1938/1939, USA, England, France - Would Have? Could Have? Should Have?

[Thumpalumpacus]

I'm not sure that Britain provided a formal guarantee of Poland's security.

They did; it was signed on 25 Aug 1939.

My reading of the agreement is that Britain agreed to do "all in their power" in the event of Poland being attacked by an unnamed European power. Note the actual guarantee was for Poland's independence and not its territorial integrity. Again, it comes back to the question of exactly what Britain could have done that was "in their power"?

This is hair-splitting similar to that which gave rise to the inaction of autumn 1939 in the first place. Their signed agreement was for each to aid the other operationally in the event of an aggression by a third party.

As for what UK might have done, perhaps send its navy to offensive action against German ports? In any event, if it could do nothing at all, perhaps the UK should not have given out a mutual defense pact. If they truly were impotent, they committed their nation to a war they could not fight.

Sending the RN into the Baltic isn't going to stop the Wehrmacht rolling all over the Polish countryside. Given the size and concentration of the Kriegsmarine's U-boat fleet, such a move would make the RN vessels more of a target than a threat.

My interlocutor was implying that the US has the means but not the will to save Poland. It is, however, inarguable that the UK had assumed the legal obligation to come to her aid.

As for Czechoslovakia, that state had only been in existence for 20 years. I don't recall much of a bruhaha in recent years when Sudan split in two. Why would the global powers care overly about a state that was about a third of the age of most politicians of the time?

That doesn't excuse the miserable sell-out. Or, if it does, at what age does a nation ascertain its right to national survival? Three decades? Five? Ten?

As for why they should care, France in particular was reliant upon the Little Entente to counterbalance a stronger Germany. Czechoslovakia was a linchpin in this plan because 1) it had a strong and competent army; 2) it had great fortifications in (wait for it --) Sudetenland; and three, in the Skoda works, it had its own source of weaponry and was less-reliant upon Western equipment.

So yeah, they should have cared. And they did, only not so much as they cared for avoiding war.

I hate to sound callous but it's not like there was a long history for Czechoslovakia as an independent nation, indeed the country itself decided to split up in 1992 which strongly suggests there was never much in the way of glue holding the nation together.

That's aside my point of bringing them up in the first place. My point is that it was foolish of the Poles to trust any pact signed with UK or France when those two countries had permitted the destruction of another country formally allied with them.

Rhe alliances between France and Poland, and Britain and Poland, were inherently defensive in nature. Suggesting that such defensive alliances should have prompted France to invade Germany seems rather optimistic. It would be rather like expecting NATO to invade Russia because of the latter's attack on Ukraine.

You don't seem to understand. France was committed to take offensive action in the event of the Germans invading Poland.

It should be noted as well that NATO had no signed agreement to defend Ukraine, while the UK did with Poland before Germany invaded. Thus it's a moot comparison.

There have been lots of posts that Britain and France should have done "something" but I've yet to see a tangible recommendation for what that "something" should be.

How about pushing the Saar offensive forward with vigor, instead of stopping after ten miles? The Germans, literally, had twelve divisions guarding all of the western border. All of it. The French had 100 divisions on the same frontier, and further, were treaty-bound to attack Germany in the event the latter attacked Poland. The French shirked the obvious riposte.

As for the UK, they did what they could at sea, but spent the next nine months dropping paper.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

There is a difference between attaching blame's (which I did not) and unwilling, which America clearly was… "Unwilling" because the political sentiment in the US was decidedly against any involvement in WWII during the first two years of the war. Surely I don't need to remind you of the "America First Committee" and outspoken advocates such as Charles Lindbergh. So yes, I am suggesting it. There were errors by all member allies during the lead up to the war.

What you elided was that while America was both unable and generally unwilling (which fact I've already acknowledged), the European powers were able and committed ... and still did not a goddamned thing. Even with the best will in the world, America was utterly incapable of helping Poland whatsoever.

That you didn't see fit to make any mention of that point is baffling, to say the least. It is essential to any understanding of the outbreak of the war, essential to understanding the failure of the policy of appeasement, and essential to understanding the fall of Poland.

 

[Snautzer01]

America was utterly incapable of helping Poland whatsoever.

