You are in charge of the Luftwaffe: July 1940

[Juha]

...So it seems it wasn't for every raid only some of them.

That was a different thing, my quess is that Balljoint means Y-Service, LW used the same system later on, simply noticing that many aircrews checked their radios indicated that a raid was soon coming.

 

[riacrato]

You are still fighting the historical scenario,not the campaign that I would wage with the benefit of hindsight.

The Battle of Britain was winnable by the Luftwaffe with some major tweaks to their strategy and some minor ones to their equipment.

Britain's problem was pilots not aeroplanes. It's much easier to keep a man down than to get him down and any sign of the green shoots of recovery from the RAF would be dealt with.

Whether Britain could be forced to terms is an entirely different question. I think that she could have been in certain circumstances. An offer whereby she conceded Europe but held on to her maritime Empire would have been appealing to many in the British elite. It's not ideal but after the series of defeats she has now,in my scenario,suffered at the hands of Germany and with her cities defenceless from aerial attack (how many Luftwaffe bombers did British AAA shoot down in 1940?) it might be seen as the lesser evil.
Cheers

Steve

And my point is: Even if you win a battle of britain, where do you go from there? Hoping they will come to terms wehn you can put no real pressure on them (i.e. boots on the ground) is a risky endeavour considering the loss in equipment and pilots you are willing to take.

 

[nuuumannn]

Even if you win a battle of britain, where do you go from there? Hoping they will come to terms wehn you can put no real pressure on them (i.e. boots on the ground) is a risky endeavour considering the loss in equipment and pilots you are willing to take.

That is a good question Riacriato and the answer is a tough one, but that's what strategists are for (which is what we are doing here); to aswer the tough questions. The only answer is subjugation through invasion. If the pressure of the attacks discussed abated, Britain would soon rebuild, not to mention enlist assistance from its Commonwealth. Essentially, any such attack without invasion would be ultimately fruitless and regardless of which course was taken, what would evolve is a war of attrition; who can maintain the hard losses the longest.

The only way that such a campaign would succeed is if all resources were poured into achieving the objective, which is the destruction of the RAF and Britain's war making industries (including ports, factories etc). The Luftwaffe would need a constant supply of bombers, fighters, recon aircraft, ammunition, pilots, support crews etc, otherwise, as you say, where do we go from here? This would obviously clash with resources required for the sustaining of an invasion, but if the objective is to be achieved, then this is necessary.

"Kampf gegen England, meine Herren..."

 

[michaelmaltby]

"... a risky endeavour considering the loss in equipment and pilots you are willing to take."

Nothing - in terms of risk - compared to Barbarossa - the following June.

Let's be blunt here. If Hitler and the High Command can't bring England to "peace" after all the gains in Western Europe including Poland, then all future activities are doomed. Absolutely doomed.

We know that Hitler needed to secure economic "spoils" to keep the domestic economy from imploding [Adam Tooze]. Russia was a far larger prize than Britain - in terms of resources - but if you can't bend Britain to your will, where are you ...?

If you can't secure air supremacy over the RAF, where are you?

MM

 

[TheMustangRider]

The only way that such a campaign would succeed is if all resources were poured into achieving the objective, which is the destruction of the RAF and Britain's war making industries (including ports, factories etc). The Luftwaffe would need a constant supply of bombers, fighters, recon aircraft, ammunition, pilots, support crews etc, otherwise, as you say, where do we go from here? This would obviously clash with resources required for the sustaining of an invasion, but if the objective is to be achieved, then this is necessary.

In other words a prioritized and sustained bombing campaign against Britain and its capacity to wage war more or less in the lines of what the USSAAF and BC did for the latter part of the war against Germany without diverting to other fronts.
That is something on which I could agree.

I too would opt to starve GB out of the war with a pre-war enhanced U-boat fleet; a suggestion out of the realm of the subject in hand I'm afraid.

 

[nuuumannn]

a suggestion out of the realm of the subject in hand I'm afraid.

