1938/1939, USA, England, France - Would Have? Could Have? Should Have?

[Shortround6]

The Battle is about the only RAF asset that might be considered a CAS asset...and we can see how successful they were. Conversely, the Stuka was a credible

Stuka was credible because it have better intelligence/targeting, contact with ground observers.
It had escorts, not a fighter sweep that went through area in the same time frame (minutes different than the Battles) and the formations never saw each other.
Not sure what protection the Stuka, had, if any in 1940. we know that the Battle didn't have any (or very little) and using a 16,000ft engine in a CAS airplane with a two pitch propeller was not helping anything.

You could have magically replaced every Battle with Ju-87s (pixie dust) and the results would have hardly changed.

 

[buffnut453]

Stuka was credible because it have better intelligence/targeting, contact with ground observers.
It had escorts, not a fighter sweep that went through area in the same time frame (minutes different than the Battles) and the formations never saw each other.
Not sure what protection the Stuka, had, if any in 1940. we know that the Battle didn't have any (or very little) and using a 16,000ft engine in a CAS airplane with a two pitch propeller was not helping anything.

You could have magically replaced every Battle with Ju-87s (pixie dust) and the results would have hardly changed.

Agree entirely...which is why I questioned whether the RAF's CAS capabilities were more advanced than those of Germany. Experience suggests they weren't. Certainly the Luftwaffe's tactical implementation was better than that of the RAF.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Which is exactly my point about it not being in Britain's interest to go to war in 1939. Britain was under no direct threat of attack.




Not sure I agree here. The Luftwaffe was inherently a tactical air force, which was part of the (mistaken) driving force for almost every German bomber having a requirement for dive bombing.

The Battle is about the only RAF asset that might be considered a CAS asset...and we can see how successful they were. Conversely, the Stuka was a credible CAS platform. I'd suggest that German state-of-the-art for CAS was considerably ahead of the RAF's.




Which is applying the retrospectroscope. Even as late as August 1939, it was not known whether there would be a large-scale conflict...and the Allies were trying hard to avoid the same. But your point about Hitler wanting a war is bang on the money...and why I keep raising the point about structure-vs-agency. Britain and France had the agency to threaten war but that agency butted up against the structural problem that Hitler couldn't be persuaded and was intent on war. Does that make the use of said agency by Britain and France wrong?

If we accept that Britain couldn't do anything to defend the territorial integrity of Poland (which they never promised to do, anyway), what options are left for them? Apart from a more aggressive assault in the west, the only other alternative is to not commit to Poland at all. That gives Germany free rein.




My point is that your suggestion of using the RN to shell ports would put those Allied vessels at considerably increased risk of attack from aircraft and submarines. There's no way either the RAF or FAA could provide air cover so close to German territory.

As to the idea of a sea blockade, exactly what vessels would the blockade stop? Neutral vessels going between Germany and the USA? That'll go down well in Washington. How about coastal vessels from other European nations, many of which were also neutral...so the Allies would be interfering with neutral nations' legal shipping activities which isn't something the "good guys" should be doing. Even if the RN sought to disrupt solely German-flagged cargo vessels, you're still bringing the RN much closer to Germany than to the UK...which, again, puts the vessels at risk.

One final note on the idea of a German blockade...the entire purpose behind Hitler's expansionist agenda was to secure more resources for the German people within Europe. Hitler saw the impact of the Allied blockade during the Great War and was determined not to make the same mistake. Germany was thus far less reliant on maritime shipping than was the UK. Under these conditions, would a maritime blockade really apply much pressure on Berlin? I suspect not.




Not in the west but it still couldn't get forces to Czechoslovakia or Poland.

We've already discussed the fact that France perhaps should have taken more aggressive action on that front in 1939 but, for whatever reason, Paris didn't make that call. Could the French Army create enough of a kerfuffle to pull forces from Poland in time to save the latter? I suspect not. The German advances in Poland were so rapid in the first 14 days that they essentially neutralized Poland's mobilization efforts. That mobilization was key to achieving Warsaw's strategic vision for the nation's defence, which involved encircling the invading force. From that point on, Poland was merely reacting to Germany's advances with no real hope of winning.