Agreed. Allthough, as time would tell, it could arm the world against the axis it would take time and a unified country. People need to understand the complexity of making things in volume. Let alone starting up a war production. See what now is happening in the ukr. It takes time.

 

[GTX]

Indeed. I think people forget how tiny the US military capability was in the 1930s, especially outside of the USN. It was Franklin Roosevelt in his "Arsenal of Democracy" speech, delivered on December 29, 1940, and beginning with FDR's earlier 1937 meeting with industry leaders, namely Myron Taylor of US Steel, William Knudsen of GM, and the president of the largest railway (for expertise in resources, manufacturing and logistics) that non-naval rearmament finally got under way. The US had nothing to give Poland, though a USN battlefleet sailing into Danzig would give pause.

Exactly.

To take the off topic diversion a little further, here is some historical background on the US Military in 1940 to give some context, along with the details in the following years to show how impressive mobilisation was:

YEAR	ARMY	NAVY	MARINES	COAST GUARD	TOTAL
1940	269,023​	160,997​	28,345​		458,365​
1941	1,462,315​	284,427​	54,359​		1,801,101​
1942	3,075,608​	640,570​	142,613​	56,716​	3,915,507​	- included to give feel for expansion post war entry, though the US entering voluntarily rather than post attack might not witness this sort of rapid expansion

As far as equipment goes:

The main tank was the M2 light tank (in the M2A2 or M2A3 versions with .50 machine gun, not the later M2A4 with 37mm gun) along with the similar sized M1 Combat Car:

That said, one could possible see a rapid development of the M2A4 version though I doubt one would see a significant number in service until 1941 at the earliest.

These would be supported by the M2A1 / M3 / M3A1 Scout Car:

And a few 37 mm M3 as a dedicated anti-tank gun (noting this was just entering service in 1940):

On the Howitzer front you had the 75mm Pack Howitzer M1 (though by 1940 there were only 91 in service):

Along with the Canon de 155mm GPF (only 24 in service at the time):

and 155 mm Gun M1 Long Tom just entering service:

When war broke out the US Army Air Corp (it only became the US Army Air Force in mid 1941) had approx 3,305 aircraft in a state of readiness, while the Navy had about 3,000 aircraft ready. For the USAAC though, of its 1,500 combat aircraft, only 800 were rated as first-line. By comparison, the RAF had 1,750 first-line aircraft and the German Luftwaffe 3,750. Of these, the main types were:

B-17: In the real world the USAAC received 39 B-17Bs in 1939–40, 18 B-17Cs in 1940, and 42 B-17Ds in the first quarter of 1941. Even if one therefore pushed the 1941 delivered into 1940 (not a definite thing because there would be a need for factory capacity), one might see some 57 - 100 odd available in 1940;
B-18 Bolo: Some 350 in service;
A-17: Some 400 in service;
DC-2/3 (as C-32/C-39): Approx 24 in service;
P-35: Some 100 odd in service;
P-36: The main fighter in terms of numbers with some 200 in service;
P-38: Only just entering service;
P-39: An initial order for 80 aircraft had been placed in only August 1939 so would have just been entering service; and
P-40: Only just entering service.

The USN was probably the best equipped though as to what this may have offered in 1940 for a largely European continental war is debatable. Leaving out the Battleships therefore, if one considers the carriers, then really just the following available in 1940:

USS Lexington (CV-2)
USS Saratoga (CV-3)
USS Ranger (CV-4)
Yorktown (CV-5)
Enterprise (CV-6)
USS Wasp (CV-7): Just commissioned and probably able to be rushed into service.

These would have carried a mix of the following:

Grumman F2F: Would have been exiting service but still an option if needed;
Grumman F3F: The main fighter in service but only with about 140 odd in service at the time;
Brewster F2A Buffalo: Probably the best (potential) type available at the time with some 11 F2A-1s and 43 F2A-2s available to the USN/USMC;
Grumman F4F-3: Maybe available but only if rushed into service;
Vought SB2U Vindicator: maybe some 150 in service; and
Douglas TBD Devastator: some 130 in service.

One has to remember though that the USN's main focus was the Pacific with Japan so would have been unwilling to commit more than about 2 - 3 of the carriers to any European War.

