1918: Who save the Allies?

parsifal said:

Germany was being militarily torn apart by the end of 1918, and was facing mutinies in the army at least as bad as had been experienced by the French.

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Other allied armies (and navies) also had mutinies. Infact a quick flick through only a couple of histories reveals British,New Zealand and notably Canadians all carrying out mutinies to a greater or lesser extent. The Aussies seem uncharacteristically to be missing,but a more in depth search might reveal more
In one case (Etaples) New Zealand troops were called in to control mutinous Scots but then themselves refused their orders!

Some mutinies were little more than riots. This was certainly the case in the example of the Royal Artillery mutiny at Le Havre in which several depots were burnt down.The date is interesting......December 9/10 1918.

Senior or elite regiments were not immune,the Guards Machine Gunners mutinied at their camp back in Britain in early 1918. For three days every Private soldier refused duties. I bet you won't find that in the official regimental histories!

There were also mutinies and strikes in the Labour Corps. These were ruthlessly dealt with,often with significant loss of life. The fact that the mutineers were typically "colonial" may have had a bearing. Both Chinese and Egyptian labourers were killed by British troops arriving to quell mutinies.

It has been said that in 1917 one military question dominated the British government,could the troops be relied on, in the event of revolution or serious civil disturbance in England?

A popular pamphlet,circulated on the Western Front, echoed Lenin,over a lurid cartoon..."A bayonet is a tool with a worker at both ends."
It was a sentiment shared by very many soldiers,and seen as extremely dangerous by their commanders and the politicians back home. Far better to demobilise and disarm them and get them back in their factories or on the land.

Desertions in the face of the enemy were also commonplace. Crozier in "A brass hat in no man's land" explains how this was dealt with. The practice of employing officers as ʻbattle policeʼ played a considerable role from the Battle of the Somme onwards. Crozier describes an incident in July 1916 which typified official fear that battle fatigue was a threat to the authority structure of the army;

"I hear a rumour about riflemen retiring on the left and go out to "stop the rot". A strong rabble of tired, hungry and thirsty stragglers approach me from the east... They are marched to the water reserve, given a drink, and hunted back to fight.Another more formidable party cuts across to the south. They mean business. They are damned if they are going to stay, itʼs all up. A young sprinting subaltern heads them off. They push by him. He draws his revolver and threatens them. They take no notice. He fires. Down drops a British soldier, at his feet. The effect is instantaneous.They turn back."

I think this gives an idea of the parlous state of the British Army and its allies in the period around the armistice.

Steve

Interesting Steve.
One of the other factors was the ability of the establishment to keep the public on side despite the losses for no real gains on the Western Front.
People only know what they are told and I would not mind betting that they are still documents buried away that 'they' still don't want us to see....
John

In australia we had words to describe the very thing you are submitting as evidence of unreliability. and it existed from before the war to a much greater extent than any other army, except perhaps the new Zealanders. We call it mateship and ega;litarinism, and it was the hallmark of our emerging military tradition in that war. It made us the best Infantry in the world at that time. To the British officers overseeing the development of the AIF, the "Orstralians" were unruly and untrustworthy, poor fighting material because they lackedf discipline. Many considered that there was insufficient distance between the enlisted men and their officers. in the British army, officers and men did not fraternize, and that was fiercely clung to, resulting in perhaps the weakest aspect of the British command system. and it made the British army susceptible to sedition and revolution. In the Australian army that never happed, at least to the extent of placing the army in the "doubtful" column. it never happened, because the very things that made the british label them as "unruly" and "untrustworthy" were the very things that made them such a tightly knit homogenous force that simply could not be stopped by casualties . im surprised that the same misconceptions exist even today. Australian soldiers suffered the highest per capita casualty rate of any army, including the Russian army, with well over 70% of the total force structure, killed captured,, or wounded. Yet there was never the slightest chance that they would stop fighting, or have any doubt about their reliability. Australian soldiers, including their officers fought, not for their country, or for an ism. they fought for each other. officers were not given a commision on the basis of birthright or tradition. our traditions were weak or non-existent. Our boys fought and dies together, for each other. You never let a mate down, no matter what the cost. didnt stop orders from being questioned, or officers being criticized for wrong decision. An officer in the Australian army was not court martialled because he question an order or because an order was illegal, which is where your New Zealand experiencve comes from. not a single Australian soldier was shot or hung for desertion during the war. Some went to gaol, but none were executed. We did not fear sedition because sedition was already part of our national and military psyche. and it helped to make us stronger

I dont doubt there were rumblings of discontent, even in armies as tightly knit as the AIF. But despite that, the problems in the Allied armies pale into insignificance compared to the problems faced by the German army. The British army was still a cohesive force, attacking aggressively at wars end. The Germans army was no longer able to depend on many units. Mass surenders were occurring up and down the entire front. troops were starving, and knew their cause was lost. They no longer believed in their leaders. In other words, the problems for the germans towered above everyone elses, including the French. You mention that its not hard to find evidence of treason in any of the allied armies. probably. but in the German army, such evid3nce was a whole order of magnitude above that being experienced in the allied forces. In the histories, its hard to not find evidnce of such sedition in the German army.

That's not really the point. It's because the British Army was perceived as being unreliable by both its military and political masters that the idea of comitting it a further 5,10,15 years in Europe (as was done after WW2) was so unpalatable. The Royal Artillery mutiny/riot of December 1918 wasn't about conditions or fighting,it was simply that those men wanted to be home for Christmas!
Any plan for maintaining British troops in mainland Europe,let alone continuing to fight has to be put into the context of the polkitical and social climate of the day. There had just been a revolution in Russia,Germany looked as if it might go the same way, France was destabilised. The British ruling class was more than a little nervous of its own Army. Britain historically does not maintain a large standing army and was keen to demobilise it. The mutinys of 1918 were not in the "Pals Battalions" they were in regular and historic regiments of the British Army,no wonder the politicians were nervous.

Weren't all Australian forces in Europe volunteers? That's a telling difference to the Frenchmen,bleating like sheep,as they marched to Verdun.

We'll gloss over the so called "disbandment" mutinys.

