70th anniversary of Hiroshima

[tyrodtom]

It isn't out of the realm of common sense to think the Japanese might resist the invasion of one of their home islands with more vigor than they resisted the Luzon invasion.
Plus in the Luzon invasion a lot of the local civilians were pro-allied.

How many of the local civilians on Kyushu do you think would assist the allies ?

The closer to Japan we got, the more costly, in casualty rates, the invasions became.

Would it have been unreasonable to think the casualty rate for invading Kyushu might have been even higher than the Okinawa invasion ?

 

[stona]

I'm only quoting what the American decision makers thought at the time. Present at the meeting were Truman, Marshall, Leahy, King, Stimpson, Forrestal, McCloy and McFarland. It's hard to imagine a more senior group of Americans at a single meeting.
If you want to disagree with that lot, that's your prerogative. We'll never know whether they were right or wrong, but their casualty estimates were what influenced the decision to go ahead with the invasion(s), initially of Kyushu. Those are the contemporary figures, whether we like or agree with them or not.

The minutes of the meeting read:
"There is reason to believe that the first 30 days in Kyushu should not exceed the price we have paid for Luzon."

MacArthur was not at the meeting, but King had asked his opinion of the operation on Kyushu and read his reply to the meeting. MacArthur wrote:
"I believe the operation presents less hazards of excessive loss than any other that has been suggested and that its decisive effect will eventually save lives by eliminating wasteful operations of a nondecisive character."

The Americans were obviously concerned with minimising casualties, but at no time is there any suggestion that they anticipated the sort of numbers commonly bandied about post war.

Cheers

Steve

 

[tyrodtom]

I didn't read your reply close enough. It was about the June 45 meeting on the invasion of Kyushu.

Did they have additional information at the later meetings where they made the decision to drop the atomic bombs on Japan ?

Seeing as how this meeting took place on the 18th of June, and the battle of Okinawa wasn't even over at that time.

 

[GrauGeist]

The Americans were obviously concerned with minimising casualties, but at no time is there any suggestion that they anticipated the sort of numbers commonly bandied about post war.

Cheers

Steve

Actually, if you read the minutes of the White House meeting of 18 June 1945, where those partial quotes are from, you'd get an idea of the concern of casualties and how they kept looking to Kyushu as thier only option.

The subject of casualties kept coming up and they were trying to make an estimate based on Normandy and the Pacific campaign. They also considered the 350,000 Japanese in the area of Kyushu and the ability of the Japanese to reinforce from nearby islands and the mainland.

It's a very interesting and sobering read, I highly recommend it:
Minutes of Meeting held at the White House

 

[stona]

Indeed, and as I said, at no point is the prospect of hundreds of thousands of Allied (actually they only seem to be debating US) casualties ever considered. It was, again as I said, a post war construct as part of the effort to justify not just the dropping of the bombs (which needed no justification in my opinion) but also the cost of the programme to develop them.

Whichever way you read it the conclusion is that something in the order of 30,000 - 35,000 casualties in the first 30 days are anticipated.

BTW they are not partial quotes, they are quotes. They are most pertinent and I don't have time to type out a document which, unlike you, I don't have a link to.

Post war the official line, that the bombs were dropped to avoid allied casualties, was rigorously adhered to. It was indeed one of the major factors in the decision to drop the bomb, it made it an easy line to follow. There were however others. Reading evidence from other meetings and discussions at the highest level, major factors were the prospect of Soviet entry into the Far Eastern war and the need to minimise the influence of other US Allies (not just Britain) in the region post war.

Cheers

Steve

 

[GrauGeist]

I think we should also keep in mind that the Joint Chiefs and their casualty estimates seen in this meeting were for the invasion of Kyushu and estimated as of the intel they had as of that date. It turns out that the Japanese had guessed (correctly) that Kyushu was the Allied target and commenced a buildup of that area, and by 2 August, had considerably more assets in that area and were in the process of creating a defensive "ring" beyond the Kyushu area.

This fact, combined with other factors, increased the casualty estimation during a reassessment in August.

 

[stona]

This fact, combined with other factors, increased the casualty estimation during a reassessment in August.

Which has no bearing on the decision to use the bombs. This was effectively agreed with the approval of Stimpson's lengthy memorandum of 2nd July after which British consent was sought, and given on 4th July. This is before even the Trinity test.

At the Potsdam conference, according to Churchill, he and Truman were made aware that the Soviet Union would attack Japan sometime shortly after 8th August which simply accelerated the effort to get the bomb dropped as soon as practically possible.
It is notable that the Potsdam declaration of 26th July makes no direct reference to the bomb, but rather to the consequences of Japan's continued resistance, prompt and utter destruction. There is no doubt that those who knew of the bomb, and that the decision was already taken to use it, were well aware of the detail of those consequences and destruction.