The only way to truly save Poland would be to preserve the territorial integrity of Poland was, somehow, to get boots on the ground...and that was impossible.




Again, two strong nations went to war on behalf of Poland and they did it immediately. What more do you want them to do? Should they not have made the commitment in the first place and let Germany run amok with no consequences?

As for "curious reading," well someone put the term "unprovoked resort to arms" in the language of the agreement between France and Czechoslovakia. That caveat was there for a purpose. Not sure my reading is, therefore "curious."

As to Poland, the "immediate assistance" was also caveated by "all support in their power." We keep going round and round on this. Britain did assist immediately, as I've explained many times. What sort of "immediate assistance" do you have in mind that was militarily practicable?




Oh, come on mate. You're better than that. We both know I never claimed that the Brits delivered any such thing. I also observed that the betrayal of Poland in 1945 was deplorable.

However, there's no way that London, in 1939, could foresee how the war would proceed. What odds that the USSR, which in 1939 was an ally of Germany, would join the Allies, along with the USA which, in 1939 was neutral? Blaming Britain for not envisaging the change in the power dynamic by the end of 1945 is really going too far.

The key point is that Britain went to war because it was committed to preserving an independent Poland. The fact that Poland was sold out by all the Allies in 1945 doesn't change the intent of why Britain went to war in the first place. It took years of fighting before the collective Allies were in a position to defeat Germany. Blaming Chamberlain for lacking a suitable crystal ball is taking things too far, IMHO.




I can (and have) agreed that Munich was a policy to buy time (whether it was cynical or not depends on how Machiavellian one presumes the participants to be).

However, the idea that Britain was still cynically buying time in 1939 doesn't make sense. Buying time for what, precisely? Deterrence had failed and Britain was at war. Time had run out. It wasn't buying time for further rearmament. It wasn't buying time to get the BEF into France. It wasn't buying time to start offensive operations. There was no more time to buy.

The fact that deterrence failed does not mean that the promise was empty. As you've pointed out, Hitler was intent on war. London and Paris didn't KNOW that in 1939. There were plenty of indicators but there was still a belief that Hitler was capable of being persuaded. Hell, there were senior politicians in London in May 1940 who were still advocating a negotiated settlement. And yet Britain persisted in the fight.

Yes, a more strident attack by France for the Saar offensive might, stress MIGHT, have had some impact. However, Polish organized resistance had effectively ceased by 17 September. The French decided to retreat from the ground taken in the Saar offensive on 21 September. I'm not sure there was enough time, even with a more aggressive French attack, for Berlin to realize the scale of the threat, let alone divert forces from Poland to counter the French. And that all presupposes that France could have tackled the Siegfried Line without significant losses.

You're only making my point for me: if the Western Allies are as helpless as you assert, then their promises were absolutely vapid. You're trying to eat your cake and have it too. Either the Allies promises had teeth, or the Allies were powerless. They cannot be both.

 

[buffnut453]

You're only making my point for me: if the Western Allies are as helpless as you assert, then their promises were absolutely vapid. You're trying to eat your cake and have it too. Either the Allies promises had teeth, or the Allies were powerless. They cannot be both.

But you're applying the retrospectroscope and judging based entirely on hindsight. When Britain and France declared war on Germany on 3 September 1939, they couldn't POSSIBLY know that Polish defences would essentially be broken within 2 weeks. They moved forward immediately with existing plans for the BEF and AEF to deploy to France. As it turned out, the Polish defence, valiant as it was, crumbled very quickly, which didn't leave enough time for a concerted Allied effort to address the German threat.

Bear in mind that nobody had ever seen warfare conducted like this before...there's a reason it was termed blitzkrieg. Germany's close tactical integration of air, armour, infantry and artillery, coupled with rapid manoeuvre, entirely unhinged the Polish defences. Given that nobody, until then, had seen the German army in action, is it realistic to believe that London and Paris could have foretold the chain of events that ultimately unfolded?