Generally, I would argue that any early entry to WWII by the US would only really see them using what was already in service in 1940 and in limited numbers at that. Therefore, they would not have made a great contribution and in fact, may have even wanted to utilise some of the European equipment. Moreover, without some sort of Casus belli I can't see a significant ramp up in either production/recruitment /introduction of new types that was later generated by the Pearl Harbour attack.

 

[GTX]

BTW, I did a short story on the scenario of the USA entering WW2 early a few years back. You can see it here: Opportunity Lost


Now back on topic...

 

[JDCAVE]

What you elided was that while America was both unable and generally unwilling (which fact I've already acknowledged), the European powers were able and committed ... and still did not a goddamned thing. Even with the best will in the world, America was utterly incapable of helping Poland whatsoever.

That you didn't see fit to make any mention of that point is baffling, to say the least. It is essential to any understanding of the outbreak of the war, essential to understanding the failure of the policy of appeasement, and essential to understanding the fall of Poland.

Okay, okay! Don't get your knickers in a twist! It was in no way an attack on either the US or yourself. If the US was "incapable whatsoever" of assisting Poland, fine. I'm happy to agree with you if that was the case at the time. However, immediately upon invasion of Poland the UK and later the "Dominions" (hate that term). declared war on Germany and Canada certainly had no capability to provide military support to Poland at that time.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Okay, okay! Don't get your knickers in a twist! It was in no way an attack on either the US or yourself. If the US was "incapable whatsoever" of assisting Poland, fine. I'm happy to agree with you if that was the case at the time. However, immediately upon invasion of Poland the UK and later the "Dominions" (hate that term). declared war on Germany and Canada certainly had no capability to provide military support to Poland at that time.

I'm not taking anything personally, so please stop implying that. I'm pointing out basic facts, and also pointing out the fact that in not mentioning them, your replies aren't fully-fleshed.

I personally think it would've been funny to see a couple of RN battleships corner and sink Schleswig-Holstein. Maybe startle the Germans, as well. But if the UK & dominions were incapable of aiding the Poles, what use was the pact they signed? It rather underlines my point that the Poles were fools for taking it seriously, after Munich.

 

[JDCAVE]

Think about Overlord, and how it was so behind schedule until it broke open and suddenly got 40+ days ahead. This dispirit is a result of an immediate-gratification world. Well, you cannot Doordash or Grubhub a victory on the battlefield, with salsa on the side. But the uneducated don't understand that. The Ukrainians are chewing through defenses that are solid and densely mined.

There's a tipping-point ahead. And at that point Ukrainian reserves will be let loose.

Well you and I certainly agree on this! I just hope the outcome will be the same!

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Well you and I certainly agree on this! I just hope the outcome will be the same!

And to be plain, JD, we need not agree on all in order to get on.

 

[buffnut453]

They did; it was signed on 25 Aug 1939.

This is hair-splitting similar to that which gave rise to the inaction of autumn 1939 in the first place. Their signed agreement was for each to aid the other operationally in the event of an aggression by a third party.

Well, declaring war and starting the movement of forces from the UK to France in less than 24 hours after the declaration is pretty rapid. However, it takes time to move forces. By 27 September 1939, some 152,000 British soldiers had arrived in France but it still took another 6 days before they started to relieve French troops at the front line.

As for what UK might have done, perhaps send its navy to offensive action against German ports? In any event, if it could do nothing at all, perhaps the UK should not have given out a mutual defense pact. If they truly were impotent, they committed their nation to a war they could not fight.

Putting RN capital ships into the Baltic would be a stupid idea. Those ships would have zero friendly air cover and yet would have been under constant threat of air and subsurface attack. While it's highly unlikely that Stukas would sink a battleship, they could do some serious damage to the superstructure and weapons. Smaller vessels would be at greater risk. And for what aim? To lob a few shells on German ports?

As it was, the RAF was already engaged in operations against German ports, the first attacks happening on 3 and 4 September 1939. Now, these weren't very effective for a whole host of reasons...but that's not the point. The RAF was taking direct action dropping bombs on German ports and military shipping. We also need to keep in mind that the legal aspects of aerial bombing were still nascent. Britain, Germany and France were, at this stage, avoiding bombing each others' civilian infrastructure which generated some thorny legal questions about dual-use facilities like ports.

