1918 - the year of offensives

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This shall be interesting.

Europe was certainly economically in ruin in 1945, but it is really hard to argue that Europe was not better off with out Hitlers and cronies running Germany and trying to destroy Europe. I don't see how you are going to win this one Dave...;)
 
The war was not about getting rid of Soviet aggression, it was about getting rid of German militarism. The world was successful in achieving that, and Europe in particualr was better off for it. To achieve that, compromises had to be made, and this resulted in the rise of Soviet domination of Eastern Europe. However, that was nothing different to what was happening in 1939. Soviets were already occupying the Baltic States, annexing large areas of Finland, occupying large areas of Poland, and Rumania, and infiltrating many of the governments of eastern Europe. many of the Governments of these eastern countries were already radicalised and undemocratic. For example the the green cross movement in Hungary, the Iron Guard in Rumania, and similar near fascist movements in yugoslavia. There was a military dictatorship in Greece, and Bulgaria was under marshal law.

The outlook for all these countries was anything but rosy in 1939, and with two great totalitarian states vying for their control, the future was bleak.

By 1945 the threat from Germany had been removed. Western Europe stood like a beacon of hope for these countries. Sure, the inevitable had happened, and the Soviets had filled the void left by the destruction of the Nazis. But now the people of eastern Europe had only one tormentor, plus they possessed something more precious than all the gold and guns in the world....hope. They could look at western europe and hope for what was possible. In 1939 they could only see blackness and subjugation. In 1945, they could look over their back fences and see a world, gutted by war, but free from tyranny, and with huge amounts of potential. Dont try to tell me that this was not a better situation for Eastern Europeans. It took another 50 years to get free of Soviet oppression, but without the defeat of Hitler, this would not have been possible.

Finally, people often compare the Soviets to the Nazis. nothing could be further from the truth. The Soviets were analogous to a child given a gun, and not told it was wrong to shoot someone. They were like primitive natives really in comparison to the peoples of the west. Doesnt excuse what they did, but they were crimes borne of ignorance for the common Soviets at least. Soviets had never known anything but brutalization and barbarity.

In comparison, the German approach was akin to a psychopathic killer.....they knew exactly what they were doing. They knew right from wrong. but they chose evil over virtue. Therein lies the difference between the Germans of 1939 and the Soviets of 1939. The Soviets had no real choice, the Germans did.
 
".... But now the people of eastern Europe had only one tormentor, plus they possessed something more precious than all the gold and guns in the world....hope."

Also - something more useful than "hope" - EXPERIENCE. First-hand daily life experience in peace-time - experiencing how god-awful, ass-backwards economically
speaking the SSR's really were. Nothing to buy. Black-market 'valuta' trading. Corruption. Phony 'quotas'.

The SSR's were collapsing from within when Mr. Reagan started pulling out the bricks. :)

In contrast, the Nazi State was a brief affair - a twisted phoenix that arose out of the ashes of WW1. The Soviet System has been through revolution, hot war, cold war,
space war and much more. Citizens of the SSR's learned to control their outward expressions and trust their internal instincts. Only party apparatchniks were shocked when the Soviet system tumbled.

"... The Soviets were analogous to a child given a gun, and not told it was wrong to shoot someone. They were like primitive natives really in comparison to the peoples of the west."

With all respect, Parsifal, the "peoples" had been Christian (Eastern Orthodox) for CENTURIES. Or Moslem, for centuries. I can't speak for Islam but
Christianity calls for individual responsibility - FREE WILL. Soviets don't get off the hook (morally speaking) in my books. People get the government (and rule of
law) that they are willing to fight (and die) for.

Beyond that, I agree with your sentiments. :)

MM
 
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Historical GDP Data.
ggdc.net/maddison/index.htm

Most of Europe was out of the depression by 1939.

dave,

Most economist date the end of The 'Great Depression' to the beginning of WW2. The accepted date for the beginning of WW2 is 9-1-39, so for 3/4s of 1939 The Great Depression was not over. Europe had not recovered to the level it was before the beginning of the Depression.

Europe was in better shape in 1945 if for no other reason that conditions now existed that did not exist before for what we have today in Europe. One of them being the demise of Nazi Germany.

History of the Holocaust - An Introduction

You don't understand the start date for the Holocaust. I am not surprised as I don't think many people realize how many Jews and other persecuted peoples were killed before they invaded Poland and before the "Final Solution" was implemented.

