1941: Top 3 Allied Bombers

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I've been looking for production figures by month to no avail.
I have found details and dates for the various contracts issued which makes Harris' desire to ditch the Halifax in 1942 much more viable.

The first contract was issued to Handley Page (obviously) for 100 aircraft, subsequently increased to 199 aircraft, and deliveries from it commenced on 13th October 1940.

Deliveries from the first English Electric contract (200 aircraft) commenced on 5th September 1941.

Fairey's first aircraft, from a contract for 150) were delivered on 27th October 1942, but not even the Air Ministry seems to have had any problem with the idea of converting Fairey to something else.

LAPG (first deliveries 7th July '43) and Rootes (first deliveries 18th July '43) could have been moved to something else had a decision been taken in late 1942 to halt the Halifax.

Cheers

Steve
 
According to this site

Halifax Technical

LAPG started delivering (entry into service?) in Jan 1942 and Rootes in April of 1942.

Most sources on LAPG say they completed their first Halifax in Dec of 1941. Rolling out factory door and completing test flying and delivery to service unit might take a few weeks (or month).

London Aircraft Production (L.A.P.) | Explore 20th Century London

By the first site it appears that LAPG delivered 250 Halifaxes by July of 1943.

Rootes had delivered 150 by March of 1943 and was in the middle of a batch of 100 in July of 1943, took from April to Sept to build the 100?

Fairey may have delivered first Halifax in Aug of 1942. It appears they were working on at least two different sets of serial numbers (?) and the first 10 aircraft used a different set of letters to start the serial number. Second set starts "delivery/entry into service" in Nov 1942 (only 4-5 days late from the 27th Oct) and there were only 10 aircraft in the first set of numbers.
 

I transposed some contract numbers and delivery dates incorrectly.

To clarify:

LAPG. First contract No. B 124357/40. Deliveries commenced 10 Jan '42 which tallies with above. BB189 was the first aircraft delivered.

Rootes. First contract No. ACFT/637. Deliveries commenced 1 April '42 (DG219)

As for Fairey, its first contract was No. ACFT/891/SAS/ C4 for 150 aircraft. First delivery was 27 Oct '42. Serials D980-999, DK114-151, DK 165-207, DK223-271, all Merlin XX powered B Mk Vs.

A second contract, No. ACFT/891 was given for a further 200 aircraft, first delivery 13 Aug '43 (LK626, Merlin 22 powered B Mk V) and 20 Jan '44 (LK747 Hercules XVI powered B Mk III).
From this contract LK626-667, LK680-711 and LK725-746 were Mk Vs.
LK747-766, LK779-812, LK826-850 and LK863-887 were Mk IIIs.

I hope I've transposed the rather small print correctly this time

Cheers

Steve
 
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That Halifax site gives 10 B/MET MK 5 srs 1 Halifax with serial numbers DJ980-DJ999 (20 numbers but 10 planes?) with first going in service in Aug. The DK114-DK151 batch sees first "in service" in Nov 1942 (a week or so is nothing to argue about) but it seems to have take until Jan 1943 for that first set of 10 (?) to be completed so at the rate of only 1-2 bombers per month for the first few months production doesn't amount to much. Only importance is in trying to establish when the factory was "tooled" up and it may be that the first few aircraft were assembled with a large number of parts brought in from other (the existing 4) sources, I don't know but am willing to concede that Fairey's production of Halifax's was minimal until Nov/Dec of 1942. Fairy built about 660 Halifax's (some during the summer/fall of 1945-cargo carriers) total so switching Fairey production was not going to have that big an impact on the availability of Lancasters during 1943 and even a good part of 1944.
 
Might be a job for someone digging in the Fairey archives, or what's left of them at Westland and the RAF museum. I believe some of the archive was saved by Ian Huntley.
Cheers
Steve
 
I have come across the data that may have tipped Harris' hand against the Halifax in late 1942. Between March and August 1942 4 Group lost 109 Halifaxes from 1,770 sorties, a loss rate of 6.2%. In the last month, August, the loss rate had been 10.2%.
This was patently not sustainable and led to the virtual grounding of the Halifax squadrons whilst various efforts were made to clean up the airframe. It also seems to have pushed Harris to the point of writing the letter I quoted way back up the thread about Handley Page, both the man and company.
Cheers
Steve
 
