1944 -You are in charge!
- Thread starter delcyros
- Start date
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Adler:
Mr. Ndicki got it; the assertion is very correct. If after a melee with P-51s or P-47s the Luftwaffe losses 10 Bf109s or 10 Fw 190s, or 10 single engined fighters -an assortment of both types- they lost 10 pilots, not forgetting a number of them might bale out succesfully later returning to combat duty.
On the other hand, if the losses we are referring to are twin engined fighters (either Bf 110s or Me 410s) the Germans lost 20 men, even if a number of them too bale out succesfully.
So it is 10 vs. 20, a 100% casualty rate for the men manning the twin engined items.
I was strictly referring to human losses in that particular line, even if we acknowledge the following material facts that further illustrate what a foolish thing was to maintain the zerstörer in service during 1944 -and throughout the entire duration of the war-:
Internal Fuel Capacity:
TWIN ENGINED FIGHTERS: SINGLE ENGINED FIGHTERS:
Bf 110 (G version): 1,270 liters Fw 190 A-8: 524 liters.
Me 410 : 2,500 liters Bf 109 G-6, G-14, G-10: 400 liters
So, the fuel used to load the internal tank feeding the DB engines of a Bf 110 could have served the tanks of 3 Bf 109 G-6s. for the same mission. The outcome is even more terrible when comparing fuel consumption in the case of the Me 410.
Fuel became more critical than the "lack" of pilots during 1944. Fuel economy was not adequately considered.
Whatever approach we might give to the matter will result in a gruesome mistake by Luftwaffe planners to face the definitive aerial battle against the western allies. More men and more material could have served the daytime jagdwaffe.
A total of ~1,150 Me 410s were produced meaning ~2,300 DB engines...see those being produced and fitted to the fuselages of Bf 109s in the 1943-1944 period.
If more than 14,000 Bf 109s of the G series rolled off production lines in 1944 alone (mainly G-6s), try to think what the actual number could have been if all the material and human resources devoted to produce twin engined fighters and bombers in 1944 had been used to produce only single engined fighters.
~2,300 bombers of all types -mainly twin engined planes- were produced by the Germans in 1944, unbelievable. Bombers cost more in terms of both material and workforce. The fuel consumption issue...terrible mistake again.
In all Germany could have had some 8,000 extra engines and the sufficient pilots to equip the jadgeschwadern between the second half of 1943 and the end of 1944.
While i do not have the paper at hand, no less than 4,000 pilots and airmen served in the Zerstörergruppen and Kampfgruppen during 1944 alone. Again, see those as single engined fighters.
Hope this clarifies my previous idea.
Cheers.
Mr. Ndicki got it; the assertion is very correct. If after a melee with P-51s or P-47s the Luftwaffe losses 10 Bf109s or 10 Fw 190s, or 10 single engined fighters -an assortment of both types- they lost 10 pilots, not forgetting a number of them might bale out succesfully later returning to combat duty.
On the other hand, if the losses we are referring to are twin engined fighters (either Bf 110s or Me 410s) the Germans lost 20 men, even if a number of them too bale out succesfully.
So it is 10 vs. 20, a 100% casualty rate for the men manning the twin engined items.
I was strictly referring to human losses in that particular line, even if we acknowledge the following material facts that further illustrate what a foolish thing was to maintain the zerstörer in service during 1944 -and throughout the entire duration of the war-:
Internal Fuel Capacity:
TWIN ENGINED FIGHTERS: SINGLE ENGINED FIGHTERS:
Bf 110 (G version): 1,270 liters Fw 190 A-8: 524 liters.
Me 410 : 2,500 liters Bf 109 G-6, G-14, G-10: 400 liters
So, the fuel used to load the internal tank feeding the DB engines of a Bf 110 could have served the tanks of 3 Bf 109 G-6s. for the same mission. The outcome is even more terrible when comparing fuel consumption in the case of the Me 410.
Fuel became more critical than the "lack" of pilots during 1944. Fuel economy was not adequately considered.
Whatever approach we might give to the matter will result in a gruesome mistake by Luftwaffe planners to face the definitive aerial battle against the western allies. More men and more material could have served the daytime jagdwaffe.
A total of ~1,150 Me 410s were produced meaning ~2,300 DB engines...see those being produced and fitted to the fuselages of Bf 109s in the 1943-1944 period.
If more than 14,000 Bf 109s of the G series rolled off production lines in 1944 alone (mainly G-6s), try to think what the actual number could have been if all the material and human resources devoted to produce twin engined fighters and bombers in 1944 had been used to produce only single engined fighters.
~2,300 bombers of all types -mainly twin engined planes- were produced by the Germans in 1944, unbelievable. Bombers cost more in terms of both material and workforce. The fuel consumption issue...terrible mistake again.
