1918 - the year of offensives

[davebender]

WWI era "sufficient protection" is not the same as WWII era "sufficient protection". Dozens of WWI era British and French tanks were knocked out using standard German Army hand grenades, light infantry mortars and 7.92mm machineguns with armor piercing ammunition. Dozens more were destroyed using standard 7.7cm field guns firing standard HE ammunition.

 

[parsifal]

WWI era "sufficient protection" is not the same as WWII era "sufficient protection". Dozens of WWI era British and French tanks were knocked out using standard German Army hand grenades, light infantry mortars and 7.92mm machineguns with armor piercing ammunition. Dozens more were destroyed using standard 7.7cm field guns firing standard HE ammunition.

I agree that the gun armour race in WWI was at the entry level, however the means to kill or disable tanks was as limited as the armouring used to protect their targets. The main German AT weapon in 1918, was the AT rifle, in 7.92mm calibre. This was already having difficulty in penetrating the frontal armour of Allied tanks and toward the end of 1918, the germans were already taking steps to phase this weapon out, or at least supplement it by an ATR in the 13mm calibre,

Grenades could not generally penetrate the armour of Allied tanks, though it did happen on occasion. Rather, a grenade lobbed onto the roof of a Mk IV or MkV could damage the tracks of the tank and force its abandonment.

77mm field guns were used, along with a number of guns, but i am unsure just how successful they actually were. A field gun cannot slew its aim very effectively, especially when it has to be dug into a trench system, and is firing HE rather than any AP round AFAIK. But its the limited traversing ability that limits their effectiveness the most. Certainly the number one limiting factor in tank effectiveness IMO was not anything the germans were doing, it was the poor reliability of the vehicles themselves, but by the latter half of 1918, this had been dramatically reduced, and the vehicles planned and entering production for 1919 would suffer from mechanical unreliability far less. In the later 1918 offensives, i am not aware of the germans being able to knock out large numbers of tanks outright, to the extent they could halt an operation. I dont even think anything like that happened in 1917 either. Inferred in your statements is that German AT defences in 1917-18 were able to defeat determined concentrated allied tank assaults, and to be honest, I dont think that actually ever happened. Breakdowns were the major cause of failure in tank offensives.

In any event arguing that the armouring on Allied tanks was not a fullproof defence against AT defences doesnt do anything to promote your claim that the open topped tracked ammunition tractor or the A7 tank were effective APCs. If anything it only serves to underscore their unsuitability in the Infantry vehicle role.

 

[davebender]

No such thing during WWI. Automotive technology had not advanced to the point where combat vehicles could carry sufficient armor and still maintain an adequate power to weight ratio. So a WWI era tracked combat vehicle must settle for minimal protection plus a power to weight ratio good enough to get the vehicle across no mans land without breaking down. Even that requirement was tough to meet.

For instance, only 9 of the 49 BEF tanks employed on the Somme during September 1916 made it across no mans land. The 121 French tanks employed May 16th, 1917 did a bit better. 81 were put out of action the first day but only 29 were due to mechanical malfunction. The other 52 were disabled by German fire. These actions were before the German Army began issuing purpose built anti tank guns.

3.7cm Rheinmetall TAK 600 issued during 1918.
Review of MGM's 1/72 German WW1 3.7cm Rheinmetall TAK AT gun

It was a gun on a fixed wheel carriage, with the 809mm long tube fixed to the carriage, without any recoil system. The gun had mechanisms for elevation (-6 degrees to +9 degrees) and traverse (21 degrees). The fixed iron sights allowed for firing up to 2,600m. The muzzle velocity was 506 m/sec. Emplaced, the gun itself weighed 175kg. The gun fired solid armour-piercing 0.46kg shells (with or without a tracer). These shells could penetrate 15mm of armour plating at a distance of 500 meters. The gun could be pulled by one horse, and on the battle*field by four men dragging it in harnesses.

