1918: Who save the Allies?

[parsifal]

St Mihiel - The Americans attack independantly

The Battle of Saint-Mihiel was fought between the American Expeditionary Force, reinforced with French troops, and the German 5th Army, near the town of St-Mihiel, from September 12 to September 15, 1918. It was the first time an American Army level formation acted indepenadantly in offensive action.

US OB

Order of Battle, First Army, 12 September 1918

First Army (United States) - Gen. John J Pershing
I Corps: Maj Gen Hunter Liggett Headquarters
5th Balloon Compan, 82nd Division - Maj Gen William P Burnham, 90th Division - Maj Gen Henry T Allen, 5th Division - Maj Gen John E McMahon, 2nd Division - Maj Gen John A Lejeune, 78th Division (Corps Reserve) - Maj Gen James H McRae 12th Aero Squadron 50th Aero Squadron, 50th Aero Squadron 42nd Balloon Company, 1st Balloon Compan, 1st Aero Squadron, 1st Balloon Company, 2nd Balloon Company

IV Corps - Maj Gen Joseph T Dickman Headquarters

89th Division - Maj Gen William M Wright, 42nd Division - Maj Gen Charles T Menoher, 1st Division - Maj Gen Chales P Summerall , 3rd Division (Corps Reserve) - Maj Gen Beaumont B Buck , 135th Aero Squadron, 43rd Balloon Company, 90th Aero Squadron, 3rd Balloon Company, 8th Aero Squadron, 9th Balloon Compan, 69th Balloon Companyy

V Corps - Maj Gen George H Cameron Headquarters
26th Division - Maj Gen Clarence R Edwards, 4th Division - Maj Gen John L Hines 8th Brigade 88th Aero Squadron, 12th Balloon Company, 104th Aero Squadron, 99th Aero Squadron, 7th Balloon Company, 6th Balloon Company

15th Colonial Division (French) 8th Balloon Company, 4th Field Artillerie Brigade
remainder of Div in reserve



1st Army Reserve

35th Division - Maj Gen Peter E Traub, 80th Division - Maj Gen Adelbert Cronkhite, 91st Division - Maj Gen William H Johnston


The US and French forces were commanded by General John J. Pershing, and the 5th Army by Georg von der Marwitz. The US Army Air Service also participated in this battle, which resulted in an American victory. The Americans and the french suffered around 7000 casualties, whilst inflicting a similar number on the retreating germans. however about 2000 Germans threww their hands up in surrender.

The American Expeditionary Force had been beefed up with two tank battalions, which were equipped with 144 French-built FT-17 tanks, under the command of Colonel George S Patton.

Saint-Mihiel was a salient in the lines which jutted out into the American-held sector. Defended by 10 infantry divisions of the German 5th Army, Saint-Mihiel was strategically important, and in order to continue with the Hundred Days Offensive, which had been launched on August 8, 1918, by French General Ferdinand Foch, it was of the utmost importance to take the strongly defended bulge in the lines. Before the American operation began, the Germans set up a series of trenches protected with barbed wire and machine-gun nests. The battlefield terrain included the nearby premises of three villages: Vigneulles, Thiaucourt, and Hannonville-sous-les-Cotes. Their capture was important because would accelerate the envelopment of the German divisions near Saint-Mihiel. The American forces planned to breach the trenches and then advance along the enemy's logistical road network.

The Battle of Saint-Mihiel was initiated on the morning of September 12, 1918, with a threefold assault on the salient. The main attack was made against the south face by two American corps. On the right was the I Corps, which was deployed from right to left in the following order: the 82d, 90th, 5th, and 2d Divisions in line with the 78th in reserve. It covered a front from Pont-à-Mousson on the Moselle westward to Limey. On the left, the IV Corps (from right to left the 89th, 42d, and 1st Divisions in line with the 3rd in reserve) extending along a front from Limey westward to Marvoisin. A secondary thrust was carried out against the west face along the heights of the Meuse, from Mouilly north to Haudimont, by the V Corps (from right to left the 26th Division, the French 15th Colonial Division, and the 8th Brigade, 4th Division in line with the rest of the 4th in reserve). A holding attack against the apex, to keep the enemy in the salient, was made by the French II Colonial Corps (from right to left the French 39th Colonial Division, the French 26th Division, and the French 2d Cavalry Division in line). In First Army reserve were the American 35th, 80th, and 91st Divisions.