But then there is this:

http://www.awm.gov.au/encyclopedia/first_aif/mutinies.asp

Cheers
Steve

I feel so moutraged by that comment about mutinies in the AIF that I felt it necessary to consult the officiel history by CW Bean on this bery matter. There were two significant mutinies in the AIF, and neither of them had anything to do with not wanting to fight. They had plenty to do with mainting unit esprit De Corps, as the following very long extract from Beans history amply demonstrates

Part I
(preamble not part of Beans account)

The First Australian Imperial Force (1st AIF) was the main expeditionary force of the Australian Army during World War I. It was formed from 15 August 1914, following Britain's declaration of war on Germany. Generally known at the time as the AIF, it is today referred to as the 1st AIF to distinguish from the 2nd AIF which was raised during World War II.

The 1st AIF was a purely volunteer force for the duration of the war. In Australia, two plebiscites on conscription were defeated, thereby preserving the volunteer status but stretching the AIF's reserves towards the end of the war. A total of 331,814 Australians were sent overseas to serve as part of the AIF, which represented 13% of the white male population. Of these, 18% (61,859) were killed. The casualty rate (killed or wounded) was 64%. About 2,100 women served with the 1st AIF, mainly as nurses. Close to 20% of those who served in the 1st AIF had been born in the United Kingdom but all enlistments had to occur in Australia (there were a few exceptions). As a volunteer force, all units were demobilized at the end of the war.

The Australian infantry did not have regiments in the British sense, only battalions identified by ordinal number (1st to 60th). Each battalion originated from a geographical region. New South Wales and Victoria, the most populous states, filled their own battalions (and even whole brigades) while the "Outer States" often combined to assemble a battalion. These regional associations remained throughout the war and each battalion developed its own strong regimental identity.

In the manpower crisis following the Third Battle of Ypres, in which the five divisions sustained 38,000 casualties, there were plans to follow the British reorganisation and reduce all brigades from four battalions to three. In the British regimental system this was traumatic enough; however, the regimental identity survived the disbanding of a single battalion. In the Australian system, disbanding a battalion meant the extinction of the unit. In September 1918, when the call was made to disband eight battalions, there followed a series of "mutinies over disbandment" where the ranks refused to report to their new battalions. In the AIF, mutiny was one of two charges that carried the death penalty, the other being desertion to the enemy. Instead of being charged with mutiny, the instigators were charged as being AWOL and the doomed battalions were eventually permitted to remain together for the forthcoming battle, following which the survivors voluntarily disbanded.

Charles Bean in the Official History of Australia in the War of 1914–1918 – Volume VI – The Australian Imperial Force in France during the Allied Offensive, 1918 described the situation as follows:

(see next part)

Part II

"he 1st and 4th Australian Divisions were now relieved and went to the rear for the "Corps" rest for which they had been hoping since July. General Monash had also insisted that the three remaining Australian divisions must go into rest after the next battle. While he was in the thick of preparation for that offensive, another sharp trouble, though much less serious than it might appear to non-Australians, descended on him.

The Army Council in London was concerned at the depletion of the Australian infantry through lack of reinforcements. It pointed out that the 57 Australian battalions were 8,500 men short, and that reinforcement drafts for the next four months, estimated at 3,000 monthly, would be insufficient to keep up even the present strength. Battalions which entered the battle with 300-400 men were in some important respects uneconomic, requiring the same staff as a battalion that took in 750. In the British Army this difficulty had been met by disbanding the fourth battalion in each infantry brigade; a similar measure had long before been adopted by the French and Germans, and this policy had already been approved for the A.I.F. in February: Battalions had been earmarked for disbandment but, in view of the extreme reluctance expressed by the Australian Government, it was to be carried out only gradually as it became unavoidable.

Three battalions had been thus disbanded in the spring; Haig entirely accepted the Australian Government's condition, but in June he pointed out that of the 57 remaining battalions 5 now had less than 700 men, 17 less than 800 and only 11 more than 900, which was the strength then laid down as minimum. He considered this ('a rather alarming degree of unevenness." Birdwood (as G.O.C., A.I.F.) explained that there were still hopes of keeping the battalions at 900 and that they were disbanded only when so weak as to be inefficient as fighting units. On August 29th the Army Council drafted a letter to Haig saying that, in view of the shortage then evident, it considered that the reduction of the remaining four-battalion brigades to three-battalion ones should be carried out as soon as possible. Before sending this letter it passed the draft to A.I.F. Headquarters for comment, and Birdwood asked Monash for his views. Both realised that the step would cause intense heart-burning, and Monash, even now that his battalions were going into battle 300-400 strong, urged that it should be postponed till the new year.

It is not likely that weather conditions will permit of our carrying on for much longer at the same intense pressure at which the Corps has been going for the last five months, (he wrote to Birdwood on Sep. 7). In all probability if we carry on, at latest till the end of October, we ought to be able to carry on right over the winter. It was possible, he added, that G.H.Q. might then be able to do "what we all desire"-keep the Australian Corps entirely out of the line for the four winter months. Australian battalions had never been so effective as in the last month when they were all far below strength; he urged that 750 should be considered a sufficient strength even for next year. I welcome any pretext (he said to a friend on Sep. 8th) to take the fewest possible men into action. So long as they have thirty Lewis guns (per battalion) it doesn't very much matter what else they have.

And it was true that the A.I.F. battalions, entering these great battles with 300-400 rifles, still attacked on fronts of 850-1,000 yards, and had even attacked on fronts of up to a mile. Carrying parties could not be provided; Lewis gun teams were reduced to two men, and Vickers gun crews could no longer carry full loads of ammunition. These and the food supplies had to go by pack or waggon, and in recent fights this had worked very well. Monash asked to be allowed to reorganise his battalions on a three company basis, but he well knew that most of them had already done this for themselves, and reduced their companies to three or even two platoons. Finally he asked to be allowed discretion to recommend the disbanding of "one or more battalions" if he and his generals found it advantageous. Birdwood insisted on prompter action, pointing out that the principle had already been determined in January. He and Monash now agreed that it should not yet be applied to the four original brigades, but he informed the War Office that it would be applied in all unreduced brigades as soon as found necessary.