And out of the realm of reality as well. The U-boat force was too small in number to impose a naval blockade against British shipping, let alone the RN. Not only that but in mid 1940 the Germans were still struggling with ineffectual torpedoes.

If you can't secure air supremacy over the RAF, where are you?

Precisely. The destruction of Fighter Command has to be the first priority in establishing air superiority. These things the Germans had intended to do in 1940, of course, but they just didn't or couldn't carry it through.

 

[meatloaf109]

After 14 pages of discussion, it still comes down to the basics, (with the benifit of hindsight,) eliminate the radar, don't get sidelined on retallitory strikes on London, and keep up the pressure on the R.A.F. Done deal.

 

[Njaco]

Thats only if the objective and orders are to attack GB. England wasn't an ideological enemy of the Third Reich - so, if Sea Lion is cancelled, I can shepherd my forces for the true enemy of Nazi Germany - Russia (well, thats what the thinking was!) In the meantime, use a few Geschwaders as a holding force on the Western Front and complete the sweep of the Med and North Africa before continuing on to Russia.

I know - I'm very simplistic.

 

[nuuumannn]

The thing about Barbarossa is that it shouldn't have been as big a surprise as it was to the world; Hitler mentions Lebensraum in the East in Mein Kampf. It was always his objective.

 

[wiking85]

After 14 pages of discussion, it still comes down to the basics, (with the benifit of hindsight,) eliminate the radar, don't get sidelined on retallitory strikes on London, and keep up the pressure on the R.A.F. Done deal.

Not really; no one has demonstrated that defeating Fighter Command would force Britain from the war.

 

[nuuumannn]

I know - I'm very simplistic.

Often the best way to look at stuff, Chris; cuts through the BS.

 

[nuuumannn]

no one has demonstrated that defeating Fighter Command would force Britain from the war.

No one has stated that that alone would do so either. The key is a sustained bombing campaign against British industry. In order to do this without hindrance, Fighter Command has to be eliminated as first priority. This is how the LW intended on waging the war against Britain.

 

[wiking85]

No one has stated that that alone would do so either. The key is a sustained bombing campaign against British industry. In order to do this without hindrance, Fighter Command has to be eliminated as first priority. This is how the LW intended on waging the war against Britain.

It wasn't necessary, as the Blitz showed; British industry was bombed at night with accuracy early on thanks to the guidance beams. They of course degraded, but area attacks did affect British industry, as it did when the RAF bombed the Ruhr in 1943. Not engaging in the Battle of Britain would preserve bomber strength for a sustained bomber campaign against British industry at night. Whether or not people accept that bombing the big ports would matter, the technology and skills existed for the Germans to hit targets at night. Part of the problem with targeting specific industries though is really poor intelligence on where factories were and what they produced. Shadow factories were not even known to the Germans, so they couldn't be targeted. So frankly I think this too is a non-starter.
Bombing the big port cities like Liverpool, Avonmouth, Glasgow, and Swansea had higher return potential than trying to target specific industries or beating the RAF, especially considering the Luftwaffe's weakness in the wake of the French campaign and the coming Russian campaign.

 

[parsifal]

Not really; no one has demonstrated that defeating Fighter Command would force Britain from the war.

No-one has conclusively shown that FC was likley to be defeated. There were a few quotes from Dowding, that dont add up FC facing defeat, there has been some rather sweeping statements about "taking out" the radar stations, when this was never really achieved. There has been some discussion about the value of alternative targets, like London (where tante makes some uncharacteristically inciteful comments about targetting London forces the RAF up), but nowhere do i see anyone "nailing it" that FC was likely to be defeated by this strategfy or that....people keep assuming that in a hypothetical like this only one side has the right to interpret history. Wrong. Properly gamed out, if an operational plan was being worked out, one simply has to consider all possible and plausible alternatives. sort of "If I do this, what is the likley response from the enemy", or "is it possible or likley that the enemy (in this case the british) will take action or make provision proactively, that is, do something before we even do anything"

The case is far from proven that FC was likley to be defeated. Very far from it ........