( with thanks to my mate)

John
 
Europe contains a lot more nations then just Germany. Let's look at the list of nations besides Germany that got destroyed and then added to the communist Empire during 1945. I won't count the Czech Republic and Austria since they were part of Germany by the summer of 1939.

Poland
Latvia
Lithuania
Estonia
Romania
Hungary
Slovakia
Croatia
Slovenia
Serbia
Part of Finland
Bulgaria
Albania
Bosnia
 
10s of millions and 95% of the victims were from the Soviet Union. Most of the remainder were killed during the Spanish Civil War with plenty of blood spilled by both sides.
 
Europe contains a lot more nations then just Germany. Let's look at the list of nations besides Germany that got destroyed and then added to the communist Empire during 1945. I won't count the Czech Republic and Austria since they were part of Germany by the summer of 1939.

Poland
Latvia
Lithuania
Estonia
Romania
Hungary
Slovakia
Croatia
Slovenia
Serbia
Part of Finland
Bulgaria
Albania
Bosnia

I hear what you are saying, but again I ask you, can you really say that Europe was not better off without Hitler and the Nazis? Seriously...

Sure the Soviets were knocking right on the door, but at the time the most dangerous was Nazi Germany. Do you really think that Europe was worse off in the Cold War than during WW2?

10s of millions and 95% of the victims were from the Soviet Union. Most of the remainder were killed during the Spanish Civil War with plenty of blood spilled by both sides.

Again, once the smoke had cleared and the ruins could start being built, Europe was still 100% better off than it was in 1939. The Holocaust had ended and Hitler was not trying to take over the world. Sure there were countries that were wrongfully taken under the influence or "control" of the Soviet Union, but that is all another matter.
 
10s of millions and 95% of the victims were from the Soviet Union. Most of the remainder were killed during the Spanish Civil War with plenty of blood spilled by both sides.


Your contention that Europe was better off in 1939 than 1945 is, er how can I put this politely...deeply flawed.

The first regime to be defeated was Nazi Germany, the second regime that you refer to defeated itself. But, that is an entirely different subject.

You surely are not suggesting that Hitler was a foil to Communism and therefore Europe was better off....
 
Hitler ran for political office on an anti-communist platform.

As for whether Europe was better off under Soviet domination, there are millions of people in Poland, Ukraine, Hungary etc. old enough to remember what Soviet occupation is all about. Ask them.
 
As for whether Europe was better off under Soviet domination, there are millions of people in Poland, Ukraine, Hungary etc. old enough to remember what Soviet occupation is all about. Ask them.

No one said they were better off, but they certainly were not any better under the Nazi thumb. Do you actually believe that?

Look at it this way. You have to pick and choose your battles. The right battle at the time was Germany, they were the most dangerous. After Germany had been defeated, then you could worry about the Soviets.

So please explain to me how Europe was not better off in 1946 than it was in 1939. The Nazis had been defeated and the worst war known to man was finished. Yes Europe was in ruins, but it was the beginning of reconciliation and rebuilding. For the most part Europe as a continent has seen more than 60 years of peace. Yes there have been isolated conflicts such as we have seen in the Balkans but for the most part Europe has seen peace and economic prosperity.

So again please explain to me how Europe in 1939 on the brink of a major world war that would see the deaths of 70 million people world wide was better off.
 
Hitler ran for political office on an anti-communist platform.

As for whether Europe was better off under Soviet domination, there are millions of people in Poland, Ukraine, Hungary etc. old enough to remember what Soviet occupation is all about. Ask them.

Dave,

I think Hitler would have run for political office on an anti-cabbage platform if he thought it would bring him to power. He just wanted power and would use anyone or anything to get it.

No matter how bad Soviet domination and occupation was it never approached what the Nazis planned for Europe. Yes Soviet Russia's leadership caused the death of tens of millions of people but it never had the agenda of the Nazis.

Sixty-five years without a major European war is a good indication that conditions in 1945 were the breeding ground for this peace. A breeding ground soon seeded with new state of the art manufacturing facilities and new ideas for organizing society. It is a tragedy that this breeding ground for peace was first tilled with the most terrible of wars before it was prepared for the growth of the new, successful, and peaceful Europe. A growth that continues, in some places faster than others, but still grows in every corner of Europe.
 
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The points on this side issue are made, and everybody has had their opportunities to put their various points forward. The arguments will become circular and counterproductive if we continue on this related, but still side issue.

