You are in charge of the Luftwaffe: July 1940

[Shortround6]

Something to be considered in these Schemes is that the Luftwaffe of Aug 1940 was not the Luftwaffe of the spring of 1941. The Do 17 can't make it to Liverpool and back without an Aux tank filling 1/2 the bomb bay. A fair number of the He 111s in service were the "P" model with two DB 601 engines, 1100hp for take-off? Early "H" models had Jumo 211s with power varying from 1100-1200hp for take-off. Late model H-4s got better engines. Similarly the early JU-88s were a little lacking in range/speed/payload. The JU-88A-1 also can't get to Liverpool and back without an auxiliary tank in the forward bomb bay. It's ability to use the external racks is limited by the gross weight limit of the plane. Partially solved by the use of rocket assisted take-off.

The introduction of the big wing JU-88 A-5 and A-4 with beefed up landing gear and other changes to handle a much increased gross weight increased the range/payload ability of the JU 88 units. The change over to later model He 111s also helped increase the average range/payload of the Luftwaffe bomber units as did replacing the Do 17 with JU 88s and He 111s.

The "Beam" systems may not have been ready to go in August. Perhaps the first was but the second wasn't used until November?

The 3rd was used when?

 

[Tante Ju]

The "Beam" systems may not have been ready to go in August. Perhaps the first was but the second wasn't used until November? The 3rd was used when?

They were used in Poland (Warsaw) September 1939 as per previous post. So planes had them. Maybe some time was needed to install transmitters in France - or were just not needed/held secret for strategic reasons?

 

[Gixxerman]

I don't know if the Germans were able to monitor the signals at that stage of the war

Isn't there a story about a German Zeppelin cruising the channel North sea just before the war looking for various radio emissions (including radar) but looking for at the wrong frequencies?
My memory may be misleading me but isn't this related to the cavity magnetron centimetre radar etc etc the Germans being convinced longer wave radar was the only kind achievable within credible costs R&D time at that time?

As regards the initial premise, as things were I don;'t think the LW had the means to defeat the RAF in the BoB, yes they could inflict heavy losses on 11 Group over a period but that is far from 'the RAF'.

Then there is the the whole issue of 'political will' to defeat the UK.
Yes it's the 'p' word.
But I don't believe the German high command (under Hitler's leadership at the time) expected anything other than a negotiated settlement after a severe prodding by the LW if they thought need be.

In short they did what they could given the true aim of their policies (the attempt to attack gain lands in the east).
They just didn't have the means to do all of it tried with what they could for as long as they could.

Whether they felt that this 'main event' (22nd June 1941) was a gamble forced upon them (given the raw materials manpower situation) or not it seems to me to be undeniable that the BoB (like the campaigns before it) created a situation where mounting losses were heavier than expected ever more difficult to cover.

 

[nuuumannn]

Yep, got it there Glixxerman; it was pie-in-the-sky. Political will accounted for most of the dumb ideas the Germans had, and some of the smart ones too, I guess.

I think that you guys are missing the point behind attacking radar sites. There's no doubt that disrupting the system would be achieved momentarily by bombing them, but the point of doing so is that it is part of the bigger picture of destroying the enemy's ability to fight back. You're taking one isolated area and hinging your entire argument for carrying out the exercise on it. Yes, in reality the LW did not succeed in knocking out the radar sites, but that is no excuse in a war game scenario not to continue attacking them. In reality Germany did not have the means nor the inclination to invade the UK - wasn't gonna happen.

Yes, your bombers are going to be shot down; in reality the RAF lost more bombers attacking high threat sites like Peenemunde, but that wasn't going to stop them continuing to do so if need be. In this kind of scenario the entire place needs to be levelled to the ground (not possible in reality - that is why we pretend); "Bombed back into the Stone Age" is how the Americans put waging war against the Trail in Laos. It's the only way.

Isn't there a story about a German Zeppelin cruising the channel North sea just before the war looking for various radio emissions (including radar) but looking for at the wrong frequencies?

The airship was Hindenburg's sister LZ 130 Graf Zeppelin II (not to be confused with LZ 127 Graf Zeppelin, which circumnavigated the Globe in 1927) and it was indeed sent out to clandestinely monitor British radio transmissions from radio towers erected along the British coast in late 1938 and throughout 1939 until just before war broke out. The excuse was route surveying flights, although LZ 130 never carried a single fare paying passenger. Off the coast of Scotland British aircraft were sent from RAF Dyce (now Aberdeen Airport) to keep an eye on it; the British never rose to the bait and radio transmissions were not recorded.