Imagine if the Polish military had remained as a coherent defensive force thru the end of October or beyond. That would afford far more opportunities for a combined Anglo-French attack on the western front. With the BEF in the front lines on 3 October, they'd have almost a month to go on the offensive while Poland was, simultaneously, continuing to cause problems for the German invading force. Unfortunately, this isn't what happened. However, that doesn't make the promises or actions by Britain or France vacuous. Again, we're back to structure -vs-agency.

Despite the rapidly-changing situation caused by Poland's rapid capitulation, Britain still stood by the promise of an independent Poland, maintaining the Polish government in exile and equipping Polish soldiers to fight for the ultimate victory. Those were actions that Chamberlain undertook as part of his promise to Poland. The fact that later leaders reneged in 1945, long after Chamberlain's death, is not his fault, nor should he carry any blame for it.

 

[SaparotRob]

Were England or France aware of the deal between Germany and Russia?

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

But you're applying the retrospectroscope and judging based entirely on hindsight. When Britain and France declared war on Germany on 3 September 1939, they couldn't POSSIBLY know that Polish defences would essentially be broken within 2 weeks. They moved forward immediately with existing plans for the BEF and AEF to deploy to France. As it turned out, the Polish defence, valiant as it was, crumbled very quickly, which didn't leave enough time for a concerted Allied effort to address the German threat.

Bear in mind that nobody had ever seen warfare conducted like this before...there's a reason it was termed blitzkrieg. Germany's close tactical integration of air, armour, infantry and artillery, coupled with rapid manoeuvre, entirely unhinged the Polish defences. Given that nobody, until then, had seen the German army in action, is it realistic to believe that London and Paris could have foretold the chain of events that ultimately unfolded?

Imagine if the Polish military had remained as a coherent defensive force thru the end of October or beyond. That would afford far more opportunities for a combined Anglo-French attack on the western front. With the BEF in the front lines on 3 October, they'd have almost a month to go on the offensive while Poland was, simultaneously, continuing to cause problems for the German invading force. Unfortunately, this isn't what happened. However, that doesn't make the promises or actions by Britain or France vacuous. Again, we're back to structure -vs-agency.

Despite the rapidly-changing situation caused by Poland's rapid capitulation, Britain still stood by the promise of an independent Poland, maintaining the Polish government in exile and equipping Polish soldiers to fight for the ultimate victory. Those were actions that Chamberlain undertook as part of his promise to Poland. The fact that later leaders reneged in 1945, long after Chamberlain's death, is not his fault, nor should he carry any blame for it.

That does not address my point: you cannot both argue that the Allies had no options while simultaneously arguing that their promises had teeth.

As for whether Poland's quick defeat was unforeseeable, that's not so. The UK and France sent a joint military mission to Moscow precisely because they knew that the Poles would need immediate help that only the USSR could provide. Said talks foundered upon Poland's refusal to allow Soviet troops in the nation -- but the fact that the Allies pursued them demonstrates that Poland's defeat was not only foreseeable, but foreseen in the absence of immediate aid.

 

[buffnut453]

That does not address my point: you cannot both argue that the Allies had no options while simultaneously arguing that their promises had teeth.

You're the one asserting that the promises had no teeth. It's my contention that the teeth involved deploying the BEF and AEF to France, starting immediate bombing attacks, and opening a western front against Germany. Those ARE teeth. The fact that Germany's rapid conquest of Poland de-fanged the Allies does not mean the original intent was empty. Again, please stop applying the retrospectroscope and try to judge actions on what was known and understood at the time.

As for whether Poland's quick defeat was unforeseeable, that's not so. The UK and France sent a joint military mission to Moscow precisely because they knew that the Poles would need immediate help that only the USSR could provide. Said talks foundered upon Poland's refusal to allow Soviet troops in the nation -- but the fact that the Allies pursued them demonstrates that Poland's defeat was not only foreseeable, but foreseen in the absence of immediate aid.

The approach to USSR was entirely geographic because it was the only nation that could provide landward reinforcement of Poland. That does not mean that Britain and France knew that Poland would be defeated so rapidly.