In all Germany could have had some 8,000 extra engines and the sufficient pilots to equip the jadgeschwadern between the second half of 1943 and the end of 1944.
While i do not have the paper at hand, no less than 4,000 pilots and airmen served in the Zerstörergruppen and Kampfgruppen during 1944 alone. Again, see those as single engined fighters.
Hope this clarifies my previous idea.
Cheers.
syscom3
Pacific Historian
I might be mistaken, but I do not think the Luftwaffe was ever had a shortage of engines in all of 1944.
I also dont think the Me109 in any of its variants in 1944 was a major threat to the allied fighters and bombers.
I would say that the Fw190 was a threat. Therefore Adler is correct in saying that it would be better to have 10 -190's than 10 -109's.
I also dont think the Me109 in any of its variants in 1944 was a major threat to the allied fighters and bombers.
I would say that the Fw190 was a threat. Therefore Adler is correct in saying that it would be better to have 10 -190's than 10 -109's.
They may not have had a shortage of engines in theory, but the ones they did have were crap. Not on paper, but in reality.
An example - the place just up the road rebuilt a Fiesler Storch a couple of years ago, and they wanted to change the engine. As luck would have it, they had a new one, still in its crate, so they banged it in. At the first turn of the starter handle, there was a horrid grinding and crunching noise, and though the engine started, it stopped again quite quickly. It was full of sand. The resistance in whichever country the engine had been built in, had poured a handful of sand into each cylinder before crating the engine. Of course, the clowns up the road hadn't bothered to check, had they!
It depends how you define a shortage of engines.
An example - the place just up the road rebuilt a Fiesler Storch a couple of years ago, and they wanted to change the engine. As luck would have it, they had a new one, still in its crate, so they banged it in. At the first turn of the starter handle, there was a horrid grinding and crunching noise, and though the engine started, it stopped again quite quickly. It was full of sand. The resistance in whichever country the engine had been built in, had poured a handful of sand into each cylinder before crating the engine. Of course, the clowns up the road hadn't bothered to check, had they!
It depends how you define a shortage of engines.
- Thread starter
- #45
delcyros
Tech Sergeant
By 1944 and for central europe in high altitude dogfights, I surely would like to have 10 Bf-109 instead of 10 Fw-190A.
The BMW engine controll box suffered in high altitude because of an error caused by division through zero. Not so the DB engines. The Focke Wulfs were good for hunting bombers up there above 6000m but little else.
The Bf-109 G6 in clean configuration was at least competetive to the US fighters. Few Bf-109G were in clean configuration.
Since this thread scenario is high altitude bomber interception, You need both.
From the allied point of view I note that the concentration on POL would cause a significant war impact but also is going to increase the losses above the historic figure. Problem lies in the concentration. This makes concentrated defense a highly probable countermeasure. AAA does not rely on fuel. POL covered by massive AA traps is a scenario to deal with. Deployment of proximity fuzes (which began in late 1944) would be accelerated as would the techn. development of radar and related FC and of SAM.
The jets probably would enter service at around the historic date or later, altough in higher numbers due to less dispersed production lines and the ability to use low grade fuel.
General dispersal of industry could be delayed or never happen for such an concentration on POL, thus increasing the output of german military equipment, ammo, etc.
Fuel will still be avaiable, altough in much fewer quantities than historical. This may cause significant reduction of mobility for the army in the east, easening their demise in 1944 and causing a rapidly accelerating soviet advance. At the end of 1944 there would probably not enough fuel left for the Ardennen-operation, thus accelerating wars end in europe.
I see the Luftwaffe bomber groups (fuel hogs), which rely on high grade fuel (as do the fighters) to be grounded early in 1944 fue to fuel shortage. The same is true for the Nightfightergruppen to mid 1944. The single engined day fighters may still continue to operate until late 1944.
The navy would not be affected that much, since it may rely on low grade fuel as well. Introduction of advanced submarines will happen months earlier and may cause some additional losses altough not enough to change things substantially.
syscom3
Pacific Historian
I think the -190 was the better of the two for bringing down the bombers.
As for AAA defenses at the POL sites, 8th AF records show that lots of bombers were damaged by them, but the actual number shot down were within acceptable limits. And the bombers that fell out of the combat box's would find plenty of escorting fighters to give it cover.
I do agree about the proximity fuses. It had the potential to really do some damage.
But in the end, the 8th, 15th and Bomber Commands would be willing to accept those losses in exchange for seriously damaging the POL industry.
As for AAA defenses at the POL sites, 8th AF records show that lots of bombers were damaged by them, but the actual number shot down were within acceptable limits. And the bombers that fell out of the combat box's would find plenty of escorting fighters to give it cover.
I do agree about the proximity fuses. It had the potential to really do some damage.