As for the 'beams'; Knickebein was successfully jammed in August 1940, but X-Gerat, which had been in operation since 1939 was not identified by the British as a seperate system until September 1940. By the time of the attack on Birmingham in October 1940 the British were aware of what the Germans were up to with this new device, although they had yet to establish its exact frequencies and wavelengths; they did this by using info from enigma decrypts, a KGr 100 He 111 that ran out of fuel over Britain and from examining the Graf Spee, which is pretty much all the British had on German radar until the BoB broke out - that line of thought (the Graf Spee's radar) yielded surpisingly useful information.

The Germans had gotten clever by November 1940 and X-Gerat was sufficiently arrayed that two raids could be launched in a single night; in the early days of November, Birmingham, Coventry and Liverpool were attacked, often on the same night. On the night of 14/15 November, the Germans enacted 'Moonlight Sonata'; this was the attack on Coventry that grabbed headlines around the world; the Brits knew about Moonlight Sonata, but didn't know the target; as I said earlier it was a fifty/fifty choice between Wolverhampton and Coventry. The other issue was that that day's enigma decrypts hadn't been decoded in time for the raid, so the vital piece of intel decifering which city was going to be bombed wasn't found out until afterwards.

Of course, the British sent out a jamming signal, but its strength was too weak (1500 MHz) and the bombers got through; the German signals worked on 2000 MHz. After Coventry the Brits got the measure of X-Gerat and used the ground stations broadcasting erroneous signals to do so, thus misleading the German pathfinders. The Germans continued using Knickebein and X and Y-Gerat into 1941 as their bombing efforts intensified, despite British efforts to jam them. More stations were set up throughout Europe to aid its campaign.

The Germans were aware that something was up, however, as reconnaissance aircraft had photographed increased AA around Wolverhampton - the next target, so, on the night that the British expected Wolves to be bombed, the Germans did not. At no time did they suspect that the British had broken their enigma codes, so they continued sending everything by this means.

By February 1941, the British had the measure of all three systems and used their countermeasures accordingly, which included decoy sites and false fires to deceive the raiders, thus the bombing raids over the next three months did not rely on accurate radio guidance as previously. The Germans placed high hopes on these systems; the LW described them in a contemporary publication as "enormously important and hardly replaceable" (I don't know the publication, this book doesn't list its name) - as the chappie who designed them, Dr Plendl was given a high commendation from Goering himself.

 

[stona]

As an aside the RAF used tracking fighters to follow the German raids once they crossed the coast to support the Observer Corps as the radar was only outward looking

I have a minute which I can't find at the moment in which this was discussed. It was not adopted because of a lack of aircraft and suitably trained pilots. Dowding and Park were both opposed to the idea of aircraft flying about in the hope that they might encounter the enemy.
Once the enemy formations crossed the coast they could be reasonably plotted by the Observer Corps (though on one occassion the planet Venus was plotted at 30,000 feet!). By this time it was too late to task squadrons to intercept the raid anyway. That was the whole point of forward interception,using radar to position RAF squadrons in the right place at the right time and,hopefully,the right altitude,if they could achieve it.
As Dilip Sarkar notes.

"Radar was essential,but it was not perfect,and the mathematics of time over distance,given the performance of the fighter aircraft in question offset against warning times,meant that scrambling RAF fighters were frequently caught on the climb,the worst possible tactical sitiuation to be in.."

And that's when the Luftwaffe formations were detected on the other side of the Channel! If they were detected close to the English coast the RAF could be caught on the ground at southerly fields. England is small and WW2 aircraft went at a decent lick. Brighton (South coast) to London is just over 40 miles. At 200 mph that's less than 10 minutes flying time.

Cheers

Steve

 

[Juha]

Hello Stona
IMHO you are a bit too pessimistic, 40mls 200mph means 12 minutes. IMHO protection of London would not have been impossible but coastal areas would have been without standing patrols and the strain they produced.