Cheers

Steve

 

[parsifal]

I think the degree of resistance at both Okinawa and Iwo Jima, coupled with the losses being sustained by the US Fleet were all factors in the decision to use the bomb. The estimates on Casualty rates was allover the place, and the estimates of how successful a direct invasion might be on bringing Japan to surrender also allover the place. Ive seen the reports at both ends of the spectrum, which leads me to the conclusion that whilst the fear of the casualty count was a factor in decision, it was also the uncertainty that a partial invasion would succeed, and perhaps more importantly succeed quick enough to prevent the Russians getting into Japan more substantially than they did.

 

[stona]

Well, the Russian thing was a double edged sword for the Americans. They'd been urging them to get involved in the Far east for three years, but despite official policy it's fair to say that the administration had a change of heart by early 1945. They could hardly now ask the Russians to stay out of it, but at the same time didn't feel that they were essential to a successful outcome, with or without the bombs.
The bombs were an easy option for the Americans on this count.
Cheers
Steve

 

[Hiromachi]

The simple fact is, Truman never presented the bomb as an alternative to invasion until after the war. He had always resisted the invasion of Japan regardless of whether the bomb worked. The prospect of several hundred Okinawas on the shores of Kyushu horrified him. He expected the naval blockade, the air war and – at least until mid-July – the Russians would together finish the job. Marshall, Stimson, Leahy, Eisenhower and Halsey all came to believe this, to a greater or lesser extent.

A dissenting voice was Leahy, who, at Truman's invitation, questioned the surprisingly small casualty estimates, citing America's 35 per cent casualty rate in Okinawa. In what numbers were we likely to invade Japan, he asked; '766,700' US troops were projected, Marshall replied. They would face about eight Japanese divisions or, at most, 350,000 troops and, of course, a deeply hostile people. The dreadful mental arithmetic rattled the room: that left 270,000 Americans dead or wounded. King protested, however, that Kyushu was very different from Okinawa, and raised the likely casualties to 'somewhere between Luzon*… and Okinawa' – or about 36,000 dead, wounded or missing. In this instance, King's arithmetic was almost as dubious as his geography – Kyushu is a mountainous land riven with caves and hilly redoubts, rather like Okinawa.
So the invasion would be 'another Okinawa closer to Japan?' Truman grimly asked. The chiefs nodded. And the Kyushu landing – was it 'the best solution under the circumstances?' the President wondered. 'It was,' the Chiefs replied.
Unpersuaded, Truman asked for Stimson's view. Would not the invasion of Japan by white men have the effect of uniting the Japanese people, he asked, interrupting the War Secretary, who had been regaling the meeting with dubious ideas about a 'large submerged class' of Japanese insurgents. Stimson agreed: yes, the Japanese would 'fight and fight' if 'white men' invaded their country.

Clearly, for Truman, the invasion plan was fading rapidly from the list of possible alternatives. He authorised the continued planning of the operation, but did not, and would never, approve its execution. The collapse of the Japanese economy, the total sea blockade and ongoing air raids had 'already created the conditions in which invasion would probably be unnecessary'. Indeed, Truman had convened the meeting precisely because he hoped to prevent 'an Okinawa from one end of Japan to another'. If the invasion of Kyushu and later Honshu was the 'best solution' of 'all possible alternative plans', demons of doubt lingered between the lines of the President's reluctant imprimatur.
In the days following, estimates of dramatically higher casualties further doomed the invasion plan. Nimitz, King and MacArthur all warned of a greater number of dead and missing than presented at the 18 June meeting. Even MacArthur ratcheted up his modest estimate, to 50,800 casualties in the first 30 days. No one could provide accurate projections, of course, and Truman never received a clear or unanimous calculation of likely losses, as King later said. Since the war, estimates of 500,000 to one million casualties have been crudely cited to justify the use of the atomic bomb – a classic case of justifying past actions using later information which was not applied at the time. At the time, nobody in a position of influence officially projected such astronomical numbers. The bomb, in any case, would not 'save' these hypothetical lists of dead and wounded: in late June and early July Operation Downfall lost the support of Truman and the Joint Chiefs not because the atomic bomb offered an alternative, but because the invasion plan was seen as too costly and, given Japan's military and economic defeat, ultimately unnecessary.

