10 Allied planes that sealed Nazi Germany's fate
- Thread starter Jerry W. Loper
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Nothing else to add to those already listed, although to reinforce the role of the Hurricane, far from being influential only during the Battle of Britain, it was used in every theatre the RAF fought in during the war and also by the FAA at sea. A considerable contribution if there ever was one.
Hi drgnDog,
Thanks for the kind words about the charts, they're really just basic Excel-Fu applied to the spreadsheets which Davis made available with his book online. I haven't seen them recently, however at one point they were there for the downloading.
I believe most of the difference in loss rates between Murray and Davis is down to myself, not to either of the authors involved. Murray uses month-by-month loss rates published by the USAF in one of their statistical surveys. Davis' spreadsheets had raid-by-raid totals, with number attacking and number lost, which I have used to calculate loss rates. No doubt there is a difference in the way the then USAAF calculated loss rates against sorties - bombers with a credit sortie which didn't attack, for whatever reason, won't appear in the numbers Davis gives, and for lack of anything better I've simply compared Davis' Lost number to his Attacked number.
No doubt my over-simplified calculation method also accounts for the difference between Martiin Middlebrook's loss rate data for Bomber Command and the rate derived from Davis.
I'd agree with you that the Nachtjagd was never comprehensively defeated, despite the best efforts of the Mossies, however the numbers in Davis don't suggest there were nights with Bomber Command unit losses at the level you describe for late in the war. I've whipped up a couple more graphs out of Davis to illustrate my point.
Bomber Command lost a total of 64 on 28 July 1944 in twin raids on Hamburg and Stuttgart, with 48 on 12 August and 39 on 28 August, but no 70- or 90-bomber loss nights.
For both 8th AF and Bomber Command, those lost will be to both flak and fighters: I've no systematic way of separating the two. You should also note that the Bomber Command loss numbers will combine those lost at night with those lost on day raids, which became more common as the war progressed.
I thought about combining 8th AF and 15th AF numbers, however I know so very little about the 15th that I was concerned that doing so would be bogus. I suppose the Luftwaffe was defending the daylight skies over the Reich againt the 15th in the same way that it was defending against the 8th, however as I say that's a supposition on my part and I'd be talking out of my ass.
For the hell of it, and with the caveat that, as stated above, I've no idea whether such an analysis is me talking out of my ass (arse?) or not, here's the combined 8th and 15th AF losses by date from Davis.
I'll take advice from folks here whether there was a unified Tagjagd effort against the USAAF in the same way there was a unified Nachtjagd effort against the RAF. Picture gets even cloudier when one bears the daylight RAF raids in mind.
Also for the hell of it, I'll make a rough cross-check for late war loss levels against the RAF Bomber Command War Diary which was (is still?) available online. One thing which seems to be coming through is the higher number of days on which Mossies operated versus the heavies.
I'll take advice from folks here whether there was a unified Tagjagd effort against the USAAF in the same way there was a unified Nachtjagd effort against the RAF. Picture gets even cloudier when one bears the daylight RAF raids in mind.
Also for the hell of it, I'll make a rough cross-check for late war loss levels against the RAF Bomber Command War Diary which was (is still?) available online. One thing which seems to be coming through is the higher number of days on which Mossies operated versus the heavies.
Just Lancaster lost tho,
Raids involving Lancasters 1944
Does anyone have Bomber Command War Diaries?
Campaign Diary July
RAF History - Bomber Command 60th Anniversary
Campaign Diary Sept
RAF History - Bomber Command 60th Anniversary
Campaign Diary Oct
RAF History - Bomber Command 60th Anniversary
Campaign Diary Nov
RAF History - Bomber Command 60th Anniversary
Raids involving Lancasters 1944
Does anyone have Bomber Command War Diaries?
