1941: Top 3 Allied Bombers

[stona]

The German results generally were no better. They exerted a lot of effort on one target (London) initially, which they could find. They then scattered bombs all over it and the neighbouring Home Counties.
The Luftwaffe had many more operational bombers and crews than the RAF in 1939/40, excluding Battles, and I think an argument can be made that the early war Luftwaffe bomber crews were generally better trained than their RAF counterparts.
I have seen it said that in September 1939 the RAF could only field 140 medium or heavy bombers.

The Luftwaffe's most successful raids were carried out using electronic aids (Knickebein, X-Gerat) and pathfinders, both of which the RAF would adopt variations of with much success later.

The problem for the RAF was that the bomber force to a very large extent was designed and trained to operate by day. Having been forced to operate by night put it at a crippling disadvantage from which it took years to recover.

Cheers

Steve

 

[Glider]

A small word in defence of the Halifax, once the Mk III entered service it was a very effective bomber. It suffers by having the earlier versions compared to the Lancaster I, but if you had to choose between the Halifax II and a Manchester, which would you take?

 

[Shortround6]

The Germans did manage to hit the Spitfire factory (perhaps they were aiming at something else?) and managed to hit two of the Shorts factories setting back introduction of the Sterling by a number of months. This among other damage.

The Germans certainly did not achieve the destruction the British and Americans would inflict on Germany later but the Germans at least realized that swanning about the countryside at night hopping for a break in clouds or good moonlight to illuminate the target wasn't really going to work and tried to come up with some sort of navigation aids. British were trusting to luck and/or the ability to muddle though. Actually the British were depending on astro-navigation and while that worked fairly well from the deck of ship with lots of practice it didn't work so well from aircraft with quickly trained personnel. However pre-war the British "night" bomber squadrons seldom flew at night to prevent accidents and were seldom allowed to fly anywhere except over the British isles so the limitations didn't become apparent.

While an early adaptation of Pathfinders and electronic aids would not have allowed the early bombers to flatten entire cities (there just weren't enough of them for one thing) there was a wide range of results possible form what was actually achieved by bomber command and what was achieved in 1943/44. Better training and few aids might have easily doubled or tripled the actual damage done if that meant it was still a far cry from what would happen later.
And even a couple of hundred bombers carrying 2 tons apiece could cause a fair a mount of damage IF the bombs were dropped in the right place (or even within a radius of 1/2 mile or so of the target).

Earlier photo recon of bomb damage might have caught the problem much earlier too.

 

[stona]

A small word in defence of the Halifax, once the Mk III entered service it was a very effective bomber. It suffers by having the earlier versions compared to the Lancaster I, but if you had to choose between the Halifax II and a Manchester, which would you take?

The Mk III Halifax was certainly an improvement, but it entered service in late 1943 or early 1944 from memory. It finally had some of the developments that Bomber Command had wanted, but had the MAP been swayed by Bomber Command's arguments in 1941 to cease production of the Halifax and concentrate production on the Lancaster it wouldn't have been missed.

Some squadrons had to convert from the Lancaster to the Halifax. Jim McIntosh, a Canadian serving with No. 403 Squadron didn't want to believe that they would be trading their Lancasters for Halifaxes which he viewed as "bait for the German defences". When the Halifaxes did indeed arrive McIntosh described the new aeroplane as a "depressing looking beast, square and squat; no lines at all. A feeling of doom now hung over East Moor".

I've seen it said that some were happy with their Halifaxes, even preferring them to the Lancaster, but in all the many memoirs and accounts I've read that would be a VERY small minority. At least statistically you had a better chance of escaping a Halifax if you did get shot down.

Cheers

Steve

 

[Glider]

I am not trying to pretend that it was better than the Lancaster but it develop into a decent aircraft and that the Halifax did suffer a poor reputation due to its earlier version being compared to the Lancaster.
I can also understand why the aircrew would feel negative about going to the Halifax, but It would be interesting to find out how they got on with the Halifax and compare the two.

 

[stona]

Lancasters flew 156,192 sorties with 3,431 losses (2.20%). 246 were lost to operational accidents (0.16%)

Halifaxes flew 82,773 sorties with 1,884 losses (2.28%). 199 were lost to operational crashes (0.24%)

A study of four Hamburg raids plus raids on Peenemunde and Nuremberg, a total of six raids, showed that from the 126 Lancasters shot down 13.2% of their crews survived.