The land invasion plans were dealt a terminal blow in early July. Further reports, based on Ultra intercepts, of mounting Japanese strength in Kyushu, turned a blowtorch on the case for Downfall. The horrific example of Okinawa focused American minds on the growing presence of Japanese troops, and armed civilians, in Kyushu. On 8*July, the Combined Intelligence Committee released an 'Estimate of the Enemy Situation' – sourced to Ultra, military appraisals and interrogation of prisoners. Prepared for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, it stands as one of the most authoritative assessments of Japan's military capability in the dying days of the war. By July 1945, the report states, Japan expected to be able to field 35 active divisions and 14 depot divisions – a total of two million men (many of them worn-out or poorly trained conscripts, or civilians pressed into uniform) – in defence of Kyushu and Honshu.

By early July 1945, regardless of whether the bomb worked or not, Japan's pathetic state, the likely casualties of Tokyo's death wish, and Truman's political sensitivity made it almost inconceivable that MacArthur's invasion plan would proceed. Ultra confirmed Washington's fears – and those of the Joint Chiefs of Staff – that Japan's leaders had not only correctly identified where the proposed invasion would start; they had made the defence of the southern half of Kyushu their 'highest priority'. These developments led to the decision to set aside, if not yet completely cancel, Olympic – MacArthur's cherished invasion plan – a week before the momentous developments in the New Mexican desert.



The President was just too smart a politician – with a genuine desire to protect American lives – to risk political suicide through the loss of so many young men against a regime that everyone in power in Washington knew was, for all practical purposes, defeated. In this context, the bomb was not a substitute for an invasion for the simple reason that Truman had no intention of approving one. He could not say this after the war, because that would have emasculated his claim that the bomb saved up to 'a million' lives.

 

[pbehn]

I don't think it is a myth. My Grandmother has told me stories of her father participating in this very thing in WW1.

This is very sensitive and shouldnt be. Accusing a war veteran of telling lies is serious. But only if he is making out he saved the world when actually he was a cook. There is no doubt that fighting stopped on a large part of the front in 1914 (when the football games took place). It wasnt all the front and very few actually played football. The myth I was referring to was that the British and Germans met to play football en masse. In the front line trenches when in conflict you dont stand up let alone play football so where did all the footballs come from? If I was a WW1 veteran with a son or a grandson I would much rather embelish a story and talk about playing football in no mans land than talk about what actually happened. WW1 was in the days before TV and for most Radio story telling was a part of culture. Sailor or fishermens yarns were part of folk lore telling (or spinning) a yarn wasnt telling a lie it was entertainment.

The playing of football on Christmas day was a little like the Angels of Mons, the story gew and grew. On the programme I watched there were only 2 letters written home after that christmas mentioned meeting the Germans and kicking a ball. Everyone forgets that the other part of the story is they drank Gin Whiskey and Schnapps ...try living in a trench for 3 months then drink a belly full of Gin whiskey and schnapps and write a story the next day lol

That is just a side issue from what I was saying, The Germans and the British both believed and were told by the government and church leaders that God was with them.

 

[GrauGeist]

...The myth I was referring to was that the British and Germans met to play football en masse. In the front line trenches when in conflict you dont stand up let alone play football so where did all the footballs come from?...

And yet, there is a great deal of photographic evidence from that day, showing that the game did occur as well as large groups of soldiers from both sides either watching the game or simply celebrating with each other.

 

[DerAdlerIstGelandet]

This is very sensitive and shouldnt be. Accusing a war veteran of telling lies is serious. But only if he is making out he saved the world when actually he was a cook. There is no doubt that fighting stopped on a large part of the front in 1914 (when the football games took place). It wasnt all the front and very few actually played football. The myth I was referring to was that the British and Germans met to play football en masse. In the front line trenches when in conflict you dont stand up let alone play football so where did all the footballs come from? If I was a WW1 veteran with a son or a grandson I would much rather embelish a story and talk about playing football in no mans land than talk about what actually happened. WW1 was in the days before TV and for most Radio story telling was a part of culture. Sailor or fishermens yarns were part of folk lore telling (or spinning) a yarn wasnt telling a lie it was entertainment.

The playing of football on Christmas day was a little like the Angels of Mons, the story gew and grew. On the programme I watched there were only 2 letters written home after that christmas mentioned meeting the Germans and kicking a ball. Everyone forgets that the other part of the story is they drank Gin Whiskey and Schnapps ...try living in a trench for 3 months then drink a belly full of Gin whiskey and schnapps and write a story the next day lol

That is just a side issue from what I was saying, The Germans and the British both believed and were told by the government and church leaders that God was with them.

Where did I say that it was along the whole front and em mass? Can you point that out?

 

[pbehn]

Where did I say that it was along the whole front and em mass? Can you point that out?

You didnt Adler but if you look at the photo above from Graugeist there is no mention of football games or indeed a football in the picture. On certain areas of the front the two sides did meet, the myth is that they all played football. Even today any mention of the ceasefire always mentions a game of football and has Jona Lewie "stop the cavalry" in the background.

