I have to agree. Appeasment is what led to WW2 but then again who are we kidding. WW2 was just a continuation of WW1 after a 20 year cease fire.
1944 -You are in charge!
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But with the state of disarmament that in particular Britain was in, the appeasement bought some time to rearm (bringing online the Hurricane and Spitfire for one). If the war had gone ahead in say 1936 the German's (if the French were willing) would of been defeated but in the air it would of been BF-109A/B's against Hawker Fury's, Gladiators and such like rather than Hurricane's and Spitfire's. Whilst I also believe it did lead to WW2 it was also as you said a continuation WW1 with a break for rearmament (and disarmament) and a chance to replace the losses of the Great War.
As for 1944 I would continue the plans to attack the oil refineries and other key industries (ball bearings, tank and aircraft production etc) as well as done the Transportation plan for the D-day invasion which would of gone ahead as it did, after the troops are a ashore focus the heavies on targets inside Germany - oil, ball bearing, tanks, aircraft, AA and as the armies get closer to Germany send in the medium bombers as well to back up the heavies (before this they would of been supporting the troops in France).
As for 1944 I would continue the plans to attack the oil refineries and other key industries (ball bearings, tank and aircraft production etc) as well as done the Transportation plan for the D-day invasion which would of gone ahead as it did, after the troops are a ashore focus the heavies on targets inside Germany - oil, ball bearing, tanks, aircraft, AA and as the armies get closer to Germany send in the medium bombers as well to back up the heavies (before this they would of been supporting the troops in France).
Twitch
Staff Sergeant
I think I'd nuke France.....8)
Think I would start by going after Germany Electric Plants. SBS after the war realized that with as little as 200 tons of bombs, 50% (or more) of German electric generation would be lost (I think I have my facts right on that one-been a while). No power, no output. A lot easier than bombing trains, refineries, ect. Easy to spot and almost impossible to hide. Since WW2, electric generation has always been at the top of the list for bombers.
But that is all looking back. At the time, nobody really had it figured out. A lot of theories on aircraft useage (Mitchell, Douhet, ect) but they were working their way through it. It took time, aircrew and a lot of mistakes.
But that is all looking back. At the time, nobody really had it figured out. A lot of theories on aircraft useage (Mitchell, Douhet, ect) but they were working their way through it. It took time, aircrew and a lot of mistakes.
Gnomey, the Luftwaffe in 1936-37 was not about Bf109s but He51s, Hs123s and suchlike. Nothing to get too excited about, as they were on a similar basis to the Furies and Gladiators you mention. Possibly, the Gladiators would have proven better; the He51 failed to make much impression in Spain.
The Ju87 was not in real squadron service, and Germany's bomber force was limited to Ju52s, He111As and Do17Es - again, converted civilian stuff that, while fast, was not up to RAF standards, as it went on to provein the Battle of Britain. Guernica apart...
And if you'd timed it right, all their best kit would have been in Spain.
The Ju87 was not in real squadron service, and Germany's bomber force was limited to Ju52s, He111As and Do17Es - again, converted civilian stuff that, while fast, was not up to RAF standards, as it went on to provein the Battle of Britain. Guernica apart...
And if you'd timed it right, all their best kit would have been in Spain.
The BF-109's were just coming online in 1937 so if it was timed around then before the Hurricane and Spitfire came online it would of been Furies etc against 109's but still the bulk of the Luftwaffe would of been as you said He-51 and other similar performance wise aircraft. I would aslo agree on the bombers the German bombers were not great in 1936 to ~1939 and the British ones were better. It would of been in an interesting contest if it had happened a year or two earlier but again it all depends on the French willingness to fight (which as shown in 1940 they didn't have) so it would be hard to call and may of ended up in a stalemate.
If the allies had stood up in 1936 they could have stopped Germany right there and then. The Germans were in no position to fight a war in 1936, hell many of the top German commanders advised Hitler that the Germans were not ready in 1939 so 1936 would have been a quick war for the allies and it would have been over.
However polotics of the time would have rendered Germany into a similiar situation as 1918/1919 and that would have just lead to worsened tentions in 1936/1937 had the allies stood up and fought that early.
However polotics of the time would have rendered Germany into a similiar situation as 1918/1919 and that would have just lead to worsened tentions in 1936/1937 had the allies stood up and fought that early.