From the 74 Halifaxes shot down 21.9% survived. In this respect the Halifax was better.

13 Stirlings were shot down on the Hamburg and Peenemunde raids, they did not operate on the Nuremberg raid, and from these 24.0% survived.

Cheers

Steve

 

[Shortround6]

As I see it the trouble with the Halifax is that it took them almost two years to straighten it out.

The MK III with Hercules engines didn't enter service until Sept of 1943 and then in small numbers. 1944 saw a large number of MK IIIs show up 1284 in the 1st 6 months.
Apparently it took until the Summer of 1943 to fit the bigger tail fins (vertical stabilizers) to the Halifax which went a long way to solving some of it's handling problems. The Late MK II's or IIa's had the bigger fins.

See this site for production lots and timing; Halifax Technical

2 years and several thousand aircraft (and how many lost crews?) is a bit too long to correct a known handling problem.

 

[Glider]

Lancasters flew 156,192 sorties with 3,431 losses (2.20%). 246 were lost to operational accidents (0.16%)

Halifaxes flew 82,773 sorties with 1,884 losses (2.28%). 199 were lost to operational crashes (0.24%)

A study of four Hamburg raids plus raids on Peenemunde and Nuremberg, a total of six raids, showed that from the 126 Lancasters shot down 13.2% of their crews survived.

From the 74 Halifaxes shot down 21.9% survived. In this respect the Halifax was better.

13 Stirlings were shot down on the Hamburg and Peenemunde raids, they did not operate on the Nuremberg raid, and from these 24.0% survived.

Cheers

Steve

Thanks for this. The numbers are pretty close and can I ask do you know if these loss ratios are from the Mk III onwards?

I agree that two years to correct something is far too long but I would guess that as time progressed and the weights increased the problems may have started to arise.

 

[nuuumannn]

The German results generally were no better. They exerted a lot of effort on one target (London) initially, which they could find. They then scattered bombs all over it and the neighbouring Home Counties. The Luftwaffe had many more operational bombers and crews than the RAF in 1939/40, excluding Battles, and I think an argument can be made that the early war Luftwaffe bomber crews were generally better trained than their RAF counterparts. I have seen it said that in September 1939 the RAF could only field 140 medium or heavy bombers. The Luftwaffe's most successful raids were carried out using electronic aids (Knickebein, X-Gerat) and pathfinders, both of which the RAF would adopt variations of with much success later. The problem for the RAF was that the bomber force to a very large extent was designed and trained to operate by day. Having been forced to operate by night put it at a crippling disadvantage from which it took years to recover.

In the scheme of things, yep, you're right Steve, but comparing aircraft for aircraft, if the RAF operated Ju 88s, G4Ms or any other type available in the environment they did, the results would be no different, likewise the Luftwaffe and Stirlings, Whitleys and Wellingtons. My point is, that the aircraft that the British operated were no worse off than their contemporaries, Bomber Command structure and method aside, so stating they were terrible has to be put into context against the standards of the day. Yes, Bomber Command was at a distinct disadvantage, but only the Luftwaffe had a better bombing force with as much exoperience and as competent equipment as the RAF in 1941. At that time, the rest of the world's air forces, including the United States had a distinctly pre-war bombing force that could not match either the Luftwaffe or Bomber Command in equipment or accuracy. The German bomber squadrons were the most accurate and probably as a result of this, the best in the world thanks to their electronic bombing aids. It took another two years before the RAF bombers were equipped with something similar.

As I see it the trouble with the Halifax is that it took them almost two years to straighten it out.

It took longer than two years to sort out the Halifax I's many issues and even then the number of variants and sub variants produced along the way to incorporate modifications took time and effort as issues that kept arising kept HP and the Aircraft and Armament Experimental Establishment hard at work and often resulted in the destruction of aircraft and the death of personnel. The Mk.III did not enter squadron service until late 1943 with 466 Sqn (RAAF) and then 35 Sqn (the first to be equipped with the Halifax I in November 1940) with the first deliveries from August that year. There's no doubt the Halifax III was an excellent aircraft, but it took its time in becoming so.