I suggest we move back to topic and pick up where we left off. Readers of the thread can decide for themselves what to make of this discussion.

We had left off with a summary of Operation "Michael", with a bit of side discussion on the role and importance of the various nationalities viz tank production. German plans for 1919 had the war continued into that year had been put forward. It had been pointed out that the germans planned to build about 600 or so tanks in 1919, a new model the LII.

The LII was roughly the same weight as the Whippet "A". In fact the LII was in reality a copy of the Whippet, mounted on an Armoured Car (AC) chassis, with tracks substituted for the wheels. All this dictated the basic layout of the vehicle, with a front mounted engine.

The vehicle had been designed with a turetted armement in mind, and in the postwar versiuon developed in Sweden, a turretted version was built (in 1926) but the limited resources available to the germans in 1918-19 meant that there were no plans to build a turret for the gun armed version in Germany during the war. Instead the 57mm gun ( acaptured British gun) were to be mounted in a fixed box, with limited traverse sponson . It was planned to build a turret for the MG armed version, and for production to be split roughly 50/50 between the MG and gun armed tanks.

Armour protection was from 0.24in to 0.43 in. The tanks was designed to climb a 6ft trench, with the ability to climb inclines of up to 45 degrees for short distances. The tank had a radius of 40 miles . It was powered by an AC petrol engine, a 55hp daimler water cooled engine. In common with most WWI tanks the vehicle was unsprung.

We should look at Allied plans and capabilities.

The French had actually overtaken the British in terms of tank production in 1918, with over 4000 tanks produced. By 1918 they were concentrating on the little Rebault, which had the following basic charateristics. For a WWI tank, the FT17 was an exceptionally well designed vehicle. Its design had begun way back in 1915, when Col Estienne had first approached Renault to build a tracked vehicle. Some sources say that the design was worked out by Estienne, others by the rtenault engineers, others still say it was a jopint effort.....but the basic layout was worked out in 1916. The first prtotypes were built in March 1917. There was considerable debate about appropriate armement, which finally settled on two main types, an MG armed version, and a cannon armed version. Orders fopr nearly 3500 of these tanks (to be deliveed in 1918) were placed in December 1917 (these were delivered, and when it is considered that total french tank production was a little over 4000 tanks for 1918, the importance of this vehicle to their equipment program becomes apparent). Not all the production was undertaken by Renault, constructors included SOMUA, Berliet, Delaunay, and Belleville (all heavy engineering firms). Component manufacture was also undertaken in England. most of the steel for the armour plate was produced and rolled in England. The US was also brought into the program, with plans to build over 8000 of the slightly different 6ton M1917.

The first combat usage of the FT17 was in May 1918. It initially suffered heavy casualties, not because of any design failings, more because of crew inexperience and reliability. Gradually its reliability improved, and by wars end was a reliable and potent vehicle. The french planned to maintain production at the same level through 1919.

This was not the only vehicleon the books for 1919. After the relative failure of the St Chamond, the French designed and built a few of the new Char 2c were built, and were designed as heavy assault tanks. 10 were built. Weighing 70 tons, they were the largest AFVs ever built until post 1945. They were armed with a turretted 75mm gun, and four MGs. If the war had not ended, it was planned to build 300 of these tanks, and use them to spearhead the destruction of the german defensive lines. They were a reliable, potent vehicle. It was the Tiger Tank of 1919, its armour completely impervious to abything the germans possessed, a massive vehicle and rather similar to the tiger in concept and effect (a waste of resources perhaps???).

The British had produced the first of their rhomboidal tanks in 1916, with the mk I. They had produced 150 of these vehicles, before progressing to the Whippet "A" and MkIV tanks in 1917. 1277 tanks had been produced in 1917, followed by 1378 in 1918. There had been a steady improvement in the rliability of British tanks, culminating in the MkV and Whippet "C" breakthrough tanks. Planned production for 1919 was about 2000 units.

However, there was an intersting development towards the end of 1918, with the development of the MkVII tank. At 45 tons, it was intended to be the first interallied engineering project, using the Britiah designed Mk VIII tank, US jigs and dies, located in a factory in France, This interallied agreement was worked out in November 1917, with a planned production of 600 vehicles, to be delivered from late 1918. In the finish, the outbreak of peace curtailed the plan, thoughh a number were built and used in the US postwar.

