposite conclusion to you. They all believe that a better informed and better coordinated campaign by the Luftwaffe in 1940 could,not would have defeated Fighter Command.
You don't have to accept my view or theirs,but I have ploughed through many of their(and others) publications and some of their sources and their arguments are persuasive for me.
Your opinion is yours and you are entitled to it just as I am to mine. I feel I have some illustrious backers for mine.
With that I bid you good day. I shall not be returning to this thread as I have no more to add.
Cheers
Steve

Were it just my opinion it could be fairly easily dismissed. However its not. I had a university lecturer, who in 1974 was a witness and referee for what has become a famous wargame at Sandhurst of the invasion of Britain in 1940. There were several versions each time the rules were changed to favour the Germans more and more. In the beginning there was an air war component, but try as they might the "german" side could not gain the necessary air supremacy considered necessary for invasion. various strategies were tried, apparently including concentrating on the known radar stations. LW did not know all the locations apparently, and in the simulation, could not destroy the stations quick enough. Moreover the stations were always abale to give some inkling of strikes coming and their likely targets before being taken off line. Time and again, some radar stations were taken out, only to be repair in a matter of hours.

These are not my opinions, they are the observations of professional soldiers using wargaming techniques based on the same model as used by the germans themselves.

In the finish it was simply stated that the LW had gained air superiority (not quite enough), by means unkown. The invasion component started, and was a similar debacle. In the finish the referees simply forces the RN to remain in port for 26 hours to give the Germans a chance of getting ashore.

Historically, the Germans were again able to knock out a number of radar stations again on the 16th. Two in fact, due to a power failure. It made timely interception of LW raids difficult, thus enabling three or four airfields to bombed, but the defenders did make interceptions and inflicted the worst attrition on the LW for the entire battle, 72 machines lost on that day alone.

Historians I have a lot of respect for, and I do acknowledge that a lot of them share your belief,. but historians dont always get it right, and they usually dont have any operational experience or training. often they are just recycling what they have read elswhere

 

[Glider]

No. Even a common Emil could do that. The PR Spit wasn't anything special during 1940. Just a regular Spit, with some polish and marginally higher top speed. Some had huge bulges on the wing, that definitely did not help to make them faster.

Not quite. They were lighter without guns, ammo, armour and were adapted for extra speed, gaps filled extra polish and additional fuel tank behind the pilot. Also changes were made to the cockpit for better visibility. Compared to a normal Spit they were faster, climbed better and had a better ceiling.

Because when roaming over Europe the problem with PR (Spit or any other) aircraft was to locate them and vector the fighters on a good vector to make contact.

Remembering that you are over the UK without radar vectoring I don't see how it can be easier to guide your fighters onto the recce aircraft.

It was the difficult part, since the interceptors would need a good time to climb to their altitude, and make a good vector. Once that happened, catching them wasn't all that hard. This was why Jabo 109s were so difficult to shoot down in 1940.

Jabo's were difficult to intercept as they were low, picked up relatively late and went for home as soon as the job was done. A formation is spotted much earlier, the recce aircraft will have more time to get to altitude as they are on their own and don't have to wait for a squadron take off and forming up, plus the better climb perofrmance and can be guided to a safe spot to make the climb by ground control.

If a PR Spit is used to spy on formations, the root of the problem is eliminated. Enemy fighters are already in contact, all they have to do is to point to nose towards the singe dot in the sky and firewall the throttle.

And the red light will be blinking so much earlier telling them to turn for home

That should work if the PR Spit would had have performance or endurance advantage but it simply did not. What you have in mind is a magic uninterceptable plane, which the PR Spit was not. Good tactics can help, but a lone aircraft tailing a large formation is a extreme high risk job once fighters are near. What is likely to happen is that a 109 Rotte leaves the bombers chases down and shoots down the lone plane, just like they would do with any other Spitfire. PR Spits weren't any different. And at this point, you are probably better off polishing regular fighter Squadron machines for the occasional odd job.

No one is saying it was without risk, but as mentioned the 109 Rotte would be soon out of fuel trying to chase down an aircraft which is faster, climbs better and has more fuel to spare. The main danger is of course the recce spit not seeing the 109s.
Its obvious that the RAF used something for the role and wouldn't have continued if the losses were high. Presumably normal spits were used, I don't know but anything else would be very vulnerable but given the choice a PR version would in my mind be a better option.

 

[Vincenzo]

I don't think that Spit PR was usefull in this mission, the plane need to back to home before to give info would bee too late for operational use of info.

 

[stona]

There's some confusion here about what a PR Spitfire was in 1940.

As of 20th July 1940 the RAF had 12 PR Spitfires,All based on the Mk 1.

Eight were the IB version. This carried a F.24 camera with an 8" focal length in each wing,taking the place of the two inboard machine guns and ammunition boxes. All other armament was removed. Gun ports were faired over and the entire airframe was filled and sanded before a coat of what was to be known as PR Blue. (The earlier IA was painted in camotint which became Sky). It was reckoned to be 10-15 mph faster than the standard fighter version.
Standard Spitfire Is carried 40lb of ballast to compensate for the weight of the three bladed,two pitch,propeller and Cotton got permission to remove this and add a 29 gallon fuel tank behind the pilot,giving a radius of action of 325 miles.

Three were the IC version.This had a 30 gallon fixed blister tank under the port wing counter balanced by a similar blister under the starboard wing housing two F.24 cameras,like the IB with an 8" focal length. This now carried an extra 59 gallons of extra fuel more than a standard Spitfire I. One of these aircraft photographed Kiel on 8th April 1940.

One was the ID version. This version is what most people think of as a PR Spitfire.The cameras were fitted in the fuselage behind the cockpit. A 57 gallon fuel cell was fitted in the leading edge of each wing,where the steam condenser would have gone had evaporative cooling been used. This was a major modification and could only be carried out at the factory by Supermarine.Though work began early in 1940 only one of these aircraft was completed by July.A special reconnaissance aircraft was far from being a priority in the lead up to the Battle of Britain,the fighter version was required more urgently.

The ID did not see action until October 1940. It had 114 gallons of extra fuel in the wings,29 gallons behind the pilot and 14 gallons of extra oil. Behind the rear fuselage tank it could carry two F.24 cameras with 8" or 20" focal length lenses or two F.8s with 20" lenses.

It was so heavily laden on take off that it was nicknamed "the bowser". You can imagine the effect on its rate of climb and handling,the latter was marginal to put it mildly.

Wing Commander Tuttle:

"You could not fly straight and level for the first half hour after take off. Until you had emptied the rear tank,the aircraft hunted the whole time. The centre of gravity was so far back you couldn't control it. It was the sort of thing that would never have got in during peace time,but war is another matter."

Cheers

Steve