Don't forget that while we were rearming, the Germans were not just standing around waiting for us to finish; they needed trained pilots, aircrew, groundcrew, soldiers, and so on. They were moving from tiny, un-equipped but excellently trained professional armed forces to a huge conscript army, and changing all their equipment at the same time. Appeasement gave them the time to do that. It is all very well having a few Bf109s if you do not have enough qualified people to maintain and fly them.
Yeap appeasement gave Hilter only more time to prepare plus it fueled his mind on things he could do. It made him feel invincible and gave him the feeling the allies would let him do as he pleases to avoid another war on the continent.
syscom3
Pacific Historian
Dont forget the Germans were also honing their skills in Spain with their assistance to Franco.
Yeap that is where they tested all there new aircraft with the Condor Legion.
Which means, as I mentioned above, that all the best, most promising people, were off "on holiday in the sun" - and not available to the Luftwaffe at short notice. Don't forget that in order to come home, they would have to go round France - not an easy task in a Bf109.
wmaxt
Staff Sergeant
I think POL would be the priority. Cracking plants cannot be subdivided in a "Cottage industry" fashon and is vital to a war. All other efforts would be adjusted to maximise confusion and to occupy the German war effort.
Hindsite shows that the attack on POL had the biggest single strategic effect on the German war effort.
wmaxt
Hindsite shows that the attack on POL had the biggest single strategic effect on the German war effort.
wmaxt
Vassili Zaitzev
Master Sergeant
Alright as the Commander of the American and British air force, I would concentrate my heavy bombers on Germany industry. I would use my medium bombers such as the B-26 for attacks on costal defences in prepartion for normandy, and for destruction of enemy forces inland. Or I would use all my air power on one point in the atlantic wall.
syscom3
Pacific Historian
The USSBS report had ample proof that the POL industry and electrical generating plants were the weak point of the German war machine.
Knocking the POL plants offline for days or weeks paid plenty of dividends. No fuel, nothing moves.
I would have every heavy bomber mission to target the POL and the railroad marshalling yards.
For the medium bombers, going after the lines of communications and known German depots would suffice.
Knocking the POL plants offline for days or weeks paid plenty of dividends. No fuel, nothing moves.
I would have every heavy bomber mission to target the POL and the railroad marshalling yards.
For the medium bombers, going after the lines of communications and known German depots would suffice.
If i, on the other hand, would have been in charge of commanding the Luftwaffe´s war effort by January 1944, then i see myself implementing the following urgent measures:
(i) In view of the USAAF build-up as observed during 1943, except for maintaining an adequate fighter force for the NJGs, I order the prompt and definitive ceasing of production of twin engined fighters to equip dayfighting units; ZG 26 and ZG 76 are disbanded, their pilots and ground personnel sent to the several Jagdgeschwardern fighting the USAAF and RAF.
I´d rather lose 10 Bf 109s or Fw190s on a single engagement, than 10 Bf-110s or Me 410s. Very simple, every twin engined fighter lost in action implies a 100% casualty rate when compared with the loss of single engined toy.
(Not that I agree with the classical account affirming the Me 410 was "uncapable" of dealing with the allied single engined fighters, but that is material for another discussion; it is just that Germany was fighting against all odds and simply could not afford losing so many men).
(ii) Except for maintaining lonf range aircraft for maritime co-operation with the U-boat force and for some very specific long range bombing missions, the production of all bombers is promptly terminated; the pilots and ground perssonel of all Kampfgruppen in service in 1944 are too sent for training as single engined pilots.
If losing both men manning a twin engined fighter in 1944 was a foolish thing to swallow, what of losing the 4 or 5 men manning a He 111, Ju 88, Ju 188, Do 217 or He 177 in such a critical year? You are spilling your valuable and scarce drinking water while you have not yet gotten across the desert. Thirst will likely kill you.
(iii) I would definetly not go for the so called "Baby Blitz" that achieved very little and implied high costs for the Germans.
The adequate implementation of the measures pointed in (i) and (ii) would imply a significant overall improvement of the German capabilities to wage the war in the air. Reichsverteidigung would bring even more horrific memories to the veterans of both USAAF and RAF.
Losses for the USAAF in 1944 were horrible; we are kind of acquainted with this common song "...the germans could not replace their losses while the USAAF could replace its losses easily...". Now wait a minute there. While the assertion might be correct (partially), the willingness to accept a high casualty toll for Uncle Sam has been completely overhyped.