You've criticized Britain for not offering "immediate assistance" and yet here you've provided another example of how Britain did everything "within its power" to aid Poland. The quotes are, obviously, deliberate and refer to Britain's guarantee to Poland.

If you believe that London and Paris genuinely knew that Poland would fall in just a couple of weeks, and that the declaration of war was a merely a cynical, hollow and premeditated ploy, then please provide contemporaneous documentary evidence to support the assertion. Anything else is hindsight, I'm afraid.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

You're the one asserting that the promises had no teeth.

And you're the one shooting down any suggestions for action.

I'll return to this conversation once we've gotten past this lather-rinse-repeat phase. Your refusal to acknowledge any justice at all to my points is not borne out by history, nor by many Britons who were alive at the time.

 

[Snautzer01]

Were England or France aware of the deal between Germany and Russia?

Yes.

 

[Snautzer01]

Just an observation.

opening a western front against Germany

True, but none to help the contact signed i think.
What is the point of making a promise and then say we cant do it?
Sending some 2 nd line battleships into Gdansk would have made a point.

And in a more personal observation, i hope this interessting discussion stays gentleman like.

Regards,

 

[pbehn]

Just an observation.

True, but none to help the contact signed i think.
What is the point of making a promise and then say we cant do it?
Sending some 2 nd line battleships into Gdansk would have made a point.

And in a more personal observation, i hope this interessting discussion stays gentleman like.

Regards,

As far as I can see it had lots of reasons. Hitler may have been dissuaded from even starting a war. He may have been dragged into a war as in 1914-18, no one expected France to fall in weeks in 1940. But in the worst case scenario Poland may have been lost, it would have been lost anyway, but the UK (and France) was at war, the measures that the UK government were able to enact with war time emergency powers played a big part in the BoB and everything that came later. The UK was fully mobilised for war by 1940 Germany wasnt.

 

[Snautzer01]

You can reason till you see blue but a contract is a contract. It was signed both sides.

 

[buffnut453]

And you're the one shooting down any suggestions for action.

I'll return to this conversation once we've gotten past this lather-rinse-repeat phase. Your refusal to acknowledge any justice at all to my points is not borne out by history, nor by many Britons who were alive at the time.

Thump, it may seem like that but I've agreed that the the Saar offensive was a missed opportunity. I've also asked a lot of questions that have gone unanswered. I'm more than happy to dig into the details of options and work together to determine what might have been feasible. Here are a few initial ideas:

1. You raised the idea of a naval blockade. I asked questions about what would be blockaded and how it would be enacted. I'll gladly contribute to an exploration of the feasibility of such an approach if we can uncover the extent of Germany's dependence on shipping and any key vulnerabilities.

2. @Snautzer01 wants the RN to send a couple of battleships to Gdansk. Let's explore the pros and cons of that course of action, in particular what other forces or agreements might be required to enable it. For example, could the RAF base aircraft in Norway to provide some covering air power?

3. I'd like to learn more about the disposition of German forces on the western front in September 1939. Experience from the Great War showed that offensive action was far more costly than defending a well-established position. I'd like to learn more about how well the Siegfried line was developed and defended to see if there was any chance of French forces pushing beyond it in September 1939.

4. One of the biggest shortfalls in the Saar offensive was the lack of reliable intelligence on the size, composition and locations of German forces. Perhaps we could explore actions to accelerate creation of the RAF's Photographic Reconnaissance Unit. It would also be worth exploring how capable the Government Code and Cypher School was at exploiting German military signals in early/mid 1939. I have books on that I can explore.

5. We recently touched on the approach of Britain and France to the USSR to support Poland. Given Moscow's later decision to invade and Poland's (probably justified) refusal to let Soviet soldiers enter Polish territory, perhaps we could dig into more detail on the details surrounding these events to see if there were any missed opportunities, or whether the USSR was steadfastly against supporting Polish independence.

6. Finally, we should probably explore whether there was anything Britain could do to accelerate the movement of the BEF to the front line of the western front in September 1939. Given the speed of Germany's advance, a month is simply too long. Could corners have been cut to accelerate getting a substantial force into operations sooner?

 

[buffnut453]

Just an observation.