It was immediately after this that Monash learnt of the coming withdrawal of "1914 men" (estimated by him at "upwards of 6,000") on furlough to Australia, which obviously would render the disbandments more urgent. The battalions selected by divisional commanders on the advice of their brigadiers were the 19th, 21st,25th,37th, 42nd,54th and 60th; and on September 23rd the order went out for their immediate disbandment: in each case their records, and a few representatives were to go to training battalions on Salisbury Plain, whose companies would assume the battalions' names, but the rest would reinforce some other battalion or battalions of their own brigade".

Part III

"To officers and men of these battalions the blow was overwhelming. The step might be necessary-but why should their battalion be chosen. Men and even officers held among themselves indignant meetings. In the first battalion to hear of its fate, the 37th, Col. Story, a fine leader, took the step of protesting not merely to the brigadier, but over his head to Gellibrand, Monash and Birdwood, a serious breach of discipline. Moreover in the bitterness of the moment Story's letter was foolishly drawn, disparaging sister units. He was relieved of his command, but his attitude had become widely known. At a meeting the men of the 37th agreed that on the final parade they would obey every order but the last-the order to march to their new battalions. On September 22nd when that parade took place, they did so, obeying every command but the final one. Brig.-Genl. McNicoll was then summoned and spoke to the men, but with the same result. The officers then reluctantly obeyed an order to fall out; after them the sergeants did the same-and one corporal and one private. The remainder were told that, if they did not join their new units that afternoon, they would be posted as absent without leave. Being left to themselves they at once re-established strict military form in the battalion, choosing from their own number commanders to carry on temporarily the absent officers' duties. It was noticeable that those selected were not the "bad hats" or of the demagogue type, but the men most fitted to lead in action, and strict discipline was maintained. The battalion marched back to its huts; men already in detention for various offences were retained under guard ; the medical aid-post was re-formed by the orderlies, and church parade for next day arranged with the padre, who went with the men.

The "commanders" had meals with the men, rations being obtained through the support of other units who "lost" occasional boxes of food from their own waggon-loads as they passed near by. There was keen sympathy for these troops throughout the force and, one after the other, the other selected battalions, when ordered to disband (mostly on September 24th and 25th) took the same action. General Gellibrand had asked for representatives of the 37th to meet him, and later went to the camp and talked the matter over with the men in a friendly, informal way. Monash also spoke quietly to representatives of the 37th, and battalion Commanders and brigadiers addressed all the recalcitrant battalions. The men's argument was the same in every case and was entirely sincere.

Look Colonel (said those of the 25th to Col. Davis) the 25th from the first has been built on esprit de corps. We have been taught that the regiment is everything. You have often told us that we must sacrifice everything for its honour. We have always obeyed you and we always will-in everything but what you now ask. We cannot obey you in this just for that reason-we would sacrifice everything for the battalion. They told General Wisdom that it was their unanimous wish to go into the next battle and to be given the hardest task: there would either be no 25th left to break up, or they would leave such a record as would make it impossible to break them up. All the resisting battalions said they were keen to enter the great attack that they knew to be impending, but they demanded to be allowed to go in with their identity unchanged. A point elicited by Gellibrand was that the amalgamation of two battalions would be much less keenly felt than the extinction (in the field) of one of them.

Some units were clearly affected by their commanders' arguments, the strongest of which was that they could not indefinitely resist, which the men knew to be true; but only one battalion gave way. It is a tribute to the unrivalled hold of Brig.-Genl. "Pompey" Elliott on the loyalty of his men that the 60th Battalion, after disobeying its commander's order to join the 59th, agreed to do so upon being addressed by this beloved stout-hearted Australian. What was Elliott's disgust when next morning, September 27th, he learnt that the other battalions were being allowed to go into the coming battle intact. As the great offensive was only a few days distant Monash had urged upon Rawlinson that the disbandment should be deferred for a fortnight, and asked him to press this upon Haig. The news of the order, says a record of the 21st Battalion, "was received with deafening cheers." Naturally trouble at once recurred in the 60th, but Elliott again addressed it.

"By using my influence to the utmost," he wrote in his diary, "I managed to sway the men over the line. My brigade is the only one in which the reorganisation was successfully accomplished."
This incident has been called that of "the mutinies over disbandment," and so in the strict sense of the terms it was; but the refusal was not treated as mutiny by any authority, Australian or British. In contrast to the mutiny in the 1st Battalion, it had its origin in some of the best men and finest qualities of the A.I.F. Australian soldiers had experienced few ties of loyalty in their civil lives; and a public loyalty once conceived was sustained with a flaming zeal disconcerting to those who had encouraged it. If, as General Brudenell White always strongly wished, it had been possible to tie the A.I.F. battalions oversea to the corresponding regiments of the citizen forces in Australia, so that the home regiment fed battalions or even companies overseas as in the New Zealand force, this trouble would probably never have arisen. But the A.I.F. was an improvised force and the disbandment of a battalion carried too many of the consequences of its extinction.

Mutiny was one of the only two offences punishable in the A.I.F. by death. No man was punished for his part in the disbandment mutiny. The mutiny in the 1st Battalion was in a totally different category. The men who refused duty, 119 in number, were tried and, with one exception, found guilty, not of joining in a mutiny, but of desertion. The ending of hostilities caused General Monash not to enforce the penalties and almost certainly saved him and the A.I.F. from having to face difficult problems whose solution would have called for not only tact but the highest qualities of wisdom, leadership and moral courage. Monash had some of these. In this decisive fighting, for such it was, he was right to work his troops to the extreme limit of their endurance, which normally is beyond the limit to which men themselves think they can endure. At such times victory often goes to the troops that hold out longest, withstanding strain, toil or exhaustion in perhaps unbelievable degree and for an unbelievable time; and the value of different armies depends largely upon how far they are ready to do this. On the other hand students of history may doubt whether mere eagerness for military prestige could ever, as Monash apparently imagined, maintain the will to such sacrifices, or could be wisely substituted for the high aims of justice and humanity in implanting a motive for which ordinary men, in such a war, will readily die".

So, for the Austral;ians at least, these concerns about "unreliability in the British officers eyes was an entire fiction, a complete and near total misreading of the attitude of their men. How true also was this situation in the British Army. how often were reports of "unreliability" actually misreports of men wanting to stay together and fight until the job was done. i would say, a lot

parsifal said:

I feel so moutraged by that comment about mutinies in the AIF that I felt it necessary to consult the officiel history by CW Bean on this bery matter.