 

[nuuumannn]

The case is far from proven that FC was likely to be defeated.

Couldn't agree more; the LW's plans began to unravel as soon as the realities of their weaknesses dawned on them. The LW lost the BoB in as much as FC 'won' it.

As for the bombing of British industry during the Blitz by the LW - the raids against British industry were devastating, but far from crippling. The biggest mileage the LW got out of the Blitz was propaganda after the bombing of Coventry, despite the strategic benefits of attacking the likes of Hillington, Glasgow (which was a Rolls Royce shadow factory - the Germans were aware of some of them), because they did not continue and maintain strategic attacks on those facilities. Evidence of this is the fact that the bombing campaign on Britain did not resume in ernest after the Blitz until after D-Day with the V-1s. The Germans could not do it conventially, so had to bring in the Vergeltungswaffen.

As for the beams, yes they certainly did help, but the LW did not use them to their full potential before the British counteracted them - they did more than degrade them - they rendered them useless to the Germans. Knickebein was countered in mid 1940 but the LW heads did not want to take responsibility for notifying Goering for at least two months after the British had 'bent' the 'crooked leg' and continued using it even after the British had jammed its signals. By the time of Coventry the British had worked out that X-Gerat was transmitted on centimetric wavelengths, but got the frequency wrong. During the Coventry raid, there was a jamming signal broadcast, but it was too weak and did not interfere with the German signals from the main land, so the devastation happened. The idea that Churchill was witholding information for fear of exposing Ultra and knew that Coventry was going to be bombed is false. The British knew that either Birmingham, Coventry or Wolverhamption would be targets at that time. Since B'ham had recently been bombed it was fifty-fifty. The night of the raid, Churchill returned to London fearing a large attack against the capital, but the British were not 100% certain which of the two cities was next.

 

[stona]

My premise for the defeat of Fighter Command,which I have repeated several times,is based on the destruction of the RAF's command and control system. This is now a pre-requisite of any modern aerial campaign.
It is essential to destroy the Chain Home sites and the Luftwaffe demonstrated historically that this was possible. It wasn't done because the Luftwaffe didn't understand and under estimated their importance to Britain's air defence system and never made a coordinated effort to disable them

The anti radar attack of 12th August which tore a 100 mile wide gap in British radar coverage was never repeated.

Goering:

"It is doubtful whether there is any point in continuing the attacks on radar sites, in view of the fact that not one of those attacked has so far been put out of action."

Infact he was wrong,some had been put out of action (Rye,Pevensey,Dover for a short period,Ventnor for three days) and wrong again,he should have continued with the attacks.

On 7th August a Luftwaffe intelligence report had already demostrated that they just didn't get it.

"As the British fighters are controlled from the ground by radio-telephone, their forces are tied to their respective ground stations and are thereby restricted in mobility, even taking into consideration the probability that the ground stations are partly mobile. Consequently the assembly of strong fighter forces at determined points and at short notice is not to be expected."

Of course that is exactly what Chain Home did enable the RAF to do.

Without this system the familiar voice of sector controllers immortalised in various movies....."Blue leader I have some trade for you,60+ bandits,Angels one five,vector one six zero" ....becomes the self same controller picking up another telephone to be told...."Sir we have reports that they are bombing Hawkinge".


Fighter Command wouldn't know where the Luftwaffe attacks were heading or even the strength of the attacks until it was too late to intercept them with fighters already at altitude and in approximately the correct position.
People are quoting the historical Luftwaffe losses as evidence of its diminishing strength,which is historically correct,but in my scenario the RAF are not making the interceptions and my Luftwaffe losses are much reduced.

That is how Fighter Command could have been defeated. I am not repeating the historical campaign and it doesn't really matter whether we agree or disagree on just how close run that was. I won't be making the same mistakes.