 

[parsifal]

I agree that there was no such thing as fullproof defence, neither did I make any claim to that effect. However, the question is not whether tanks were fullproof but whether the AT defences were good enough, and dense enough to break up allied armour. In summary they were not. the loss rates you mention are not loss rates due to enemy action, about 90% of those losses are due to break downs, and this decreased as the war progressed.

Now, looking at individual performance, if we take the german 37mm gun as the likely primary AT defence for 1919 (which it wasnt....the plan was to introduce the 13mm ATR as the main defence against tanks), with an armour penetration of 15mm @ 500m, this might sometimes, maybe 30% of the time that hits were scored, penetrate the 16mm frontal armour of an FT17, or 14mm frontal armour of a MkV. It would have little hope of penetrating the 45mm of an FCM or the 30 mm of a Medium Type D. It would have slim hope of penetrating the 18mm of case hardened (the first in the world) frontal armour of an International Type.

In 1918, 1919, the balance favoured the tanks defences over the AT defences, and this is reflected in the relatively low numbers of tanks lost to enemy action. As previously indicated, your implied claim that the majority of tanks were knocked out by German action is just false, or at best misleading (I believe deliberately so) since the majority of losses 1916-June 1918 were due to breakdowns

Further the actions that you have selected are highly selective and misleading. As has been stated several times, Allied tanks did not really start to have their full effect until the last half of 1918. At Hamel, for example, 45 tanks were committed to the battle, and only 3 were knocked out due to German activity. Others did break down, but about half the tank force was still operational at the end of the action.

Trying to argue that German defences were effective against Allied tanks, or that tanks were not a decisive element in the fighting at the end of the war is a nonsense. Tanks were very effective, once the allies worked out how to use them, and the reliability issues had been solved. Once that was done, the Germans were no longer in the hunt.

 

[parsifal]

I found Tim Travers' book (Command Technology in the British Army 1917-18, Routledge 1992) to be very good. it includes a number of primary sources that are appended to the main dialogue. I would recommend it as a reference for peope wanting to study this period and the effect of technology on the british Army at this time.

He spends quite a bit of time on the contribution of tanks to both Hamel and Amiens fought in July and August of 1918, and attributes the low loss rates at Hamel to the way they were employed and the visibility conditions, along with the close levels of co-operation that had been developed in the prepratory training leading up to th attack. At Hamel, the Infantry led the Tanks, not the other way aroundwith the tanks providing close fire support as the Infantry advanced. This was the theory, though in practice the relatively speedy MkVs overtook the advanacing Infantry in a number of places.

At Amiens, the performance of the tanks was quite good, though victory was less one sided than it had been at Hamel. At Amiens, in support of 4th Australian Division, the 8th Tank Bn of the RTC with 39 operational tanks were committed. In the after action reports it was generally considered that 10-14 of the tanks committed had done critical work in the attack. 10 of the tanks had remained operational but had not fulfilled a critical role in the battle. 15 tanks had either broken down due to mechanical breakdown or had been disabled by german fire. Frustratingly there is not a breakdown on the reasons for these breakdowns, so we dont how how many broke down of their own accord, and how many had been disabled by German artillery and ATG/ATR fire. Neither do I have information on the numbers of tankmen killed or injured. However, every one of the tanks knocked out, or broken down were repaired and eventually returned to service. So, in this major attack on a critical German position, german AT efforts failed to break up the assault, and inflicted zero permananet losses on the supporting British tank Bn. I fail to see the "scores of British tanks knocked out" here, and this battle was viewed by both sides as a critical final turning point in the war......