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Well the link I posted is to the AWM site which is I think an official Australian government site. Maybe you should take it up with your government if you feel that there is misleading information or use of the word mutiny there.

This is all getting a bit far away from the original premise which was,if I remember,that the Anglo/French alliance and its allies should continue fighting in 1917/18,forcing the Germans to a complete surrender complete with victory parades up Unter den Linden and through the Brandenburg gate folowed by coffee for the officers on Friedrichstrasse.
Noone is denying the courage or sacrifice of Australian troops,but they weren't going to carry on alone and the salient point is that neither the British nor the French had the will to do so.

There is a significant political component to this. Lloyd George was keen to demobilise and hopeful of a Khaki vote. When he left for the Paris Peace Conference a cabal within the war cabinet,headed by Churchill and Field Marshall Wilson,held an unofficial cabinet meeting to devise a scheme to do much of what you originally suggested. they co-operated to
devise a compulsory service scheme. The plan aimed at having a million men in khaki, ready to put forces on the Rhine, to send men to Russia, to provide other armies of occupation and to cope with the situation in Britain. Manpower was still required,according to them,to cope with other contingencies like the "Irish problem" and potentially curbing industrial unrest at home.

Just how poisonous the atmosphere became may be judged by the actions of the War Office in issuing a circular, officially described as ʻsecretʼ to the Commanding Officers of all Army units on May 29, 1919.Unfortunately for the Army the document was leaked to the Daily Herald which,unsurprisingly given its history and militant left wing politics,published it.
The Circular requested of the Army officers that they provide weekly reports ʻto reach this office without fail not later than first post each Thursday morningʼ on a number of important matters, including the following:

ʻWill troops in various areas respond to orders for assistance to
preserve the public peace?ʼ

ʻWill they assist in strike-breaking?ʼ

ʻWill they parade for draft to overseas, especially to Russia?ʼ

Station Commanders were also asked to report weekly on:

ʻWhether there is any growth of trade unionism among the units
under your command?ʼ

ʻThe effect outside trade unions have on themʼ

ʻWhether any agitation from internal or external sources is affecting
themʼ

ʻWhether any Soldiersʼ Councils have been formedʼ.

The information was needed ʻwith a view to the establishment of an efficient Intelligence Service whereby the Army Council can keep its fingeron the pulse of the troopsʼ. The facts were required ʻfor the information of the Secretary of State for Warʼ,at that time Winston Churchill.

Steve

I know the Aussies volunteered in droves in 1914/15. My great uncle and Grandfather were amongst them.
I also thought that the volunteers were er, less willing as the war progressed...which is entirely understandable.
The AIF that I have looked into for family connections fought with valour and where ever they were. Gallipoli and in France mainly.
I refer back top my earlier point about the foot soldiers be they conscripted or volunteers and the cynical establishment.
I don't know about you guys but I don't think I will ever really get my head around the morality of WW1.
John

Readie said:

I don't know about you guys but I don't think I will ever really get my head around the morality of WW1.
John

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It doesn't pay to examine the morality of war,any war,too closely unless you are prepared to confront some very unpleasant facts and negotiate many grey areas.

I'm not a pacifist,I do believe that sometimes we have to fight,but to imagine that this can be done without some serious moral compromises would be naive.

Cheers
Steve

Well the link I posted is to the AWM site which is I think an official Australian government site. Maybe you should take it up with your government if you feel that there is misleading information or use of the word mutiny there.

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You need to actually read the links that you post. if you did, then you would be surprised to find that it leads to beans account, and is, in fact based on his history. And Bean does not say that the AIF was cracking up or unable to fight. He does say that the British high command completely misread the mood and aspirations of the Australian troops, something I strongly suspect they were doing with their own troops. The British and commonwealth troops continued to fight and attack the Germans until the very last. there were grumblings and officers who had grown fat and lazy in the rear areas whilst others had fought and died were more than a little concerned that their privelege and status might be at risk, so well they should, but that is not at all an indication that the British (or more pertinently the Australians and Canadians, who were doing the lions share of attacking) were about to mutiny or refuse to fight.

This is all getting a bit far away from the original premise which was,if I remember,that the Anglo/French alliance and its allies should continue fighting in 1917/18,forcing the Germans to a complete surrender complete with victory parades up Unter den Linden and through the Brandenburg gate folowed by coffee for the officers on Friedrichstrasse

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No, its not getting away from the issue. the issue is whether the British/Commonwealth Army still had the capacity to fight as at the end of 1918. you are equating faulty (British) command appraisals as proof that fighting/attacking could not continue. Thats the bit thats getting far away from the issue. They (the British commanders) had botched the last three years of fighting so spectacularly, and yet, here we are relying on their troop appraisals as gospel truth of what might have happened had the fighting continued past christmas. bollocks. Facts are, the parts of the British command that needed to continue attacking did so, or (in the case of the Australians) had rested and were moving back into the line to relieve the Canadians (perhaps not directly, but the Canadians had just completed more than 100 days of continuous attacks since the breakthrougfhs achieved by the Australians in July August). There simply is not the hard eviddence that your claim that the important troops needed to continue the attacks could not be relied on could no longer be relied upon to do so. Just the nervous rantings of officers already known to be incompetent.

Noone is denying the courage or sacrifice of Australian troops,but they weren't going to carry on alone and the salient point is that neither the British nor the French had the will to do so.

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Yes, you are questioning their courage and resolve, misquoting the official history to get there, and relying on men proven to be failures to do it. And, further, it was the Australians Canadians and new Zealanders that were doing the lions share of assault work at the end, moreover, I postualte that the Canadaians were about ready to be rested by the end of Novemeber, but the Australians (and the freah Americans) were moving up to take over the offensive role. So, yes, the Australians (and the others mentioned) were playing a key role in the unfolding events, and determining their state of readiness a keyy deteminant of whether the allies could fight or not. This is about possiblilty, incidentally, not what actually happened. What actually happened is that the peacocks running the British army got their way, and an incomplete and unsatisfactory peace declared.