My interlocutor was implying that the US has the means but not the will to save Poland. It is, however, inarguable that the UK had assumed the legal obligation to come to her aid.

And Britain did come to Poland's aid, declaring war on 3 September and immediately starting offensive action via the RAF and deploying ground forces to France. Britain satisfied the terms of its agreement simply by declaring war on Germany. Note that this was the first instance in British history where it went to war on behalf of another nation, as per a treaty obligation. Britain wasn't directly under threat from Germany and yet it still went to war because Poland was attacked. That's a non-trivial decision, particularly in light of what happened in 1914-1918 which scarred the European generations who experienced it to the horrors of war, prompting the efforts to avoid a repeat of those experiences.

And there's still no solid concept for what Britain could have done to defend Poland's territorial integrity. I'll touch on your comments about the Saar offensive later, which absolutely was a missed opportunity. However, there was simply no way for British forces actively to engage German forces in Poland. It was a non-starter geographically, logistically, temporally, and from a materiel capability perspective.

That doesn't excuse the miserable sell-out. Or, if it does, at what age does a nation ascertain its right to national survival? Three decades? Five? Ten?

So yeah, they should have cared. And they did, only not so much as they cared for avoiding war.

I never said it excused the sell-out. I was simply offering one perspective for why it happened.

As to avoiding war, my comment above is entirely relevant. The Great War scarred Europe. Both Britain and France were keen to avoid a repeat. Plus, in 1938, Britain was certainly in no position to respond military. It was still playing catch-up trying to update its military, particularly the RAF. Finally, Czechoslovakia presents similar problems to Poland. There was no plan to deploy forces there and it's a tough place to get to from the UK.

Yes, Czechoslovakia was a sell-out but it directly led to the more determined efforts regarding Poland and, ultimately, the declaration of war that resulted.

That's aside my point of bringing them up in the first place. My point is that it was foolish of the Poles to trust any pact signed with UK or France when those two countries had permitted the destruction of another country formally allied with them.

Again, what would you have Britain, in particular, do? Britain declared war because Poland was invaded. It immediately undertook offensive action and started moving troops to France. What other options are on the table, aside from putting capital ships into the Baltic so they can be target practice for the Luftwaffe and the U-boat fleet?

You don't seem to understand. France was committed to take offensive action in the event of the Germans invading Poland.

It should be noted as well that NATO had no signed agreement to defend Ukraine, while the UK did with Poland before Germany invaded. Thus it's a moot comparison.

How about pushing the Saar offensive forward with vigor, instead of stopping after ten miles? The Germans, literally, had twelve divisions guarding all of the western border. All of it. The French had 100 divisions on the same frontier, and further, were treaty-bound to attack Germany in the event the latter attacked Poland. The French shirked the obvious riposte.

Now, here's a point where we can both agree. The Saar offensive was a glaring missed opportunity, largely driven by poor intelligence and lack of intestinal fortitude. I have no idea why France didn't press forward with more vigour. Perhaps they were waiting for the BEF to show up in adequate numbers? It also should be borne in mind that the Great War showed it was desperately hard to advance against well-prepared positions. Perhaps the French commanders wanted to conserve their forces rather than throwing casualties against the Siegfried line? Again, poor intelligence probably contributed to some atrocious decision-making.

One note, though, is that France couldn't use all of those 100 divisions in the offensive. They needed a large reserve in case of German counter-attack (again, poor intelligence plays a role). The plan for the Saar offensive called for 40 divisions to participate. However, France didn't even push forward with that scale of force.

I have no solid reasons or rationale for why France didn't press forward. There was a window of about a month where they could take action against a relatively poorly-defended German front line...and they entirely missed the opportunity. I suspect an overly-centralized decision-making process within the French Army, coupled with fears of becoming over-extended, may have driven the decisions...but that's just an opinion and we all know what those are worth. By mid-October, Poland had surrendered and Germany was able to reinforce its western borders.

As for the UK, they did what they could at sea, but spent the next nine months dropping paper.

Again, that's an over simplification. Yes, there were plenty of "bombphlet" raids later during the Phony War but, as noted above, legal concerns played a part in targeting decisions, as did Roosevelt's advocacy for all belligerents to not attack civilian targets. We had, collectively, not reached the stage of unrestricted warfare that truly only came about in May 1940.

