1938/1939, USA, England, France - Would Have? Could Have? Should Have?

[Thumpalumpacus]

International relations involves competing aspects of structure and agency. Sometimes structure prevents you from doing what you would wish to do and geography is part of that structure problem, just as it was for the USA. The US may have wanted peace in the world but it was geographically isolated and, in 1939, lacked the political will and military teeth to do anything. Britain and France hoped that a formal threat of war would dissuade Hitler. He called their bluff...but they followed through on their promise. That doesn't make their promises vacuous. It simply means there were limits on their ability to act.

Would you prefer that Britain and France gave Germany free rein in Poland without threatening to go to war? It could be easily argued that it was not in Britain's best interest to go to war in 1939. Britain was under no direct threat of attack from Germany. Avoiding war would have preserved the British Empire, continued trade, and saved hundreds of thousands of British lives, both military and civilian.

It's not a vacuous promise when it leads to the deaths of 384,000 soldiers and over 70,000 civilians from your population for a war which, arguably, wasn't in your national best interests. That's putting real, physical skin (and blood and bone) in the game.

Without disparaging those sacrifices at all, didn't the British leadership know that it wasn't able to take action? And what does that say about those promises?

As for what I wish they'd done instead, I would have liked to see both nations abandon the policy of appeasement much earlier ... before Germany got so powerful they were rendered impotent.

And I will now definitively leave off this derail. If you wish to discuss it further, open that thread, I'll happily partake.

 

[DerAdlerIstGelandet]

Please carry on with all discussion pertaining to actions or lack thereof in this thread. It was a good discussion. Just keep it civil. Thanks.

 

[buffnut453]

Uhmm, no they could.. if they were in range.

Not sure a Stuka could carry a bomb large enough to sink a battleship. Cruiser or something smaller? Yes. Battleship? I'm not so sure.

The whole point of moving RN vessels into the Baltic would be to disrupt the German offensive in Poland. That would require getting close enough to ports/harbours to shell them. By default, that means the RN warship is within range of land-based air power.

 

[buffnut453]

Without disparaging those sacrifices at all, didn't the British leadership know that it wasn't able to take action? And what does that say about those promises?

As for what I wish they'd done instead, I would have liked to see both nations abandon the policy of appeasement much earlier ... before Germany got so powerful they were rendered impotent.

And I will now definitively leave off this derail. If you wish to discuss it further, open that thread, I'll happily partake.

If the larger British forces in 1939 were unable to dissuade Hitler from his trajectory, what odds the far smaller, and less capable, forces available in 1938? If going to war in 1939 wasn't in Britain's best interests, doing so in 1938 when Britain was feverishly rebuilding its military would be downright foolhardy.

It seems the US gets a free pass because its military wasn't big enough or modern enough and yet you want Britain to act decisively against Germany under similar constraints?

Finally, you keep saying that the British didn't act. They declared war, moved over 150,000 troops plus air assets onto the continent, and undertook offensive operations within 24 hours. That is taking pretty powerful action. The fact that those actions didn't dissuade Germany or failed to prevent the overrunning of Poland doesn't mean the promises were empty. When America declared war on Japan, was it capable instantly of stopping further Japanese aggression? No...because it wasn't in a position to do so. Those conditions changed over time, and such was the case in Europe and other theaters as Britain continued the war it declared in September 1939.

 

[gumbyk]

If the larger British forces in 1939 were unable to dissuade Hitler from his trajectory, what odds the far smaller, and less capable, forces available in 1938? If going to war in 1939 wasn't in Britain's best interests, doing so in 1938 when Britain was feverishly rebuilding its military would be downright foolhardy.

It seems the US gets a free pass because its military wasn't big enough or modern enough and yet you want Britain to act decisively against Germany under similar constraints?

Finally, you keep saying that the British didn't act. They declared war, moved over 150,000 troops plus air assets onto the continent, and undertook offensive operations within 24 hours. That is taking pretty powerful action. The fact that those actions didn't dissuade Germany or failed to prevent the overrunning of Poland doesn't mean the promises were empty. When America declared war on Japan, was it capable instantly of stopping further Japanese aggression? No...because it wasn't in a position to do so. Those conditions changed over time, and such was the case in Europe and other theaters as Britain continued the war it declared in September 1939.

Don't forget that Europe was slowly recovering from WW1, which, in part was so large because of cascading treaties. Britain and the US had no appetite for war, and would have happily given up smaller allies to avoid it.

 

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

By the mid 1930's the Air Forces had largely convinced themselves and so the politicians bombers were carrying something approaching nuclear weapons, able to hit targets accurately, they could systematically wreck cities a few blocks at a time. Consider if in June 1940 Hitler wanted to totally destroy Britain, starting a bombing campaign with chemical and biological weapons.

The German public cheered Chamberlain at Munich. The USSR was the only state that expressed an interest in defending Czechoslovakia as per its treaty with them. Poland had friends, like the pact with France from the 1920's, like the treaties with Romania, again from the 1920's but its joining in at Munich made it a convenient scapegoat for others.

France signed a Treaty of Alliance and Friendship with Czechoslovakia on 25 January 1924. Strangely enough when Hitler decided to take parts of the country he convinced others to join in. The Poles were quite interested, the Hungarians also. The Romanians stayed out, they had an alliance with Czechoslovakia.

Munich agreement 28 September 1938, Poland demands Teschen, German occupation of Sudetenlands begins 1 October 1938 Polish occupation of Teschen begins 2 October 1938. Hungary annexes parts of the border area with Slovakia.

"Munich Pact : Annex to the Agreement

His MAJESTY's GOVERNMENT in the United Kingdom and the French Government have entered into the above agreement on the basis that they stand by the offer, contained in paragraph 6 of the Anglo-French proposals of the 19th September, relating to an international guarantee of the new boundaries of the Czechoslovak State against unprovoked aggression.