The Halifax III was intended on being an interim only until the arrival of the Halifax IV, which was cancelled, leaving the III as the principal production variant; It incorporated the square fins and glased nose section sans turret that were first fitted to B.II Series 1As, indeed the prototype R9534 was one of those marks modified with Hercules engines. At the time it was modified as an interim, a cure had yet to be found for the issue with rudder over balance and the bigger fins were about to go into service on the B.II.

Here is a section on dealing with rudder over balance from The Secret Years, Flight testing at Boscombe Down by Tim Mason;

"During 1942 and later, the search continued for a solution to the problem of rudder over balance though in view of the establishment's experience on the Mk.Is to be the cause of some unexplained service accidents and operational losses. The worst case considered was failure (and feathering) of the two port engines with the two starboard engines at take off power. The first modification, late in 1941, of reducing the rudder trimmer movement resulted in excessive foot loads until, on reducing speed to 160 mph the rudders violently overbalanced to full travel and the resulting uncontrolled manoeuvre could only be overcome by throttling the starboard engines. 'Noseings' (bulbous nose to the rudders) improved matters such that control could be maintained down to a speed 140 mph with 10 deg bank without over balancing, but with very high foot loads. Further changes, in mid 1942, to the balance tab and rudder tab settings reduced the foot loads to acceptable proportions, but re-introduced a mild tendency to rudder over balance.

It was decided to check the effectiveness of the latest modifications on a representative aircraft. W7917 [a B.II Srs I] arrived in December 1942 from 102 Sqn; on the first handling test flight on 4 February 1943, the aircraft crashed fatally. The top half of one rudder had detached in flight - attributed to a violent over balance leading to loss of control. Further investigation on HR679 (the first production aircraft incorporating the full range of aerodynamic improvements known as the Series IA in service but with rudders similar to W7917). Cautious reduction in speed during steady sideslips caused no indication of over balance until at 120 mph the rudders suddenly moved to full travel of their own volition. The pilot regained control at 150 mph after easing the control column forward; 4,000 ft had been lost in the spiral dive. On second attempt control was regained by opening up the engines on the inside of the spiral. Later tests with restricted rudder movement reduced the speed at which less violent over balance occurred. Cords on the trailing edge were tried but removed after it was foundthat they had no effect on over balance and again made the rudders excessively heavy. HR727 had rudders with smaller balance areas which over balanced at smaller angles; the modification was rejected. It was decided that larger fins was the only effective cure; in the mean time restrictors were fitted in existing aircraft with the original fins and service pilots carefully briefed on the over balance of rudders."

I am not trying to pretend that it was better than the Lancaster but it develop into a decent aircraft and that the Halifax did suffer a poor reputation due to its earlier version being compared to the Lancaster.

The Halifax III did have advantages compared to the Lancaster I and it is only natural to compare the two, in fact a number of different books and articles in magazines do so. The Halifax VI out performed the Lancaster III, but by the time it had entered service in April 1945, the Avro Lincoln was in production, which had better performance and again the Halifax was second fiddle to an Avro bomber. What would I choose between the Halifax and Manchester in 1941? The Manchester, not least in hindsight because of the Lancaster, bearing in mind that the Lancaster prototype, which had flown at the very beginning of the year, was a modified Manchester and the type was almost ready for service by the end of 1941.

 

[Shortround6]

I think they had problems with first aircraft.

Something about the airflow over the vertical stabilizers "stalling" and either locking the rudder/s hard over or rendering them ineffective?
The plane was considered to hunt directionally and the bigger fins made it a better (more stable) bomb platform. Some sources talk of older bombers being refitted with the bigger fins in the field.

The early ones were also under-powered and the substitution of Merlin XX engines didn't solve much as the weight went up almost as much as the power.

 

[nuuumannn]

Apart from rudder over balance, from the very first Halifax built the aircraft suffered from being overweight and far too draggy. Somewhat disappointingly, the aircraft failed to meet its performance figures as a result and over the next few years alterations were made to the basic design, including more powerful engines and even Griffon and Sabre engined derivatives were considered, but not built. Tha Halifax IV powered by Griffons was to be the major production variant and on paper it offered considerable advantages over even the Lancaster, but was cancelled - by then it was too late in the day for a new Halifax. Throughout the aircraft's career there were changes that were made to its aerodynamics to improve performance losses resulting from in-service weight creep, like removing the front turret altogether, substituting the bulky top turret with a more streamlined four gun turret and so on. there were also issues with its undercarriage right from the start and from early on the main undercarriage was removed and a new design fitted and the tail wheel, a source of trouble, was fixed down instead of retracting, but this incurred a speed penalty. Inefficiencies in altitude were improved with extended wing tips and fitting Hercules engines in the Mk.III.