No major issue here, if you read my original post it was just a side mention....as I know soldiers in december they want to drink not play football.

 

[pbehn]

And yet, there is a great deal of photographic evidence from that day, showing that the game did occur as well as large groups of soldiers from both sides either watching the game or simply celebrating with each other.

View attachment 298327

Where is the football? And look at the ground and the clothes. The guys met and had a drink exchanged photos and jokes....the evidence for footie games is very sketchy considering everyone knows the story.

 

[pbehn]

I think we've all heard stories about the two sides in a war decalring a temporary truce and having a holiday. Makes pretty good sense to me and follows the famous movie of same. I might do the same after a time of insane action.

I'd hesitate to say it was fiction as I have heard it often enough.

Wonder if we'll ever really know?

Certainly not a myth that they had an unofficial truce there is much evidence that it happened and the steps taken next year to make sure it never happened again prove it. The myth is mass football games, most contibutors to ths part of the discussion are from the USA, in the UK huge numbers of people believe the two sides met every christmas (not just 1914) and they played football. Everytime Germany and England play a game of football the legs of the myth get a bit longer and stronger.

 

[bobbysocks]

I think Okinawa was the pacific Schweinfurt...I made the heads of the military take a long look at what had happened and how they should progress.

 

[gumbyk]

Certainly not a myth that they had an unofficial truce there is much evidence that it happened and the steps taken next year to make sure it never happened again prove it. The myth is mass football games, most contibutors to ths part of the discussion are from the USA, in the UK huge numbers of people believe the two sides met every christmas (not just 1914) and they played football. Everytime Germany and England play a game of football the legs of the myth get a bit longer and stronger.

It was well-documented when it (an official truce, to gather up the dead, which turned into an informal get together between Turks and ANZACS) happened in Gallipoli during WW1. AFAIK, there were no steps taken to prevent it happening again.

 

[DerAdlerIstGelandet]

You didnt Adler but if you look at the photo above from Graugeist there is no mention of football games or indeed a football in the picture. On certain areas of the front the two sides did meet, the myth is that they all played football. Even today any mention of the ceasefire always mentions a game of football and has Jona Lewie "stop the cavalry" in the background.

No major issue here, if you read my original post it was just a side mention....as I know soldiers in december they want to drink not play football.

I believe that on occasions small groups did play football...

 

[stona]

@Hiromachi

I would take issue with your postulation that the invasion plan was falling from the list of possible alternatives. The Navy, particularly King and Leahy did not believe an invasion was necessary, in King's words, "that the defeat of Japan could be accomplished by sea and air power alone, without the necessity of actual invasion of the Japanese home islands by ground troops. "
This was not US policy and MacArthur argued strongly for an invasion. Writing to the Chief of Staff on 20th April 1945, he declared that this course was the only one that would permit application of the full power of US combined resources (ground, naval, and air) on the decisive objective. Japan, he believed, would probably be more difficult to invade the following year. An invasion of Kyushu at an early date would position United States (and presumably Allied) forces in the most favourable position for the decisive assault against Honshu in 1946, and would "continue the offensive methods which have proved so successful in Pacific campaigns." In MacArthur's view reliance upon bombing alone was still an unproved formula for success, as was evidenced by the bomber offensive against Germany. The seizure of a ring of bases around Japan would disperse Allied forces even more than they already were and (if an attempt was made to seize positions on the China coast) might very well lead to long-drawn-out operations on the Asiatic mainland. These would be the "non-decisive" operations he referred to in his reply to King, read out in the June meeting.

Agreed at the meeting were:

1. Air bombardment and blockade of Japan from bases in Okinawa, Iwo Jima, the Marianas, and the Philippines.

2. Assault of Kyushu on 1 November 1945, and intensification of blockade and air bombardment.

3. Invasion of the industrial heart of Japan through the Tokyo Plain in central Honshu, tentative target date 1 March 1946.

The second assault on Honshu was tentative because there was still substantial interest in ending the war by political means. Preparations for the Honshu assault would continue, but no final decision would be made until preparations had reached the point "beyond which there would not be opportunity for a free choice."

Far from falling off the list of possible alternatives to end the war an invasion was right at the top of the list, along with political/diplomatic efforts in June 1945. It may have slipped down the list in July, but only after the decision in principle to use the bombs had been taken.

To imagine that the prospect of a Russian intervention in August/September, before OLYMPIC (invasion of Kyushu) could be launched, did not have an influence on the decision to drop the bombs would be naïve. This was not part of the official line which concentrates on the genuine concern to prevent Allied casualties and was supported post war by hugely inflated numbers. On that I do agree with you.

Cheers

Steve