When the question of the Polish and Hungarian minorities in Czechoslovakia has been settled, Germany and Italy for their part will give a guarantee to Czechoslovakia.
Munich, September 29, 1938.
ADOLF HITLER,
NEVILLE CHAMBERLAIN,
EDOUARD DALADIER,
BENITO MUSSOLINI"

In February 1939 the Romanians received the German delegation, Romanian production was to be adapted to German requirements, it demanded a joint German-Romanian oil industry, to "respect German export interests" and to standardise armaments along German lines.

March 1939 is a key turning point, up until then Hitler had expanded on the premise of having all German speakers united under him. There was now a world wide shortage of modern weapons as all major powers up defence spending.

On March 15 1939 Hitler took over the other Czech provinces, making Slovakia a protectorate, Hungary annexes Ruthenia/Transcarpathia from Slovakia, gaining more territory in April

On March 16 Romania mobilised 5 infantry corps assuming they were next, which made the Hungarians mobilise.

On March 22 the start of Nazi press claims about atrocities against Germans in Poland.

On March 23 it was annexation of Memel and the surrounding area. And Romania signed the Economic agreement with Germany but managed to keep it as a framework document, rather than a set of specific proposals. The Romanian Air Force started buying aircraft, like Blenheims and Hurricanes.

On March 26 the Poles offer a joint German Polish guarantee for Danzig and a customs free transit route, road and rail, across the corridor. In response to Germany's proposals of extra territorial links and control of Danzig. The Polish ideas were rejected, in effect the German proposals became demands, with an or else attached.

On March 29 the British received a good summary of Hitler's directive to the army dated 25 March, detailing the idea for the destruction of Poland and the annexation of Lithuania, along with the claim this was to happen within a few weeks.

On March 31 Chamberlain announced that it would help Poland if it was threatened and needed to respond with force.

On April 1 Hitler ordered definite plans for an attack on Poland be ready for an attack on 1 September.

On April 6 came the announcement of talks to form an Anglo Polish alliance.

On April 13 came Anglo French guarantees for Romania and Greece.

On April 23 the British announced conscription.

On 28 April Hitler renounced the Anglo-German naval agreement and the non aggression pact with Poland. Before this announcement the German embassy in Poland was informed to give no encouragement for any attempt by the Poles to reopen negotiations.

Things continued to speed up from then on. The only credible non Polish force that could stop a German invasion was the Red Army, but Poland was sure if the Red Army entered it would never leave. That left Britain and France with you may win the battle with Poland but you will lose the war with us, given every country has examples of breaking treaties that meant convincing people they really would follow through and it seems they did convince all but two of Germany's leaders, Ribbentropp was irrelevant, Hitler was not.

23 August Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact signed, the USSR to gain the Baltic states, eastern Poland and parts of Romania. Also Danzig declares itself a free state, hoping to provide the pretext for a German invasion.

25 August Anglo Polish Agreement, Hitler postpones the attack. The Avalon Project : The British Bluebook

German dispositions on the western frontier as of 26 August 1939 from north to south (numbers in parenthesis are the divisional Welle) *' indicates subordination,
HG C - Generalfeldmarschal Ritter von Leeb
5. Armee - General der Infanterie Curt Liebmann (HQ Münster, covering Dutch and Belgian frontier)
*Korück 560 (Commander Army Rear Area)
*Armee-Nachschubführer 561 (Army Supply Command)
*Armee-Nachrichten-Regiment 563 (Army Signals Regiment)
*Vermessungs-Abteilung 624 (Artillery Survey Battalion)
Attached Heerstruppen (Non-divisional Troops):
*Pionier-Regiments-Stab 504 (Engineer Regiment HQ)
**Brücken-Bau-Bataillon 550 (Bridging Battalion)
**Pionier-Bataillon 666 (Engineer Battalion)
**Pionier-Bataillon 46
*Panzerabwehr-Abteilung 543 (AT Battalion)
*Oberbaustab 16 (Construction HQ)
**Bau-Bataillon 42 (Construction Battalion)
**Bau-Bataillon 41
**Bau-Bataillon 26
**Bau-Bataillon 25
**Bau-Bataillon 83

V. Armeekorps (AK) - Generaloberst Richard Ruoff (Army Corps, covering the Dutch border Emden-Kleve)
*Korps-Nachrichten-Abteilung 45 (Corps Signals Battalion)
*Korps-Nachschubtruppen 405 (Corps Supply Troops)
*22. ID (1.) (Infantry Division of the 1st Wave)
*225. ID (3.) (Infantry Division of the 3rd Wave)
*Grenzschutz-Abschnitts-Kommando 9 (Border Sector Command)
**Grenzwacht-Regiment 6 (Border Regiment) (two battalions with six companies)
** Grenzwacht-Regiment 19 (three battalions with seven companies)
Festung Aachen (total 16 MG and 12 AT companies)
Grenzwacht-Regiment 26 (three battalions)
Grenzwacht-Regiment 36 (nine companies)
Grenzwacht-Regiment 46
Grenzwacht-Regiment 56 (two battalions with seven companies)
Grenzwacht-Regiment 66

227. ID (3.) (Belgian border south of Aachen (Eifel) under direct control of 5. Armee)

VI. AK - General der Pioniere Otto-Wilhelm Förster (Luxembourg border (HQ Trier)):
*ARKO 6 (Artillery Commander)
*Korps-Nachrichten-Abteilung 46
*Korps-Kartenstelle (mot) 406
*Feldgendarmerie-Trupp 406
*Korps-Nachschubtruppen 406
*Grenz Infanterie Regiment Stab 124 (three battalions with three MG and four AT companies, two artillery and one flak batteries)
*Grenzwacht-Regiment 112 (three battalions)
*Grenzwacht-Regiment 122
*MG Batallion 1.
*MG Batallion 2.
*MG Batallion 3
En route - 251., 253., 254., 263., 267., 269. ID (all 4.)