Under the command of Georg von der Marwitz, 10 German divisions from Army Detachment C, 5th Army, defended the salient. By this time in the war, the Germans were exhausted and desperately short of manpower, and they began a step-by-step withdrawal from the salient only the day before the offensive began. The attack went so well on September 12 that Pershing ordered a speedup in the offensive. By the morning of September 13, the 1st Division, advancing from the east, joined hands with the 26th Division, moving in from the west, and before evening all objectives in the salient had been captured. At this point Pershing halted further advances so that American units could be withdrawn for the coming offensive in the Meuse-Argonne sector.

 

[parsifal]

Operations By British 1st Army 27 august - 5 September 1918

On 27th August 1918, Sir Harold sinclair horne (HSH) ordered further advances beyond the D-Q defensive line by the Canadians who found it to be strongly held. After a few days of consolidation, including reinforcement by 4th Division (British), several of the villages adjacent to the defence line were captured in fierce fighting. But the D-Q Line remained unbroken. Further attempts were made on 28th , 29th and 30th August without success, and the casualties were mounting fast; the Canadians alone had lost almost 6,000 men. By 1st September 1918, Haig had organised a concerted effort by First, Third and Fourth Armies on the D-Q Line. HSH having assured an atypically querulous Haig that First Army could perform its part satisfactorily.

The general assault was led by an assault by the canadian Corps attached to 1st Army. On 2nd September 1918, an attack at 0500hrs by the Canadians broke the D-Q Line on a front of 7,000 yards. In effect, this made the German's Scarpe defences untenable, forcing an immediate German withdrawal to the Hindenberg Line and to behind the Canal du Nord. However, HSH's objective of the Canal du Nord was still outstanding. But, due to the heavy casualties sustained by the Canadians and others, this aim was put on a temporary hold until sufficient resources could be mustered. Meanwhile, constant pressure was maintained on the retreating Germans.

Haig at this point realised that the static war of the trenches was fast coming to an end and that a phase of more open warfare and mobility was coming to the fore. Accordingly, he instructed his commanders to set aside the old trench warfare dogmas and asked them to encourage initiative and a more adventurous spirit, reinforcing success, and not to over react to limited local setbacks.

Canal du Nord and the Hindenberg Line: As part of the joint attack strategy with Third and Fourth Army, HSH now planned to move onto the Hindenberg defence line and the associated Canal du Nord defences, based on a very innovative plan submitted by Arthgur Currie. And, once more, a deception plan of false troop movements and probing attacks was initiated to wrong foot the Germans as to which direction an assault would be made.

 

[parsifal]

euse Argonne

The Meuse-Argonne Offensive was the greatest American battle of the First World War. In six weeks the AEF lost 26,277 killed and 95,786 wounded. It was a very complex operation involving a majority of the AEF ground forces fighting through rough, hilly terrain the German Army had spent four years fortifying. Its objective was the capture of the railroad hub at Sedan. Its capture would break the rail net supporting the German Army in France and Flanders and force the enemy to rely soley on supply via the more vulnerable rail network further noth.

The bulk of the forces engaged in the initial onslaught had to be transferred from the St. Mihiel Salient (assaulted less than two weeks earlier) to a new jump off line north and northwest of Verdun. This new section of the front extended thirty miles east to west. The re-shifting of forces in such a short period of time was one of the great accomplishments of the Great War. These logistics were planned and directed by Col. George C. Marshall establishing his reputation.

The American forces consisted initially of fifteen divisions of the U.S. First Army commanded by then-General John J. Pershing until October 16 and then by Lieutenant General Hunter Liggett. The logistics were planned and directed by then-Colonel George C. Marshall. The French forces next to them consisted of 31 divisions including the Fourth Army (under Henri Gouraud) and the Fifth Army (under Henri Mathias Berthelot).[6] The U.S. divisions of the AEF were oversized (16 battalions per division compared to the French/British/German 9 battalions per division), being up to twice the size of other Allies' battle-depleted divisions upon arrival, but the French and other Allied divisions had been partly replenished prior to the Grand Offensive. Both the U.S. and French contributions in troops were considerable. Most of the heavy equipment (tanks, artillery, aircraft) was provided by the European Allies. For the Meuse-Argonne front alone, this represented 2,780 artillery pieces, 380 tanks and 840 planes. As the battle progressed, both the Americans and the French brought in reinforcements. Eventually, 22 American divisions would participate in the battle at one time or another, representing two full field armies.[7] Other French forces involved included the 2nd Colonial Corps, under Henri Edouard Claudel, which had also fought alongside the AEF at the Battle of Saint-Mihiel earlier in September 1918.