One issue that occurred that wasn't altogether serious, but more discomforting was that the radio operator's position was directly below the pilot's and dirt from the pilot's boots on the rudder pedals would fall down on top of the radio equipment and the radio operator!

 

[stona]

Thanks for this. The numbers are pretty close and can I ask do you know if these loss ratios are from the Mk III onwards?

I can't find a break down of the numbers by sub type I'm afraid. The numbers are for all sub types for their entire operational periods during WW2.

The numbers are superficially close, but nearly 0.08% on 2.2% is a significant difference. For every 100 Lancasters lost 103-104 Halifaxes were lost. For men taking a 50/50 chance on their lives this did tilt the odds even more unfavourably.

The Halifax also suffered a much higher rate of operational crashes, here classified as crashes in the UK by aircraft setting off or returning from operational missions. This rate fell throughout the war due to many reasons, better training, more reliable aircraft, better air traffic control, better diversion procedures etc. None of this excuses the poor performance of the Halifax, though it does excuse to some extent some earlier types like the Whitley with a 1.43% operational crash rate, compared with the Lancaster's 0.16%.

Cheers

Steve

 

[Shortround6]

The early British war bombers had a number of things going against them. Like being woefully under powered (imagine modern 6 place light twin with 150-160hp engines and one engine out), two pitch props instead of constant speed (and no feathering of dead prop) and very often bad cockpit layouts. A lot of potential accidents. Halifax and Manchester continued the under-powered condition.

 

[stona]

A note on percentage loss rates. The seemingly low numbers can be deceptive in the context of many operational sorties over a length of time. For example, between 7/8th July and 10th November 1941 Bomber Command suffered a 3.5% loss rate by night, 7.1% by day. There were 11,991 night sorties with a loss of 414 aircraft and 1,567 day sorties with a loss of 112 aircraft.

This gives a total loss in four months of 526 aircraft, a loss rate of 3.9%, approximately equivalent to Bomber Command's entire front line strength in bombers and crews.

The bomber offensive as it had been carried out to date was effectively halted as a result of these figures and the evidence of the Butt Report. A new policy was formulated and on 8th January 1942 Sir Richard Peirse was sent of to command the Allied Air Forces in India and South East Asia, not exactly a sacking, thus making room for a new man to carry out this policy.

Cheers

Steve

 

[nuuumannn]

If any one is interested, here is a break down of figures similar to Steve's produced by author Jon Lake for an article on Halifax variants;

"The Halifax flew 36,995 sorties against Germany by night and 10,074 by day, dropping 224,207 tons of bombs (compared to 83,881 and 23,204 sorties and 608, 612 tons for the Lancaster). Bomber Command losses totalled 2,236 compared to 3,936 Lancasters. This gave the RAF a loss rate of one Halifax per 21.05 sorties, and one Lanc per 27.02 sorties. An average Lancaster sortie delivered 5.68 tons of bombs, while a typical Halifax sortie delivered only 4.76 tons. These figures were surprisingly close and represented a great improvement over the Stirling, which suffered one loss for every 10.7 sorties, and delivered only 3.38 tons of bombs per sortie."

"Even in the bomber role, the Halifax played a vital part, dropping 23.5 percent of Bomber Command's total (with the Lanc contributing 63.7 percent). During daylight operations, which predominated during the latter part of the war, the Halifax actually had a better return rate than the Lancster, with 0.56 percent ofthose Halifaxes dispatched being lost, compared to a figure of 0.74 percent for the Lancaster."

This from Harry Fraser-Mitchell in a feature article about the Halifax for Aeroplane Monthly magazine:

By January 1944 nine squadrons were equipped with the Halifax III and losses began to dwindle - 433 Sqn recorded 400 sorties without loss, for example" "Halifaxes, including the new marks VI and VII, were now involved in tactical bombing and made 4,428 sorties for the loss of only 99 aircraft. The Halifaxes of No.4 Group were credited with33 fighters destroyed, a Bomber Command record."