True, but none to help the contact signed i think.
What is the point of making a promise and then say we cant do it?
Sending some 2 nd line battleships into Gdansk would have made a point.

And in a more personal observation, i hope this interessting discussion stays gentleman like.

Regards,

The contract said that Britain would help preserve an independent Poland. It did not guarantee Polish territorial integrity. That's one of the key sticking points in this discussion. Britain never promised to move troops or other forces into Poland and, given the geography, Poland couldn't possibly have expected such a move.

Creating a two-front war would have caused Germany substantial problems if Poland could have remained in the fight longer than a couple of weeks. Unfortunately, the speed of German advance even took the Poles by surprise, preventing them from enacting the mobilization required to achieve their own defence plans. You can't blame Britain and France for that particular debacle.

 

[BarnOwlLover]

Well, there's two big problems as far as I'm concerned. One, Poland is east of Germany. Which means that unless England and France want to create a second western front, if they wanted to provide direct aid to Poland, they'd have to go either through or around Germany. Doesn't help that by Sept. 1939 that Germany had annexed Austria and Czechoslovakia, and it wasn't known what Italy's intentions were at the time (though it was clear that Mussolini favored Hitler).

Point two was the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact. That IMO (though I could be wrong) opened the door for the Russians to send troops in to occupy parts of eastern Poland. And it does seem that the Poles knew of the pact as well, hence part of their suspicions about the Soviets, as well as issues stemming from Polish independence since the end of World War I.

Granted, Poland falling in only about 3 weeks didn't help matters, but considering that Germany in 1939 probably couldn't fight a two front war, Germany could've been crippled if England and France were able to take action.

One thing I did read in the book World's Worst Weapons talking about the failure of the Maginot Line, was that it may've fostered feelings/thoughts in the French government and armed forces into fighting a defensive war. There, of course, was something to this tactically, given that in such a situation, at least the initial stages tended to favor the defenders. After all, if Germany wanted to attack the line head on, they'd have to do all the heavy lifting. But, of course, in hindsight, a defensive mindset was out of place against the Nazis in 1939. How true that was in reality, I don't really know. Though history does show that the Germans mostly just flew over the Maginot Line or flanked it though Belgium.

Nevertheless, the fact that Poland collapsed so quickly pretty much prevented any worthwhile attempt to open a second front in '39, and resulted in the "Phony War", which gave Germany several months to build up and plan for the 1940 western offensives.

And in both cases, Germany basically planned for a short, violent war to goad the Allies into giving them what they wanted, which in the long run didn't work.

 

[Shortround6]

2. Snautzer01 wants the RN to send a couple of battleships to Gdansk. Let's explore the pros and cons of that course of action, in particular what other forces or agreements might be required to enable it. For example, could the RAF base aircraft in Norway to provide some covering air power?

It is 200 miles from Norway to the choke point getting into the Baltic.
It is about 480-490 miles from Norway to Gdansk and you need to fly over both Denmark and Sweden to get the distance that short in addition to basing the planes out of natural. Norway didn't become an ally until The Germans attacked. Norway refused to the let the British land an expedition force just a few days before the invitation in April.
Old battleship would probably be 1 or 2 "R"s. Rather deep draft, not very good AA. Putting one or 2 Rs in the Baltic where you can't them back out is probably a no go.

6. Finally, we should probably explore whether there was anything Britain could do to accelerate the movement of the BEF to the front line of the western front in September 1939. Given the speed of Germany's advance, a month is simply too long. Could corners have been cut to accelerate getting a substantial force into operations sooner?

The British pulled near miracle getting the BEF into France when they did. It was actually a show force of limited capability. There was only 1 division that could be called well trained. Or perhaps adequately trained would be better. The Officers involved did a great job of training the troops over the winter and they preformed very well indeed in May of 1940. But that was not what they were capable of in Sept-Oct 1939. The British army was greatly expanded in 1938-39 and many of the divisions were pretty much new even though some of the regiments were not, but the units have to get use to operating together. Also old units were split off or numbers of old troops were used as training cadre for the new units.