1. Armee - Generalfeldmarschal Erwin von Witzleben (Saarpfalz)
*Armee-Nachschubführer 591
*Armee-Nachrichten-Regiment 596
*Korück 590

IX. AK - General der Artillerie Friedrich Dollman
*ARKO 15
*Korps-Nachrichten-Abteilung 49
*Korps-Nachschubtruppen 409
*Korps-Kartenstelle 409
*Feldgendarmerie-Trupp 409
*25. ID (1.)
*33. ID (1.)
*71. ID (2.)

Gruppe Saarpfalz - General der Pioniere Walter Kuntze (as of 17 September XXIV. AK)
*ARKO 143
*Korps-Nachrichten-Abteilung 424
*Korps-Nachschubtruppen 424
*Korps-Kartenstelle 424
*Feldgendarmerie-Trupp 424
*6. ID (1.)
*9. ID (1.)
*36. ID (1.)

*Grenz-Kommando Saarpfalz (total of 26 infantry, 9 MG, 6 engineer, and 10 AT companies, 29 artillery and five flak batteries)
**Grenz-Infanterie-Regiment 125 (three battalions)
**Grenz-Infanterie-Regiment 127 (two battalions)
**Grenz-Infanterie-Regiment 129 (one battalion)
**Grenzwacht-Regiment 132
**Grenzwacht-Regiment 142
**Grenzwacht-Regiment 152
**I./Artillerie-Regiment 105 (three batteries 15cm sFH, motorized)
**I./Artillerie-Regiment 106 (two batteries 15cm SFH and one battery 10cm sFK, motorized)
**I./Artillerie-Regiment 108 (two batteries 15cm SFH and one battery 10cm sFK, motorized)
**I./Artillerie-Regiment 109 (three batteries 15cm sFH, motorized)
**MG Batallion 10
**MG Batallion 13
**MG Batallion 14
**Grenz-Pionier Batallion 73
**Grenz-Pionier Batallion 74
**Grenz-Nachrichten Batallion 74

XII. AK General der Infanterie Walter Schroth
*Arko 108
*Korps-Nachrichten-Abteilung 52
*Korps-Nachschubtruppen 412
*Korps-Kartenstelle 412
*Feldgendarmerie-Trupp 412
*15. ID (1.)
*34. ID (1.)
*52. ID (2.)
*79. ID (2.)
En route - 75. ID (2.), 209., 214., 223., 231., 246. ID (all 3.), 268. ID (4.)

7. Armee (Oberrhein)
*Armee-Nachschubführer 558
*Armee-Nachrichten-Regiment 558
*schwere Stellungs-Artillerie-Abteilung 216 (Heavy Fortress Artillery Battalion)
**Stellungs-Artillerie-Batterien 217, 224, 227 und 230 (Fortress Artillery Battery)
*78. ID (2.)
*212. ID (3.)
*215. ID (3.)
*14. Landwehr Division (205. ID as of 1 January 1940)
*Grenzwacht-Unterabschnitt IV/33 (one battalion with six companies)
*Grenzwacht-Regiment 76 (two battalions with 12 companies)
**MG Batallion 4
**MG Batallion 5
**MG Batallion 11
En route - 260., 262. ID (both 4.)

Both 1. and 2. Welle divisions were fully prepared for mobile operations by 26 August, 3. and 4. Welle divisions were fully capable in defensive positions.

1 September Germany invades Poland

2 September France Mobilises, eight days after the German mobilisation was effectively complete (albeit some units especially of the 4. Welle were still moving to their positions as of 2 September). Also, the active German army (1. Welle) had begun its mobilisation in March for Fall Grün and had never returned to peacetime manning, its French counterpart, the "force couverture" or active army covering force, went on alert and began recalling forces to the colours circa 22 August. The two French "armoured division", 1e and 2e DCR, weren't actually created until January 1940. On mobilisation six of the later DLC were actually horse cavalry (DC) and only two of the mechanized cavalry divisions existed, only two DLM (the closest thing to a panzer division) existed there were 17 active infantry divisions and 9 active motorised divisions in France, between them they only included 24 active infantry and 20 motorized infantry regiments. The 27 other infantry and 7 other motorized infantry regiments to bring them up to strength required at least three weeks of mobilisation. The bulk of the initial mobilization (serial A) was designed to man the fortresses rather than to fill out the field army.

Assuming that all the active units were immediately thrown into battle without absorbing their mobilisation cadres, that pits the equivalent of 15 1/3 French infantry divisions and perhaps the equivalent of two or three mechanized and cavalry divisions, against 26 German divisions in prepared fortifications. The French reconnaissance into the Saarland "succeeded" in getting as far as it did because the Germans had no intention of employing a cordon defence until the Polish campaign was resolved. Furthermore, the Germans knew the French mobilisation schedule well, it was no great secret, and knew that by the end of the month the French could have considerable forces deployed, so it was better to yield early in the month to minimize casualties and complete preparations for a possible stronger attack later in the month.