But in the end, the 8th, 15th and Bomber Commands would be willing to accept those losses in exchange for seriously damaging the POL industry.
If you focus on POL exclusively that would be likely.
If you make it the most strategicly important target and mix it up with your other activities then you will end up with spread AA.
Your next targets are power and heavy production facilities that can not be dispersed easily.
Ports get visited regularly combining night area bombing and mine laying as a denial method, preventng supplies moving by this route as much as possible.
Railway rolling stock gets hammered as do the yards and sheds. The replacement of rolling stock and engines means more resource draining from production of tanks etc.
I would also consider major wing operations over France for fighters and ground attack wings combined, flood whole regions with mass attacks on any viable target while forcing the air clear with fighter cover, drawing German Fighters away from bomber duties, and working on attrition by numbers.
Start using the Sicily airbases at this time to cut the northern transport lines in Italy, focus ground attack, and medium range bombers on this task, cut off the army in Italy from resupply as much as possible.
Stick with the premise that this is the start of 1944, and every thing that is historically correct has occured, not "what if they did this" or "we did that". Work with what you have got.
If you make it the most strategicly important target and mix it up with your other activities then you will end up with spread AA.
Your next targets are power and heavy production facilities that can not be dispersed easily.
Ports get visited regularly combining night area bombing and mine laying as a denial method, preventng supplies moving by this route as much as possible.
Railway rolling stock gets hammered as do the yards and sheds. The replacement of rolling stock and engines means more resource draining from production of tanks etc.
I would also consider major wing operations over France for fighters and ground attack wings combined, flood whole regions with mass attacks on any viable target while forcing the air clear with fighter cover, drawing German Fighters away from bomber duties, and working on attrition by numbers.
Start using the Sicily airbases at this time to cut the northern transport lines in Italy, focus ground attack, and medium range bombers on this task, cut off the army in Italy from resupply as much as possible.
Stick with the premise that this is the start of 1944, and every thing that is historically correct has occured, not "what if they did this" or "we did that". Work with what you have got.
- Thread starter
- #48
delcyros
Tech Sergeant
Absolutely. However, at those altitudes it is easy prey for escort fighters.
AAA is a serious matter. One of the aspects of city bombing is that Germany needed to disperse it´s AAA force.
To name some numbers: 2500 8.8cm AAA Luftwaffe and 64 10.5cm AAA in 1939.
production numbers for 1939-44 are (note that 12.8cm AAA only had proximity fuze from mid 1944 onwards) for heavy AAA:
16411 8.8cm AA (army and Luftwaffe)
3889 10.5cm AA (army and Luftwaffe)
1031 12.8cm AA (luftwaffe only)
Early in 1944 were 7420 heavy AAA for central Germany (including Vienna and Prague) avaiable, most of them being 8.8cm AAA.
Close to 80% of the AAA in 1944 was dispersed in belts around large cities, not around key targets. 10% were reseved for Key targets, such as the Leuna oil plants. They enjoied Radar aiming but in our scenario there would be three-four times as much AAA around these key sites than historical.
"In 1944 Flak accounted for 3,501 American planes destroyed, enemy fighters shot down about 600 less in the same time period. More flak guns gradually appeared, mainly the 128mm (5 in) German Flak accounted for 50 of the 72 RAF bombers lost over Berlin on the night of March 24th, 1944*. An incredible 56 bombers were destroyed or crippled by flak during a B-17 raid on Merseburg in November of 1944." - FLAK Air Defenses Fliegerabwehrkanonen (Anti-Aircraft-Artillery)
*)Note that I doubt the claims, however, the 12.8cm fired proxy fuzed shells as noted above by then, so it may be possible.
Concentration on POL is something worthy to do but perhaps You should delegate some or all efforts on other key targets, at least in a sukzessive way. This makes coordination of air defense a harder task. 12 months POL bombings means horrible losses with the risk of the demise of the US day bombing fleet.
Soundbreaker Welch?
Tech Sergeant
What would You do to shorten the war?
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1944 switched forward to 2007:Set a timeline for troop withdrawal. We are losing too many airmen fighting this war. We are using an administrations failed policy cannot win, and we have no good strategy in. This President has misled this country into a war without a plan. We need to pull back to our shores and defend our women and children on our undefended coastline. We are in a mess if we stay in this war, and I say we need to bring our boys back home by Christmas. We will make America a safer place.
(Joke. I forgot that FDR was a Democrat. He would not be in trouble in 2007.)
----------------------------------------------
1944 switched forward to 2007:Set a timeline for troop withdrawal. We are losing too many airmen fighting this war. We are using an administrations failed policy cannot win, and we have no good strategy in. This President has misled this country into a war without a plan. We need to pull back to our shores and defend our women and children on our undefended coastline. We are in a mess if we stay in this war, and I say we need to bring our boys back home by Christmas. We will make America a safer place.