Juha

 

[stona]

Hello Stona
IMHO you are a bit too pessimistic, 40mls 200mph means 12 minutes.
Juha

Correct.....I should have worked it out. I think 9.6 minutes is for 250mph which is a bit optimistic for the Luftwaffe's bombers

It's still not long enough to react as Sarkar noted. The average scramble time,to get a squadron airborne, was 4-5 minutes. Then about 7 minutes to 15,000ft,10 to 20,000. Then they had to make an interception. The radar was supposed to position the interceptors within 2-3 miles of the enemy formation at which range they should be able to make visual contact. If you know the speed,bearing and altitude of the enemy and your own position and speed the arithmatic to calculate a bearing on which to fly to make the interception is easy. Without radar....?

Interception of withdrawing bombers was further complicated by the Luftwaffe formations breaking up into several groups,all of which then literally dived for "home",the French coast.

Cheers

Steve

 

[Juha]

Hello Stona
the responsibility to give info on LW a/c over England was anyway in the hands of Observer Corps, CH radars "saw" only towards sea. And interceptions based on human eyes was possible but not sure, Finnish air defence during WWII was based on observers, even with more archaic signal system it worked moderately well, even in 43/44 when a 109G staffel protected Kotka harbour against attacks by Pe-2s protected by Yaks and La-5s.

Juha

 

[stona]

Hello Stona
the responsibility to give info on LW a/c over England was anyway in the hands of Observer Corps, CH radars "saw" only towards sea. And interceptions based on human eyes was possible but not sure,
Juha

Absolutely true. What the Chain Home radar did was give the RAF time. As the raids were tracked across the Channel their strength,altitude and bearing could be ascertained (not always perfectly of course). This allowed the Sector controllers to vector their squadrons into a position to make visual contact with the incoming raid and make the interception.
It was not a perfect system and the Germans were not daft enough to fly on a direct bearing to their target every time. Nonetheless it worked more often than it didn't.

To make an interception in the skies of Kent or Sussex the RAF fighters had to be in the air long before the Luftwaffe raid even reached the South coast of England.

Once the raid had crossed the coast the (Royal) Observer Corps,itself fore warned,became a vital link in the chain,updating the position of the raid. The observer posts reported to Sector Control via their own Observer Corps Centre unlike the radar stations which reported to HQ Fighter Command who "filtered" the reports which were passed on to Group Headquarters and only then on to the relevant Sector Control.

It truly was an integrated air defence system and Dowding's great achievment. Remove any link in the chain and it wouldn't have worked.

Cheers

Steve

 

[Glider]

I have a minute which I can't find at the moment in which this was discussed. It was not adopted because of a lack of aircraft and suitably trained pilots. Dowding and Park were both opposed to the idea of aircraft flying about in the hope that they might encounter the enemy.

You certainly could be right but it looks as if it was used later in the BOB. I am going on a letter sent to Fighter Command dated 8th July where they are discussing the tactics used by the Germans to counter RAF sweeps and identify the raids with Bombers and those that don't. It refers to the enemy adopting the tactics used by FC towards the end of the BOB where high flying Recce fighters would spot the raids with bombers and instruct fighters to intercept.

A copy of the letter is attached

 

[stona]

That is not detection of the raid but reconnaissance of it,I see that this was adopted at a later stage of the battle. I wonder which units carried it out?

In order to get in to a position high above an incoming raid in time to report on it's make up you'd need plenty of warning which could only come from the Chain Home system. This sort of reconnaissance was only possible because of the radar and itself formed an integral part of the whole system.

Is that PoW Pingel by any chance? It looks vaguely familiar

Cheers

Steve

 

[Glider]

I totally agree that it was the tracking/recce of the raid and the letter clearly states at the end of the BOB.

I am afraid that I have no idea as to who the POW was who spilled the beans or what unit carried out the task.

Its only a guess but a PR Spit would be best for the job. They had the combination of range, altitude, performance and climb. A normally loaded 109 wouldn't get anywhere near it in altitude

 

[Tante Ju]

E-7/Z, F-4/Z, G-1...

 

[stona]

I can't emphasise enough that Britain's air defence system was made up of many interlinking parts. From the radar described by Park as "fickle as can be" and as behaving "just like a young lady" (he was born in 1892 ) to the Observer Corps whose reports were so unreliable that a raid not previously reported by radar was rejected at the filtering stage,to the Y service intercepts, it just about worked.

