10 Allied planes that sealed Nazi Germany's fate

[Hop]

At the end of the summer of 1943 the battle of Stalingrad is about to start. The outcome in the East is far from certain.

The battle of Stalingrad started in summer 1942. The German forces were encircled in November 1942 and surrendered in February 1943.

As to Italy, the best the Germans could hope for was a delaying action.

A year earlier the Germans had been trying to take Egypt. By the end of summer 1943 they were merely trying to hold the line in Italy.

By the summer of 1943 the Germans had abandoned the offensive. At best they were trying to hold the line, in other areas they were just trying to slow the pace of retreat.

If you look at the aims of German operations each year their position becomes clear:

1939 - Defeat Poland
1940 - Defeat France, Britain, Belgium and Netherlands
1941 - Defeat the Soviet Union
1942 - Capture the Caucasus and Egypt
1943 - Shorten the lines at Kursk and hold the line in Italy

The Luftwaffe was on the road to defeat in 1943 but it most certainly was not defeated. You could easily argue (as Williamson Murray does quite convincingly) that it had been on that road since 1938/9.

From Irving's biography of Milch:

When the ministers and gauleiters assembled on Hitler's instructions in
Berlin on  August for Dr Goebbels to 'inject some cement into them', Milch
repeatedly interrupted a discussion on the war in the air with the almost treasonable
outcry, 'We have lost the war! Finally lost the war!' Goebbels had to appeal
to his honour as an officer before he would quieten down, and the minister
complained to his staff afterward, 'I would just like to see one of my state secretaries
dare behave like that  however right he was!'

During the night the British attacked Hamburg yet again. 'My own view
is this,' Milch lectured to the silent officers who gathered in his ministry. 'It's
much blacker than Speer paints it. If we get just five or six more attacks like
these on Hamburg, the German people will just lay down their tools, however
great their willpower. I keep saying, the steps that are being taken now are being
taken too late. There can be no more talk of night-fighting in the east, or of
putting an umbrella over our troops in Sicily or anything like that. The soldier
on the battlefield will just have to dig a hole, crawl into it and wait until the attack
is over. What the home front is suffering now cannot be suffered very
much longer.' That day he cabled Göring in these terms: 'It is not the front
which is under attack and struggling for survival, but the home base, which is
fighting a desperate fight.' When General Meister, deputy Chief of Air Staff,
declined his suggestion that two idle long-range fighter squadrons should be
taken out of the eastern front and sent back to the Reich, Milch reproached
him: 'I keep getting this feeling that we are all sitting out on a limb. At this limb,
the British keep sawing away! Here at home I can hear the rasp of the saw. You
out there, Meister, are farther away, and are deaf to it.'

The situation of the Luftwaffe was the same as for Germany: at best they sought to hold the line in some areas, others they practically abandoned.

 

[stona]

The Battle of Stalingrad is generally accepted to have started around 23rd August 1943,which I would say is late summer. At least in the UK September is considered the first month of autumn. The first snow fall in the Caucasus was reported by German troops on 12th September.

I agree with you about North Africa. The Germans fought an impressive defensive campaign through Italy and made the Allies pay heavily for every success. The political reasons why the Germans fought on are not really anything to do with this thread. Let's just say that many officers envisaged an outcome,even in late 1944,which did not involve a complete and utter unconditional surrender on both fronts.

Officials and officers expressing defeatist views,and Milch was by no means alone in 1943,is not the same as actually being defeated.

So the Luftwaffe was trying to do exactly the same in 1943/44 as the RAF in 1940. Neither the RAF nor Britain was ultimately defeated.

What areas did the Luftwaffe "practically abandon"? It was certainly became overstretched and unable to meet all its comittments but not in 1943.