French forces in the Saarland as of circa 8 September was:
Corps d'Armée Colonial (CAC) (Colonial Army Corps)
12ème Division d'Infanterie Motorisée (DIM) (12th Motorized Infantry Division)
3ème Division d'Infanterie Nord-Africaine (DINA) (3rd North African Infantry Division)

1er Corps d'Armée (CA) (1st Army Corps)
2ème DINA
42ème Division d'Infanterie (DI) (42nd Infantry Division)

IVème Armée
9ème CA
6ème Division d'Infanterie Coloniale (DIC) (6th Colonial InfantryDivision)
4ème DINA
20ème CA
11ème DI
21ème DI
9ème DIM
23ème DI
5ème CA
15ème DIM
3ème DIC
Total of 12 active divisions: 4 DI, 3 DIM, 3 DINA, 2 DIC

French Mobilization
Active Metropolitan Army consisted of 33 divisions and 2 Spahis brigades:
In Metropolitan France (including Algeria and Tunisia)
7 Motorized Infantry Divisions: 1e, 3e, 5e, 9e, 12e, 15e, 25e DIM
10 Infantry Divisions: 10e, 11e, 13e, 14e, 19e, 21e, 23e, 36e, 42e,
43e DI
3 Mountain Infantry Divisions: 27e, 29e, 31e DI
3 Cavalry Divisions: 1e, 2e, 3e DC
2 Light Mechanized Divisions: 1e, 2e DLM
4 North-African Infantry Divisions: 1e, 2e, 3e, 4e DINA
4 Colonial Infantry Divisions: 1e, 2e, 3e, 4e DIC
2 Spahis Brigades: 1e, 2e BS

Of those, VIe Armée (Alps), was 6 divisions and 1 Spahis brigade:
23e, 27e, 29e, 31e DI, 1e DINA, 2e DIC and 1e BS
All others units were covering the North-East from Switzerland to Belgium.

Mobilization consisted of 39 réserve infantry divisions:
15 Infantry Divisions (série A): 2e, 4e, 6e, 7e, 16e, 18e, 20e, 22e, 24e, 26e, 32e, 35e, 41e, 45e, 47e DI
2 Mountain Infantry Divisions (Série A): 28e, 30e DI
1 North-African Infantry Division (Série A): 5e DINA
3 Colonial Infantry Divisions (Série A): 5e, 6e, 7e DIC
16 Infantry Divisions (Série B): 51e, 52e, 53e, 54e, 55e, 56e, 57e, 58e, 60e, 61e, 62e, 63e, 66e, 67e, 70e, 71e DI
2 Mountain Infantry Divisions (Série B): 64e, 65e DI

Scheduled mobilization plan (France, North Africa & Levant):
Mobilization Day (M) was 2 September at 00.00 Hrs
1) M+7: 41 divisions ("couverture")
36 DI
3 DC
2 DLM

2) M+12: 63 divisions
58 DI
3 DC
2 DLM

3) M+17: 83 divisions
78 DI
3 DC
2 DLM

4) M+22: 86 divisions
81 DI
3 DC
2 DLM

Situation planned as of M+22 (24 September)
North-East and Jura: 56 divisions
23 DI Active (17 DI, 3 DINA, 3 DIC)
19 DI Série A (15 DI, 1 DINA, 3 DIC)
9 DI Série B
2 DLM
3 DC
1 BS

South-East: 9 divisions
5 DI Active (3 DI Mtn, 1 DINA, 1 DIC)
2 DI Série A Mtn
2 DI Série B Mtn
1 BS

Interior: 7 divisions
7 DI Série B

North-Africa: 14 divisions
10 DI (81e, 82e, 83e, 84e, 85e, 86e, 87e, 88e DIA, 1e & 3e DM)
4 DI "Protection" (181e, 182e, 183e DIA, 2e DM)
5 Cavalry Brigades
DIA = Division d'Infanterie d'Afrique (mountain type)
DM = Division d'Infanterie Marocaine (mountain type)

Levant (Syria-Lebanon): 2 mixed Brigades

Total: 86 Divisions + 9 Brigades (+ equivalent of 15 Fortress divisions)

At the point of contact in the Saarland the French forces totalled 12 divisions under two separate army commands; the German, ten divisions, plus a division-size frontier command. The French offensive occupied two small salients of German territory jutting into France, that were not seriously defended, but never reached more than some of the covering outposts of the Westwall.

In theory by 24 September the French forces in the Saarland could have numbered as many as 56 divisions if the Belgian and Luxembourg frontier had been stripped of all troops and assuming that all the mobilisation forces could have been sent to the Saar front, which is unlikely. They would have been facing about 24 German division equivalents who had a month to occupy the fixed positions of the Westwall and prepared field positions. Also, by 17 September the Polish resistance was effectively at an end and German forces had begun redeploying west. At best there may have been a window of a few days where the French could have attacked with a superiority in numbers, but it seems unlikely they would have accomplished much.

3 September Britain and France declare war on Germany.

17 September the Red Army crosses the border, some fighting but the Polish Government orders no resistance.

2 November 1939 US Cash and Carry act signed into law

Hitler sided with Hungary against Romania in 1940 and more territory changed ownership. The second Vienna Award, including ceding territory to Bulgaria.

11 March 1941 US Lend Lease act signed into law.

I would like to see the western allied military moves that would keep at least parts of Eastern Europe out of Stalin's control, Hitler largely decided where the Iron Curtin was.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Not sure a Stuka could carry a bomb large enough to sink a battleship. Cruiser or something smaller? Yes. Battleship? I'm not so sure.

The whole point of moving RN vessels into the Baltic would be to disrupt the German offensive in Poland. That would require getting close enough to ports/harbours to shell them. By default, that means the RN warship is within range of land-based air power.

The RN had good submarines, too. And the Germans had ports on the North Sea, too.

 

[buffnut453]

I've written a few times about how critical it was for Britain to have a year from the Munich Crisis to the declaration of war in order to complete rearmament.

In September 1938, Fighter Command comprised about 29 squadrons but only 5 had Hurricanes and one had Spitfires. All the others were equipped with Gladiators and Gauntlets. Only 5 Chain Home stations were operational at the time of Munich. A year later, the Chain Home system was complete comprising 21 stations.