The rest of your post is just a reliance on men worried about losing their positions in society, men who in my eyes were complete and utter failures at their jobs anyway. Society was profoundly changing as a result of the war experiences. im not denying that. These men were attempting to shore up their cushy positions in society, and were attempting to blame the very troops who had delivered victory whilst they had sat on their big fat backsides and continued to blunder about in amazing fashion. Facts are, the british/commonwealth still had the capacity to fight in 1918, as the continuing offensives so convincingly demonstrate. to rely on faulty intell, and the observations of a suspect rulling class, is getting away from the subject.

stona said:

It doesn't pay to examine the morality of war,any war,too closely unless you are prepared to confront some very unpleasant facts and negotiate many grey areas.

I'm not a pacifist,I do believe that sometimes we have to fight,but to imagine that this can be done without some serious moral compromises would be naive.

Cheers
Steve

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Its not fact or any unpleasantness Steve, it is sheer cynicism of the leadership and the appalling losses year after year for little or nothing that I find hard to grasp. Any war will have a dose of this I fully realise but, usually there is a gain to warrant the battle.
Cheers
John

parsifal said:

or more pertinently the Australians and Canadians, who were doing the lions share of attacking.

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Absolute rubbish. Arras Offensive:

First Army (Horne)
I Corps (Holland)
24th Division.
Canadian Corps (Byng)
5th Division
1st Canadian Division
2nd Canadian Division
3rd Canadian Division
4th Canadian Division.

Parallel phase: the First Battle of the Scarpe, 9 - 14 April 1917

First Army (Horne)
XIII Corps (Congreve) (came into the line on 12 April when 2nd Division relieved 51st Division of XVII Corps)
2nd Division.

Third Army (Allenby)
Cavalry Corps (Kavanagh)
1st Cavalry Division
2nd Cavalry Division
3rd Cavalry Division, which captured Monchy le Preux.
VI Corps (Haldane)
3rd Division
12th (Eastern) Division
15th (Scottish) Division
17th (Northern) Division
29th Division
37th Division, which also captured Monchy le Preux.
VII Corps (Snow)
14th (Light) Division
21st Division
30th Division
50th (Northumbrian) Division, which captured the Wancourt Ridge
56th (1st London) Division.
XVII Corps (Fergusson)
4th Division
9th (Scottish) Division
34th Division
51st (Highland) Division.

Flanking operation: the first attack on Bullecourt, 11 April 1917

Fifth Army (Gough)
V Corps (Fanshawe)
62nd (2nd West Riding) Division.
I ANZAC Corps (Birdwood)
4th Australian Division.

Flanking operation: the German attack on Lagnicourt, 15 April 1917

Fifth Army (Gough)
V Corps (Fanshawe)
62nd (2nd West Riding) Division.
I ANZAC Corps (Birdwood)
1st Australian Division
2nd Australian Division.

Phase: the Second Battle of the Scarpe, 23 - 24 April 1917

First Army (Horne)
XIII Corps (Congreve)
63rd (Royal Naval) Division, which captured Gavrelle.

Third Army (Allenby)
VI Corps (Haldane)
15th (Scottish) Division, which captured Guemappe
17th (Northern) Division
29th Division
8th Brigade of 3rd Division.
VII Corps (Snow)
30th Division
33rd Division
50th (Northumbrian) Division.
XVII Corps (Fergusson)
37th Division
51st (Highland) Division
103rd Brigade of 34th Division.

Subsidiary: the attack on La Coulotte, 23 April 1917

First Army (Horne)
Canadian Corps (Byng)
5th Division
2nd Canadian Division
3rd Canadian Division.

Phase: the Battle of Arleux, 28 - 29 April 1917

First Army (Horne)
XIII Corps (Congreve)
2nd Division
63rd (Royal Naval) Division.

Third Army (Allenby)
VI Corps (Haldane)
3rd Division
12th (Eastern) Division.
XVII Corps (Fergusson)
34th Division
37th Division.

Phase: the Third Battle of the Scarpe, 3 - 4 May 1917

First Army (Horne)
XIII Corps (Congreve)
2nd Division
5th Division
31st Division.
Canadian Corps (Byng)
1st Canadian Division, which captured Fresnoy
2nd Canadian Division
3rd Canadian Division.

Third Army (Allenby)
VI Corps (Haldane)
3rd Division
12th (Eastern) Division
56th (1st London) Division.
VII Corps (Snow)
14th (Light) Division
18th (Eastern) Division
21st Division.
XVII Corps (Fergusson)
4th Division
9th (Scottish) Division.

Flanking operation: the Battle of Bullecourt, 3 - 17 May 1917

Fifth Army (Gough)
V Corps (Fanshawe)
7th Division
58th (2/1st London) Division
62nd (2nd West Riding) Division.
I ANZAC Corps (Birdwood)
1st Australian Division
2nd Australian Division
5th Australian Division.

Subsequent: the capture of Roeux, 13 - 14 May 1917

Third Army (Allenby)
VI Corps (Haldane)
3rd Division
12th (Eastern) Division.
XVII Corps (Fergusson)
17th (Northern) Division
51st (Highland) Division.

Flanking operation: the actions on the Hindenburg Line, 20 May - 16 June 1917

Third Army (Allenby)
VII Corps (Snow)
21st Division
33rd Division

Fifth Army (Gough)
IV Corps (Woollcombe)
20th (Light) Division.
V Corps (Fanshawe)
7th Division
58th (2/1st London) Division
62nd (2nd West Riding) Division.
I ANZAC Corps (Birdwood)
5th Australian Division.

Flanking operation: towards Lens, 3 June - 26 August 1917
including the affairs south of the Souchez River 3-25 June 1917 and the capture of Avion 26-29 June 1917, both by 3rd and 4th Canadian Divisions

First Army (Horne)
I Corps (Holland)
6th Division
46th (North Midland) Division.
Canadian Corps (Byng)
1st Canadian Division
2nd Canadian Division
3rd Canadian Division
4th Canadian Division.

Subsequent: the capture of Oppy Wood, 28 June 1917

First Army (Horne)
XIII Corps (Congreve)
5th Division
31st Division.

Subsequent: the Battle of Hill 70, 15 - 25 August 1917

First Army (Horne)
I Corps (Holland)
6th Division
46th (North Midland) Division.
Canadian Corps (Byng)
1st Canadian Division
2nd Canadian Division
3rd Canadian Division
4th Canadian Division.

You can tot up the numbers.