Incidentally you could use quotes from Milch (and Speer,Galland et alter) to argue that post Hamburg the Lancaster was the decisive aircraft of WWII. You'll have a job convincing many. It had an important role to play but debates about the effectiveness of the allied strategic bombing campaign usually generate more heat than light

Cheers

Steve

 

[tomo pauk]

Steve, you might want to check out here:

Battle of Stalingrad - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

The Battle of Stalingrad was a major and decisive battle of World War II in which Nazi Germany and its allies fought the Soviet Union for control of the city of Stalingrad (now Volgograd) in the southwestern Soviet Union. The battle took place between August 23, 1942 and February 2, 1943

By August 1943, the Germans were pushed back towards Dnieper river, Red Army will start the Kiev offensive by November 1943.

 

[drgondog]

By the end of summer 1943 the Germans were on the retreat in the East, had been kicked out of Africa and the allies had landed in Italy. Italy had switched sides.

The Mustang became one of the finest fighters of the war, but it did so after the outcome was already decided.

The BoB represented the first time the LW was stopped from achieving its mission. The Hurricane deserves great credit for this achievement. Ditto Spitfire.

The Battle of Germany in the air in fall of 1943 represented the last time the LW continued denying air superiority to the Allies. It effectively stopped the USAAF from achieving its Objectives and remained effective against RAF night bombing till the end of the war.

The Mustang changed the fortunes of US Airpower in Europe and destroyed more German aircraft, over Germany, than all the aircraft the VVS destroyed in 1944-1945.

The fact that the war was going badly for Germany when the Mustang arrived over Germany is irrelevant to the Thread question.

 

[stona]

Steve, you might want to check out here:

OOOps! Wrong year...........sorry about that

Sadly not a typo,just dodgy recall ):

The Wermacht was indeed on the back foot by mid 1943.

Cheers

Steve

 

[Jenisch]

Having said that, the P-38 over Germany was not nearly as effective in destruction of LW - air and ground - as the Mustang on a pro-rata basis.

Yes, but it did "work", specially after the dive brakes were installed. Give it a complement of the P-47N, and the things are more or less ok.

 

[Jenisch]

The Luftwaffe was on the road to defeat in 1943 but it most certainly was not defeated.

By this statement what exactly you want to mean? That the LW would be able to change the reality in the Eastern Front if not for the American long-range fighters? I don't think so.

You could easily argue (as Williamson Murray does quite convincingly) that it had been on that road since 1938/9.

Murray's book is good, but is "outdated". He mentions that the Germans didn't prepared adequadetely for the war - they did it. The German strategy went to ruin when the Russians didn't collapsed like they expected.

 

[drgondog]

Yes, but it did "work", specially after the dive brakes were installed. Give it a complement of the P-47N, and the things are more or less ok.

'OK" but too late for Invasion and pre-invasion destruction of LW. The Dive flaps were introduced in the P-38J-25 which started arriving in late May 1944 and the P-47N started arriving in February 1945.

The above comment is as useful as speculating about introducing the Mustang with the Merlin in 1941 instead of mid 1943..

 

[Jenisch]

'OK" but too late for Invasion and pre-invasion destruction of LW.

The question is: there was an absolute necessity of an invasion of France in 1944? The answer is: no. The main concern for the Anglo-Americans would be if Russia would overrun Germany and perhaps other countries in Western Europe before Anglo-American presence was in continent. Perhaps for this, as well as fear that Russia might signed peace with Germany, the Anglo-Americans might have tried to invade in less than ideal conditions. If the LW was strong to a point of bring some serious treat to the Allied forces in Western Europe, then your argument is valid IF there was no alternative to the P-51 (which I'm skeptical about).

About my "speculation", it's absolutely logical that the P-47 range could be increased. It was not done earlier because the P-51 was avaliable.

 

[dobbie]

Suppose that high ranking German military officers are asked shortly after the war, what 10 Russian and Western Allied planes contributed most to the Third Reich's downfall, and suppose the first 3 planes mentioned are the Ilyushin Il-2 Shturmovik, the B-17 Flying Fortress, and the Avro Lancaster. What are the other 7 planes? P.S. You don't have to accept the first 3 planes make the list; knock 'em off if you think they don't belong.

If I was in the German high command, the other 7 I would not to see would be the P47, Typhoon, Mosquito, Mustang, Liberator, Spitfire, P38. With the exception of the Spitfire, most of these aircraft were successful in a multitude of roles. There are others on the list which are great aircraft, such as the B29, Corsair and Hellcat, but I don't recall them flying over Germany so I limited my selections.