Bomber Command had 32 operational squadrons available, some 22 of which were equipped with Battles, Blenheims and Wellesleys. The remaining 10 "heavy" bomber squadrons had Whitleys and Harrows (yep, even the Wellington wasn't introduced into service until October 1938). A further 15 squadrons were in the process of re-equipment or had obsolete aircraft like the Heyford, Hind and Hendon.

Four rearmament schemes had been initiated to address these shortfalls. Scheme C had been completed in March 1937 to raise numbers to the following levels (squadrons/aircraft with reserve (probably RAuxAF) units in parentheses): Bomber 70(11)/840; Fighter 35(5)/420; Coastal 13/162; Army Coop 5/90. Schemes A, F and H were all due to complete in March 1939. I believe the RAuxAF units are included as part of the overall totals. Also note that the numbers of squadrons were for the entire RAF, including overseas units, and hence the delta between the totals for Bomber Command and Fighter Command and the overall totals for the Service.

The above data is sourced from "The Royal Air Force, an Encyclopedia of the Inter-War Years Volume II: Re-Armament 1930-1939" by Wg Cdr Ian Philpott.

 

[Shortround6]

I would ask people to go to google maps and look at the Baltic and see how to get there past Demark.

That corner on the SE side is the border (present day) between Germany and Poland. There was a reason that Jackie Fisher built those absurd light armored cruisers (large light cruisers?) Normal WW I dreadnoughts and battlecruisers could not operate with freedom in parts of the Baltic near the German coast. British subs did get into Baltic on occasion. Those men had large pure brass spherical appendages.

Given the raids and exchanges both ways in WW I the North sea ports were fairly familiar to the RN. What may not have been known was well the shore defenses may have been rebuilt in the last few years.

 

[Shortround6]

All the others were equipped with Gladiators and Gauntlets.

I would further note that the Gladiator never equipped more than 8 squadrons at a time so the situation was even worse. The Gladiators were used as sort of advance operational trainers (my term) as when a squadron got Hurricanes or Spitfires, the Gladiators were moved to a Squadron that had Gauntlets (or older? they only built 246 Gauntlets and that included exports) and then the process repeated. The idea was that new monoplanes did not go straight to the Gauntlet squadrons. How well that worked in practice I don't know.
The Gladiators had enclosed cockpits and flaps and helped bridge the gap.

 

[EwenS]

I would ask people to go to google maps and look at the Baltic and see how to get there past Demark.

View attachment 733498

That corner on the SE side is the border (present day) between Germany and Poland. There was a reason that Jackie Fisher built those absurd light armored cruisers (large light cruisers?) Normal WW I dreadnoughts and battlecruisers could not operate with freedom in parts of the Baltic near the German coast. British subs did get into Baltic on occasion. Those men had large pure brass spherical appendages.

Given the raids and exchanges both ways in WW I the North sea ports were fairly familiar to the RN. What may not have been known was well the shore defenses may have been rebuilt in the last few years.

Ahhh. Geography again!!!

Churchill proposed Operation Catherine into the Baltic in late 1939. Look at the modifications being considered necessary to the ships involved. Fortunately cooler heads prevailed and the First Sea Lord, Pound, was able to persuade him otherwise and the whole thing fizzled out in Jan 1940.

Jason Stevenson

Pound is often criticised for not tackling Churchill's sometimes odd ideas head on. But as Boyd pointed out in his book, his methods were to quietly put all the problems in front of Churchill in detail, so making him realise the error of his suggestions. A full on confrontation with your boss is not a good way to keep your job.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

International relations involves competing aspects of structure and agency. Sometimes structure prevents you from doing what you would wish to do and geography is part of that structure problem, just as it was for the USA. The US may have wanted peace in the world but it was geographically isolated and, in 1939, lacked the political will and military teeth to do anything. Britain and France hoped that a formal threat of war would dissuade Hitler. He called their bluff...but they followed through on their promise. That doesn't make their promises vacuous. It simply means there were limits on their ability to act.

"If they attack Poland, we'll declare war."
"But sir, we have nothing with which to do anything before Poland falls."
"That's okay. The Germans will still be deterred."

That is the epitome of an empty promise.

Would you prefer that Britain and France gave Germany free rein in Poland without threatening to go to war?

No. As I noted above, my preference would have been abandoning appeasement before Czechoslovakia happened.

Now, before you argue that they weren't ready, bear in mind, Germany was significantly weaker in 1938 than 1939 too. They had three divisions of PzKw !s (this would change when the captured and pressed into service several hundred Czech tanks, enough for three more divisions). PzKw Is would have been death traps against either the Czech or the French fortifications. That was the extent of their active tanks. The rapid expansion of the Army also meant that many units were poorly trained -- rated by the Germans themselves as B- and C-quality formations -- i.e. no better than their French counterparts. The rapidly expanding army was not a well-trained force, and it would be thrown against the Czech fortifications and mountainous terrain.

The Luftwaffe was still rearming with newer models, just as were the Brits (and I'd assume that the RAF would be their major contribution, alongside naval blockade), and according to Williamson Murray had only 25% of its mobilized fuel needs. The International Churchill Society claims a Luftwaffe readiness rate of around 50%. The Germans didn't have the fighters to escort any bombers attacking England proper.

With the RN throwing a blockade on a German economy that was already maxed out, the war would have pinched the home front quickly.

It could be easily argued that it was not in Britain's best interest to go to war in 1939. Britain was under no direct threat of attack from Germany. Avoiding war would have preserved the British Empire, continued trade, and saved hundreds of thousands of British lives, both military and civilian.

That's arguable, sure.