Campaign Diary July
RAF History - Bomber Command 60th Anniversary
Campaign Diary Sept
RAF History - Bomber Command 60th Anniversary
Campaign Diary Oct
RAF History - Bomber Command 60th Anniversary
Campaign Diary Nov
RAF History - Bomber Command 60th Anniversary
Glider
Captain
Some years ago a member of this forum did a number of stats on the loss ratios of the B24 and the Lancaster. The results were interesting and you may find them of some interest.
http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/aviation/best-bomber-wwii-4-a-2997-3.html
http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/aviation/best-bomber-wwii-4-a-2997-3.html
drgondog
Major
For the hell of it, and with the caveat that, as stated above, I've no idea whether such an analysis is me talking out of my ass (arse?) or not, here's the combined 8th and 15th AF losses by date from Davis.
I'll take advice from folks here whether there was a unified Tagjagd effort against the USAAF in the same way there was a unified Nachtjagd effort against the RAF. Picture gets even cloudier when one bears the daylight RAF raids in mind.
Also for the hell of it, I'll make a rough cross-check for late war loss levels against the RAF Bomber Command War Diary which was (is still?) available online. One thing which seems to be coming through is the higher number of days on which Mossies operated versus the heavies.
The 15th and 8th were collaborating during Big Week, Feb 20-25, 1944. At that time and until May the 15th had no Mustangs and like the 8th, the P-47 was inadequate for target escort and the P-38 could only fly basically a straight line to and from Vienna, Munich area.
To the extent that planners from both Commands collaborated on a daily basis? I don't know how much Eaker and Doolittle staffs performed joint target selection as the German target selection opportunity was reduced for the 15th until late 1944 to primarily extreme east-southeast and south Germany
As to "a unified Tagjagd effort against the USAAF in the same way there was a unified Nachtjagd effort against the RAF", I suppose the answer is a qualified Yes - for attacks on Germany/Czechoslovakia. LuftFlotte Reich controlled the assets and chose the defense strategy when attacks were occuring simultaneously, particularly in the Leipzig to Halberstadt to Munich to Brux zone. Such attacks, when executed as planned, tended to split the LW forces to react both south and west/N.
I have to scratch my head to search for any reason why the co-ordination and planning between Day and Night defenses - as far as radar and centralized communications assets are concerned - would be different? Tactical deployment and management would seem to differ as 'finding' 8th and 9th AF should be far easier for Day Fighters than Night in search of RAF..
The USAAF statistical survey does include all losses, including 'retirement and salvage' for War Weary a/c, accidents, mechanical failure, structural failure, mid air collision, Friendly Fire, etc in "All Other". So its impossible to extract a combat loss that occurred for causes 'other than Fighters and Flak' such as a mid air collision on a combat mission while forming up over East Anglia or an aircraft breaking up in a thunderstorm over Hannover. For Mid Air over England there is a another complexity when looking at Failed To Return statistics. It didn't fail to return in the minds of the 8th AF - because it 'never went' when it crashed on take off or had a mid air over Bassingbourn, but it is counted as a Combat Loss if it was on a mission or an Accident if not..
Although there are errors in Mighty Eighth War Diary, I find Roger Freeman's scholarship a better source than the Army Air Force Statistical Digest when trying to differentiate data quickly. Unfortunately there were no "Freeman's" as devoted to 9th, 15th, 5th, CBI/MTO, etc.
As to 'RAF' losses in 1945 I was seduced by Woods LW Victory Credits tables and should realize that they are as overstated for RAF credits as USAAF..
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MikeGazdik
Senior Airman
As far as the discussion of the P-38 Vs the P-51. I am a huge fan of the Lightning. And I do agree that IF the Mustang was not available the Lightning could have, in enough numbers, successfully escorted the bombers. But the "kill" numbers tell the most important story.
The fighter strength of the Luftwaffe would not have been impacted any where near the amount that was shot down by the Mustang.
Perhaps the bombing missions would have been successful, and perhaps the bomber losses would have been acceptable. But the P-38 would not have destroyed the same amount of Luftwaffe fighters. The stats posted show this. Without the destruction of the Luftwaffe fighters, the war last longer. Period.
The fighter strength of the Luftwaffe would not have been impacted any where near the amount that was shot down by the Mustang.