The opposing German forces were seriously understrength. During this period of the war, German divisions procured only 50 percent or less of their initial strength. The 117th Division, which opposed the U.S. 79th Division during the offensive's first phase, had only 3,300 men in its ranks. Morale varied among German units. For example, divisions that served on the Eastern front would have high morale, while conversely divisions that had been on the western front had poor morale. Resistance grew to approximately 200,000 German troops from the Fifth Army of Group Gallwitz commanded by General Georg von der Marwitz. The Americans estimated that they opposed parts of 44 German Divisions overall, though many fewer at any one time.

The battle was fought in three phases, with the last phase remaining incomplete as at 11 November 1918.

Allied casualties amounted to 187000 whilst German casualties were about 120000.

The American attack began at 5:30 a.m. on September 26 with mixed results. The V and III Corps met most of their objectives, but the 79th Division failed to capture Montfaucon, the 28th "Keystone" Division was virtually ground to a halt by formidable German resistance, and the 91st "Wild West" Division was compelled to evacuate the village of Épinonville though it advanced eight kilometers. The green 37th "Buckeye" Division failed to capture Montfaucon d'Argonne. The subsequent day, September 27 most of 1st Army failed to make any gains. The 79th Division finally captured Montfaucon and the 35th "Sante Fe" Division captured the village of Baulny, Hill 218, and Charpentry, placing the division forward of adjacent units.

On September 29, six extra German divisions were deployed to oppose the American attack, with the 5th Guards and 52nd Division counterattacking the 35th Division, which had run out of food and ammunition during the attack. The Germans initially made significant gains but were barely repulsed by the 35th Division's 110th Engineers, 128th Machine Gun Battalion and Harry Truman's Battery D, 129th Field Artillery. In the words of Pershing, "We were no longer engaged in a maneuver for the pinching out of a salient, but were necessarily committed, generally speaking, to a direct frontal attack against strong, hostile positions fully manned by a determined enemy."

The German counterattack had shattered so much of the 35th Division, a poorly led division (most of its key leaders were replaced shortly before the attack) made up of National Guard units from Missouri and Kansas, that it had to be relieved early - though remnants of the division subsequently reentered the battle.

Part of the adjacent French attack met temporary confusion when one of its generals died, however it was able to advance nine miles, penetrating deeply into the German lines, especially around Somme-Py and northwest of Reims (the Battle of Saint-Thierry). The initial progress of the French forces was thus faster than the two to five miles gained by the adjacent American units (however, the French units were fighting in a more open terrain, which is easier to attack).

The second phase of the battle began on 4 October, during which time all of the original phase one assault divisions (the 91st, 79th, 37th and 35th) of the U.S. V Corps were replaced by the 32nd, 3rd and 1st Divisions. The 1st Division created a gap in the lines when it advanced one and a half miles against the 37th, 52nd, and 5th Guards Divisions. It was during this phase that the Lost Battalion affair occurred. The battalion was rescued due to an attack by the 28th and 82nd Divisions (the 82nd attacking soon after taking up its positions in the gap between the 28th and 1st Divisions) on October 7. The Americans launched a series of costly frontal assaults that finally broke through the main German defenses (the Kriemhilde Stellung of the Hindenburg Line) between 14–17 October (the Battle of Montfaucon). By the end of October, US troops had advanced ten miles and had finally cleared the Argonne Forest. On their left the French had advanced twenty miles, reaching the Aisne River. It was during the opening of this operation, on October 8, that Corporal (later Sergeant) Alvin York made his famous capture of 132 German prisoners.

By October 31, the Americans had advanced 15 kilometers and had finally cleared the Argonne Forest. On their left the French had advanced 30 kilometers, reaching the River Aisne. The American forces reorganized into two armies. The First, led by General Ligett, would continue to move to the Carignan-Sedan-Mezieres Railroad. The Second Army, led by Lieutenant General Robert L. Bullard, was directed to move eastward towards Metz. The two U.S. armies faced portions of 31 German divisions during this phase. The American troops captured German defenses at Buzancy, allowing French troops to cross the River Aisne, whence they rushed forward, capturing Le Chesne (the Battle of Chesne). In the final days, the French forces conquered the immediate objective, Sedan and its critical railroad hub, on November 6 and American forces captured surrounding hills. On November 11, news of the German armistice put a sudden end to the fighting.