It's not a vacuous promise when it leads to the deaths of 384,000 soldiers and over 70,000 civilians from your population for a war which, arguably, wasn't in your national best interests. That's putting real, physical skin (and blood and bone) in the game.

Again, not disparaging their sacrifices, but the real tragedy is that for all that sacrifice, Poland at the end of the war simply swapped on tyranny for another.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

If the larger British forces in 1939 were unable to dissuade Hitler from his trajectory, what odds the far smaller, and less capable, forces available in 1938?

The German armed forces as well were smaller, less well-trained, and less well-equipped as well. The myth that Munich bought the Allies time ignores the fact that the Germans gained exactly the same amount of time, and they too put it to good use.

If going to war in 1939 wasn't in Britain's best interests, doing so in 1938 when Britain was feverishly rebuilding its military would be downright foolhardy.

It seems the US gets a free pass because its military wasn't big enough or modern enough and yet you want Britain to act decisively against Germany under similar constraints?

With Czechoslovakia, I'd expect much more of the French, given that they have the far bigger army. I'd expect both navies to impose a crippling blockade on Germany while Czech forces fight the German invasion and the French attack in the west.

I don't give America a pass for it military impotence, but much more on geography. No nation on earth at that time had the strength to project military power across thousands of miles of ocean on short notice. UK and France, on the other hand, are right there.

Finally, you keep saying that the British didn't act. They declared war, moved over 150,000 troops plus air assets onto the continent, and undertook offensive operations within 24 hours. That is taking pretty powerful action. The fact that those actions didn't dissuade Germany or failed to prevent the overrunning of Poland doesn't mean the promises were empty. When America declared war on Japan, was it capable instantly of stopping further Japanese aggression? No...because it wasn't in a position to do so. Those conditions changed over time, and such was the case in Europe and other theaters as Britain continued the war it declared in September 1939.

I didn't say they didn't act. I said they gave out empty promises that the Poles were fools to believe.[/QUOTE]

 

[Shortround6]

The Germans were better at propaganda. They had convinced France and England that they were stronger than they were.

 

[EwenS]

As British armour plate manufacturers were still building up their facilities again to supply the growing needs of the naval rearmament programs, Britain had to place orders for 12,000-12,500 of NC armour plate with the Skoda factory in Czechoslovakia. That was after approaching suppliers in the USA, France & of all places Germany and being turned down. In all 10,000 tons was delivered before the outbreak of WW2 with the last deliveries arriving after a journey by rail through Germany in Aug 1939. The shortfall delayed completion of the carrier Victorious.
DK Brown "Nelson to Vanguard"
Johnston & Buxton "The Battleship Builders"

Go to war in 1938, and that would have meant little or no armour from Czechoslovakia and consequent delays to all 4 of the Illustrious class carriers and at least 2 cruisers that all completed in 1940/41.

That alone would have made Britain weaker relative to Germany through the first half of WW2.

 

[buffnut453]

The German armed forces as well were smaller, less well-trained, and less well-equipped as well. The myth that Munich bought the Allies time ignores the fact that the Germans gained exactly the same amount of time, and they too put it to good use.

There are some nuances here. Firstly, the Luftwaffe had gained a lot of operational experience in Spain, starting in 1936. Their tactics were more advanced and they started WW2 with a larger cadre of better experienced aircrew who passed on their knowledge and skills to the aircrew coming out of the training schools.

I agree that Germany also had more time to re-equip but, for whatever reason, it hadn't initiated a full mobilization footing even by the summer of 1940. The net result is that the RAF gained ground over the Luftwaffe...and that is the key. The additional time helped Britain close the gap and stand a chance of prevailing.

With Czechoslovakia, I'd expect much more of the French, given that they have the far bigger army. I'd expect both navies to impose a crippling blockade on Germany while Czech forces fight the German invasion and the French attack in the west.

I think it's fair to say that French military performance was poor from beginning to end. They didn't act decisively, they steadfastly refused to seize the initiative, and allowed themselves to be pushed into a reactive fight. However, we come back to the simple fact that nobody wanted another war that consumed Europe. It's also politically challenging to support a country if there are elements of truth to their claims of repression and mistreatment of your ethnic population.

In general, I can agree that France should have done more but, for whatever reason, France didn't want to go to war on its own. I suspect that's part of the reason why Paris allowed Britain to take the lead in driving what was seen as a successful negotiation at Munich (for everyone except the Czechoslovak country and people. Again, that was despicable in hindsight but was thought, at the time, to constitute a success in avoiding another war.

I'm not sure it was practical to impose a crippling naval blockade given that the Kriegsmarine already had 65 U-boats in service. Any blockading naval vessels would provide ample targets for the U-boats.

I don't give America a pass for it military impotence, but much more on geography. No nation on earth at that time had the strength to project military power across thousands of miles of ocean on short notice. UK and France, on the other hand, are right there.

"Right there" as compared to the US. However, it's still a major challenge to do anything except attack Germany from the west. Getting forces into Czechoslovakia or Poland to defend the territorial integrity of those nations was impossible. So, while Britain and France were "right there", their ability to operate was severely constrained by geography. Distance is one form of obstacle. Geographic location is another. We can't wave a magic wand and expect Allied forces magically to appear in regions that lacked direct access. S Shortround6 's post about the entry into the Baltic Sea is bang on the money. To get forces into Poland would require troopships to navigate along Germany's northern coastline and then land in Poland, all while under U-boat and air attack. It's simply not a practical proposition.

I didn't say they didn't act. I said they gave out empty promises that the Poles were fools to believe.