Unlike the soviet ally, the U.S.A. was not a tyranny where the lives of hundreds of thousands of men could be just put in the toilet; so yes, while the USAers could replace their dead easily than the Germans, a better planned and more concentrated German jagdwaffe could have pushed the guys in the USAAF into some filthy dark alley.
Many pilots of the sturmgruppen of JG 3 and JG 300 reported well performances from their mates providing top cover flying Bf 109 G-6 (although their numbers would not be sufficient), try to imagine what the number of available Bf 109s could have been if you cancel all production of bombers and twin engined fighters (and the availability of more single engined fighter pilots).
All the raw materials, engines, spare parts, ammo, fuel, weaponry, workforce and pilots will be devoted for producing mainly single engined fighters and the Me 262: Bf 109 G-6/AS and Fw 190 A-8s and A-9s for the first half of 1944
Bf 109 G-14/AS and G-10 for the second half of 1944 alongside the Fw 190 D and the Ta-152.
But most importantly, a better planned fighter force would help the entrance of the Me 262 in more respectable numbers.
Cheers!
(i) In view of the USAAF build-up as observed during 1943, except for maintaining an adequate fighter force for the NJGs, I order the prompt and definitive ceasing of production of twin engined fighters to equip dayfighting units; ZG 26 and ZG 76 are disbanded, their pilots and ground personnel sent to the several Jagdgeschwardern fighting the USAAF and RAF.
I´d rather lose 10 Bf 109s or Fw190s on a single engagement, than 10 Bf-110s or Me 410s. Very simple, every twin engined fighter lost in action implies a 100% casualty rate when compared with the loss of single engined toy.
(Not that I agree with the classical account affirming the Me 410 was "uncapable" of dealing with the allied single engined fighters, but that is material for another discussion; it is just that Germany was fighting against all odds and simply could not afford losing so many men).
(ii) Except for maintaining lonf range aircraft for maritime co-operation with the U-boat force and for some very specific long range bombing missions, the production of all bombers is promptly terminated; the pilots and ground perssonel of all Kampfgruppen in service in 1944 are too sent for training as single engined pilots.
If losing both men manning a twin engined fighter in 1944 was a foolish thing to swallow, what of losing the 4 or 5 men manning a He 111, Ju 88, Ju 188, Do 217 or He 177 in such a critical year? You are spilling your valuable and scarce drinking water while you have not yet gotten across the desert. Thirst will likely kill you.
(iii) I would definetly not go for the so called "Baby Blitz" that achieved very little and implied high costs for the Germans.
The adequate implementation of the measures pointed in (i) and (ii) would imply a significant overall improvement of the German capabilities to wage the war in the air. Reichsverteidigung would bring even more horrific memories to the veterans of both USAAF and RAF.
Losses for the USAAF in 1944 were horrible; we are kind of acquainted with this common song "...the germans could not replace their losses while the USAAF could replace its losses easily...". Now wait a minute there. While the assertion might be correct (partially), the willingness to accept a high casualty toll for Uncle Sam has been completely overhyped.
Unlike the soviet ally, the U.S.A. was not a tyranny where the lives of hundreds of thousands of men could be just put in the toilet; so yes, while the USAers could replace their dead easily than the Germans, a better planned and more concentrated German jagdwaffe could have pushed the guys in the USAAF into some filthy dark alley.
Many pilots of the sturmgruppen of JG 3 and JG 300 reported well performances from their mates providing top cover flying Bf 109 G-6 (although their numbers would not be sufficient), try to imagine what the number of available Bf 109s could have been if you cancel all production of bombers and twin engined fighters (and the availability of more single engined fighter pilots).
All the raw materials, engines, spare parts, ammo, fuel, weaponry, workforce and pilots will be devoted for producing mainly single engined fighters and the Me 262: Bf 109 G-6/AS and Fw 190 A-8s and A-9s for the first half of 1944
Bf 109 G-14/AS and G-10 for the second half of 1944 alongside the Fw 190 D and the Ta-152.
But most importantly, a better planned fighter force would help the entrance of the Me 262 in more respectable numbers.
Cheers!
Ummm not sure what to think about that. I am still trying to fathom it. I certainly understand what you are saying but I am having a hard time agreeing with it.
syscom3
Pacific Historian
I think hes trying to say that losing a twin engined fighter means the loss of twice the ammount of material.
Yeah I know, but I think I would still rather have 10 Fw-190s than 10 Bf-109s.