 

[FlakDancer]

The question of the invasion of France being necessary is interesting (perhaps another thread). There was an implied colonial world order that came out of WWI (or at least reaffirmed) and there was no way the Allies were going to allow that to fall by the wayside. The decades following WWII would confirm this, especially for America.

The question above and this thread's question also again highlights Hitler's error in declaring war on the United States after Pearl Harbor. The German's assumption of Japan invading the Soviet Union fell through too.

These very choices put into play the need for a strategic fighter such as the P-51. The point fighter has never vanished but somewhere in the distant sound of the F-22's super cruise capabilities one can still here the echo of those Merlin's.

 

[drgondog]

The question is: there was an absolute necessity of an invasion of France in 1944? The answer is: no. The main concern for the Anglo-Americans would be if Russia would overrun Germany and perhaps other countries in Western Europe before Anglo-American presence was in continent.

The answer is Yes, for political and military reasons. Roosevelt agreed with Stalin and over ruled Churchill's preference for the "soft underbelly" approach. The primary reason for Stalin was for the West to bleed resources from the East so that he could advance faster. The primary reason for Point Blank was for the western Allies to destroy the LW and achieve air superiority over Allied ground and naval forces.

Perhaps for this, as well as fear that Russia might signed peace with Germany, the Anglo-Americans might have tried to invade in less than ideal conditions. If the LW was strong to a point of bring some serious treat to the Allied forces in Western Europe, then your argument is valid IF there was no alternative to the P-51 (which I'm skeptical about).

You may be skeptical but it was only during May 1944 that more than three P-38 groups were in England and operational for both 8th and 9th AF combined. The 8th and 9th AF P-47s were effective when the LW chose to engage west of Dummer Lake. Th P-38s (8th and 9th AF) destroyed 178 LW a/c between Jan 1 and June 30. The P-47 (8th and 9th AF) destroyed 969, and the P-51 destroyed 1361 in the air in that same timeframe. These numbers do Not reflect the RAF contribution with the Mark II or Mark III - which was significant compared to the P-38.

Net - there was No alternative other than to withdraw critical P-38 operations from PTO entirely for 1944 and re-direct to ETO in November 1943 to replace the P-51B deployment

About my "speculation", it's absolutely logical that the P-47 range could be increased. It was not done earlier because the P-51 was avaliable.

The P-47D-25 was produced with extra fuselage fuel, combined with earlier capability of 'wet' bomb racks upon which fuel tanks could be mounted. First Produced in April 1944 and operational in July 1944. Even then, it could Not escort to Berlin or Munich - leaving most German refineries/petrochem plants out of range,

The P-47N, had the specification been produced in 1941, could have feasibly been accelerated - but a.) would have been a drain on Republic assets and diverting deliveries of the late D models (which is why Curtiss got contract to build F and G models) and, b.) have to wait for Pratt and Whitney deliveries of the R-2800-57 and 77 engines ~ August 1944 for XP-47M and October for XP-47N (2nd XP-47M prototype with new wet wing) with R-280 -77.

Simply stated - No to earlier than delivered P-47D-25 and/or P-47M and N... No to crippling USAAF 5th AF long range operations in the Pacific and USAAF escort capability in MTO, for less than premium performance in the ETO..

 

[Jenisch]

The question above and this thread's question also again highlights Hitler's error in declaring war on the United States after Pearl Harbor.

The US was far from the "neutral" popularily understood it was. For Germany, not only the US was pumping tremendous resources the Axis enemies (i.e. Lend-Lease), but the treat of a US intervention was very real.

The German's assumption of Japan invading the Soviet Union fell through too.

Germany wanted that Japan striked the Pacific, to keep the US and Britain busy while the victory in the USSR was consolidated and Germany was preparing the terrain for an attrition war with the Anglo-Americans. Also: a Japanese attack in Siberia would not be what would defeat the USSR, there was nothing vital for the Soviet state that was in Japan's reach.