You're also ignoring the action the RAF did take in response to the declaration of war. The AASF deployed to France on 2 September 1939. As noted above, the first bombing raids against German ports took place on 3 and 4 September. The first RAF air losses due to the Luftwaffe took place on 20 September when two Fairey Battles were shot down.

Attacks against German ports and military vessels continued thru the end of 1939. The Battle of Heligoland Bight was a pivotal event that would ultimately drive Bomber Command to night operations due to the vulnerability of bombers during daylight.

It's worth noting that, in 1939, Bomber Command only had 280 bombers in total. That's a pifflingly small force...which again leads back to "what can they do with it"? Given the lack of technology available, Bomber Command wasn't much of a capable force at all. Perhaps more could have been done but, IMHO, there was little opportunity to deliver any decisive effects given the resources available.



Part of the problem here is that we know how the war played out. We know that Germany would continue its expansionist actions. That wasn't clear in 1939. It's perhaps tough for Americans to understand the depth of the scars left by the Great War. Literally every church in every village in Britain still has a memorial to local lads who died in the Great War. It wiped out the finest men of a whole generation. It's easy to point out the lack of enthusiasm for engaging in another war but most people truly didn't want a repeat of 1914-1918...and, in 1939, there was no evidence to suggest that wasn't going to happen.

Perhaps more could/should have been done. However, there were limits to Britain's ability to actively engage Germany on a large scale. France probably has less of an excuse but, then again, France was prepared for a defensive fight and, for whatever reason, clearly had little interest in taking the fight to Germany. Perhaps the politicians hoped for a negotiated settlement rather than further expansion of the war? Given recent experience, that would be naiive but one only has to look at the machinations going on in London in May 1940 about whether to reach a settlement with Berlin. Again, easy to judge in hindsight...perhaps less easy when the future isn't clear.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Well, declaring war and starting the movement of forces from the UK to France in less than 24 hours after the declaration is pretty rapid. However, it takes time to move forces. By 27 September 1939, some 152,000 British soldiers had arrived in France but it still took another 6 days before they started to relieve French troops at the front line.




Putting RN capital ships into the Baltic would be a stupid idea. Those ships would have zero friendly air cover and yet would have been under constant threat of air and subsurface attack. While it's highly unlikely that Stukas would sink a battleship, they could do some serious damage to the superstructure and weapons. Smaller vessels would be at greater risk. And for what aim? To lob a few shells on German ports?

As it was, the RAF was already engaged in operations against German ports, the first attacks happening on 3 and 4 September 1939. Now, these weren't very effective for a whole host of reasons...but that's not the point. The RAF was taking direct action dropping bombs on German ports and military shipping. We also need to keep in mind that the legal aspects of aerial bombing were still nascent. Britain, Germany and France were, at this stage, avoiding bombing each others' civilian infrastructure which generated some thorny legal questions about dual-use facilities like ports.




And Britain did come to Poland's aid, declaring war on 3 September and immediately starting offensive action via the RAF and deploying ground forces to France. Britain satisfied the terms of its agreement simply by declaring war on Germany. Note that this was the first instance in British history where it went to war on behalf of another nation, as per a treaty obligation. Britain wasn't directly under threat from Germany and yet it still went to war because Poland was attacked. That's a non-trivial decision, particularly in light of what happened in 1914-1918 which scarred the European generations who experienced it to the horrors of war, prompting the efforts to avoid a repeat of those experiences.

And there's still no solid concept for what Britain could have done to defend Poland's territorial integrity. I'll touch on your comments about the Saar offensive later, which absolutely was a missed opportunity. However, there was simply no way for British forces actively to engage German forces in Poland. It was a non-starter geographically, logistically, temporally, and from a materiel capability perspective.




I never said it excused the sell-out. I was simply offering one perspective for why it happened.

As to avoiding war, my comment above is entirely relevant. The Great War scarred Europe. Both Britain and France were keen to avoid a repeat. Plus, in 1938, Britain was certainly in no position to respond military. It was still playing catch-up trying to update its military, particularly the RAF. Finally, Czechoslovakia presents similar problems to Poland. There was no plan to deploy forces there and it's a tough place to get to from the UK.