That points to the problem that was faced. There is no denying the Halifax losses or the fact that they were not sustainable. However there only 346 Lancasters built by the end of Aug 1942 and how many of them had even flown combat missions?
By the end of 1942 another 352 Lancasters would be added to the total and while Harris certainly wanted more Lancasters, he wasn't going to get them any time soon by converting Halifax factories. The 5th Halifax factory/production group working up at about the time he wrote the letter. I don't know what HP was promising at the time to "fix" the Halifax but they took way too long, justifying Harris's criticism. What HP may have wanted to do vs what he/they were allowed to do may have had some impact/result here also. Trying to keep the triangular fins with small tweaks for production reasons vs redesigning/retooling the fins? Not fitting the longer span wing until the MK III? IF the MAP was obsessed with numbers HP's hands may have been tied (or at least covered in treacle)
 
The official report into the Halifaxe's performance made in the autumn of 1942 is less than flattering. It said that,

"...deterioration in the performance of the Halifax II aircraft, consequent upon progressive application of external equipment, has augmented to such an extent that the aircraft has become incapable of meeting concurrently the operational requirements of both high loading and high altitude cruising."

That's just about an admission that the type was no longer fit for purpose.

It wasn't just the 'application of external equipment' that featured in the long list of problems. Why for example in late 1942 were Halifaxes still having to fly with radiator flaps open (sometimes fully open) to prevent engine overheating, costing 9mph (true) at 15,000ft and lowering the operational ceiling? Rolls Royce had suggested a solution some time earlier. Some squadrons simply cropped the radiator flaps, thus effectively increasing the exit area from the radiator with flaps fully closed. Handley Page were very slow to implement relatively easy solutions and this must have contributed to Harris' frustration. The loss of speed incurred by this problem alone could expose the Halifax to the risk of attack for as much as 40 minutes longer on an eight hour flight and that would increase the loss rate.

Anyway, to come back to the original topic, all this is why I would be loathe to place the Halifax in my top three, even in 1941 and even given the quality of the other contenders

Cheers

Steve
 

Certainly true but only the Lancaster could promise both high loading and high altitude cruising as the twin engine planes certainly couldn't and the Short Sterling certainly couldn't.

And in 1941 those are the planes the Halifax should be compared to, not 1942 Lancasters.
 
I have done some digging and have concentrated on 6 Group simply because I have the information to split the actual types flown. I did this as its the only way I can be pretty sure that I would be comparing the Lancaster with the Halifax III.

408 squadron
Halifax III 1469 sorties 20 losses 1.4%
Lancaster 1210 sorties, 41 losses 3.4%

415 Squadron (July 1944)
Halifax III 1526 sorties 13 losses 0.9%

419 Squadron (Jan 43 on Halifax II April 44 on Lancaster X)
Halifax 1616 sorties 66 losses 4.1%
Lancaster 2029 sorties 39 losses 1.9%

420 Squadron (Dec 43 on Halifax III)
2477 sorties 25 losses 1.0%

424 Squadron (Dec 43 on Halifax III, \Jan 45 Lancaster I and III)
Halifax III 1,811 sorties 23 losses 1.3%
Lancaster 388 Sorties 5 losses 1.3%

425 Squadron (Dec 43 on Halifax III)
2,445 sorties 28 losses 1.1%

426 Squadron (Jun43 on Lancaster II, April 44 on Halifax III)
Lancaster 579 28 losses 4.8% note they had very heavy losses in Battle for Berlin which tilt the figures
Halifax III 2161 sorties 22 losses 1.0%

427 Squadron (May 43 Halifax II, Jan 44 Halifax III, Feb 45 Lancaster III)
Halifax's 2,800 sorties 58 losses 2.1%
Lancaster 239 sorties 1 loss 0.4%

428 Squadron (June 43 Halifax II, June 44 Lancaster X)
Halifax's 1406 sorties 32 losses 2.3%
Lancaster 1677 sorties 18 losses 1.1%

429 Squadron (Aug 43 Halifax II/V, March 44 Halifax III, March 45 Lancaster X
Halifax 2519 sorties 49 losses 1.9%
Lancaster 114 sorties 1 loss 0.9%

Sorry I have to sign off due to time but hope to complete in next couple of days.