Cheers

Steve

 

[fastmongrel]

The problem with saying knock out Chain Home is its a Hydra a vast effort was expended in knocking a 100 mile gap in the coverage. Well the next day you have to try and knock out the others whilst you are doing that the initial damage is being repaired. That effort has to be carried out again and again because even the stupid incompetent Brits will notice what you are trying to do and will do something about it.

Every time the LW manages to knock out a CH tower a couple of CHL units appear to help plug the gap. You are asking your dimishing Ju87 and Ju88 force to day after day dive into an ever growing storm of AAA. Every gun that could be spared would be set up near CH towers, even Dads Army with a WWI Lewis machine gun loaded with tracer is going to be there. The RAF controllers know where you are going to be even without complete cover and will not stand back and let your divebombers get there unopposed.

Thats the problem with what ifs they are always based on the opposition doing nothing about it or blindly carrying on doing as in real time. Knocking out CH is the right thing to do its just not going to be easy or quick and by the time you are finished the south coast is going to be littered with smoking aircraft. Just look at the experiences of the RAF and USAAF in 45 when they tried to catch Me262 taking off and landing if you want to see what happens when aircraft fly into concentrated AAA fire and they were flying low and fast in well armoured aircraft not slow moving dive bombers.

 

[riacrato]

The only answer is subjugation through invasion. If the pressure of the attacks discussed abated, Britain would soon rebuild, not to mention enlist assistance from its Commonwealth. Essentially, any such attack without invasion would be ultimately fruitless and regardless of which course was taken, what would evolve is a war of attrition; who can maintain the hard losses the longest.

Exactly.

The only way that such a campaign would succeed is if all resources were poured into achieving the objective, which is the destruction of the RAF and Britain's war making industries (including ports, factories etc). The Luftwaffe would need a constant supply of bombers, fighters, recon aircraft, ammunition, pilots, support crews etc, otherwise, as you say, where do we go from here? This would obviously clash with resources required for the sustaining of an invasion, but if the objective is to be achieved, then this is necessary.

"Kampf gegen England, meine Herren..."

Yes, and seeing how long it took two giant bomber forces better equipped for strategic warfare to have any meaningful impact on the German war industry, we are now talking about years of attacks, development of new equipment and strategies and so forth. I don't see that happening without essentially abandoning any expansion plans to the east for years to come. So you either change your whole Weltanschauung and declare the Soviets not so evil after all or you risk Stalin and his quickly expanding red army pulling their own Barbarossa on you, while you are occupied with an exhaustive strategic air war. Option 1 is not a bad idea, but not likely to happen with the Nazis in charge.

And in the meantime there's also one of the largest, best equipped and most experienced navys you have to destroy before any invasion can even be prepared.

 

[stona]

The historical attack on Chain Home of 12th August was a moderate success,the specific attack one on Ventnor a complete success. That sort of pressure would need to be kept up over several days. The task in itself becomes much easier when the defenders can't see you coming as other nations without the benefit of a properly coordinated air defence system discovered.

The attack that disabled Dover,Rye and Pevensey (and failed to disable Dunkirk (the one near Canterbury) ) was carried out by a mere 16 Bf 110s. Not a massive effort by any stretch of the imagination. This is real world,not the famous 1967 film with its radio controlled Stukas

The blind spot created led to successful attacks on Lympne (which faulty Luftwaffe intelligence was unaware was an emergency satellite field) and Hawkinge.
Portsmouth was also heavily bombed by a force which, even when detected by the Poling Chain Home station,the British could not ascertain where it was heading. Another undetected smaller force bombed Ventnor. Fifteen 500Kg bombs hit the station destroying the transmitter array and "demolishing almost every structure on the ground" according to Patrick Bishop. The station was only partially repaired by the 15th.
It could be done .It should have been done. It was a campaign losing blunder not to do it.

I already posed a question about Britishh AAA capabilities in 1940. Here it is again,how many Luftwaffe bombers (including dive bombers) did British AAA shoot down in 1940?