Perhaps the bombing missions would have been successful, and perhaps the bomber losses would have been acceptable. But the P-38 would not have destroyed the same amount of Luftwaffe fighters. The stats posted show this. Without the destruction of the Luftwaffe fighters, the war last longer. Period.
drgondog
Major
I long ago formed an opinion that the air to air totals and ratios of the P-38 were far less than the Mustang in the ETO primarily because the P-38 was much more visible because of size, and distinguishable due to the twin boom configuration.
Consequently the German pilot often had much more time to decide to flee or fight, or seek a tactically superior position because of the gap time it took for the P-38 driver to see a 109 or 190.
It is clear that a skilled P-38 pilot could take any other conventional fighter on with high probability of winning a fight if he managed to the P-38 strengths.
Consequently the German pilot often had much more time to decide to flee or fight, or seek a tactically superior position because of the gap time it took for the P-38 driver to see a 109 or 190.
It is clear that a skilled P-38 pilot could take any other conventional fighter on with high probability of winning a fight if he managed to the P-38 strengths.
I don't have doubt that Germany would go down with or without the P-51. The Allies would still be able to fight the LW for most part of the way with the P-38 (actually using the relay system and less engagement time, for all the way), while the P-47D had extended range by 1944, and the N model would arrive in 1945. And the most deep targets in Germany would be in range of RAF's Bomber Command. Also, the VVS was becoming a gorila in the East, and could have take much more LW strenght if necessary (it also could have Western air units based in the Eastern Front if needed). There was also the fact that the US could make cuts in the PTO and bring thousands of extra planes and pilots without problem (the same being possible with Soviet forces in the Far East and Turkey). And ultimately there was the atomic bomb.
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drgondog
Major
The P-38s were not going to be re-deployed from any theatre into ETO. The P-51s were planned and executed to deploy to the ETO - but because of the crisis with battling the LW and the Ordered destruction of the LW in time for invasion, the 8th traded P-47s and P-38s for Mustangs.. but even so, all the 8th AF P-38 groups (5) remained with 8th until they converted to Mustangs post D-Day.
Jenisch - it is entirely Ok if you disagree that the P-51 was among the 10 aircraft most responsible for the demise of Germany. These are opinions only.
This has to be taken with a huge dose of hindsight, as, why would the Americans move resources from the PTO? The Japanese were a tough opponent who showed no mercy, so the US are going to throw everything they could at them - and they did. As for the Atomic bomb, the decision to use this weapon against Japan wasn't made until very late in the procedings, long after the deployment of P-51s to the ETO. It sounds like you're assuming that the Americans thought, "Well, we got the bomb, she'll be right in Europe, no need for those long range Mustangs..."
I don't understand how the P-51 could not be considered as one of the top ten aircraft against Germany. Even though it wasn't around as early as the P-47 or P-38, it was faster and had a greater range than both of them. Its contribution to the war effort was enormous because of its performance - it was, after all a first class fighter, not saying the P-38 or P-47 weren't, but the Mustang set the bar pretty high. I bet if you were to ask any German fighter pilot in home defence duties which type he thought was the best American fighter he had encountered in combat, he'd say the Mustang. Technically, it set a new standard in aerodynamic efficiency; with the same engine power output as the smaller and lighter Spitfire IX, the heavier and physically larger P-51D was faster by more than 10 mph (I don't have exact figures to hand) - nothing to be scoffed at back then.
Ultimately the war was a numbers game and all three of those fighters were needed, but the P-51 stood head and shoulders above its contemporaries because of what it offered. Claiming that the US could have done without it by shifting assets is rather silly, the nature of the war and all that. It had better performance as a long range escort than its stablemates, why wouldn't they use it? Its war record speaks for itself; it didn't gain the reputation it has by just being there.
CobberKane
Banned
- 706
- Apr 4, 2012
To my mind anyone who holds that the Mustang does not deserve a place in the top ten is drawing a very, very long bow. To argue that had the Mustang had not existed another design would have emerged to do the job is spurious; the same could be said of any design that had its impact at a time other than circumstances like the BoB or BoA, when the Allies were facing imminent defeat.