Yes, Czechoslovakia was a sell-out but it directly led to the more determined efforts regarding Poland and, ultimately, the declaration of war that resulted.




Again, what would you have Britain, in particular, do? Britain declared war because Poland was invaded. It immediately undertook offensive action and started moving troops to France. What other options are on the table, aside from putting capital ships into the Baltic so they can be target practice for the Luftwaffe and the U-boat fleet?




Now, here's a point where we can both agree. The Saar offensive was a glaring missed opportunity, largely driven by poor intelligence and lack of intestinal fortitude. I have no idea why France didn't press forward with more vigour. Perhaps they were waiting for the BEF to show up in adequate numbers? It also should be borne in mind that the Great War showed it was desperately hard to advance against well-prepared positions. Perhaps the French commanders wanted to conserve their forces rather than throwing casualties against the Siegfried line? Again, poor intelligence probably contributed to some atrocious decision-making.

One note, though, is that France couldn't use all of those 100 divisions in the offensive. They needed a large reserve in case of German counter-attack (again, poor intelligence plays a role). The plan for the Saar offensive called for 40 divisions to participate. However, France didn't even push forward with that scale of force.

I have no solid reasons or rationale for why France didn't press forward. There was a window of about a month where they could take action against a relatively poorly-defended German front line...and they entirely missed the opportunity. I suspect an overly-centralized decision-making process within the French Army, coupled with fears of becoming over-extended, may have driven the decisions...but that's just an opinion and we all know what those are worth. By mid-October, Poland had surrendered and Germany was able to reinforce its western borders.




Again, that's an over simplification. Yes, there were plenty of "bombphlet" raids later during the Phony War but, as noted above, legal concerns played a part in targeting decisions, as did Roosevelt's advocacy for all belligerents to not attack civilian targets. We had, collectively, not reached the stage of unrestricted warfare that truly only came about in May 1940.

You're also ignoring the action the RAF did take in response to the declaration of war. The AASF deployed to France on 2 September 1939. As noted above, the first bombing raids against German ports took place on 3 and 4 September. The first RAF air losses due to the Luftwaffe took place on 20 September when two Fairey Battles were shot down.

Attacks against German ports and military vessels continued thru the end of 1939. The Battle of Heligoland Bight was a pivotal event that would ultimately drive Bomber Command to night operations due to the vulnerability of bombers during daylight.

It's worth noting that, in 1939, Bomber Command only had 280 bombers in total. That's a pifflingly small force...which again leads back to "what can they do with it"? Given the lack of technology available, Bomber Command wasn't much of a capable force at all. Perhaps more could have been done but, IMHO, there was little opportunity to deliver any decisive effects given the resources available.



Part of the problem here is that we know how the war played out. We know that Germany would continue its expansionist actions. That wasn't clear in 1939. It's perhaps tough for Americans to understand the depth of the scars left by the Great War. Literally every church in every village in Britain still has a memorial to local lads who died in the Great War. It wiped out the finest men of a whole generation. It's easy to point out the lack of enthusiasm for engaging in another war but most people truly didn't want a repeat of 1914-1918...and, in 1939, there was no evidence to suggest that wasn't going to happen.

Perhaps more could/should have been done. However, there were limits to Britain's ability to actively engage Germany on a large scale. France probably has less of an excuse but, then again, France was prepared for a defensive fight and, for whatever reason, clearly had little interest in taking the fight to Germany. Perhaps the politicians hoped for a negotiated settlement rather than further expansion of the war? Given recent experience, that would be naiive but one only has to look at the machinations going on in London in May 1940 about whether to reach a settlement with Berlin. Again, easy to judge in hindsight...perhaps less easy when the future isn't clear.

Buff, none of this -- not one jot -- changes the fact that 1) the US was both unwilling and unable to succor Poland and 2) the Poles were fools for trusting Chamberlain, Daladier, and their empty promises after their abandonment of Czechoslovakia in October 1938. Those were the points I was making.

 

[Snautzer01]

While it's highly unlikely that Stukas would sink a battleship,

Uhmm, no they could.. if they were in range.