 

[tomo pauk]

Warren Bodie mentions two trained fighter groups of P-38, 'lingering' in the continental USA, available form mid 1943 on. Off hand I cannot remember their names, they were mentioned in either his book about P-38 or P-47. He criticizes the USAF for not sending those FGs in ETO in whole 1943.
Unfortunately, the P-38 jockeys would be still hampered by compressibility issues, poor heater, single generator, while the internal fuel was still 300 gals (500 miles combat radius?).

The "US hundred thousands" gives for late P-47D (370 + 300 gals) 600 miles of combat radius, on paper that would be enough for Berlin Munich with 50 miles to spare. However, if we remember that escorts were forced to weave, in order to keep the speed up, but not to overtake bombers, they would be still not ideal for the task. The same book gives 700 miles for P-51 (296 + 150 gals).

 

[Jenisch]

The P-47N, had the specification been produced in 1941, could have feasibly been accelerated - but a.) would have been a drain on Republic assets and diverting deliveries of the late D models (which is why Curtiss got contract to build F and G models) and, b.) have to wait for Pratt and Whitney deliveries of the R-2800-57 and 77 engines ~ August 1944 for XP-47M and October for XP-47N (2nd XP-47M prototype with new wet wing) with R-280 -77.

Simply stated - No to earlier than delivered P-47D-25 and/or P-47M and N... No to crippling USAAF 5th AF long range operations in the Pacific and USAAF escort capability in MTO, for less than premium performance in the ETO..

Look: the RAF bombing was already inflicting heavy damage in the German industry. The USAAF Mustang escorted missions only started in 1944. Let's suppose that there was no Mustang and the P-47N would have to wait until early 1945 to arrive. The B-17s and B=24s might not went to targets beyond the escort range, or perhaps the USAAF could empoy part of it's bomber fleet to night operations to hit such targets. There would be a D-Day? If the Allies considerated that such operation could not be conducted until air supremacy was estabilished over Europe, then it would not happen. Would the Germans defeat the VVS in the East due to less attrition with the Anglo-Americans? No. The VVS from 1944 onwards is underestimated in the West. The Russians were not only with modern machines like the La-5FN, the La-7 and the Yak-3, but they also had adequated trained pilots. If they needed to shoot down more LW planes, they do it, even because, for example, extra 500 fighters for the Germans in the vast Eastern Front are not of much relevance. The Germans jets, however, might give some trouble, but the Anglo-Americans already had answers to them. This was not so much the case of the Russians, but if they started to "cry" to the Anglo-Americans, they might receive some jets by Lend-Lease as well.

 

[Readie]

Actually, Goering said once he saw Mustangs over Berlin, he knew it was over. And this is one of his more sensible quotes.

During the Battle of Britain, in a front line General Officer briefing on Luftwaffe tactics, Göring asked what his pilots needed to win the battle.
Werner Mölders replied that he would like the Bf 109 to be fitted with more powerful engines. Galland replied: "I should like an outfit of Spitfires for my squadron." which left Göring speechless with rage. Galland still preferred the Bf 109 for offensive sweeps, but he perceived the Spitfire to be a better defensive fighter, owing to its manoeuvrability.

This is what I meant Riacrato. Thanks for the correction.
Cheers
John

 

[Readie]

I have read through this thread and am left wondering whether you simply cannot choose a few aircraft.
The main contenders have been listed so I'll not repeat them.
Do you think that even the flawed designs like, the Defiant, contributed as well?
Why?
Without them better designs may not have come along (as quickly)
Just a thought.
Cheers
John

 

[stona]

By this statement what exactly you want to mean? That the LW would be able to change the reality in the Eastern Front if not for the American long-range fighters? I don't think so.
Murray's book is good, but is "outdated". He mentions that the Germans didn't prepared adequadetely for the war - they did it. The German strategy went to ruin when the Russians didn't collapsed like they expected.