The battle also hailed the debut of the Browning Automatic Rifle in combat, with both the US and France using them significantly for the first time in battle. It is generally accepted that the battle's pressure on the Germans was a factor in their agreeing to the armistice:

 

[yulzari]

There is a point to be gently raised here. Canadian, Australian, New Zealand etc. soldiers' bravery and commitment were second to none. They did, proportionately to their numbers, serve more in the front line than British soldiers as they were less easily directed into the supporting services as they, and their governments, felt that they had volunteered to fight, not hump stores etc. This is reflected in their losses.

Their losses, resulting from this commendable spirit, has been used later by some to imply that they thrown into the fighting with less concern by the overwhelming British high command than would British troops. It is simply a fact that you would have been more likely to die in front of Ypres than behind Amiens.

This is no criticism of any of those fine men.

It may be useful, for those who have not read it, to read Gordon Corrigan's 'Mud Blood and Poppycock'. As ever one should read it critically (in the proper sense) but ask oneself how you, without the benefit of hindsight, could have done it better?

In the Second World War losses in the campaign from Normandy through Belgium to Germany were on a par with the First War and troops were commanded by men who had been junior officers in that war. Motorisation gave the attack a mobility to exploit local success that was lacking in the First World War where defence ruled the field. Few Western Front attacks did not initially breach the front lines but reserves could not be brought forward fast enough to maintain the momentum. I do not excuse those senior officers who were lacking in competence but the majority tried manfully to achieve the tasks set for them by their democratically elected masters and were, by and large, respected by their men and routinely invited to post war reunions of ex-soldiers.

The spectre of Colonel Blimp is traditionally raised in these matters, but we would do well to recall that Colonel Blimp was an honourable man cast into a dishonourable world. As a senior officer he failed to adjust to a sordid new reality but as a character of a man he should be respected.

 

[stona]

More than 5,000,000 British soldiers (of the nearly 9,000,000 mobilised) served overseas,mainly in France/Belgium, compared with 331,000 (of the 417,000 who enlisted) Australians. The maths is not difficult.

Bean was a good historian but he had an agenda.

Again noone is trying to disrespect or belittle the Australian effort. The percentage of Australian males of fighting age who enlisted for WW1,from all States,is only exceeded by some Canadian Provinces in WW2.

The figures,rounded,are from The War Office, Statistics of the Military Effort of the British Empire During the Great War, 1914-1920, (London 1922) and AWM133 Nominal Roll of the AIF abroad

Steve

 

[Readie]

We equally should not forget the French Army losses in WW1....
The total loss of life on all sides in such a small part of Europe is staggering.

John

 

[yulzari]

We equally should not forget the French Army losses in WW1....
The total loss of life on all sides in such a small part of Europe is staggering.

John

Indeed Readie, and we should remember the huge losses of life in the early campaigns of 1914 where hundreds of thousands of French and German troops were mown down in mobile warfare before they all dug in. We tend to only think of the Western Front as a sea of mud and trenches but so many died before it became so. Equally we forget the death and misery of fighting in the East where the Russians had trouble even finding enough rifles to go round and they all fought through four Russian winters.

The wars of 1870 and 1914 did not only result in a depopulation of my region through the death of so many young men. It gave so many of the survivors an opportunity to see that rural peasant drudgery and poverty were not their only options and huge numbers left for the cities and industry.

The depictions of the Great War as solely mud and trenches is a modern folklore. An true but not accurate picture. Somewhat like the modern view of industrial work and housing in the industrial revolution where people were 'forced' to live squalid, exhausting and demeaning lives. At the time, life in a factory in an industrial town was seen as a positive step for the enterprising rural poor. Regular paid work indoors and to live in the midst of services and schooling were dreams to the rural poor. People flocked to the industrial cities by choice (yes I know that necessity drove some).

Mud and trenches were an unspeakable horror but not the whole horror of that war just as rural poverty is not picturesque whilst urban poverty is squalid.