To be fair, Travers does not view the role of tanks at either Hamel or Amiens as critical to the outcome of the battle. In both cases, indeed, right to the wars end, tanks in the british Army played a supporting role to the infantry/ artillery combination. Still they were critical to reducing casualties, and generating a collapse of morale in the frontline German units

 

[parsifal]

To be as fair as possible, Travers does mention several occasions following Amiens (mostly in the pursuit in September) where the retreating Germans delivered some nasty stinging blows on the RTC. Haig to my mind was attempting to exploit the near collapse of the german Army in flanders following the bollocking it received in August, and in essence sent s number of tank Bns into battle without adequate support. The results were predictable, and quite nasty, so to that extent the German defenders demonstrated in spades that they still had plently of fight and could be effective when they were given the opportunity to do so. But in properly planned battles, with proper all arms integration, the Germans by August and beyond were just outnumbered, and outgunned. And they knew it, which was affecting their morale...

 

[davebender]

No such thing. The German Army employed multiple anti tank weapons by 1918. You can expect improved AT weapons and tactics during 1919.

Welcome to Landships! - A site for WW1 Military Hardware WW1 Military Modelling
- K rounds. 7.92mm AP rounds that could be fired from normal infantry rifles and machineguns.
- 13.1mm AT rifle. By the end of the war every infantry company had two.
- TUF 13.1mm AT machinegun. Essentially a scaled up Maxim MG. Prototype stage when war ended.
- HMGs dedicated to AT role. LMGs replaced the pre-war Maxim 08 in the infantry support role.
- A new model 7.58mm light mortar was introduced that allowed direct fire vs tanks and bunkers.
- 3.7cm TAK AT gun. Intended to replace light mortars in the AT role. Hence more mortars available for infantry support.
- 7.7mm field guns plus special AP ammo. Sep 1918 instruction designated tanks as the primary target for all field guns.
- Flammenwerfer. An effective close range AT weapon. German Pioneer had them by 1916.
- Grenade bundles. A method still employed at the beginning of WWII.
- Mines. German soldiers improvised mines during 1914. By 1918 they had factory built mines.
- AT ditches. Crude but effective right up to modern times.
- Dedicated AT squad. Most German infantry battalions had one by 1918. Satchel charges and grenade bundles were the preferrred weapons.
- 3.7cm AT guns and 7.7cm field guns with the new AP ammo were often located in designated AT forts.
- Experiments for developing the 2cm Becker autocannon into an anti tank weapon.

 

[parsifal]

Thankyou for posting that, quite a good source. however, does not alter my basic position that the 13mm AT rifle was planned to be the German army's primary AT weapon system. According to the article you posted, they were planning to issue 30000 of them at a scale of 2 per company. thats a total of 54 or so per division, making it the most numerous AT weapon, and hence the primary weapon system for combatting tanks. Just a quick note for you to remember in future, "primary" does not mean "sole"

The unfortunate thing about this AT rifle was that it lacked sufficient peformance to be fully effective against the heavier tanks being introduced by the allies in the latter half of 1918. The smaller 7.92mm rifle, would be even less effective, though more accurate. Both weapons would have been useful, but inadequate overall

With regard to the AT MG, I note that the article finds it doubtful that any had been issued, but also notes the Germans intended to use all their available HMGs for AT work, firing the standard K round. This means the standard issue maxim might have similar performance to the 13mm AT rifle, which by 1918 was insufficient except at close range to deal with allied tanks. and the whole concept is deeply flawed when you think about it. If the german MGs were busy engaging the allied tanks and not the allied Infantry, and they were busy doing that until close range, that would mean the Allied Infantry would be able to cross no-mans land virtually untroubled.....the tanks would achieve their purpose, and survive, simply by staying 100 to 300metres from the trenches but issued on a much lower scale.

A German Infantry Bn in 1918 had a total of 6 MGs, thats 54 per Div, so if all MGs were converted to the AT role then yes, these become the primary AT weapon. Problem is, I just cannot see all 54 being diverted to that purpose. Maybe 1 company per Bn (2 guns) equalling 18 per div. In any event, converting your primary anti-infantry weapon to an AT function, is a bad idea, because it takes a weapon system very good at one thing (killing Infantry) and diverts it to a role that it would be less good at (killing tanks) and demands that it do that at a time in the battle when maximum anti-infantry capability would be needed. Dumb.......

