In 1941 the Hurricane was being withdrawn as a fighter in Europe as it wasn't a match for the Me109. In the Middle East and Malta as soon as the Me109 arrived the Hurricane suffered huge losses. In the Far East they were totally outclassed by the IJAAF fighters. The RAF knew this as did the Pilots. To believe that the Hurricane was a match for the opposition from 1941 onwards flies in the face of all evidence.
From 1941 its role was as a GA aircraft as was the Whirlwind.
In Europe the Hurricane units were the first to convert to the Typhoon a statement you can easily check, the Whirlwind squadrons were amongst the last, something else you can easily check. So the question still stands, why if the Hurricane was so much better than the Whirlwind, did the Whirlwind squadrons be amongst the last to convert to the Typhoon?
To say that the Whirlwind operated in areas where it was unlikely to meet enemy fighters is also incorrect. They flew a normal variety of missions, convoy patrols certainly but also targeted enemy airbases attacks on ports, blockade runners, factories, bridges and bomber escort, as I said the normal mixture of missions. In three years of combat in two squadrons 24 were lost in combat, 7 missing in action and 5 written off with battle damage after crash landings. 36 losses to enemy action in three years of combat across two squadrons in the most hostile air combat area around. I suspect these figures had something to do with the RAF delaying the conversion of the Whirlwind to Typhoons.
In dogfights with the Me109f at low altitude the Whirlwind more than held its own, something a Hurricane would struggle to do.
The Hurricane started to suffer losses when the Bf 109 F turned up on Sicily.
The Hurricane was not principally a ground attack aircraft in 1941 (the time in question in this thread) it was one of the RAF's two front line fighters.
As regards conversion from the Hurricane, Edgar has made the point above. Most Hurricane units were fighter units and converted to the best available fighter, the Spitfire when it became available.
The Whirlwind flew low level hit and run raids for much of its career, somewhat like the Bf 110s of Erpr.Gr. 210 in 1940. They certainly did try to avoid enemy fighters. When 10 Group prepared instructions for the Whirlwinds carrying out 'Mandolin' (later 'Rhubarb') operations, on which they were anyway heavily escorted by real fighter, the instructions said:
"...it is proposed to carry out raids by small numbers of fighter aircraft, operating in conditions which would allow cloud cover, against selected enemy aerodromes and other German military objectives within striking range of this Group....the main factor in this operation and in selecting targets is the safety of the fighters; thus particular attention must be paid to cloud cover, and the likelihood of the pilot locating the target on coming through the cloud without making himself vulnerable by prolonged search."
The RAF sought to exploit the good low level performance of the Whirlwind. They typically crossed the Channel at 'low level' or 'sea level' before climbing over the French coast to 8-10,000 ft altitudes at which they could compete. This does not make them a good fighter. Combats were regularly taking place above 20,000ft.
Later the Whirlwind did operate by night. It was safer under cover of darkness. The fact that it was able to operate in this way is a testament to those who flew it as it was not initially deemed suitable for night flying.
The last time Whirlwinds crossed the French coast, on 26th November 1943, eight of them were escorted by the Spitfires of 610 Squadron, they were invariably escorted in daylight. Incidentally all eight were damaged by flak on this occasion. Flak is far more deadly than fighter to ground attack aircraft.
Of the 22 operational losses to known causes (excluding 'failed to return') 17 were to flak and just 5 to fighters.
The Whirlwinds role in daylight strikes was perhaps slightly unfairly summed up by No.263 Squadron's own intelligence officer. Having attacked Brest-Guipvas airfield the escorting squadrons of the Ibsley Wing (three of Spitfires and two of Typhoons) successfully engaged the Luftwaffe, the officer wrote,
"Whirlie-bait caused successful combats for the wing."
There are very few instances when the Whirlwind engaged in combat with Luftwaffe fighter over its two and a half year service life, I don't have time now to trawl for them.
Beware of Wikipedia:
"The Whirlwind proved a match for German fighters at low level, as demonstrated on 6 August 1941, when four Whirlwinds on an anti-shipping strike were intercepted by a large formation of Messerschmitt Bf 109s, claiming three Bf 109s destroyed for no losses."
The four Whirlwinds were accompanied by thirteen Spitfires of 118 Squadron. Four not three Bf 109s were claimed, two by the Whirlwinds and two by the Spitfires. In fact the only loss was one Bf 109 of Erg/JG 2.
This may have been shot down by a Whirlwind flown by Flt.Sgt. Brackley who reported:
"...the first enemy aircraft broke across my nose but was gone before I could fire. As the second broke away, also across my nose, I fired a 2.5 second barrage and saw it go straight into the sea."
AIR 50/103/3 if you've got £3.30 to spare or fancy a trip to the National Archives. I know you know your way around
As in many aerial combats the victim was shot down, probably unaware of the aircraft (in this case Brackley's Whirlwind) which attacked him and whose nose he was crossing. This does not in any way demonstrate the superiority of the Whirlwind to the Bf 109, rather it illustrates an unfortunate and fatal manoeuvre by the Messerschmitt pilot.
Here's an excerpt from another report which gives an idea of what happened when Whirlwinds saw Luftwaffe fighters:
"From there he was about to deliver the projected attack on Lannion aerodrome when someone gave the warning: "ME. 109s: beat it." About 6 ME 109s were seen in all: 5 definitely F, and 1 definitely E. Three were at 1000 feet, and 2 were at sea level coming towards the Whirlwinds. They made as if to deliver an attack, but then refused combat, either because they saw the Spitfires or because the Whirlwinds were too fast for them: (A.S.I. at this point showed 310.). The pilots report that the fire from the ME 109s. took the form of a regular line of black puffs, very like a barrage. Possibly they were firing shells fitted with a time fuse. They followed the Whirlwinds about 50 miles out to sea."
(AIR 27/1551)
The Whirlwinds made use of their low level performance to escape, exactly as 10 Group intended. The presence of escorting Spitfires gave the Bf 109 pilots food for thought.
Cheers
Steve