The Luftwaffe was defeated in the west,not the east look at the numbers. The Luftwaffe could have had a serious influence in the east if not comitted in the west.The balance of air power would have altered. What effect this might have had along the eastern front would be conjecture.
The Luftwaffe's rate of loss in the west was more than four times that in the east. I've already posted the figures showing that,by sortie,in 1944,a Luftwaffe aircraft was more than seven times as likely to be destroyed in the west than it was in the east.

Murray is outdated by what exactly.
I've never seen the data on which he bases his arguments fundamentally contradicted which is hardly surprising given the sources. If you have some new data about German aircraft production from 1936-45,the level of Luftwaffe losses and rate of attrition I'd love you to tell me where I can find them.

Cheers

Steve

 

[drgondog]

Look: the RAF bombing was already inflicting heavy damage in the German industry.

Not according to Speer.

The USAAF Mustang escorted missions only started in 1944.

December 1943 - but close enough

Let's suppose that there was no Mustang and the P-47N would have to wait until early 1945 to arrive. The B-17s and B=24s might not went to targets beyond the escort range, or perhaps the USAAF could empoy part of it's bomber fleet to night operations to hit such targets. There would be a D-Day?

Lets suppose that the question on this thread wasn't "10 Allied Planes that sealed Nazi Germany's fate? Start another Thread.

If the Allies considerated that such operation could not be conducted until air supremacy was estabilished over Europe, then it would not happen. Would the Germans defeat the VVS in the East due to less attrition with the Anglo-Americans? No. The VVS from 1944 onwards is underestimated in the West. The Russians were not "500 fighters?" - how about an extra 4,000 fighters and 2,000+ pilots in first half of 1944only with modern machines like the La-5FN, the La-7 and the Yak-3, but they also had adequated trained pilots. If they needed to shoot down more LW planes, they do it, even because, for example, extra 500 fighters See above) for the Germans in the vast Eastern Front are not of much relevance. The Germans jets, however, might give some trouble, but the Anglo-Americans already had answers to them. This was not so much the case of the Russians, but if they started to "cry" to the Anglo-Americans, they might receive some jets by Lend-Lease as well.

Jenisch - with all due respect. A.) if Luftwaffe achieved parity on Eastern Front, held Italy as they did, and had no fear of an invasion on Kanalfront- the war in the east would go at least another year, maybe to a Cease Fire. B.) both the Yak-3 and La-7weren't even in full combat ops until June 1944 and October 1944 respectively.

You really think we would have given Soviets any advanced US technology after they refused to return our B-29, then subsequently broke it down and re-engineered it? Remember their jet engine technology sucked until Rolls Royce sold them the engine that basically powered the MiG 15 in 1949.

At any rate - if you take daylight bombing and Normandy invasion off the table, the war in the east is very much different with respect to increased Soviet losses and progress toward defeating Germany. AAA artilliary, the troops that manned them, the damage to oil and petrochemical industry, the increased production diverted to training pilots and fueling mechanized infantry, the diversion of the delta resources used to build fighters to replace the horrible losses over Germany - toward trucks and light armor would have been significant had they been available from January 1944. But I digress and have slipped into an equally 'speculative' historical perspective of 'what if'.

What did happen is that Mustangs crushed the LW over Germany, 8th AF achieved significant strategic results, the Allies successfully invaded France and took Germany to the Elbe - and the Mustang was 'one of the 10' per this thread.

 

[FlakDancer]

Jenish, I didn't mean to imply the U.S. was standing on the sidelines before Hitler's declaration of war. There was a very real effort by Roosevelt to help the British as much as possible, but his hands were tied by Congress, upcoming elections, and a lingering economic hangover from the Depression. When Pearl Harbor happened the American's focused like never before and even though it was a Japanese attack the policy from Washington quickly went to a "Europe first" mindset. If Hitler had not declared war on the U.S. it politically would have been impossible for this "Europe first" plan (which was agreed upon by both the U.S. and the U. K.).

Don't want to hijack this interesting thread, but here is a link to a long article on this pre-war subject. The Transatlantic Duel: Hitler Vs. Roosevelt | American History Lives at American Heritage

Plus several interesting books have been written about the diplomatic and political duels Hitler and Roosevelt fought before Pearl Harbor.