 

[parsifal]

The allied victory was just that, an allied victory. Moreover, I am not quoting just Bean in bringing out these historical points. I rely on a number of different sources, some good, some less so. Some are on line, and I admit to cutting and pasting some rather large slabs from some sources. However the "guiding" histories are rather short, single volume accounts so as to remain as concise as possible. I am using a number of different sources, but rely on the following as principal souirce material:

Martin Matrix Evans 1918 - The Year Of Victories - Arcturus Publishing London 2004
Beans Official History ( as summarised on the AWM website)
Stalling Laurence - The AEF 1917-18 - New York Harper Row 1963.
Nicholson G.W.L. - Canadian Expeditionary Force 1914-18 - Ottawa Queens Printer - 1962
Keegan John- The First World War - London Hutchinson 1998


You will notice that only one, (plus Monashes book which i have used only a little) that virtually none of these books have an "Australian Bias". Neither are the accounts I have given shown or attempted to show the Australians as winning the fight single handedly, or in concert with the Canadians, beyond the generally accepted level of achievement that they are recognized by most as having achieved. However, the truth is that it was the Australians and the Canadians that undertook the lions share of the attacks for the BEF until the early part of October. Then the armies further to the north undertook a series of attacks as the Germans evacuated the Lys salient. These attacks were costly especially to the Belgians, but they were not breakthrough assaults that broke the back of the Germans in the same way as Amiens, Scarp Canal Du Nord and St Quentin did. The British effort in those last 100 days is marked starkly by the relatively few British divisions that were used as breakthrough units. Several divisions were used to cover flanks or as reserve forces to be committed after the breakthroughs had been made, but perhaps 5 or 6 purely British divisions of the BEF were used in direct assault in the same way as Curries and Monashes men were used.

Why. Well, I dont think it was a lack of fighting spirit or poor morale. When called upon to fight in assault, the British formations performed quite well. Rawlinsons command had adopted the new assault techniques worked out by the AIF far more comprehemsively than Byngs command, and this showed in the advances they achieved.

The British component of the BEF were a force being starved of manpower in 1918. after the horrors of the Somme, many in war office were looking for ways of getting rid of Haig and his cronies. Haig had finally realized he had a winner after Amiens and had travelled to Londoin, seeking release of the Home army reserves. He request was refused, leaving the British preciously short of replacements at the front. This had to be colouring Haigs thinking. There was more or less open discussions on how to get him removed and replaced by officers from the "new guard", which included Currie as the head of the BEF and Monash his Cof S. This was perhaps not a serious suggestion, but the desire to get rid of Haig most certainly was, and he was denied critical resources as a result. So, the British, whilst critical to the victory, and still able to attack effectively, were not greatly used in the assault role in that final three month period.

The French were somewhat more intensively used in the assault, mostly at the insistence of Foch. Elements of 1st Army particiapted at Amiens. They were also in the lead elements of the Assaults at Soissons, St Mihiel and in the Meuse Argonne offensives. The French army in 1918 showed no signs of cracking as had happened in 1917. However, because there had been some serious break downs in French morale. the allies did tend to "go easy" on the French. For example, at Amiens the entire 1st Army was supposed to attack in ful assault, but in the finish only about 2 Divs (out of 12) were used as assault elements.

What triggered this historical account was the claim the Allies were no longer at the end of 1918 in a position to attack and grabbed the armistice because they had no other choice. That is sheer fantasy. The British were lightly engaged in the assault role, but the allies, particualalry the Americans, were still attacking very effectively. The British were drawing up plans on how to continue the fight into 1919 should that be required, and that plan featured many more reserves released to the front, and a whole new style of warfare based on Fullers threories. The AIF were moving up to relieve the Canadians, who had finished the war with the capture of Mons.

The only army doing any cracking at the end of 1918 was the German Army. Of all the combatants, it was the Germans who absolutely needed peace the most. The country really was collapsing and so was their army

 

[VBF-13]

Its not fact or any unpleasantness Steve, it is sheer cynicism of the leadership and the appalling losses year after year for little or nothing that I find hard to grasp. Any war will have a dose of this I fully realise but, usually there is a gain to warrant the battle.

Good spot for a little poem...

"REQUIESCANT"

In lonely watches night by night,
Great visions burst upon my sight,
For down the stretches of the sky
The hosts of dead go marching by.

Strange ghostly banners o'er them float,
Strange bugles sound an awful note,
And all their faces and their eyes
Are lit with starlight from the skies.

The anguish and the pain have passed,
And peace hath come to them at last.
But in the stern looks linger still
The iron purpose and the will.

Dear Christ, who reign'st above the flood
Of human tears and human blood,
A weary road these men have trod,
O house them in the home of God.