The direect fire mortar would have been used as part of the standard mortar detachments which were already being used to engage allied tanks. The problem here is twofold, limited scales of issue, and limited range of the weapon system. But it has to be conceded that they were at least effective at range below 500m.

The article you posted relevantly states..."In September 1918 an instruction was issued to the effect that half of every battalion's light trench mortars should be dedicated to anti tank work. The 192nd division of the German Army had already pioneered this approach in August. They proved very effective but limited by a shortage of horses for the transport of ammunition. During this trial British tank crews had described the use of light trench mortars in this role and from September onwards German light trench mortar crews reported that tank gunners were paying them particular and unwanted attention. With their relatively short range if operating in the mobile anti tank role (in the open) they were highly vulnerable to machine gun fire from tanks"

This fails to appreciate that from Hamel onward, the British were using their tanks as part of all arms assualt groups, and as often as not were pushing their Infantry forward of the supporting tanks and using their tanks as fire support vehicles. If the mortars were being detailed to engage the tanks at the very time they were needed to also engage the advancing infantry, the tanks were achieving their stated purpose. two things were developed in the allied inventory to counter the AT mortars. The tanks from the mkV onward were more mobile, and they used their MG armament to keep the mortars suppressed.

In terms of equipment scales, it is worth noting that each Bn had 6 mortars attached, 3 light and 3 medium. It was only intended that the Light mortars be assigned to this task, so each Division in theory had 13 or 14 of these weapons for AT duties. thats not enough to make much difference. Average frontage of a German Inf Div on the western front was 6 miles from memory....But if you read the tactical employment methods devised by the germans it becomes apparent just how limited they were...."light trench mortars assigned to anti tank duties were not to be used singly but always positioned in groups of at least two. They were also to be positioned were two or more groups could provide each other with supporting fire. They were to be echeloned in depth behind the front line being concentrated where tank breakthroughs were most likely". In other words, one might expect that at minimum a given piece of the divisional frontage with an effective enagem,ent range of no more than 500m out of a divisional fontage of 12000m might be repeated 3 times. that means that the mortar teams could cover, at most, a little over 10% of the divisional frontage when used in this way. hardly any sort of show stopper i am afraid.

If the 3.7cm gun had been introduced, it at least would have allowed the mortars to return to duties that they were better suited to.

Not included in your article is the expected rate of issue for the dedicated ATG assets. I can tell you it was intended to provide each Bn with just 2 guns. some Divs may also have had a further centralized detachment of 6 guns attached, though in reality this would have been rare IMO. so at maximum the 37mm gun would have been issued at a rate of 24 per Div, but more likely 18, to cover an average frontage of 12000m. The dedicated AT Bns might have helped a bit, but the germans would have been lucky to have any of them in time, and in the right place at the right time.

The ATg was a vast improvement on the lash up adaptations mentioned so far, but still insufficient to be truly effective against the heavy breakthrough tanks the allies were preparing for 1919.


All of the other measures and equipment have issues one way or another. The central problem was that the germans had not appreciated the threat from tanks in time, and by detaching their other weapons to the AT role, were in fact diminishing the eoverall effectiveness of their field formations. This includes things such as AT ditches and the like

My opinion...by the latter part of 1918, the allies had worked out tactical methods, some of them taken from the germans themselves, and grafted tanks and aircraft into the mix. The Germans had underestimated the effect of tanks in widening the all arms concepts, and by August 1918, increasingly one sided defeats were being inflicted on the Germans. There is no reason that in 1919 this would not have continued, at an accelarated rate in fact. Basic problem for the germans was that they were running out of men, faster than their opponents, and were suffering a crisis in morale to boot

 

[davebender]

AMMS Brisbane
7.7cm Feldkanone 96 n.A modified for the anti tank role. The Heer had 50 batteries of these heavy AT guns by the end of WWI. I find it difficult to believe anyone could mass produce a WWI era tank with enough armor to survive an AP shot of that size.