The mk VIII was an altogether better designed vehicle that the mk V. It had a separate engine compartment, pressurized crew compartment improved steering system. At 45 tons it was armoured to 0.63in, it had a range of some 50 miles, trench climbing of 14 feet, and could climb a gradient in excess of 40 degrees.

These are the principal vehicles that would have been in the 1919 campaign. It would have seen approximately 15000 allied tanks engaging about 600 German tanks. Allied tanks were significantly better than the single design put forward by the germans. To me, there was no doubt as to the outcome of the tank battles of 1919.


I would suggest that we move the focus to the next major offensive of the german Spring campaign.
 
There was one tank, or rather AFV, that I forgot to mention, and which I thought quite interesting

The Infantry Tank Mk X was the worlds first APC. Developed in 1918, a few had been built by wars end. I have some pictures at home for those intersted. It was a large vehicle, similar in general outline to the mk V, though larger. It was unarmed. It could carry up to 30 fully equipped troops, and was amphibious, which IMO was a very advanced concept for 1918.

This suggests to me that the allies were making prepration for a rhine crossing in 1918. Getting across the Rhine would have been a major undetaking, but having amphibious armoured support would have assisted a crossing gratly. From the accounts I have, the british intended to build about 2000 of these vehicles.

We also need to look at JFC Fullers concepts for armoured warfare in 1919, his so-called 1919 armoured division or armoured corps....I have an article somewhere and will dig it out if I can....
 
The changes in warfare in 1918

Both sides expected that the war would continue and planned accordingly. But the fighting could hardly have gone on as it had thus far. A new form of warfare was clearly emerging in 1918, one that threatened to render the fighting methods 1914-1917 obsolete in many respects.

The German offensives of Spring and Summer 1918 were notable in that they showed the way to break the deadlock of trench, HMG, and QF artillery on the one hand, against the extreme vulnerability tightly packed infantry trying to advance out of cover on the other hand. The basic problem was the differential in firepower….the weapons of 1914 heavily favoured the defence. This was compounded by the poor understanding of tactics…the generals continued to think in terms of Napoleonic wars really. The best defence against cavalry had been tightly packed formed infantry advancing slowly in close order. And it needs to be remembered, that both sides maintained large bodies of cavalry behind the front lines, waiting to exploit a breakthrough in the lines that never came.

Fundamentally what had been under estimated was the defensive power of the machine gun. Moreover the perceived solution to the problem, planned, long running preparatory artillery barrages caused more harm than good. They were designed to destroy the defences at certain point, but they could never succeed in defeating all of the MGs, and because they lasted days or weeks, gave plenty of warning of an impending attack, allowing reserves to be moved into position to contain any breakthroughs.

The Germans were the first to develop tactical methods to break this deadlock. The main elements to their solution included

1) Surprise. This dictated very short preparatory barrages. It also meant that concentration of troops should, if possible be completed as secretly as possible. This in part meant that air superiority over ones own lines was needed in order to limit or deny the enemy the ability to carry out effective aerial recon.

2) Use of terrain, weather and cover. Instead of advancing along a broad front in clear conditions at a slow pace, with little or no return fire, Hutiers tactics envisaged rapid advances by small groups of Infantry from cover position to cover position, using mutually supporting formations and firepower centred around the Infantry Squad. To this end Infantry was trained to maximise return of fire even whilst advancing .

3) To this end, the Germans made changes to their basic Infantry arrangements and equipment. They maximised the short range firepower of the Infantry squad by introducing a new weapon, the MP 18 Bergmann SMG. Squads were issued a high degree of mortars, and light mountain artillery pieces, so that artillery fire could follow the infantry breakthroughs. AT weaponary, generally in the form of 7.92mm Patrone AT rounds were issued. German Madsen and LMG 08—were more widely issued than before and were treated as mobile, offensive weapons rather than as static, defensive assets
4) There were two significant tactical elements to the new methods of attack. The first was that assaults were targeted at the weaker elements of a defence, rather than the stronger parts, with the idea that a breakthrough would lead to the dislocation of the defence, rather than having to completely overwhelm the defence. The second element, kind of linked to the first, was that strongpoints revealed in a defence were isolated and bypassed, rather than the halting the advance to deal with the strongpoint. This tactic emphasised forward movement and momentum in an offensive