I think we're talking past each other. As I've pointed out, Britain and France did not guarantee the territorial integrity of Poland. They promised to support an independent Poland. They couldn't deliver on the former for all the reasons mentioned and they never really tried. They could, and did, deliver on the latter, to include hosting the Polish Government in exile throughout the war. More could have been done, perhaps, in September 1939 to distract German forces but, again, France didn't want to act without Britain and it took a month to get the BEF in place. The true blot on the Allies' treatment of Poland came at the end of the war and the sellout of veterans to the USSR.

 

[SaparotRob]

Good stuff!

 

[GTX]

Don't forget that Europe was slowly recovering from WW1, which, in part was so large because of cascading treaties. Britain and the US had no appetite for war, and would have happily given up smaller allies to avoid it.

Indeed, and while people might like to 'beat up' on Chamberlain and cry "Appeasement!!", one has to also remember that neither Ramsay MacDonald or Stanley Baldwin before him were big advocates of re-arming either. More to the point though, they were dealing with the economic situation and a hope to avoid another major war so soon after the 1914 - 1918 conflict, which had already devastated one generation. In the case of Baldwin, I believe the following comment from him to Chamberlain in 1938 sums up well some of the thinking: "If you can secure peace, you may be cursed by a lot of hotheads but my word you will be blessed in Europe and by future generations".

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

There are some nuances here. Firstly, the Luftwaffe had gained a lot of operational experience in Spain, starting in 1936. Their tactics were more advanced and they started WW2 with a larger cadre of better experienced aircrew who passed on their knowledge and skills to the aircrew coming out of the training schools.

They still had no way to bomb Britain. Their CAS doctrine wasn't nearly so well-developed, either.

I agree that Germany also had more time to re-equip but, for whatever reason, it hadn't initiated a full mobilization footing even by the summer of 1940. The net result is that the RAF gained ground over the Luftwaffe...and that is the key. The additional time helped Britain close the gap and stand a chance of prevailing.

That's one branch of the service. Now, about the armies ... not so good, I think you'll agree.

I think it's fair to say that French military performance was poor from beginning to end. They didn't act decisively, they steadfastly refused to seize the initiative, and allowed themselves to be pushed into a reactive fight. However, we come back to the simple fact that nobody wanted another war that consumed Europe. It's also politically challenging to support a country if there are elements of truth to their claims of repression and mistreatment of your ethnic population.

Of course no one wanted another war. They didn't really have a say in the matter though; Hitler forced one on them all the same.

In general, I can agree that France should have done more but, for whatever reason, France didn't want to go to war on its own. I suspect that's part of the reason why Paris allowed Britain to take the lead in driving what was seen as a successful negotiation at Munich (for everyone except the Czechoslovak country and people. Again, that was despicable in hindsight but was thought, at the time, to constitute a success in avoiding another war.

"Despicable" ... yes.

I'm not sure it was practical to impose a crippling naval blockade given that the Kriegsmarine already had 65 U-boats in service. Any blockading naval vessels would provide ample targets for the U-boats.

1/3 at sea, 1/3 in transit, and 1/3 in refit leaves 22 on station -- with blockade lines between Scapa and Norway (400 miles across) and the Channel, and one could make the argument that you're drawing a deadly threat to merchant traffic onto warships which are equipped to sink them.

"Right there" as compared to the US. However, it's still a major challenge to do anything except attack Germany from the west. Getting forces into Czechoslovakia or Poland to defend the territorial integrity of those nations was impossible. So, while Britain and France were "right there", their ability to operate was severely constrained by geography. Distance is one form of obstacle. Geographic location is another. We can't wave a magic wand and expect Allied forces magically to appear in regions that lacked direct access.

The French army had no such impediment. The Germans had few troops in the west, the West Wall was not complete and was regarded as insufficient by the Germans themselves.

S Shortround6 's post about the entry into the Baltic Sea is bang on the money. To get forces into Poland would require troopships to navigate along Germany's northern coastline and then land in Poland, all while under U-boat and air attack. It's simply not a practical proposition.

At no point did I suggest such a course of action.

I think we're talking past each other. As I've pointed out, Britain and France did not guarantee the territorial integrity of Poland. They promised to support an independent Poland.

I'm sure we are -- for example, while you decry "quibbling" over adjectives, you engage in a curious reading of both France's pact with Czechoslovakia, and Britain's with Poland, the latter of which called for "immediate assistance".

They couldn't deliver on the former for all the reasons mentioned and they never really tried. They could, and did, deliver on the latter, to include hosting the Polish Government in exile throughout the war.

You think the Brits delivered an independent Poland?! At what point?

More could have been done, perhaps, in September 1939 to distract German forces but, again, France didn't want to act without Britain and it took a month to get the BEF in place. The true blot on the Allies' treatment of Poland came at the end of the war and the sellout of veterans to the USSR.

Right. As Alexander Cadogan wrote at the time of the pact's signing, "Naturally, our guarantee does not give any help to Poland. It can be said that it was cruel to Poland, even cynical". It goes without saying that I agree: it was a cynical ploy to buy time -- as was the surrender at Munich a year before.

 

[buffnut453]

They still had no way to bomb Britain.

Which is exactly my point about it not being in Britain's interest to go to war in 1939. Britain was under no direct threat of attack.

Their CAS doctrine wasn't nearly so well-developed, either.

Not sure I agree here. The Luftwaffe was inherently a tactical air force, which was part of the (mistaken) driving force for almost every German bomber having a requirement for dive bombing.

The Battle is about the only RAF asset that might be considered a CAS asset...and we can see how successful they were. Conversely, the Stuka was a credible CAS platform. I'd suggest that German state-of-the-art for CAS was considerably ahead of the RAF's.

Of course no one wanted another war. They didn't really have a say in the matter though; Hitler forced one on them all the same.