 

[parsifal]

They were effective, in terms of the weight of shell, but replaced rather than added to the 24 guns normally attached to a German Infantry Div. also the weight of these guns made them clumsy and difficult to bear on a moving target. Given that the new MkVs and above were all noted for their improved mobility the firing solution for a field gun adapted to ATG work becomes that much harder.

With 50 batteries available, that equates to just 2 to 4 guns per div, so these weapons are going to have virtually no effect on a tank/infantry battle. just not enough of them, they are too clumsy and hard to train to be effective. This was certainly the experience of the Australian formations that came up against them during the 100 days offensive. many were captured, many more abandoned...

Moreover, to be used in the AT role, they would have needed to be in the trench lines, in relatively open revetments, and in the artillery dominated battlefields of WWI that was a damning weakness. an open revetment would be needed to permit proper movement of the gun, but the minute you do that, you expose both gun and crew to counter battery from the Allied artillery as well as MG fire from advancing Infantry and armour (and in 1919 they would also have been bombed by the armourd Sopwith TR ground attack aircraft) . if the guns are held back, they are still going to be under threat, since by the second half of 1918, allied Infantry/Armour teams were being accompanied by mobile batteries of artillery, much as the germans themselves had done at the beginning of 1918.

Dont be mistaken, these guns were useful, but had some sever limitations, and given the small numbers that could be deployed, would have little or no effect on the battle.

The germans needed a lightweight, purpose built AT gun, strong enough to defeat the second gen Allied tanks coming into service. the gun needed to be lightweight, and easily trained. The 3.7cm gun they did develop was a step in the right direction, but still lacked power to kill the allied new tanks

 

[davebender]

British Casualties on the Western Front.
122,272 August 1918.
114,831 September 1918
121,046 October 1918

Except for the Somme bloodbath Britain sustained more casualties during the final 3 months then any other period of WWI. Propaganda aside I'd say the Australians had a rough time during the so called "100 days".

 

[parsifal]

British Casualties on the Western Front.
122,272 August 1918.
114,831 September 1918
121,046 October 1918

Except for the Somme bloodbath Britain sustained more casualties during the final 3 months then any other period of WWI. Propaganda aside I'd say the Australians had a rough time during the so called "100 days".

Its useful to compare the actual losses, for both sides to determine if the hundred days offensives were having a real or propaganda effect. From 8 July 1918 to 11 November the principal combattants suffered the following casualties

Killed, wounded and prisoners:
Allies
531,000 French
411,636 British Empire
127,000 American
Total: 1,070,000 Killed wounded and prisoners:

Germans
785,733
Total prisoners:
386,342

Total: 1,172,075 killed wounded and prisoners

The casualty rates were heavy for all sides in that last 3 months of the war, but the difference was that by the end of it, German morale was clearly collapsing and the German army was in full retreat. German formations were taking heavier casualties than any of the opposing nationalities, and could only remain competitive in the field if they continued their retreat. Further, the opposing nationalities could spread their casulaties over three main national groupings. The strongest evidence that the germans were clearly losing, and badly so, comes from the reaction of the german leadership itself.

Australian casulaties were the heaviest of any of the protagonists on either side, as a percentage of the force deployed. 68% of all soldiers deployed ended up a casualty. There were 67000 dead Australians alone by the end of it. 12000 of these were killed at gallipoli. I dont dispute that casualties for the allies continued to be heavy, but what i do dispute is this attempt to re-write history....that somehow the germans were not losing, that somehow they were not suffering even more catastrophic losses than their opponent. Clearly the statement by their own leadership disproves that, as well as the figures themselves, along with a glance on the map as to what was happening.