If the Mustang had not come along it seems entirely likely that the allies would have needed another six to twelve months to develop and deploy the P-47 and P-38 to the point where they could do the same job, by which time they would have been facing six months more of German jets, apart from anything else. I know that earlier in the thread it was stated that the Allies had that threat covered with their own jet designs but that is patent nonsense - a Meteor or Vampire on the Tarmac in England isn't much use in an air battle over Germany.
Total,air superiority over Europe was a prerequisite for Overlord. If the fighter that delivered it doesn't make the top ten something is wrong.
If the Mustang had not come along it seems entirely likely that the allies would have needed another six to twelve months to develop and deploy the P-47 and P-38 to the point where they could do the same job, by which time they would have been facing six months more of German jets, apart from anything else. I know that earlier in the thread it was stated that the Allies had that threat covered with their own jet designs but that is patent nonsense - a Meteor or Vampire on the Tarmac in England isn't much use in an air battle over Germany.
Total,air superiority over Europe was a prerequisite for Overlord. If the fighter that delivered it doesn't make the top ten something is wrong.
They didn't need to be totally re-deployed. It was question of put other manufactures to produce the existing planes, give more planes to the Russians (perhaps also operate Western air units in Russia), etc. There's always flexibility.
It's not question of opinion, it's a fact. The Mustang was indeed among the most important Allied planes. But was it absolutely crucial for the German total defeat? This is my point...
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The Japanese were well contained when 1943 started. There was no absolute need to went to the offensive as the Americans went with them from '43 onwards. And much less need to bomb them like the Americans started in late 1944 early 1945.
CobberKane
Banned
- 706
- Apr 4, 2012
Uh-oh, here we go...
Jenisch, I don't think you understand the concept of total war. To assume the Japanese were well contained in 1943 is just plain ignorant of the situation at that time and what it was that both Japan and the USA were at war for. Neither side was prepared to give up until one emerged victorious. It took the use of nuclear weapons to bring the Japanese to believe that the war was lost for them and even then it took two of them and still there was reluctance to give up among the military hierarchy. Using nuclear weapons in anger is a pretty desperate act and although here is probably not the best place to argue whether it was necessary or the moral implications, their use alone should convince you that the situation was desperate and far from being resolved any earlier than it was.
I read a book that said that privately, Truman lost a lot of sleep over the decision to drop the bombs, but ultimately he felt it was necessary to bring an end to the bloodshed.
You could argue that it was, because it fulfilled a role that no other type could because of its performance margins over its contemporaries. The thing with aircraft like the Mustang, Spitfire and Mosquito (for example) was that what they achieved was crucial in bringing about the defeat of Nazi Germany, so in answer to your question, yes, it was.
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I will talk just about the end of the war. When the B-29s started to fly over Japan in 1945, what was the treat that Japan representated? The major ships were sunk, the Japanese were cut from their resources and the American submarines were doing what the U-boats didn't managed.
From: http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/AAF/Sta ... 3.html#t87
Airplanes on Hand in the AAF, August, 1945.
Very Heavy Bombers
1st Line B-29: 2,132
2nd Line misc.: 733
There was other planes that could be taken away from the Pacific. I'm not saying that the Pacific and even offensives in it should be abandoned. It was possible to ration even more the theater, this is my point.
Maybe they would surrender if they took several nukes (given the US invasion preparations, there was no much faith in nukes alone), but as it was: two nukes plus a special type of "nuke" in Manchuria.
When you firebomb Japanese civilians, strafe them with fighters and conduct unrestricted submarine warfare, a nuke is just an add thing. Not that the Japanese were not capable of do those things, of course.
They achived determined results, but say that a specific type could not have a substitute is the point. A fighter plane is an aiframe, engine, systems and guns. The P-38 and the P-47 could substitute the Mustang. In time for D-Day in 1944? Don't know. But for 1945, certainly. Then there were the Russians who had "just" 6000 single-seat fighters in January of 1944 (Mustang missions started in December '43, isn't?). Then there was the RAF and it's Bomber Command doing a lot of devastation in Germany since 1943. The Allies had flexibility to overcome problems such as a lack of the P-51, which was definately a very important plane for the Allied cause, but was not one which in it's absence would change the outcome of the war in the sense that the country which Gröfaz ruled would be occupied.
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