French capability in Sept of 1939 is certainly questionable. My own feeling is that the French probably improved but I doubt that on average (individual units may have done good training over the winter) the French army improved as much. The French Army was many times the size of the BEF so it is hard to get a read on it with very casual study.

 

[buffnut453]

It is 200 miles from Norway to the choke point getting into the Baltic.
It is about 480-490 miles from Norway to Gdansk and you need to fly over both Denmark and Sweden to get the distance that short in addition to basing the planes out of natural. Norway didn't become an ally until The Germans attacked. Norway refused to the let the British land an expedition force just a few days before the invitation in April.
Old battleship would probably be 1 or 2 "R"s. Rather deep draft, not very good AA. Putting one or 2 Rs in the Baltic where you can't them back out is probably a no go.

That's kind of where my head went, too. Using RN assets against German ports outside the Baltic is probably more feasible but we'd still need to get air cover from somewhere.

The British pulled near miracle getting the BEF into France when they did. It was actually a show force of limited capability. There was only 1 division that could be called well trained. Or perhaps adequately trained would be better. The Officers involved did a great job of training the troops over the winter and they preformed very well indeed in May of 1940. But that was not what they were capable of in Sept-Oct 1939. The British army was greatly expanded in 1938-39 and many of the divisions were pretty much new even though some of the regiments were not, but the units have to get use to operating together. Also old units were split off or numbers of old troops were used as training cadre for the new units.

I do think getting 152,000 troops into France and at the front line within a month is pretty impressive. I also think the Allies needed more time to bring their plans to fruition. Unfortunately, the adversary always gets a vote in any operational endeavour...and, in this case, the German forces simply moved too quickly. For the Allies' plan to work, it required Poland to keep fighting for at least a month, preferably longer.

French capability in Sept of 1939 is certainly questionable. My own feeling is that the French probably improved but I doubt that on average (individual units may have done good training over the winter) the French army improved as much. The French Army was many times the size of the BEF so it is hard to get a read on it with very casual study.

Agreed. I really need to do some more digging into the strengths and limitations of the French army, in particular, in 1939. it would also be interesting to know how well the forces involved in the Saar offensive were prepared for that operation. I remain concerned that the "Maginot mindset" predisposed the French forces into defensive operations.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Thump, it may seem like that but I've agreed that the the Saar offensive was a missed opportunity. I've also asked a lot of questions that have gone unanswered. I'm more than happy to dig into the details of options and work together to determine what might have been feasible. Here are a few initial ideas:

1. You raised the idea of a naval blockade. I asked questions about what would be blockaded and how it would be enacted. I'll gladly contribute to an exploration of the feasibility of such an approach if we can uncover the extent of Germany's dependence on shipping and any key vulnerabilities.

A distant blockade would cut off a lot of materials such as nickel and chrome from Turkey, iron from Sweden during the winter when it has to pass the Skaggerak, and that sort of thing. Granted that these things too would be long term and not immediate, direct assistance.

2. @Snautzer01 wants the RN to send a couple of battleships to Gdansk. Let's explore the pros and cons of that course of action, in particular what other forces or agreements might be required to enable it. For example, could the RAF base aircraft in Norway to provide some covering air power?

I wouldn't do that at all. My comment was more about submarines, which while being almost as dangerous will be likely more effective.

3. I'd like to learn more about the disposition of German forces on the western front in September 1939. Experience from the Great War showed that offensive action was far more costly than defending a well-established position. I'd like to learn more about how well the Siegfried line was developed and defended to see if there was any chance of French forces pushing beyond it in September 1939.

I'll have to fetch a couple of books from home to answer this better. But the wall was still being constructed in fits and starts and the divisions defending it were not first-rate; those were busy attacking Poland.

4. One of the biggest shortfalls in the Saar offensive was the lack of reliable intelligence on the size, composition and locations of German forces. Perhaps we could explore actions to accelerate creation of the RAF's Photographic Reconnaissance Unit. It would also be worth exploring how capable the Government Code and Cypher School was at exploiting German military signals in early/mid 1939. I have books on that I can explore.