During the German offensive of 1918, small, highly motivated, lightly equipped units of Sturmtruppen had penetrated Allied lines with relative ease. But the Allied armies had not disintegrated. Observers in both camps noted that, wherever clerks, cooks, and stragglers rallied around a field kitchen or an isolated strip of ruined trench, the infiltrators suffered grievously, slowed, and, as often as not, fell victim to organized counterattacks. The multiplication of small defended points caused delays, and delay was the isolated, lightly loaded storm trooper's deadliest enemy. This lesson led both sides to develop formidable defenses in depth. The old, shallow trench lines were replaced by deep, discontinuous belts of strongpoints, arranged for all-around fire and mutual support. On the German side, where this trend was most pronounced, concrete pillboxes and shell-proof infantry shelters shared interlocking fields of fire. Mine fields, wire, and antitank ditches 20 to 30 feet across channeled attackers into fire lanes where pre-laid artillery and machine-gun fire could annihilate them. It was thus clear that the new weapons and tactics could easily replace the 1914-17 stalemate with another, deadlier impasse. To achieve a decisive, war-winning breakthrough, the new weapons and tactics would have to be combined under a new strategy, a strategy calculated to exploit their potential before they could be countered.
 
The changes in warfare in 1918

Both sides expected that the war would continue and planned accordingly. But the fighting could hardly have gone on as it had thus far. A new form of warfare was clearly emerging in 1918, one that threatened to render the fighting methods 1914-1917 obsolete in many respects.

The German offensives of Spring and Summer 1918 were notable in that they showed the way to break the deadlock of trench, HMG, and QF artillery on the one hand, against the extreme vulnerability tightly packed infantry trying to advance out of cover on the other hand. The basic problem was the differential in firepower….the weapons of 1914 heavily favoured the defence. This was compounded by the poor understanding of tactics…the generals continued to think in terms of Napoleonic wars really. The best defence against cavalry had been tightly packed formed infantry advancing slowly in close order. And it needs to be remembered, that both sides maintained large bodies of cavalry behind the front lines, waiting to exploit a breakthrough in the lines that never came.

Fundamentally what had been under estimated was the defensive power of the machine gun. Moreover the perceived solution to the problem, planned, long running preparatory artillery barrages caused more harm than good. They were designed to destroy the defences at certain point, but they could never succeed in defeating all of the MGs, and because they lasted days or weeks, gave plenty of warning of an impending attack, allowing reserves to be moved into position to contain any breakthroughs.

The Germans were the first to develop tactical methods to break this deadlock. The main elements to their solution included

1) Surprise. This dictated very short preparatory barrages. It also meant that concentration of troops should, if possible be completed as secretly as possible. This in part meant that air superiority over ones own lines was needed in order to limit or deny the enemy the ability to carry out effective aerial recon.

2) Use of terrain, weather and cover. Instead of advancing along a broad front in clear conditions at a slow pace, with little or no return fire, Hutiers tactics envisaged rapid advances by small groups of Infantry from cover position to cover position, using mutually supporting formations and firepower centred around the Infantry Squad. To this end Infantry was trained to maximise return of fire even whilst advancing .

3) To this end, the Germans made changes to their basic Infantry arrangements and equipment. They maximised the short range firepower of the Infantry squad by introducing a new weapon, the MP 18 Bergmann SMG. Squads were issued a high degree of mortars, and light mountain artillery pieces, so that artillery fire could follow the infantry breakthroughs. AT weaponary, generally in the form of 7.92mm Patrone AT rounds were issued. German Madsen and LMG 08—were more widely issued than before and were treated as mobile, offensive weapons rather than as static, defensive assets
4) There were two significant tactical elements to the new methods of attack. The first was that assaults were targeted at the weaker elements of a defence, rather than the stronger parts, with the idea that a breakthrough would lead to the dislocation of the defence, rather than having to completely overwhelm the defence. The second element, kind of linked to the first, was that strongpoints revealed in a defence were isolated and bypassed, rather than the halting the advance to deal with the strongpoint. This tactic emphasised forward movement and momentum in an offensive


During the German offensive of 1918, small, highly motivated, lightly equipped units of Sturmtruppen had penetrated Allied lines with relative ease. But the Allied armies had not disintegrated. Observers in both camps noted that, wherever clerks, cooks, and stragglers rallied around a field kitchen or an isolated strip of ruined trench, the infiltrators suffered grievously, slowed, and, as often as not, fell victim to organized counterattacks. The multiplication of small defended points caused delays, and delay was the isolated, lightly loaded storm trooper's deadliest enemy. This lesson led both sides to develop formidable defenses in depth. The old, shallow trench lines were replaced by deep, discontinuous belts of strongpoints, arranged for all-around fire and mutual support. On the German side, where this trend was most pronounced, concrete pillboxes and shell-proof infantry shelters shared interlocking fields of fire. Mine fields, wire, and antitank ditches 20 to 30 feet across channeled attackers into fire lanes where pre-laid artillery and machine-gun fire could annihilate them. It was thus clear that the new weapons and tactics could easily replace the 1914-17 stalemate with another, deadlier impasse. To achieve a decisive, war-winning breakthrough, the new weapons and tactics would have to be combined under a new strategy, a strategy calculated to exploit their potential before they could be countered.