The success of the 100 days isnt that casualties were avoided, they werent. But during set piece battles, such aas at Hamel or Amiens the division of losses was clearly and substantially in favour of the allies. Allied losses took sharp rises whenever they tried to cut corners and exploit apparent german weaknesses. Here the allied strengths of careful preparation and true all arms co-operation gave way to a mad scramble and improvisation, and inevitably this led to heavy losses for the allies, because in those situations the allies made mistakes. However, the germans could only now survive if they retreated. Every time they attempted to stabilize and create a static defence, the allies would give them a rather severe beating. Allied military technique had mastered the technique of the static line battle, but was less able to deal with a mobile engagement. The germans could only survive if they kept retreating. Thats why their military leaders knew they had to find a way out of the quagmire

 

[Readie]

Good post. Another interesting thing to consider is the Aussie volunteering rate. Bearing in mind that all Aus trops were volunteers and not conscripted.

In the early years of WW1 most of the Au volunteers were of British stock (like my Great Uncles and Grand father), as the war progressed and the casualty rates got worse and with the realisation of the consquences of battles at Gallipoli and on the Western Front the Aussies became, er.. less willing to volunteer.
Man for man the Aussie troops took a pounding wherever they were deployed.
First World War 1914

Cheers
John

 

[parsifal]

Thanks John

My grandfather was in the 7th Light Horse Regiment, AIF, from 1914 to 1919. The following is a brief history. I also have the original regimental history as well as my grandfathers military6 decorations....


7th Light Horse Regiment A.I.F., 1914-19

After the outbreak of World War One, 7th Light Horse Regiment was formed at Liverpool and Holsworthy, near Sydney in October and November 1915, as part of 2nd Australian Light Horse Brigade.
The first commanding officer was Lt Col J. M. Arnott of 11th Light Horse (C.M.F.) and Major G. M. Macarthur-Onslow of 9th Light Horse (C.M.F.) was appointed 2nd-in-command.
The Regiment arrived in Egypt on 1st February, 1915 and in May, the Brigade was ordered to Gallipoli as a dismounted force, the 7th disembarking on the 19th. From then on it was in the fighting until the evacuation of the Peninsula in mid-December. For a period, the squadrons were distributed to the battalions of 3rd Infantry Brigade; later the Regiment operated as a complete unit. It was at such historical places as Bolton's Ridge, Tasmania Post, Chatham's Post, Balkan Pits and Lone Pine.
During August, Lt Col Arnott was evacuated sick and was succeeded in command by Major (later Lt Col) Macarthur-Onslow.
After Gallipoli, the Light Horse were re-horsed in Egypt and 2nd Light Horse Brigade was allotted to Anzac Mounted Division, with which the 7th Regiment remained until the end of hostilities. In Egypt, Sinai and Palestine, it gained battle honours and the following remarks by Lt Gen Sir Harry Chauvel, who commanded the Desert Mounted Corps, are appropriate:
"At the Battle of Romani it was largely due to its stubborn defence and spirited counter-attack, under the leadership of Lt Col G. Macarthur-Onslow that the victory was so complete.
At the first Battle of Gaza, it was this Regiment that led the Anzac Mounted Division through the night to its position in rear of the city and which captured the new Commander of the Gaza Defence, who was on his way up to take his command. During the Battle of Beersheba and the pursuit which followed, the Regiment sustained the fine traditions it had already established for dash and gallantry. In the raids across Jordan and throughout the long summer of 1918 in the Jordan Valley, it bore its share of the fighting and the hardships, from the bitter cold of Gilead in mid-winter to the scorching heat of Jericho in July.
Under Lt Col J. D. Richardson, it played a brilliant part in the final victory which destroyed three Turkish Armies and brought Germany's Allied out of the War."
Decorations and awards gained by the Regiment were as follows: CMG - 2; DSO - 5; MC - 8; Order of the Nile - 4; DCM - 8; MM - 20; Serbian Medal - 5; Mentioned in Despatches - 41; Complimentary Mention (Anzac) - 1; Mentioned in Divisional Orders (Anzac) - 1.