"...in 1943 the loss rate for the Halifaxes of 4 Grp was 485 aircraft in 11,607 sorties, 4.2 percent and in 1944, 402 in 25,464 sorties, or 1.6 percent. Available Lancaster rates indicate 3.4 percent in 1943 and 2.8 percent in 1944."

 

[Glider]

I can't find a break down of the numbers by sub type I'm afraid. The numbers are for all sub types for their entire operational periods during WW2.

The numbers are superficially close, but nearly 0.08% on 2.2% is a significant difference. For every 100 Lancasters lost 103-104 Halifaxes were lost. For men taking a 50/50 chance on their lives this did tilt the odds even more unfavourably.

The Halifax also suffered a much higher rate of operational crashes, here classified as crashes in the UK by aircraft setting off or returning from operational missions. This rate fell throughout the war due to many reasons, better training, more reliable aircraft, better air traffic control, better diversion procedures etc. None of this excuses the poor performance of the Halifax, though it does excuse to some extent some earlier types like the Whitley with a 1.43% operational crash rate, compared with the Lancaster's 0.16%.

Cheers

Steve

Thanks for this. I disagree about the 0.08% being significant in the context of comparing the Lancaster I/III against the Halifax III. A good proportion of those Halifax losses would have been the Mk I and II which were much worse than the Lancaster.

 

[stona]

A good proportion of those Halifax losses would have been the Mk I and II which were much worse than the Lancaster.

Possibly, but it's impossible to draw any such conclusion from the figures.

Cheers

Steve

 

[tomo pauk]

Do we know how many Halifaxes were lost in 1941-42? How much in 1943? 1944-45?

 

[stona]

Do we know how many Halifaxes were lost in 1941-42? How much in 1943? 1944-45?

I don't have those figures (at least not to hand).
Looking at the losses for squadrons that converted to Lancasters from Halifaxes it is generally the case that the losses for the Halifax are very much higher than the losses for the Lancaster. Given that the difference for the two types over the entire war was less than 0.1% this might imply that the high Halifax losses were sustained early in the war, that is before the units converted to Lancasters and whilst they were flying early versions of the Halifax.

This might also explain Harris' passionate and vitriolic dislike of the Halifax and personal contempt for Handley Page himself. When Lancaster squadrons were losing around 2%, Halifax squadrons were losing 5%-6%.

There are however any number of other factors that might skew the statistics.

Cheers

Steve

 

[Shortround6]

The Big fin MK IIs don't show up until the spring/summer of 1943 and would not become the dominant model (of Merlin powered planes) in use for quite some time (if ever). The MK IIIs start showing up in the fall of 1943. Since the early arrow fin planes are not yanked out of service (and I am not sure how fast or how many were converted in service). Not sure when the Melrin 22 was introduced to replace the Merlin XX. Some time in 1943?

It would take quite a while for the earlier aircraft to be phased out of service however so an overnight change in the loss rate could hardly be expected.

Trouble with the idea of shutting down Halifax production and making Lancasters instead was that it wasn't one factory making Halifaxes but five. Handley Page, English Electric, Fairey, Rootes and the London Aircraft Production Group (LAPG).

From Wiki:
" In parallel with the Shadow Factory scheme, the London Aircraft Production Group (LAPG) was formed in 1940 by combining management of factories and workshops of Chrysler, Duple, Express Motor Bodyworks Limited, Park Royal Coachworks and London Transport. The major activity of the group was the production of Handley Page Halifax bombers for the RAF, ammunition, gun parts, armoured vehicles and spare parts for vehicles. The group was led by London Transport from their works at Chiswick and later at Leavesden near Watford, which had a large purpose-built factory and airfield for production, assembly and flight testing of completed Halifax bombers.[7]

Due to the high priority placed on aircraft production, large numbers of workers were drafted with little experience or training in aircraft production, with over half the workforce eventually being female. At its peak the LAPG included 41 factories or sites, 600 sub-contractors and 51,000 employees, producing one aircraft an hour. The first Halifax from the LAPG was delivered in 1941 and the last, named London Pride, in April 1945"

I have my doubts about how long the one aircraft per hour rate was kept up (one day?) but obviously once large set-ups/organizations were tooled up and running switching to a different type of aircraft could result in months of lost production.