You make an interesting point here Michael. But, one should not forget that by 1918 European countries were all running out of men to fight. (The exception being the as yet untapped resources of America)
Quite how the Germans seriously intended to fight on is hard to see.
Cheers
John
 
I don't think so. APCs were part of the German tank program right from the beginning.

First Panzers 1917-1918
On November 13th of 1916, the German Army decided to build tanks and overall project was under direction of Joseph Vollmer.

New tank was to be a universal platform to be used as a base for both a tank and cargo carrier

30 to 75 unarmored cargo carriers - Uberlandwagen / Gelandewagen were produced.

The German Army cancelled the A7V tank after only 20 prototypes. However they apparently liked the cargo carrier variant enough to keep it in limited production. I suspect some of the hundreds of captured British and French tanks became cargo / personnel carriers also.

a8166994.png

This particular tracked cargo carrier was based on the cancelled Orion Wagen tank.



Flak Pz.jpg

WWI Flak Panzer based on the A7V chassis.
 
Well i'll grant you that when I made my statement I was unaware of the vehicle you mentioned. however, I would not classify either the photo that you posted or the A7 as APCs by any stretch. The Photo is more a tracked ammunition carrier, does not provide sufficient protection for Infantry to be carried into a hot environment, and is in fact classified as a cargo carrier. Infantry is cargo, but they are a special forma of cargo. if you wanted to classify that vehicle as an APC, then why not the numerous ammunition carriers employed by the allies from before the war??????

The A7 cannot be classified as an APC either, though it did carry some Infantry. The Infantry could not be tactically loaded or disembarked easily, and in any event that was not the intention for the A7

I am also very dubious about the link that you posted. It claims that there were tank battles in the vicinity of St Quentin 21 March 1918, against the british. German tanks are known to have been committed to battle on that day , and were quite successful, but there were no British tanks that I know of committed to any sector held by Byngs 5th Army on that day. AFAIK all tanks of the RTC were under refit well behind the lines. Its possible that tanks were there, but highly doubtful. The source then says that there was a further engagement 21 April near Villers Bretonneux....well almost right, except that they got the date wrong....it happened on the 24th April, and is an event we previously talked about. That is the first time that British tanks engaged German tanks , and as I stated and referenced several times, is believed to be the first tank vs tank engagement in history (something you have disputed, but provided no supporting evidence or references until now)

The mk X is, in my opinion, the first true APC. It was tracked, armoured, allowed for tactical embarkation and disembarkation and could enter the field of battle with some hope of survival for its occupants. It was amphibious to boot. A photo is attached

Trying to argue that the germans held any sort of technical advatage in AFVs in WWI is certainly a new and novel argument. i know of no author that would support that position. The Germans were by 1918 the masters of tactical concepts and in some areas of weaponary, particulalry small arms, but its a new angle for me to see anyone trying to argue the germans held a technical superiority in tank design
 

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You make an interesting point here Michael. But, one should not forget that by 1918 European countries were all running out of men to fight. (The exception being the as yet untapped resources of America)
Quite how the Germans seriously intended to fight on is hard to see.
Cheers
John

Ah true enough, though the germans were in worse shape than the Brits. Both nations had lost 1.8 million dead by the beginning of 1918, but whereas the Brits had suffered about 2 million wounded, the germans had sufferfed a whopping 3.25 million. After Operation Michael, which had cost the allies 177000 casualties to halt, the British were able to transfer a further 170000 fully trained fillers from the training schools to the front line, more or less immediatley. The French also replaced their losses. The Germans had lost 244000 men, but could only replace about 40% of men lost, and most of these were untrained levies. They had lost a large proportion of their Stosstruppen, which they could not easily replace. These guys were very like modern soldiers, taking months to train properly.

By 1918, the Germans were down to their old men and boys, like they were 27 years later
 

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