 

[buffnut453]

Buff, none of this -- not one jot -- changes the fact that 1) the US was both unwilling and unable to succor Poland and 2) the Poles were fools for trusting Chamberlain, Daladier, and their empty promises after their abandonment of Czechoslovakia in October 1938. Those were the points I was making.

I never disagreed with your #1. Isolationism and the small size and geographic separation of the US military made intervention impossible.

I fundamentally disagree with your characterization that the UK made "empty promises." As noted, the UK declared war, deployed over 150,000 soldiers to France, and undertook offensive operations immediately using the RAF. The fact that these were unsuccessful does not mean the promise was empty.

You keep stating that Britain and France abandoned Czechoslovakia and yet neither country ever made any promise about maintaining Czechoslovak independence. Indeed, both nations actively encouraged the Prague government to accede to Germany's demands. I'm not saying that was the right thing to do but it does provide a stark difference in conditions between 1938 and 1939 and the respective responses by Britain and France to German aggression.

It's also worth noting that Poland and Hungary had also made claims for parts of Czechoslovak territory, and Hitler added those demands to his Sudetenland takeover bid. Both Poland and Hungary benefitted territorially from Czechoslovakia as fallout from the Munich agreement, in fact Poland invaded the part of Czechoslovakia after failing to reach agreement with the Prague government.

The treatment of Czechoslovakia by Britain and France was abysmal. However, Britain and France broke no treaties and tried to negotiate a reasonable settlement in a bid to avoid a wider war. Czechoslovakia was undoubtedly sacrificed by Britain and France. In particular, Chamberlain's belief that the Sudetenland represented the extent of Hitler's expansionist agenda were woefully incorrect. It didn't help that, rather like Putin and eastern Ukraine, there was a small kernel of truth to Hitler's claims about repression of the ethnic German majority in Sudetenland.

None of this excuses the actions of Britain and France. However, Poland was acting on the side of the aggressors against Czechoslovakia. The situation between Britain, France and Czechoslovakia in 1937-38 was very different from that between Britain, France and Poland in 1939. IMHO, conflating the two obscures more than it illuminates.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

You keep stating that Britain and France abandoned Czechoslovakia and yet neither country ever made any promise about maintaining Czechoslovak independence. Indeed, both nations actively encouraged the Prague government to accede to Germany's demands.

France had a security pact with Czechoslovakia. You are aware of that, right? That puts its refusal do anything to help Czechoslovakia in an entirely different light, and underlines my point that the Poles were fools for trusting them.

And not only did they urge Czechoslovakia to surrender 3 million citizens and its border fortifications with Germany, both Chamberlain and Daladier refused to allow Benes to even sit in on the conference that was to dismember his nation. That, m'friend, is scurrilous.

It's also worth noting that Poland and Hungary had also made claims for parts of Czechoslovak territory, and Hitler added those demands to his Sudetenland takeover bid. Both Poland and Hungary benefitted territorially from Czechoslovakia as fallout from the Munich agreement, in fact Poland invaded the part of Czechoslovakia after failing to reach agreement with the Prague government.

That is irrelevant and doesn't address any point I've made.

The treatment of Czechoslovakia by Britain and France was abysmal. However, Britain and France broke no treaties and tried to negotiate a reasonable settlement in a bid to avoid a wider war.

This is factually incorrect; read the link above.

Czechoslovakia was undoubtedly sacrificed by Britain and France. In particular, Chamberlain's belief that the Sudetenland represented the extent of Hitler's expansionist agenda were woefully incorrect. It didn't help that, rather like Putin and eastern Ukraine, there was a small kernel of truth to Hitler's claims about repression of the ethnic German majority in Sudetenland.

"Sacrifice" is an inapt word, insofar as it implies that the loss still carried some sort of benefit. In Churchill's words -- and I agree with him on this: "We have suffered a complete and unmitigated disaster." So no, it wasn't a "sacrifice", it was a betrayal.

None of this excuses the actions of Britain and France. However, Poland was acting on the side of the aggressors against Czechoslovakia. The situation between Britain, France and Czechoslovakia in 1937-38 was very different from that between Britain, France and Poland in 1939. IMHO, conflating the two obscures more than it illuminates.

I brought up Munich precisely because it demonstrates the foolishness of the Poles trusting the Western Allies.