I don't think GCCS was able to read Enigma until 1940. As for developing PRUs etc, that again does zero-point-zero assistance to the Poles in a useful time-frame. It will certainly help the British war effort later in the war. A fat lot of good that does the millions of Poles already dead by then.

5. We recently touched on the approach of Britain and France to the USSR to support Poland. Given Moscow's later decision to invade and Poland's (probably justified) refusal to let Soviet soldiers enter Polish territory, perhaps we could dig into more detail on the details surrounding these events to see if there were any missed opportunities, or whether the USSR was steadfastly against supporting Polish independence.

To what end? Stalin didn't want an independent Poland. The Poles were surely right that if you let the camel's nose in at nightfall you wake up next to him in the morning. 45 years of post-war occupation demonstrated that. What happened was that the Germans, having resolved to attack Poland after they had digested the rump Czech state in Mar 1939. They hurried up their courting of the Soviets after receiving hints that Stalin would be amenable. Thus, by the time Drax et al set out for Moscow in Aug, they had already been passed up by events, in addition to the Polish intransigence about Soviet troops passing through. The Soviets rightly regarded the Allied mission as an attempt to save a deteriorating situation with them (the Soviets) to provide the muscle. But by then events were in train to send Ribbentrop to Moscow and with an agreement already in process of being hammered out.

In short, by the end of July 1939, there were no opportunities to miss.

6. Finally, we should probably explore whether there was anything Britain could do to accelerate the movement of the BEF to the front line of the western front in September 1939. Given the speed of Germany's advance, a month is simply too long. Could corners have been cut to accelerate getting a substantial force into operations sooner?

Perhaps? I don't know. I would imagine that getting those divisions together and shipped would likely have taken some time. I don't see the Brits being able to intervene on land in time to save Poland at all. They were impotent that way.

I think the smart money is on drawing the line after the reoccupation of the Ruhr, the tearing up of Versailles, and the Anschluss on any further German shenanigans -- and presenting a strong face at Munich. That was the last chance to stop Hitler without war, and the Western Allies muffed it.

The contract said that Britain would help preserve an independent Poland.

And the UK did not do that. This is a fact of history.

 

[Shortround6]

iron from Sweden during the winter when it has to pass the Skaggerak,

Well, that was a big reason (not the only one) for the invasion of Norway.
And everybody knew about the Iron ore and had know about it since WW I.
Norway was neutral in WW I and hoped to stay that way. Norway also had a large merchant marine (if you lived in Norway you either fished, farmed (rock), or were in the merchant sea trade, owner down to sailor) Blockades hurt Norway.

 

[buffnut453]

A distant blockade would cut off a lot of materials such as nickel and chrome from Turkey, iron from Sweden during the winter when it has to pass the Skaggerak, and that sort of thing. Granted that these things too would be long term and not immediate, direct assistance.

Iron ore from Sweden could only reasonably interdicted during the winter (Nov thru Mar). At other times, shipments went via the Baltic into Lubeck. In 1939, interdicting the western route, via Narvik, was limited by Norway's neutrality. That said, Churchill did push to interdict ore shipments further south from December 1939 onwards. As you point out, this wouldn't help Poland.

I know nothing of nickel ore shipments from Turkey. Definitely would like to learn more about that. I'll do some digging and see what I can find out. That said, it still won't help Poland.

I wouldn't do that at all. My comment was more about submarines, which while being almost as dangerous will be likely more effective.

I wouldn't put battleships into the Baltic, although it was formulated as a plan in 1939 under Operation Catherine. Multiple objections, not least of which was an underestimation of the air power threat, resulted in Churchill cancelling the operation in January 1940. The idea of sending submarines into the Baltic is certainly worth more exploration, although I can't see that it was ever countenanced by London. The threat environment would be complicated given that the Baltic was essentially a boating lake for Russia and Germany in 1939.

I'll have to fetch a couple of books from home to answer this better. But the wall was still being constructed in fits and starts and the divisions defending it were not first-rate; those were busy attacking Poland.

Definitely interested in hearing what you discover.