Recognisably modern tactics were used throughout,tactics devised by your incompetent peacocks who had learnt their lessons.

The rest of your diatribe is in a similar vein,a social historian you obviously are not, and with that I'll leave you to it.

Steve

You can get angry, and call what i post rubbish. im okay with that. I do apologize for getting hot myself, and causing you grief. But I am not the one that (perhaps inadvertently or indirectly) that attempted to label the AIF as "unreliable". However, I do have some questions about your last post. Firstly it references dates in 1917, though some of the battles it refers to are 1918. If the reference dates are correct, what has accounts dealing with April 1917 got to do with matters relating to July to November 1918. Even if as i suspect most of the accounts relate to 1918, what on earth does a reference to battles in April have to do with battles fought in July.

For those operations that do fall within the designated time period, they are overwhelmingly dominated by Canadians and Australian forces. Thats on the basis of what you have posted, not anything ive put on the thread, and based on the dates July to November 1918.

Moreover, the peacocks you are defending were not responsible for working out the winning formulas of the final offensives. that is generally credited to both Currie and Monash, with some desultory support from some in the british high command. It had nothing really to do with the dullards moving to protect their positions, and continuing to issue some of the ost stupid military orders in history.

Moreover, I am willing to bet money that the majority of British forces that were committed to the critical offensives in August-Septemeber were actually not involved in the actual assault. The majority were given hol;ding or relief roles. most of the breakthrough assaults were undertaken by fresher less worn troops

So, all your final post has done is to confirm that the British army, whilst critical to the outcome, were not critical to the continuing offensive

One and only time I will say this. Play nice or you will be taking a vacation.

Its obvious to me that to obtain anything of value from this stouche, we need to undertake some reasonable investigation. For that reason I propose to undertake a brief report on the major actions on the western front between July and November 1918, to establish who were the lead elements of the Allied counteroffensive, and who were basically operating in a supporting role. This might take a while

Reduction of the Soissons- Marne Salient – July 25 to 6 August

It comes as some surprise that the initial battles leading to the general allied counteroffensive was not Amiens. There was a minor assault at Hamel by the Australians in which the basic elements the new assault techniques were finalised. This attack formed the tactical basis for most of the battles fought from Amiens onward.

The first major assault was however ordered directly by Foch, led by the French XX Corps, but in reality most of the assault fighting was done by the Americans. The Americans still lacked experience, but a few of their formations had gained valuable experience fighting under the Guidance of the AIF. These more experienced units were now used independently to assault the key positions on the southern flank of the great salient.

The initial attack was indeed undertaken by the French XX Corps plus the US 1 2 ID and the 1st Moroccan ID. Flanks were to be protected by the British 51st highland and 62nd ID which were attached to the French 5th Army. Reserves consisted of the US 26 ID and 167 Fr ID.

The British forces were initially given a subsidiary role . They were the spearhead of a diversionary attack designed to relieve the pressure on XX Corps. The attacks of the two separate Brit formations were separate to each other….51sts attack broke down more or less immediately, but 62nds attack, ably supported by the New Zealanders was quite successful. However the 62nd took such heavy casualties that it had to be withdrawn the next day, leaving the New Zealanders to press on a further 3 miles unsupported. This assault unhinged the german defences and forced the Germans to yield when the main assault went in

The Battle Of Ourcq

This assault initially involved the US 3ID on the southern side of the Marne salient. 3rd Div forced the Germans out of Le Charmel. By 25 July capturing a huge cache of suppliesvital to the Germans at the front. The germans retreated and dug in behind the Ourcq River, preparing to a make a desperate stand. 3rd Div was reinforced by the 28 and 42 IDs. On the 28 July assault were made, resulting in the capture of Courmont which provided high ground to overlook the main German defensive lines.

The allies now undertook a hooking movement on the Germans, with the French 3rd Div in support. However fierce counterattacks by the 4th german Imperial Gds divpushed back the advancing 26 US ID retaking the recently liberated village of Sergy. Attack followed counterattack, with the village falling and being retaken several times. The village, and the village of ciaryo (???)- were eventually taken and held, after the commitment of additional reserves (US 4th and 47 IDs). The Germans resisted stubbornly, there were no further major counterattacks, but german battery fire was very damaging . Yet more reserves were fed into the battle in the form of the 32 and 42 US IDs. By 5th August the germans were in full retreat, their fromn on the southern flank collapsing badly. A great dent had been made into the salient, that in fact made the remainder of the salient untenable for the Germans.

These battles were a foretasts of the future for the germans , and had been won at a cost of about 16000 Brit and CW casualties, 95000 frenchmen and 42000 Americans. German casualties exceeded 168000, including over 30000 prisoners.

The Battle of Amiens - plans and preparations

Foch disclosed his plan on 23 July 1918, following the German retreat that had begun on 20 July. The plan called for reducing the Saint-Mihiel salient (which would later see combat in the Battle of Saint-Mihiel) and liberating the railway lines that ran through Amiens.

Field Marshal Douglas Haig, already had plans in place for an attack near Amiens. When the British retreat had ended in April, General Sir Henry Rawlinsons 4th Army under had taken over the front astride the Somme. Its left hand corps was the British III Corps under Lieutenant General Richard Butler, while the Australian Corps under John Monash held the right flank and linked up with French armies to the south. On 30 May, all the Australian infantry divisions were united under the Corps HQ, for the first time on the Western Front. This in turn allowed the Australians to fully integrate and develop very effective assault e techniques in a number of assaults, culminating with the Battle of Hamel. Rawlinson was so impressed by these initiaitives that they were adopted as standard for the entire BEF. Monash also made a number of military proposal aimed at breaking the deadlock.

Rawlinson had submitted Monash's proposals to Haig in July and Haig had forwarded them to Foch. At a meeting on 24 July, Foch agreed to the plan but insisted that the French First Army, which held the front to the south of the British Fourth Army, should participate. Rawlinson opposed this as his and Monash's plans depended on the large-scale use of tanks (now finally available in large numbers) to achieve surprise, by avoiding a preliminary bombardment. The French First Army lacked tanks and would be forced to bombard the German positions before the infantry advance began, thus removing the element of surprise. Eventually, it was agreed that the French would participate, but not launch their attack until 45 minutes after Fourth Army, and in a very reduced format, involving a fraction of the available 12 divs available (I have read, but not confirmed that 2 divs were used in the assault role). It was also agreed to advance the proposed date of the attack from 10 August to 8 August, to strike the Germans before they had completed their withdrawal from the Marne salient.