You really should read William Shirer's account of this period.

Having already seen a complaint about this derail, this will be my last response on this matter here.

 

[buffnut453]

France had a security pact with Czechoslovakia. You are aware of that, right? That puts its refusal do anything to help Czechoslovakia in an entirely different light, and underlines my point that the Poles were fools for trusting them.

And not only did they urge Czechoslovakia to surrender 3 million citizens and its border fortifications with Germany, both Chamberlain and Daladier refused to allow Benes to even sit in on the conference that was to dismember his nation. That, m'friend, is scurrilous.

Yeah...I was writing too quickly and grouped Britain and France together inappropriately.

However....Article 1 of the pact states very clearly that it only came into effect if the political failure between France, Czechoslovakia and Germany "is accompanied by an unprovoked recourse to arms." It's political semantics but there was no recourse to arms. Hitler certainly threatened but there was no actual attack. Meanwhile, Chamberlain's perspective that Hitler had some legitimate grievances probably cast doubt on whether any German action would, in fact, be "unprovoked."

I really don't see the point of quibbling over adjectives. Scurrilous, disaster, sacrificed...and there are plenty of others we can throw around. Both Britain and France were keen to avoid a domino effect of pacts and treaties leading to a global war, as had happened in 1914. That doesn't make their actions good, right, or honourable. They were twisting and turning to avoid a war with Germany, and Czechoslovakia was forced into submission as the sacrificial lamb. It was nasty and ugly and, in hindsight, plain wrong. However, the alternative involved going to war in 1938, a war for which Britain, at least, was simply not ready. Fast forward a year and the line in the sand was drawn...and it was Poland, and it did result in war between Britain, France and Gernany.

None of this addresses my fundamental question, that does apply equally to Czechoslovakia and Poland: what could Britain and France have done to militarily dissuade Germany? By the time they were in a position to act, Germany had already achieved its goals. I keep banging on about this but I'm not getting any answers. However, agree we should probably put this in a separate thread if we want to continue the discussion.

 

[Snautzer01]

could Britain and France have done to militarily dissuade Germany?

Living up to a contract both signed. And act on it. You signed, you act, thats a contract
I believe its a mistake to take knowledge about the facts and how it played out into this.
It failing contracts that gave nazi freedom to move.

 

[Greg Boeser]

Living up to a contract both signed. And act on it. You signed, you act, thats a contract
I believe its a mistake to take knowledge about the facts and how it played out into this.
It failing contracts that gave nazi freedom to move.

Not honoring treaties is a time-honored tradition.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

None of this addresses my fundamental question, that does apply equally to Czechoslovakia and Poland: what could Britain and France have done to militarily dissuade Germany? By the time they were in a position to act, Germany had already achieved its goals. I keep banging on about this but I'm not getting any answers.

This inability to change anything shows the vacuity of their promises.

 

[buffnut453]

Living up to a contract both signed. And act on it. You signed, you act, thats a contract
I believe its a mistake to take knowledge about the facts and how it played out into this.
It failing contracts that gave nazi freedom to move.

But Britain and France did act in accordance with their contract. Both went to war over Poland. Again, what more would have them do?

 

[buffnut453]

This inability to change anything shows the vacuity of their promises.

International relations involves competing aspects of structure and agency. Sometimes structure prevents you from doing what you would wish to do and geography is part of that structure problem, just as it was for the USA. The US may have wanted peace in the world but it was geographically isolated and, in 1939, lacked the political will and military teeth to do anything. Britain and France hoped that a formal threat of war would dissuade Hitler. He called their bluff...but they followed through on their promise. That doesn't make their promises vacuous. It simply means there were limits on their ability to act.

Would you prefer that Britain and France gave Germany free rein in Poland without threatening to go to war? It could be easily argued that it was not in Britain's best interest to go to war in 1939. Britain was under no direct threat of attack from Germany. Avoiding war would have preserved the British Empire, continued trade, and saved hundreds of thousands of British lives, both military and civilian.

It's not a vacuous promise when it leads to the deaths of 384,000 soldiers and over 70,000 civilians from your population for a war which, arguably, wasn't in your national best interests. That's putting real, physical skin (and blood and bone) in the game.