From my own family history I know that when AAA in the Oxford parks opened fire on some passing Luftwaffe aircraft the resultant damage to windows and roofs from concussion and falling splinters caused angry letters to the local press demanding that the guns desist unless the Germans were actually dropping bombs!

I don't believe the destruction of British industry was a prerequisite of negotiations. I think that is an overestimation of the British resolve to continue no matter what the cost. Britain is a democracy and a compromise "let's save what we can from this situation" mentality is not inconceivable,particularly with guarantees for the Empire.

I think this thread has run its course,though if anyone knows how many bombers British AAA shot down in 1940 I'd like to know as I can't find a figure.

If I was Hermann Goering I would run my air war against "England" very differently and with a much greater chance of success.

Cheers

Steve

 

[parsifal]

x

My premise for the defeat of Fighter Command,which I have repeated several times,is based on the destruction of the RAF's command and control system. This is now a pre-requisite of any modern aerial campaign.
It is essential to destroy the Chain Home sites and the Luftwaffe demonstrated historically that this was possible. It wasn't done because the Luftwaffe didn't understand and under estimated their importance to Britain's air defence system and never made a coordinated effort to disable them

The anti radar attack of 12th August which tore a 100 mile wide gap in British radar coverage was never repeated.

Goering:

"It is doubtful whether there is any point in continuing the attacks on radar sites, in view of the fact that not one of those attacked has so far been put out of action."

Infact he was wrong,some had been put out of action (Rye,Pevensey,Dover for a short period,Ventnor for three days) and wrong again,he should have continued with the attacks.

On 7th August a Luftwaffe intelligence report had already demostrated that they just didn't get it.

"As the British fighters are controlled from the ground by radio-telephone, their forces are tied to their respective ground stations and are thereby restricted in mobility, even taking into consideration the probability that the ground stations are partly mobile. Consequently the assembly of strong fighter forces at determined points and at short notice is not to be expected."

Of course that is exactly what Chain Home did enable the RAF to do.

Without this system the familiar voice of sector controllers immortalised in various movies....."Blue leader I have some trade for you,60+ bandits,Angels one five,vector one six zero" ....becomes the self same controller picking up another telephone to be told...."Sir we have reports that they are bombing Hawkinge".


Fighter Command wouldn't know where the Luftwaffe attacks were heading or even the strength of the attacks until it was too late to intercept them with fighters already at altitude and in approximately the correct position.
People are quoting the historical Luftwaffe losses as evidence of its diminishing strength,which is historically correct,but in my scenario the RAF are not making the interceptions and my Luftwaffe losses are much reduced.

That is how Fighter Command could have been defeated. I am not repeating the historical campaign and it doesn't really matter whether we agree or disagree on just how close run that was. I won't be making the same mistakes.

Cheers

Steve

but this well illustrates one of the faulty premises in your plan, and it gets back to the quid pro quo i mentioned. if the LW did start to "get it" regarding the radar system, it would show up months or years of careful intell gathering to do so, which inevitably would show up in their various communications on the matter, including in their signal traffic, which the british had been reading since at least april. Time enough for the british to significantly harden and beef up the defences around these station, provide back up systems, and the like. and the british were fully aware of the impprtance of these stations to their air defence network.

moreover, despite this 'hundred mile gap' that you mention, the LW lacked the strength to exploit that gap as well as neutralize the whole system, and in any case there was no "gap created at all, since the RAFs C&C system did have adequate back ups within their system. It wasnt the radars that were the keystone to the RAF command, it was the sector system that it supported. take out one or two radars and you certainly downgrade it, but you dont destroy it. A weakened or downgraded C&C is not a destroyed C&C, and effort needed to subjugate those radars means less availability for exploitation. if the defences are stiffened/hardened, that means greater durability, more flexibility, more losses for the LW. Translates to even more resources needed to subjugate the or eliminate the sytem. which i think was an unatainable goal anyways.