It was the radar and sector airfields,with their vital communications links,which were considered most vulnerable.

David Zimmerman has written,of the system, "If this system had suffered a complete failiure,either through its own inadequacies or enemy action,then surely the RAF would have been defeated."

AJP Taylor is unequivocal,"The Battle of Britain was won by Fighter Command and radar."

On 21st Decenber 1940 Watson-Watt told Sinclair that the battle had been won by "radar and the eight gun fighter" and that "our old statement that RDF would multiply by three,and perhaps five the value of our fighter force,has been justified."

Park wrote that "radar at its worst is most valuable to my fighter group,and at its best,it is quite invaluable and a great boon."

Park also feared the disruption of communications which would be caused by concerted attacks on sector airfields. There were plenty of airfields in Southern England but they were not equipped to communicate directly with his headquarters. "Without signals" he wrote "I commanded only my desk at Uxbridge."

Dowding wrote in his official 1941 dispatch on the BOB,concerning radar specifically "it is not too much to say that the warning which it gave could have been obtained by no other means,and constituted a vital factor in the air defence of Great Britain."

I still believe,like Zimmerman,that had this system been incapacitated by coordinated attacks the RAF would have been scuppered.

Incidentally,in response to a comment way back in the thread,there was no plan to withdraw the RAF North of the Thames unless the Germans mounted an invasion because this was considered to leave too many vital targets unprotected. Such a move,prior to an invasion,would be an admission of defeat.

Cheers

Steve

 

[Njaco]

Was "?" a better Air Marshall than Dowding?

 

[stona]

Was "?" a better Air Marshall than Dowding?

Lieutenant-General Sir Frederick Pile who met and worked with Dowding when he was put in charge of the Army's anti aircraft and search light defences in support of Fighter Command wrote that Dowding

"Was the outstanding airman I met in the war. A difficult man,a self opinionated man,a most determined man,and a man who knew more than anybody about all aspects of aerial warfare. He was a good friend to me on many occasions,and history will undoubtedly record his great contribution to Allied victory."

That seems fair enough to me.

Cheers

Steve

 

[Glider]

E-7/Z, F-4/Z, G-1...

Think BOB timescale

 

[stona]

One more reference,from Sebastian Cox,who I suspect can be googled. Currently he is one of the three directors of the Royal Air Force Centre for Air Power Studies.He too believes that the Luftwaffe could have prevailed. From his "Comparative Analysis of RAF and Luftwaffe Intelligence in the Battle of Britain".

"It [Luftwaffe] should have been used,first,to destroy the Chain Home radar towers,a simple task because only nine,all flimsy and highly conspicuous,guarded the coast between Southampton and Dover. The blinded RAF airfields should then have been overwhelmed by around the clock bombing. And finally,if the British still showed resistance,their naked cities should have been deluged with high explosives and incendiaries."

Dowding himself,in a conversation with Portal and Churchill said that he could not understand why the Germans kept "coming in waves" rather than concentrating on one mass raid a day which "could not be effectively parried."

Cheers

Steve

 

[Tante Ju]

E-4/N then..

 

[Juha]

One more reference,from Sebastian Cox,who I suspect can be googled. Currently he is one of the three directors of the Royal Air Force Centre for Air Power Studies.He too believes that the Luftwaffe could have prevailed. From his "Comparative Analysis of RAF and Luftwaffe Intelligence in the Battle of Britain".

"It [Luftwaffe] should have been used,first,to destroy the Chain Home radar towers,a simple task because only nine,all flimsy and highly conspicuous,guarded the coast between Southampton and Dover. The blinded RAF airfields should then have been overwhelmed by around the clock bombing. And finally,if the British still showed resistance,their naked cities should have been deluged with high explosives and incendiaries."

Dowding himself,in a conversation with Portal and Churchill said that he could not understand why the Germans kept "coming in waves" rather than concentrating on one mass raid a day which "could not be effectively parried."

Cheers

Steve

IMHO 12 Aug 40 proved that the CH masts were not flimsy, even very accurate bombing of Ventnor by 15 Ju 88s didn't knock down even a single mast. They were highly conspicuous and LW signal intelligence had pinpointed them during July 40. I wonder wheather LW had pinpointed the CHL stations, they used a different wavelenght but were situated very near the coast, those without tall mast looked very different than CH stations but were not unlike German Freya.