My Grandfather was a scout in the campaign in Palestine. When war broke out, he was working in Queensland as a Stockman. He and his best friend , a man named Doyle brought over 400 head of horses down from Mt Isa to Sydney....that over 2000 miles by the long paddock. He was the best horseman I ever knew, and tough as nails.


The 7th fought at Gallipoli, Beersheeba, Romani, helped to capture Jerusalem and Damascus just to name a few. My grndfather was mentioned when he and Doyle rode down and captured a German advising officer North Of Jerusalem. Said he roped and hog tied him like a calf. His own horse was a big grey mare, 17 hands high, which he called "Charlotte", after my Grandmother I think

At the end of the war, Field Marshal Allenvy wrote to Harry Chauvel, the commander of the Australian Light Horse, 2nd Brigade, with a specific unit commendation. Unless you believe this was all just proaganda, it was a pretty impressive rap....


"I knew the New South Wales Lancers and the Australian Horse well in the Boer War, and I was glad to meet some of my old friends of those days when the Light Horse came under my command just two years ago ...

The Australian Light Horseman combines with a splendid physique a restless activity of mind... on every variety of ground - mountain, plain, desert, swamp or jungle - the Australian Light Horseman has proved himself equal to the best.

He has earned the gratitude of the Empire and the admiration of the world".

Finally here are some photgraphs of the Light Horse....

 

[Readie]

Thanks Michael,
The respectful Au archives have a mine of information that never fails to impress me.
http://naa12.naa.gov.au/scripts/Imagine.asp?B=8070340
If this link doesn't work and you are interested in a bit of Read history
Search Retrieve - Session timed out
Or type Charles Archibald Read into 1915 - 1917 into the national archives of Au website and you can see his history.
Cheers
John

 

[Lighthunmust]

My grandfather was in the 7th Light Horse Regiment, AIF, from 1914 to 1919. The following is a brief history. I also have the original regimental history as well as my grandfathers military6 decorations....

I am extremely impressed! You have much to be proud of Michael! I saw the Mel Gibson movie 30 years ago and "The Light Horseman" when it came out. Both moved me to do a little reading about Gallipoli and Beersheeba. Your grandfather's generation was magnificent in the performance of duty! Have you ever read about the Australian submarine that penetrated the Sea of Marmara? Really impressive.

Steve

 

[TheMustangRider]

I second Lighthunmust's post.
Your grandfather seemed to be a very admirable person Parsifal and I'm sure you must feel very proud of him.
I hope you had the opportunity to have long talks with him about The Great War.

 

[parsifal]

Thanks guys, I am proud of his achievements. But he hated the war. Talking about casualties, he was the only surviving 1914 man to make it through the whole war unscathed....well almost unscathed. he suffered psychological trauma for the rest of his life. Not a happy experience for him. He never really complained about it, but he suffered I can tell you.

We could look at the 1918 offensives on the fronts other than the western front, though we have not really finished with the western front.

I was hoping that some of you other guys would post information on the other nationalities It would be great to make this thread a more or less complete record of the war in 1918.

 

[davebender]

Where are you getting your data?

You have omitted Russian casualties so I assume only western front casualties count for this comparison. Per the Reichsarchiv these are the German western front casualties for July to November 1918.
78,196 Dead.
347,867 Missing and POW.
359,670 Wounded.
-----------------------------
785,733 Total German Western Front Casualties July to November 1918.

 

[parsifal]

My sources in all of this are the Australian War Memorial (AWM) archives mostly, which are recognized as providing the most complete and accurate records of this nature for WWI. The figures I posted are for the western front only.

(Edit: One thing worth scommenting on...the figures you paraded as "British losses on the wetern front" appear for all the world to be the allied equivalent of what you are rqaising for the Germans. They appear to be British empire" losses for all fronts, though the majority were on the western front, admittedly)


Ive just realized what Ive done. Have added the wounded figures to the total. There are two figures one that adds up to 785733, which includes the wounded total. ive then added that number again to the total, which skews the number right out of whack.

Doesnt change the outcome, or the significance of the 100 days.