I don't think GCCS was able to read Enigma until 1940. As for developing PRUs etc, that again does zero-point-zero assistance to the Poles in a useful time-frame. It will certainly help the British war effort later in the war. A fat lot of good that does the millions of Poles already dead by then.

Any Enigma capabilities in 1939 were probably heavily dependent on the Poles. My comment about PRU capabilities is to better ascertain the strength of German defences in the west. Having viable PR capabilities might have enabled a more accurate assessment of Germany's weakness in the west. That MIGHT have been of direct help to Poland.

To what end? Stalin didn't want an independent Poland. The Poles were surely right that if you let the camel's nose in at nightfall you wake up next to him in the morning. 45 years of post-war occupation demonstrated that. What happened was that the Germans, having resolved to attack Poland after they had digested the rump Czech state in Mar 1939. They hurried up their courting of the Soviets after receiving hints that Stalin would be amenable. Thus, by the time Drax et al set out for Moscow in Aug, they had already been passed up by events, in addition to the Polish intransigence about Soviet troops passing through. The Soviets rightly regarded the Allied mission as an attempt to save a deteriorating situation with them (the Soviets) to provide the muscle. But by the events were in train to send Ribbentrop to Moscow and with an agreement already in process of being hammered out.

In short, by the end of July 1939, there were no opportunities to miss.

I don't disagree that bringing in the USSR would likely do nothing to help Poland, indeed it might accelerate Russia's aggression against Poland. I can fully understand why Poland refused to allow Soviet troops on its territory.

Perhaps? I don't know. I would imagine that getting those divisions together and shipped would likely have taken some time. I don't see the Brits being able to intervene on land in time to save Poland at all. They were impotent that way.

I agree that the BEF deployed as rapidly as they could. As S Shortround6 has observed, the BEF wasn't a fully-prepared fighting force. The operational readiness wasn't as high as it should have been but, again, it would have been far worse a year earlier. Indeed, the size of the BEF would probably have been considerable smaller.

Any British impotence only came about because the Polish forces collapsed in the face of an unexpectedly rapid advance by the German army. However, the longer Poland military resistance continued, the better the chance of the Allies making real gains on the western front. Two weeks just wasn't fast enough, and the Allies couldn't possibly know they only had 2 weeks to act.

I think the smart money is on drawing the line after the reoccupation of the Ruhr, the te3aring up of Versailles, and the Anschluss on any further German shenanigans -- and presenting a strong face at Munich. That was the last chance to stop Hitler without war, and the Western Allies muffed it.

Again, that requires foreknowledge of how things would eventually play out. We've all agreed that the sell-out of Czechoslovakia was a low point. We're starting to have the rinse-repeat conversation again. It would be good to know if your blame of the western Allies is limited to Britain and France or if you are willing to extend blame to other nations that might have influenced events.

And the UK did not do that. This is a fact of history.

And you give me grief for not listening to your point of view...sheesh! Your "fact of history" entirely depends on conflating the territorial definition of a nation with the political definition of a nation. Alas, that's not a correct alignment.

The European governments in exile during WW2 all considered themselves as independent, legal, and free governments of their respective nations. This was particularly the case for the Polish government which never surrendered either to Nazi Germany or the USSR. The Polish government in exile organized the Polish Armed Forces in the west, and coordinated the Polish Underground State and the Home Army. Same for the Free French who saw themselves as the legal government of France, as opposed either to the German-occupied zone or the Vichy territory. Even Czechoslovakia had a government in exile under former President Beneš as the legitimate government of the First Czechoslovak Republic.

For the most part, it was those governments in exile that reformed their respective nations at the end of the war. If those governments considered themselves the legal and independent manifestations of their countries, who are we to question it?

We have the same thing happening even today in Ukraine. The Ukrainian regional leaders of Russian-occupied areas continue to represent their regions as part of the political construct that is the whole of Ukraine. They are, legally, the legitimate and free local governments in contrast to the governments set up by the occupying Russians. If those Ukrainian regional governments don't legally represent those regions then, logically, the only legitimate governance comes from the Russian-formed governments.

I hope this explains the key distinction I am making, which is not represented in your assertion.