Rawlinson had already finalised his plans in discussion with his Corps commanders (Butler, Monash, Sir Arthur Currie of the Canadian Corps and Lieutenant General Charles Kavanagh of the Cavalry Corps) on 21 July. For the first time, the Australians would attack side by side with the Canadian Corps. Both had a reputation for aggressive and innovative tactics and a strong record of success over the past two years.
The tactical methods had been tested by the Australians in a local counter-attack at the Battle of Hamel on 4 July. The German defenders of Hamel were deeply dug in, and their position commanded a very wide field of fire. Similar positions had resisted capture for two months in the Battle of the Somme. The Australians had used surprise rather than weight at Hamel and a great deal of success had resulted . The artillery had opened fire only at the moment the infantry and tanks advanced, and the Germans were rapidly overrun.

A key factor in the final plan was secrecy. There was to be no pre-battle bombardment, only artillery fire immediately prior to the advance of Australian, Canadian, and British forces. The final plan for Fourth Army involved 1,386 field guns and howitzers and 684 heavy guns, making up 27 medium artillery brigades and 13 heavy batteries, in addition to the infantry divisions' artillery. The fire plan for Fourth Army's artillery was devised by Monash's senior artillery officer, Major General C.E.D. Budworth. British sound ranging advances in artillery techniques and aerial photographic reconnaissance made it possible to dispense with "ranging shots" to ensure accurate fire. Budworth had produced a timetable which allowed 504 out of 530 German guns to be hit at "zero hour", while a creeping barrage preceded the infantry. This method was similar to the Feuerwalze which the Germans themselves had used in their Spring Offensive, but its effectiveness was increased by the surprise achieved. The australians developed a level of co-operation between the tanks and the Infantry not seen previously, and the tanks were maintained to a very high standard of maintenance to improve their reliability. These measures all paid off handsomely during the battle

There were also to be 580 tanks. The Canadian and Australian Corps were each allocated a brigade of four battalions, with 108 Mark V fighting tanks, 36 Mark V "Star" tanks capable of carrying a squad of infantry armed with a Lewis gun and 24 unarmed tanks intended to carry supplies and ammunition forward. A single battalion of Mark V tanks was allocated to III Corps. The Cavalry Corps were allocated two battalions each of 48 Medium Mark A Whippet tanks.

The Allies had successfully moved the Canadian Corps of four infantry divisions to Amiens without them being detected by the Germans. This was a noteworthy achievement and reflected well on the increasingly efficient staffwork of the British Armies. A detachment from the Corps of two infantry battalions, a wireless unit and a casualty clearing station had been sent to the front near Ypres to bluff the Germans that the entire Corps was moving north to Flanders. The Canadian Corps was not fully in position until 7 August. To maintain secrecy, the Allies commanders pasted the notice "Keep Your Mouth Shut" into orders issued to the men, and referred to the action as a "raid" rather than an "offensive"

Amiens - The Battle

The German front east of Amiens was held by their Second Army under General Georg von der Marwitz, with six divisions in line (and two facing the French 1st Army). There were only two divisions in immediate reserve. There was some concern among the Allies on 6 August when the German 27th Division actually attacked north of the Somme on part of the front on which the Allies planned to attack two days later. The German division (a specially selected and trained Stosstruppen formation) penetrated roughly 800 yards (730 m) into the one-and-a-half mile front. This attack was made in retaliation for a trench raid by the 5th Australian Division north of the Somme on the night of 31 July, which had gained many prisoners, before the Australian corps was concentrated south of the river. The German division moved somewhat back to its original position on the morning of 7 August, but the movement still required changes to the Allied plan.
The battle began in dense fog at 4:20 am on 8 August 1918. Under Rawlinson's Fourth Army, the British III Corps was to attack north of the Somme, the Australian Corps to the south of the river in the centre of Fourth Army's front, and the Canadian Corps to the south of the Australians. The French 1st Army under General Debeney opened its preliminary bombardment at the same time, and began its advance 45 minutes later, supported by a battalion of 72 Whippet tanks. In the finish, however, only two of the four British Divisions of III Corps were considered battleworthy enough to undertake breakthrough assault operation s
Although German forces were on the alert, this was largely in anticipation of possible retaliation for their incursion on the 6th and not because they had learned of the preplanned Allied attack. Although the two forces were within 500 yards of one another, gas bombardment was very low, as the bulk of the Allied presence was unknown to the Germans. The attack was so unexpected that German forces only began to return fire after five minutes, and even then at the positions where the Allied forces had assembled at the start of the battle and had long since left.
In the first phase, seven divisions attacked: the British 18th (Eastern) and 58th (2/1st London), the Australian 2nd and 3rd, and the Canadian 1st, 2nd and 3rd Divisions. Parts of the American 33rd Division supported the British attackers north of the Somme.
The attackers captured the first German position, advancing about 4,000 yards (3.7 km; 2.3 mi) by about 7:30 am. In the centre, supporting units following the leading divisions attacked the second objective a further 2 miles (3.2 km) distant. Australian units reached their first objectives by 7:10 am, and by 8:20 am, the Australian 4th and 5th and the Canadian 4th Divisions passed through the initial breach in the German lines. The third phase of the attack was assigned to infantry-carrying Mark V* tanks. However, the infantry was able to carry out this final step unaided. The Allies penetrated well to the rear of the German defences and cavalry now continued the advance, one brigade in the Australian sector and two cavalry divisions in the Canadian sector. RAF and armoured car fire kept the retreating Germans from rallying.
The Canadian and Australian forces in the center advanced quickly, pushing the line 3 miles (4.8 km) forward from its starting point by 11:00 am. The speed of their advance was such that a party of German officers and some divisional staff were captured while eating breakfast. A gap 15 miles (24 km) long was punched in the German line south of the Somme by the end of the day. There was less success north of the river, where the British III Corps had only a single tank battalion in support, the terrain was rougher and the German incursion of 6 August had disrupted some of the preparations. Although the attackers gained their first objectives, they were held up short of the Chipilly spur, a steep wooded ridge.
The British Fourth Army took 13,000 prisoners while the French captured a further 3,000. Total German losses were estimated to be 30,000 on 8 August. The Fourth Army's casualties, British, Australian and Canadian infantry, were approximately 8,800, exclusive of tank and air losses and those of their French allies.
German Army Chief of Staff Paul von Hindenburg noted the Allies' use of surprise and that Allied destruction of German lines of communication had hampered potential German counter-attacks by isolating command positions. The German general Erich Ludendorff described the first day of Amiens as the "Schwarzer Tag des deutschen Heeres" ("the black day of the German Army"), not because of the ground lost to the advancing Allies, but because the morale of the German troops had sunk to the point where large numbers of troops began to capitulate. He recounted instances of retreating troops shouting "You're prolonging the war!" at officers who tried to rally them, and "Blackleg!" at reserves moving up. Five German divisions had effectively been engulfed. Allied forces pushed, on average, 7 miles (11 km) into enemy territory by the end of the day. The Canadians gained 8 miles (13 km), Australians 7 miles (11 km), British 2 miles (3.2 km), and the French 5 miles (8.0 km