(Joke. I forgot that FDR was a Democrat. He would not be in trouble in 2007.)
- Thread starter
- #50
delcyros
Tech Sergeant
I actually would do little else, however, I would plan decently.
Heavy bomber groups:
Up to and including february:
bombing of cities
(yes, I know it may have little effect in terms of industrial output but it will cementate the AAA concentration on cities for some time)
march:
exclusively POL campaign (trying to get all facilities bombed)
april:
exclusively bombing of airfields and aircraft production related plants
may-june:
exclusively concentration on DDay preperations in France: communication, transport and military targets in northern France (huge task)
This should push Germany in a very uncomfortable defensive position for the first half year. The decentralisation of AAA should led to reduced day bombing losses, fuel shortages will led to reduced Luftwaffe offensive abilities, very close to historic record
jule:
exclusively POL campaign 2
august:
bombing of the cities, concentration on industrial targets
september: bombing of the cities, concentration on transport relative structures
oktober:exclusively POL campaign 3
november-december: Targets of opportunity, R&D, transport related structures
Heavy bomber groups:
Up to and including february:
bombing of cities
(yes, I know it may have little effect in terms of industrial output but it will cementate the AAA concentration on cities for some time)
march:
exclusively POL campaign (trying to get all facilities bombed)
april:
exclusively bombing of airfields and aircraft production related plants
may-june:
exclusively concentration on DDay preperations in France: communication, transport and military targets in northern France (huge task)
This should push Germany in a very uncomfortable defensive position for the first half year. The decentralisation of AAA should led to reduced day bombing losses, fuel shortages will led to reduced Luftwaffe offensive abilities, very close to historic record
jule:
exclusively POL campaign 2
august:
bombing of the cities, concentration on industrial targets
september: bombing of the cities, concentration on transport relative structures
oktober:exclusively POL campaign 3
november-december: Targets of opportunity, R&D, transport related structures
Soundbreaker Welch?
Tech Sergeant
Sounds like a good plan. Wonder why the allies didn't really try to alternate more. In the Eighth Air Force Eaker wasn't the most inovative, but Doolittle?
102first_hussars
Tech Sergeant
Focus all air power on bombing
1. communications
2. Radar Installations
3. Airfeilds
4. AAA sites
5. Supply Movements
6. Troop Movements
7. Tanks
8. Artillery
9. Infrastructure (eg, Highways, Railroads bridges, Governement Buildings etc)
10. Coastal Forts
1. communications
2. Radar Installations
3. Airfeilds
4. AAA sites
5. Supply Movements
6. Troop Movements
7. Tanks
8. Artillery
9. Infrastructure (eg, Highways, Railroads bridges, Governement Buildings etc)
10. Coastal Forts
Hurricane33
Recruit
- 7
- Oct 29, 2006
there is no way to end the war in europe in a fast @ timely matter. the nazis had to be destroyed, by any @ all means of course changes could have been made such as pulling out troops from Itlay. by 1944 musselini was dead; deplore extra troops to France starve out the German resistance just like we did in the pacific w/the Japanese,move north thru austria @ west thru France in a pincer movement around Germany @ also invade Switzerland since they were the bankers of the Reich: cut off the money you cut off the supply
Hurricane33
Recruit
- 7
- Oct 29, 2006
that is west thru France
102first_hussars
Tech Sergeant
No way in hell i would bomb civilians so theres no point
I have to disagree that the German engines were crap. Most were not sabatured and the BMW-801, DB-605, and Jumo-213 were some of the best engines built during the war.
You would not make it north through Austria. The allies met very harsh resistance form the Germans and Italy and it pretty much bogged down. Besides you said you were going to pull the troops out of Italy, so how are you going to even get to Austria then?
Invading Switzerland would have been stupid. Have you ever read up on the Swiss Defenses. Why do you think Hitler did not invade Switzerland besides the fact it was his bank. The mountains in Switzerland are hollow with defenses. They are full of artillary hidden behind false mountain faces. Everytown had hidden walls in the building consealing artillary and every Swiss man is trained in the military and everyone has military equipment and weapons. They have a vast superior knowledge of the mountains and they walled up the passes between the mountains. No one would have been stupid to invade Switzerland.
It is actually still the same today as it was in WW2 in Switzerland. The mountains are still hollow and maintained and the cannons are just modern versions of the WW2 ones, barns still have machine gun nests in them and every man when they turn 18 is required to do military service and after there service is finished participate in maneuvers even as a civilian every year until a certain age which is pretty old.
My soon to be brother in law is from Switzerland and he just got back from maneuvers. He works in investments in one of the richest parts of Switzerland and is pretty wealthy himself. At his house he keeps all of his military gear including his military issue rifle for when the call comes to defend his country.
So as you see the only way into Germany was through France and Poland.