Which is applying the retrospectroscope. Even as late as August 1939, it was not known whether there would be a large-scale conflict...and the Allies were trying hard to avoid the same. But your point about Hitler wanting a war is bang on the money...and why I keep raising the point about structure-vs-agency. Britain and France had the agency to threaten war but that agency butted up against the structural problem that Hitler couldn't be persuaded and was intent on war. Does that make the use of said agency by Britain and France wrong?

If we accept that Britain couldn't do anything to defend the territorial integrity of Poland (which they never promised to do, anyway), what options are left for them? Apart from a more aggressive assault in the west, the only other alternative is to not commit to Poland at all. That gives Germany free rein.

1/3 at sea, 1/3 in transit, and 1/3 in refit leaves 22 on station -- with blockade lines between Scapa and Norway (400 miles across) and the Channel, and one could make the argument that you're drawing a deadly threat to merchant traffic onto warships which are equipped to sink them.

My point is that your suggestion of using the RN to shell ports would put those Allied vessels at considerably increased risk of attack from aircraft and submarines. There's no way either the RAF or FAA could provide air cover so close to German territory.

As to the idea of a sea blockade, exactly what vessels would the blockade stop? Neutral vessels going between Germany and the USA? That'll go down well in Washington. How about coastal vessels from other European nations, many of which were also neutral...so the Allies would be interfering with neutral nations' legal shipping activities which isn't something the "good guys" should be doing. Even if the RN sought to disrupt solely German-flagged cargo vessels, you're still bringing the RN much closer to Germany than to the UK...which, again, puts the vessels at risk.

One final note on the idea of a German blockade...the entire purpose behind Hitler's expansionist agenda was to secure more resources for the German people within Europe. Hitler saw the impact of the Allied blockade during the Great War and was determined not to make the same mistake. Germany was thus far less reliant on maritime shipping than was the UK. Under these conditions, would a maritime blockade really apply much pressure on Berlin? I suspect not.

The French army had no such impediment. The Germans had few troops in the west, the West Wall was not complete and was regarded as insufficient by the Germans themselves.

Not in the west but it still couldn't get forces to Czechoslovakia or Poland.

We've already discussed the fact that France perhaps should have taken more aggressive action on that front in 1939 but, for whatever reason, Paris didn't make that call. Could the French Army create enough of a kerfuffle to pull forces from Poland in time to save the latter? I suspect not. The German advances in Poland were so rapid in the first 14 days that they essentially neutralized Poland's mobilization efforts. That mobilization was key to achieving Warsaw's strategic vision for the nation's defence, which involved encircling the invading force. From that point on, Poland was merely reacting to Germany's advances with no real hope of winning.

The only way to truly save Poland would be to preserve the territorial integrity of Poland was, somehow, to get boots on the ground...and that was impossible.

I'm sure we are -- for example, while you decry "quibbling" over adjectives, you engage in a curious reading of both France's pact with Czechoslovakia, and Britain's with Poland, the latter of which called for "immediate assistance".

Again, two strong nations went to war on behalf of Poland and they did it immediately. What more do you want them to do? Should they not have made the commitment in the first place and let Germany run amok with no consequences?

As for "curious reading," well someone put the term "unprovoked resort to arms" in the language of the agreement between France and Czechoslovakia. That caveat was there for a purpose. Not sure my reading is, therefore "curious."

As to Poland, the "immediate assistance" was also caveated by "all support in their power." We keep going round and round on this. Britain did assist immediately, as I've explained many times. What sort of "immediate assistance" do you have in mind that was militarily practicable?

You think the Brits delivered an independent Poland?! At what point?

Oh, come on mate. You're better than that. We both know I never claimed that the Brits delivered any such thing. I also observed that the betrayal of Poland in 1945 was deplorable.

However, there's no way that London, in 1939, could foresee how the war would proceed. What odds that the USSR, which in 1939 was an ally of Germany, would join the Allies, along with the USA which, in 1939 was neutral? Blaming Britain for not envisaging the change in the power dynamic by the end of 1945 is really going too far.

The key point is that Britain went to war because it was committed to preserving an independent Poland. The fact that Poland was sold out by all the Allies in 1945 doesn't change the intent of why Britain went to war in the first place. It took years of fighting before the collective Allies were in a position to defeat Germany. Blaming Chamberlain for lacking a suitable crystal ball is taking things too far, IMHO.

Right. As Alexander Cadogan wrote at the time of the pact's signing, "Naturally, our guarantee does not give any help to Poland. It can be said that it was cruel to Poland, even cynical". It goes without saying that I agree: it was a cynical ploy to buy time -- as was the surrender at Munich a year before.

I can (and have) agreed that Munich was a policy to buy time (whether it was cynical or not depends on how Machiavellian one presumes the participants to be).

However, the idea that Britain was still cynically buying time in 1939 doesn't make sense. Buying time for what, precisely? Deterrence had failed and Britain was at war. Time had run out. It wasn't buying time for further rearmament. It wasn't buying time to get the BEF into France. It wasn't buying time to start offensive operations. There was no more time to buy.

The fact that deterrence failed does not mean that the promise was empty. As you've pointed out, Hitler was intent on war. London and Paris didn't KNOW that in 1939. There were plenty of indicators but there was still a belief that Hitler was capable of being persuaded. Hell, there were senior politicians in London in May 1940 who were still advocating a negotiated settlement. And yet Britain persisted in the fight.

Yes, a more strident attack by France for the Saar offensive might, stress MIGHT, have had some impact. However, Polish organized resistance had effectively ceased by 17 September. The French decided to retreat from the ground taken in the Saar offensive on 21 September. I'm not sure there was enough time, even with a more aggressive French attack, for Berlin to realize the scale of the threat, let alone divert forces from Poland to counter the French. And that all presupposes that France could have tackled the Siegfried Line without significant losses.