Breaking the Hindenburg Line

Amiens fizzled as a battle until 12 August. Foch was, as always strongly advocating pressing on . however the Australians and Canadians were both in need of rest, and reserves, particularly tanks were all but used up. A more prudent and cautious Haig whilst agreeing that pressure should be maintained (he was slowly realizing that a turning point had been reached…it was about this time he went to London to press for the release of British manpower reserves stationed in England. His request was denied, the war office did not trust him with Britain's last reserves and believed that would be needed in the fighting of 1919).

Haig plannned to use Byngs 3rd Army to mount one of his "Big Pushes" further north in the direction of Baupaume. Foch the firebrand wanted to maintain the attack in the centre whilst extending the offensive to both the northern and southern flanks. Eventually Haig and his staff dissuaded Foch from this position. This back and forward discussion took time however and was clear evidence of allied indecision. Luckily however Allied indecision was matched by German incompetence. It was at this time that the reserves arriving to relieve and reinforce the shattered front line forces defending the outer reaches of the Siegfried line were booed and jeered to stop prolonging the war. The local german commanders wanted to fall back to the better prepared positions about 10 miles back, but Ludendorf refused and ordered them to stay where they were. The German army was showing clear signs of cracking up, on the western front it was now 9510000 me short of full complement and getting worse every day. That represented a roughly 30% shortfall. Morale was now also very suspect as the Germans faced the prospect of a stalled offensive, increasing allied power, starvation and unrest at home. The Spanish flu epidemic was also taking a heavier toll on the Germans than the Allies as the German soldiers were weakened by malnutrition.

Byng did eventually attack from the 21 August with some of the divisions under his command (roughly 4 were involved), but the weather was too hot for effective use of tanks. Byng had not fully integrated the new assault techniques into his command, and his forces were running short of men. He nevertheless made some progress, but no spectacular advances, which displeased Haig. The BEF CinC was forced to call on the 4th Army (which now had 5 US IDs re-attached) and in particular the Canadian and Australian Corps to kick start the almost stalled offensive. 4th Army retook Albert the next day (21 August) following Byngs forces being stalled by German resistance. 4th Army once again led by the Canadians and Australians made good progress and at reasonable cost. Thiepval fell on the 24 August, followed by Mametz Wood (25th), Delville Wood (27th),

On 26 August byngs Army(but inreality the canadians, yet again) opened an offensive starting with the Battle Of Scarpe Briefly the Canadian Corps advanced over 5 kilometers and captured the towns of Monchy-le-Preux and Wancourt. Lt. Charles Smith Rutherford VC MC MM from the 5th Canadian Mounted Rifles of the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division performed actions that would earn him the Victoria Cross. He captured a German party of 45, including two officers and three machine-guns, then captured another pill-box along with another 35 prisoners and their guns. On the 28 august, the 2nd and 3rd Canadian Infantry Divisions seized an important portion of the German Fresnes-Rouvroy defence system after three days of intense fighting. Total casualties are reported as 254 officers and 5,547 other ranks. They captured more than 3,300 prisoners, 53 guns and 519 machine guns. LCol William Hew Clark-Kennedy, 24th Battalion, 2nd Canadian Infantry Division, earned a Victoria Cross by personally driving the advance despite being severely wounded, and suffering from intense pain and loss of blood (I cant help but make comment here….does this seem the actions of an army that is suspect and unable to continue offensive action…hardly). On the 29 august Brutinel's Brigade, the first fully motorized unit within the forces of the British army, advances the front line by approximately one kilometer by seizing Bench Farm and Victoria Copse. The Canadian Corps Cyclist Battalion established posts right up to the Scarpe River. On the 30th the battle drew to a close Soldiers from the Canadian Corps cleared portions of the Fresnes-Rouvroy trench system, including Upton Wood. After holding all day under heavy fire, they drive off a German counterattack, capturing 50 prisoners and five machine guns in the process.

Bapaume was captured by the "suspect" (yeah right) New Zealand Division on the 29 August.. The Germans were, at the time, trying to consolidate their new defensive line here after retreating from the Amiens salient to the Somme and the capture of Bapaume by the New Zealanders knocked a hole in the new German line even before it was really formed. _

Behind Bapaume the Germans rmained entrenched in the heights of Mont St Quentin. The AIF, now seriously depleted and in urgent need of rest and refit were called upon to deal with this serious threat. Two depleted battalions were used to clear the position, relyoing on heavy artillery support and a great deal of elan, some 600 attackers defeated approximately 3000 well dug in defender. The Australians swarmed into the german position in a predawn attack, remaining a concentrated force and defeating successive German positions one after the other. By 0800 it was all over, with the Australians taking more prisoners than they had committed men to the battle.

To the North, at Bouchavesnes, the 47th (london) division attacked the next day. The terrain and the positionmade this a tough assault for the Londoners, but they were successful in their assault. The Germans were now falling back to their pre-March jumping off points The French and US armies, with some help from the British had dealt with the Soissons salient, now the british and empire troops with a little help from the French and Americans had flattened the great Amiens salient. It was time for the Americans to act on their own….