Thankyou for posting that, quite a good source. however, does not alter my basic position that the 13mm AT rifle was planned to be the German army's primary AT weapon system. According to the article you posted, they were planning to issue 30000 of them at a scale of 2 per company. thats a total of 54 or so per division, making it the most numerous AT weapon, and hence the primary weapon system for combatting tanks. Just a quick note for you to remember in future, "primary" does not mean "sole"
The unfortunate thing about this AT rifle was that it lacked sufficient peformance to be fully effective against the heavier tanks being introduced by the allies in the latter half of 1918. The smaller 7.92mm rifle, would be even less effective, though more accurate. Both weapons would have been useful, but inadequate overall
With regard to the AT MG, I note that the article finds it doubtful that any had been issued, but also notes the Germans intended to use all their available HMGs for AT work, firing the standard K round. This means the standard issue maxim might have similar performance to the 13mm AT rifle, which by 1918 was insufficient except at close range to deal with allied tanks. and the whole concept is deeply flawed when you think about it. If the german MGs were busy engaging the allied tanks and not the allied Infantry, and they were busy doing that until close range, that would mean the Allied Infantry would be able to cross no-mans land virtually untroubled.....the tanks would achieve their purpose, and survive, simply by staying 100 to 300metres from the trenches but issued on a much lower scale.
A German Infantry Bn in 1918 had a total of 6 MGs, thats 54 per Div, so if all MGs were converted to the AT role then yes, these become the primary AT weapon. Problem is, I just cannot see all 54 being diverted to that purpose. Maybe 1 company per Bn (2 guns) equalling 18 per div. In any event, converting your primary anti-infantry weapon to an AT function, is a bad idea, because it takes a weapon system very good at one thing (killing Infantry) and diverts it to a role that it would be less good at (killing tanks) and demands that it do that at a time in the battle when maximum anti-infantry capability would be needed. Dumb.......
The direect fire mortar would have been used as part of the standard mortar detachments which were already being used to engage allied tanks. The problem here is twofold, limited scales of issue, and limited range of the weapon system. But it has to be conceded that they were at least effective at range below 500m.
The article you posted relevantly states..."In September 1918 an instruction was issued to the effect that half of every battalion's light trench mortars should be dedicated to anti tank work. The 192nd division of the German Army had already pioneered this approach in August. They proved very effective but limited by a shortage of horses for the transport of ammunition. During this trial British tank crews had described the use of light trench mortars in this role and from September onwards German light trench mortar crews reported that tank gunners were paying them particular and unwanted attention. With their relatively short range if operating in the mobile anti tank role (in the open) they were highly vulnerable to machine gun fire from tanks"
This fails to appreciate that from Hamel onward, the British were using their tanks as part of all arms assualt groups, and as often as not were pushing their Infantry forward of the supporting tanks and using their tanks as fire support vehicles. If the mortars were being detailed to engage the tanks at the very time they were needed to also engage the advancing infantry, the tanks were achieving their stated purpose. two things were developed in the allied inventory to counter the AT mortars. The tanks from the mkV onward were more mobile, and they used their MG armament to keep the mortars suppressed.
In terms of equipment scales, it is worth noting that each Bn had 6 mortars attached, 3 light and 3 medium. It was only intended that the Light mortars be assigned to this task, so each Division in theory had 13 or 14 of these weapons for AT duties. thats not enough to make much difference. Average frontage of a German Inf Div on the western front was 6 miles from memory....But if you read the tactical employment methods devised by the germans it becomes apparent just how limited they were...."light trench mortars assigned to anti tank duties were not to be used singly but always positioned in groups of at least two. They were also to be positioned were two or more groups could provide each other with supporting fire. They were to be echeloned in depth behind the front line being concentrated where tank breakthroughs were most likely". In other words, one might expect that at minimum a given piece of the divisional frontage with an effective enagem,ent range of no more than 500m out of a divisional fontage of 12000m might be repeated 3 times. that means that the mortar teams could cover, at most, a little over 10% of the divisional frontage when used in this way. hardly any sort of show stopper i am afraid.
If the 3.7cm gun had been introduced, it at least would have allowed the mortars to return to duties that they were better suited to.
Not included in your article is the expected rate of issue for the dedicated ATG assets. I can tell you it was intended to provide each Bn with just 2 guns. some Divs may also have had a further centralized detachment of 6 guns attached, though in reality this would have been rare IMO. so at maximum the 37mm gun would have been issued at a rate of 24 per Div, but more likely 18, to cover an average frontage of 12000m. The dedicated AT Bns might have helped a bit, but the germans would have been lucky to have any of them in time, and in the right place at the right time.
The ATg was a vast improvement on the lash up adaptations mentioned so far, but still insufficient to be truly effective against the heavy breakthrough tanks the allies were preparing for 1919.
All of the other measures and equipment have issues one way or another. The central problem was that the germans had not appreciated the threat from tanks in time, and by detaching their other weapons to the AT role, were in fact diminishing the eoverall effectiveness of their field formations. This includes things such as AT ditches and the like
My opinion...by the latter part of 1918, the allies had worked out tactical methods, some of them taken from the germans themselves, and grafted tanks and aircraft into the mix. The Germans had underestimated the effect of tanks in widening the all arms concepts, and by August 1918, increasingly one sided defeats were being inflicted on the Germans. There is no reason that in 1919 this would not have continued, at an accelarated rate in fact. Basic problem for the germans was that they were running out of men, faster than their opponents, and were suffering a crisis in morale to boot