In brief the loss ratio between the Halifax III and the Lancaster seems to be very similar but the Halifax Mk II had considerably higher losses
 
Those figures are pretty typical for the entire time the types served.
I do have them for all the squadrons that operated the Halifax and Lancaster with Bomber Command. In one of the squadron's figures you mention the bias the Battle of Berlin applied to the raw numbers. There are a lot of factors that can skew the figures like this. Not least the type of operations being flown. There were at least two periods during which Halifax squadrons did not operate on the more dangerous missions. It's why I posted the figures for the two types on raids to Germany as that is a more valid comparison. Missions to Germany would be likely to encounter similar and more heavy resistance than mine laying or bombing Turin. In other words we can compare the losses on German raids as both types were subjected to similar risk. They were often flying together on the same operation.
Those figures were Halifax: 36,995 sorties, 1,410 missing (3.8%) Lancaster: 83,881 sorties, 2,508 missing (3.0%). This equates to 127 Halifaxes lost for every 100 Lancasters. The only bias here works in favour of the Halifax as the later versions were much improved and did not suffer quite the disproportionate losses of the earlier versions.
Cheers
Steve
 
Once the Mk III entered service the restriction on targets was removed. Which is why I tried to differentiate between the versions of the Halifax. The Mk III units generally had very similar losses to the Lanc, those with the Mk II did a lot worse
 
Glider said:
Once the Mk III entered service the restriction on targets was removed. Which is why I tried to differentiate between the versions of the Halifax. The Mk III units generally had very similar losses to the Lanc, those with the Mk II did a lot worse
Click to expand...

Yes, I agree.

It just makes the overall Halifax losses on raids against Germany even worse. It explains the 6%-10% loss rates the early versions were sustaining. The Mk III reached squadrons towards the end of 1943 and in early 1944, in time for the Battle of Berlin, though Lancasters bore the brunt of it in 1943 and into 1944 when the target was Berlin itself.

Cheers

Steve
 
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Simplistic question. Why more dangerous to fly at 15,000 feet than 19,000 feet? 88mm guns quite capable at both heights.
 
Actually the Heavy AA guns gained considerably with a reduction in height.



And that is for a plane flying directly over the gun, a similar diagram could be made for planes firing 5,000-10,000 yds to the side of the gun. Put the two together and the lower altitude can mean a lot more shells fired from the same number of guns.

The guns/projectiles are not laser beams. There is a certain amount of dispersion to the shells this goes up with the square of the range (that is ideal theory, in practice it is a bit worse) so the shells will be dispersing in an area about 60% larger at 19,000ft than 15,000ft.

You also have a shorter time of flight for the shell which helps in several ways ( less lead on the target is needed) and the since the fuse error is a percentage of the time of flight a shorter time of flight means less fuse timing error (more shells burst closer to the nominal altitude).

You also have the fact that even the range-finding equipment used by the AA gunners has errors expressed as a percentage of range. For example some Allied Air-borne radar in WW II had a possible error in range ( max distance or scale) of + or - 10%. at closer ranges it may be better but the longer the distance the more errors can creep into the firing solution. Put that together with the fact that the closer the bomber flies to the gun/s the more rounds can be fired and things get pretty bad real quick.
 
Thanks for the info. But a saturation barrage you would think to be pretty effective at most practical heights.Anyway the stats are there so who am I.
 
At 15000 ft, the aircraft are just within the ceiling of the 3,7 cm Flak shells. Granted, the chances for a direct hit are slim, but the number of shells exploding, at around that altitude (due to the self-destruct mechanism) meant that there was quite a bit of fragments unleashed.
Fortunately for the bomber crews, the Germans skipped the chance on the more powerful rounds/guns for the 3,7-4 cm caliber range.

edit to add:
Saturation barrage was some times used when there was no radars around. In most of the times it meant huge increase in rounds expended for an airplane hit or damaged, along with increased barrel wear (meaning less accurate guns).
Even with radar-guided fire, reasonably new guns and trained experienced crews, it took 4000 heavy shells (88mm and bigger) and further thousands of light Flak shells expended to bring down the allied aircraft. That is for 1942; prior that (= almost no fire control radars) and after (better Allied electronic countermeasures, worn-out guns, experienced crews replaced by levies, Allied bombers flying at more safer altitudes) it was 10-16 thousands of heavy shells per A/C downed.
Bottom line - it was cheaper for the UK to conduct the night bombing, than it was for the Germany to defend.
 
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A Great diagram but the horizontal scale in yards distorts what should be a very pronounced ellipse over the gun.
 
stona said:
Missions to Germany would be likely to encounter similar and more heavy resistance than mine laying
Click to expand...

Actually Gardening missions had some of the highest casualty rates of all night missions. Flying close to shore at 180mph at 1500 feet in a straight line often very close to Flak ships to drop Parachute mines was no picnic. Particulary when the dropping run needs to be down the swept channel and who would know better where the swept channel was than the people who swept it.
 

Actually;



Granted this is an allied estimate of effective ceilings rather than actual tests but the max ceiling or self destruct height were vastly different than effective height, which is the reason the Germans tried to get the 50-55mm AA guns into service.
 
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